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has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Psychology as an Associational Science: A Methodological Viewpoint

  AUTHORS: Sam S. Rakover

  KEYWORDS: Philosophy of Psychology; Methodology; Philosophy of Science and Mind

  JOURNAL NAME: Open Journal of Philosophy, Vol.2 No.2, May 22, 2012

  ABSTRACT: Unlike the sciences (physics), psychology has not developed in any of its areas (such as perception, learning, cognition) a top-theory like Newtonian theory, the theory of relativity, or quantum theory in physics. This difference is explained by a methodological discrepancy between the sciences and psychology, which centers on the measurement procedure: in psychology, measurement units similar to those in physics have not been discovered. Based on the arguments supporting this claim, a methodological distinction is made between the sciences and psychology as an associational science. It is suggested that that these two kinds of science generate two different classes of technologies. The possibility that in psychology there is a connection between the issue of measurement and the unsolved consciousness/brain problem is discussed.