Open Journal of Philosophy
2012. Vol.2, No.4, 244-250
Published Online November 2012 in SciRes (http://www.SciRP.org/journal/ojpp) http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2012.24036
244
Identifying the Intellectual Virtues in a Demon World
M. C. Young
Department of Philosophy, L akehead University, Orillia Campus, Orillia, Canada
Received July 4th, 2012; revised August 9th, 2012; a c c epted Au g u s t 1 9th, 2012
Within contemporary epistemology, notions of intellectual virtue have come to fulfill a prominent role in
attempts to provide an account of knowledge. Notions of such virtue can vary, and one particular aspect
of this variance concerns how to construe the relationship between the intellectual virtues and particular
epistemic ends. The goal of this article is to defend an instrumental connection between the intellectual
virtues and the epistemic end of true belief. One type of skeptical argument that attempts to sever this
connection, a Cartesian Demon argument, is considered. This Cartesian D emon argument will be summa-
rized, as well as three responses to it. The claim that truth-conduciveness is a tenable criterion for identi-
fying the intellectual virtues is then defended. It is acknowledged that the possibility of a Cartesian De-
mon does initiate scepticism, but that this scepticism is directed toward identifying specific intellectual
virtues and not toward the instrumental connection between intellectual virtue and true belief.
Keywords: Intellectual Virtue; Cartesian Demon; Subjective Justification; Truth-Conduciveness
Introduction
The goal of this article is to defend an instrumental connec-
tion between intellectual virtue and true belief; specifically
against a Cartesian Demon skeptical argument. This position is
formulated not simply as a reaction to the former skeptical ar-
gument, but also in response to three other positions offered by
James Montmarquet, Jonthan Kvanvig and Casey Swank. Al-
though all three of these authors offer slightly different posi-
tions, they all agree that the possibility of a Cartesian Demon
initiates doubt about the truth-conduciveness of the intellectual
virtues. It is argued that the possibility of a Cartesian Demon
does initiate skeptical doubt, but that this doubt is not directed
toward the instrumental connection between intellectual virtue
and true belief. Rather, this doubt is directed toward those in-
tellectual virtues on our current list of virtues and not toward
the connection between intellectual virtue and true belief.
Intellectual Virtues, Cartesian Demons and
Normal Worlds
There are two notions of intellectual virtue that are the focus
of contemporary virtue epistemologists; one advocated by vir-
tue reliabilists and another advocated by virtue responsibilists
(Axtell, 1997; Greco, 2000). According to virtue reliabilism an
intellectual virtue is any aspect of first-nature, or capacities and
faculties we are born with, that reliably produces true belief
(Axtell, 1996; Axtell, 1998; Bloomfield, 2000). Consequently,
virtue reliabilists advocate an instrumental connection between
intellectual virtue and true belief, since they count as intellec-
tual virtues capacities and faculties that fulfill a causal role in
the maximization of true beliefs, and minimization of false
beliefs. Examples of intellectual virtues identified by the virtue
reliabilist include: sight, hearing, memory, introspection, de-
ductive and inductive reasoning, and rational intuition (Sosa,
1985; Greco, 1992; Fairweather, 2001). The virtue responsi-
bilist’s notion of such virtue differs significantly from the pre-
vious notion. This is because the virtue responsibilist advocates
a character-based notion of intellectual virtue. Virtue response-
bilists therefore focus on aspects of second-nature, or aspects
that agents are not born with but can develop or habituate in
order to become intellectually virtuous. This is why the position
earns the nomenclature “responsibilist”, because it focuses on
aspects of character that agents can be responsible for develop-
ing or habituation. Their list of intellectual virtues includes
various character traits, as opposed to capacities and faculties,
such as intellectual courage, intellectual humility, intellectual
integrity, curiosity, intellectual caution and diligence in intel-
lectual matters (Montmarquet, 1993; Zagzebski, 1996).
Debate between these two camps of virtue epistemologists
concerning how the intellectual virtues should be construed is
typically focused around attempts to explain, descriptively and
prescriptively, epistemological terms. That is, virtue reliabilists
and virtue responsibilists often criticize one another’s notions
of intellectual virtue on the grounds that either cannot ade-
quately account for notions such as justification or knowledge
(Axtell, 1997; Greco, 2000; Reed, 2001; Fairweather, 2001).
The focus of this article is not to enter into the debate between
virtue reliabilists and responsibilists, but instead to focus one
particular type of argument that attempts to sever an instru-
mental connection between intellectual virtue and true belief.
As mentioned, the type of argument in question is a Cartesian
Demon argument. Virtue reliabilists do advocate an instrumen-
tal connection between various intellectual virtues and the
epistemic end of true belief, so it would seem that if the argu-
ment in this paper is successful it would favour the virtue reli-
abilist position. This is not so, since one could also construe the
intellectual virtues as understood by the virtue responsibilist as
possessing an instrumental connection to true belief (Zagzebski,
1996). So neither notion of intellectual virtue is favored, as the
focus is solely on maintaining an instrumental connection be-
tween intellectual virtue and true belief by responding to a Car-
tesian Demon argument. Let us now consider this argument.
The Cartesian Demon argument against an instrumental con-

M. C. YOUNG
nection between specific intellectual virtues and true belief
begins by proposing that it is possible that our world is a demon
world. If our world is a demon world then it is possible for us to
hold certain traits, skills or faculties to be truth-conducive, and
therefore intellectual virtues, while in fact we are deceived by a
malicious Cartesian Demon. The Demon manipulates us into
believing various traits, faculties and skills are conducive to
true beliefs while in fact they are not conducive to such beliefs.
Our beliefs concerning the truth-conduciveness of various in-
tellectual virtues are therefore false. Even further, it could be
the case that the traits, skills and faculties we identify as truth-
conducive could be in fact conducive to false beliefs while
those we identify as conducive to false beliefs are conducive to
true beliefs. If we relied on “truth-conduciveness” as our crite-
rion for identifying specific intellectual virtues, then our intel-
lectual virtues would actually be intellectual vices and our in-
tellectual vices would be intellectual virtues (Goldman, 1986;
Montmarquet, 1987; Kvanvig, 1992; Swank, 2000). Some au-
thors have even proposed the Demon’s deception could be so
effective that it is undetectable. We cannot detect this deception,
for no matter how conclusive our evidence seems to be con-
cerning the truth-conduciveness of certain traits, skills and fac-
ulties it is always possible that the evidence, or our beliefs con-
cerning this evidence, has been manipulated by the demon. The
mere possibility of the demon impacts our claims about the
truth-conduciveness of the intellectual virtues simply because if
such a demon existed we would not be able to detect his influ-
ence. The demon would manipulate our beliefs at every turn, so
that we believe we are obtaining true beliefs, by whatever
methods, and yet this is not the case. Hence, the mere possibil-
ity of a Cartesian Demon presents a problem for anyone who
wants to maintain that there is an instrumental connection be-
tween the intellectual virtues and true belief. For it seems that
any claim concerning the truth-conduciveness of specific intel-
lectual virtues could be the result of the undetectable manipula-
tions of a Cartesian Demon (Axtell, 2001; Lehrer, 2001).
One possible response to the problem that a Cartesian De-
mon presents to identifying the truth-conducive properties of
agents is to make the distinction between the demon world and
“normal” worlds. This is the approach taken by Alvin Goldman.
When considering the possibility of a Cartesian Demon sys-
tematically misleading agents in regard to the reliability of
certain cognitive processes leading to true beliefs, Goldman
responds by proposing that we identify truth-conducive traits
against the backdrop of normal worlds. That is, the reliability of
cognitive processes in producing true beliefs is determined in
normal worlds as opposed to demon worlds, where a normal
world is identified through the criteria of “a large set of com-
mon beliefs about the actual world” (Goldman, 1986). Such a
response does not deny that our world could be a demon world,
but instead holds that demons are not part of normal worlds and
therefore will not impact our ability to identify various truth-
conducive properties of agents (Goldman, 1986). If we rely on
such a response to the Cartesian Demon problem, we can con-
fidently identify certain traits as intellectual virtues by propos-
ing that certain traits are truth-conducive in the normal world,
and that this normal world is itself identified by shared beliefs
concerning the actual world.
As part of his of his exposition of the Cartesian Demon prob-
lem Jonathan Kvanvig begins by considering Goldman’s nor-
mal worlds response. One significant problem he identifies with
this response is the question of whose beliefs will be relied on
to determine the parameters of the normal world? According to
Goldman the normal world is determined by a set of common
beliefs we share about the actual world. Kvanvig asks who
exactly is this “we” that is relied on to generate a list of beliefs
about the actual world, and therefore normal worlds? Is it
meant to include every human agent that has ever existed, only
agents from twentieth century western culture, or only a subset
of the latter group? As Kvanvig points out, “the set of normal
worlds will be different depending on which group one appeals
to in defining the notion of a normal world”(Kvanvig, 1992). If
we consult some agents’ beliefs concerning the normal world
we may be surprised that demons fulfill a significant role in
their world. Consequently, if we want to rule out the possibility
of demons existing and exerting their influence on us in normal
worlds we will have to find a way to exclude the beliefs of such
agents. Further work would have to be done to designate which
normal world beliefs are legitimate and which are not, or to
designate whose beliefs we will rely on to identify the normal
world and whose beliefs can be legitimately dismissed. Taking
such an approach appears to entail a lot more work than merely
dealing with the demon directly, as it would likely be very dif-
ficult to establish whose beliefs are legitimate so we could then
determine the parameters of the normal world. In fact, it would
seem that one would have to have a set of uncontroversial epis-
temological norms already in place in order to dismiss some
beliefs while leaning on others to identify the normal world.
Such an approach therefore seems to beg the question, for it
assumes that we already possess the uncontroversial epistemo-
logical norms that would allow us to identify the normal demon
free world. Goldman’s normal world approach appears to entail
as many problems as the original Cartesian Demon problem, if
not more, and therefore cannot be relied on as a solution to the
latter problem. With this in mind we will now turn to other
possible responses to the Cartesian Demon problem for identi-
fying the intellectual virtues.
Epistemic Desires and Subjective Justification
To reestablish the connection between intellectual virtue and
true belief, while acknowledging the possibility of a Cartesian
Demon, is the goal of the next section. Before an attempt is
made to reestablish such a connection three other responses to
the demon problem, offered by Casey Swank, James Mont-
marquet and Jonathan Kvanvig, are considered. None of these
philosophers attempt to reestablish the connection between
intellectual virtue and truth-conduciveness, but instead each
holds that due to the possibility of a Cartesian Demon we have
to reformulate the means by which we either individuate or
understand the intellectual virtues. In order to defend the in-
strumental connection between intellectual virtue and true be-
lief these positions therefore must be addressed. We will begin
by considering Swank’s position.
Swank accepts the possibility of a Cartesian Demon on the
grounds that our world could be a demon world. He proposes
that we have to account for why certain traits are considered
virtues and others vices based on the qualities such traits pos-
sess in the actual world. The actual world might be a demon
world, and therefore we cannot designate intellectual virtues to
be such on the grounds that they are truth-conducive. Even
though we cannot rely on this criterion for individuating the
intellectual virtues we nonetheless can identify the various as-
pects of intellectual character. We simply know, Swank sug-

M. C. YOUNG
gests, that character traits such as open-mindedness, intellectual
courage and reasonableness are intellectual virtues while being
dogmatic, unreasonable and intolerant of others’ beliefs are
intellectual vices regardless of any malicious influence of a
Cartesian Demon. We know this because we value the former
virtues, and would want to possess them, regardless of their
connection to truth, and it is the same for the intellectual vices.
Even if we found out that being unreasonable and dogmatic
were both conducive to true beliefs we would still reject them
as vicious and therefore undesirable. Our designation of them
as intellectual vices would be based solely on the fact that they
are just plain bad character traits to have. They simply represent
defects in character and for this reason are considered vicious
or vices. Intellectual virtues, on the other hand, represent char-
acter traits we deem desirable and are therefore considered
virtuous solely on that basis. Our identification of intellectual
virtues as such, and intellectual vices as such, has nothing to do
with their connection to truth and falsity, but instead occurs
simply due to perceiving them as good and bad character traits
(Swank, 2000).
There are at least two problems with Swank’s response to the
evil demon problem. First, the claim that we would value those
character traits typically designated intellectual virtues regard-
less of their connection to truth seems presumptuous. Swank’s
argument relies on an appeal to what his audience values. He
proposes that even if the demon let us in on his secret by telling
us that what we have identified as intellectual virtues are in fact
conducive to false beliefs, while intellectual vices are condu-
cive to true beliefs, we would still want to possess those char-
acter traits deemed intellectual virtues and discard all concern
for true belief due our aversion to the standard list of intellect-
tual vices (Swank, 2000). Such a claim assumes that Swank’s
audience shares either his intuitions or value set. There is no
guarantee, though, that any agent who was confronted with the
situation as Swank presents it would judge it as he does. When
confronted with the possibility that what we typically think of
as intellectual virtues are not truth-conducive, but in fact con-
ducive to false beliefs, there is no guarantee that one would
discard all concern for the truth; specifically that its value is
easily overridden by the value of those intellectual virtues on
the standard list. One can easily imagine someone responding
that the value of truth outweighs the value of those character
traits typically deemed intellectual virtues, and therefore it is
the former that must be valued as opposed to the latter. Second,
Swank also assumes that the demon’s influence is limited to
beliefs concerning whether the intellectual virtues are truth-
conducive, and that we are not deceived in regard to our value
judgments concerning those virtues. If our world is one where
we could be deceived by a Cartesian Demon concerning the
truth-conduciveness of certain character traits, then it could also
be a world where such a Demon deceives us concerning what is
valuable. Swank therefore cannot rely on our beliefs concerning
the value of certain traditionally understood intellectual virtues,
and the disvalue of certain traditionally understood intellectual
vices, for our beliefs in these respects could also be wrong due
to the influence of a malicious demon. Consequently, by not
dealing with the demon directly Swank has not been able to
display the value of the intellectual virtues, since the demon
could be deceiving us in this regard also.
Turning to Montmarquet and in response to the possibility of
a Cartesian Demon, he proposes that we have to reformulate the
individuating characteristic of the intellectual virtues. Since it is
possible that the Cartesian Demon exists, and deceives us into
believing that certain traits are truth-conducive while such traits
are conducive to false beliefs, we cannot hold “truth-conduci-
veness” to be the defining characteristic of the intellectual vir-
tues. Instead, he suggests, the definitive characteristic of the
intellectual virtues is that they are desired by the epistemically
responsible agent. That is, the intellectual virtues are held to be
traits that any agent who desires the truth would want to have.
They are desired by the epistemically responsible agent, since
such an agent is epistemically conscientious and therefore tries
her best to obtain true beliefs and avoid false beliefs. Such a
desire therefore leads the epistemically responsible agent to
habituate those character traits deemed intellectual virtues.
Presumably, then, their desirability is premised on the fact that
they appear to the epistemically responsible agent to be truth-
conducive, but since their truth-conduciveness cannot be as-
sured, due to the possibility of systematic deception by a Carte-
sian Demon, t he most that we can say i s that they are de sirable.
Hence, it is acknowledged that intellectually virtuous character
traits appear to be truth-conducive, but since the agent’s beliefs
concerning such traits are possibly influenced by a malevolent
demon it cannot be asserted that the intellectual virtues are in
fact truth-conducive. At most, one can only say that they are
desirable for any agent concerned with epistemic ends (Mont-
marquet, 1987; Montmarquet, 1993; Montmarquet, 2000).
In reaction to the possibility that we are systematically de-
ceived by a Cartesian Demon into believing that the intellectual
virtues are truth-conducive, when in fact they are not, Kvanvig
proposes we must instead construe the intellectual virtues as
conducive to subjective justification. He claims that if it were
the case that a demon was powerful enough to ensure that some
agent’s beliefs always came out false, despite that agent’s best
efforts and intellectual character, we could not hold that such an
agent possessed any dispositions toward true beliefs. This agent
could not be held to have any dispositions toward true beliefs,
since nothing that the agent attempts, or is disposed to do, could
ever lead him to have true beliefs. Kvanvig admits that it is
unlikely that a Cartesian Demon exists, and that there are deci-
sive philosophical objections to its very possibility, but none-
theless he holds that it is a useful heuristic device that demon-
strates a significant point. The significant point is that to obtain
and sustain true beliefs agents require a cooperative environ-
ment. An agent could be completely intellectually virtuous, but
if her environment is not cooperative in enabling her to obtain
true beliefs, as is the case with the demon world, then her vir-
tuous character will not facilitate this end. It is possible, then,
that our world is like the demon world, such that it is uncoop-
erative in enabling agents to obtain true beliefs no matter their
personal level of virtue (Kvanvig, 1992).
Due to the impact of the possibility of uncooperative envi-
ronments on the truth-conducive construal of the intellectual
virtues Kvanvig suggests, as mentioned, that we understand
such virtues as conducive to subjective justification. His first
step toward this conclusion is to propose that even though we
cannot construe the intellectually virtuous agent as disposed to
obtaining true beliefs we can construe such an agent as dis-
posed to trying to obtain true beliefs. The agent is unsuccessful,
given the environment she lives in, but nonetheless she at-
tempts to obtain true beliefs through the influence of her virtu-
ous character. She employs means that appear to her to be
truth-conducive, by becoming intellectually virtuous, and there-
fore can be described as trying her best to obtain true beliefs
246

M. C. YOUNG
and avoid false beliefs. Kvanvig then suggests that a natural
way to construe the possession of justified beliefs for agents is
to hold that such possession occurs when the agent tries her
best to obtain true beliefs and avoid false beliefs. That is, if an
agent wants to obtain only true beliefs, and this leads her to
adopt the best methods to this end, and, in turn, to be careful in
regard to the reasons for which she accepts a belief, then we
can describe the belief she settles on to be justified even if it is
not true. The intellectual virtues would therefore be understood
as conducive to justified beliefs, as opposed to true beliefs,
since they would be the means that agents employ in the at-
tempt to obtain true beliefs. Kvanvig admits that this would
only lead the agent to be subjectively justified in holding the
beliefs she has, since from an objective point of view her be-
liefs are false and therefore are unjustified, but nonetheless the
agent tries her best from her own perspective and is therefore
subjectively justifie d in believing as she does (Kvanvig, 1992).
Intellectual Virtue in a Demon World
In this section the goal is respond to the Cartesian Demon
problem in order to maintain truth-conduciveness as the indi-
viduating characteristic of the intellectual virtues. It is argued
that what the possibility of a Cartesian Demon initiates doubt
about is not the connection between intellectual virtue and true
belief, but rather those virtues on the standard list of intellectual
virtues. More specifically, that when faced with the possibility
of a Cartesian Demon we do not have to conclude that the in-
tellectual virtues are not truth-conducive, but instead that we
could be simply wrong concerning those traits we have identi-
fied as intellectual virtues. An attempt is therefore made to
maintain the truth-conducive criterion for determining which
traits are intellectual virtues, and, in turn, propose that it would
be more warranted to doubt that those traits we have identified
as intellectual virtues are actually intellectual virtues given the
presence of a Cartesian Demon.
Linda Zagzebski was the first to suggest that what is brought
into to doubt by the possibility of a Cartesian Demon are those
traits on the standard list of intellectual virtues, as opposed to
the connection between intellectual virtue and true belief. When
confronted with the Cartesian Demon argument it was her
claim that the connection between intellectual virtue and true
belief can be maintained. Assuredly, the possibility of system-
atic deception by a Cartesian Demon will generate scepticism,
but it need not be scepticism concerning whether an intellectual
virtue must be truth-conducive to be considered an intellectual
virtue. The latter claim need not follow, since one could simply
insist that for a trait, skill or faculty to be considered an intel-
lectual virtue it must be truth-conducive. If one insists that
“truth-conduciveness” is the definitive characteristic of an in-
tellectual virtue, then when confronted by a Cartesian Demon
one would propose that we were simply wrong concerning what
we identified as intellectual virtues because none of the former
were in fact truth-conducive. The Cartesian Demon misleads us
because we believe that we are intellectually virtuous, and are
therefore acquiring true beliefs through various intellectual
virtues, while in fact this is not the case. Either the demon im-
plants false beliefs in us concerning which dispositions are
truth-conducive or he manipulates the environment in such a
way that none of our dispositions facilitate true beliefs. In such
a world no traits are truth-conducive. This position mirrors the
positions of Montmarquet and Kvanvig, for it agrees that no
traits would be truth-conducive in such a world, but instead
concludes from this that such a world would be devoid of intel-
lectual virtue. We would therefore not have to re-conceptualize
those traits, faculties and skills that were identified as intellec-
tual virtues, along the lines suggested by Montmarquet and
Kvanvig, but instead could maintain the “truth-conducive” con-
ceptualization and simply exercise doubt in regard to our pre-
sent list of intellectual virtues (Zagzebski, 1996; Zagzebski,
2000).
Thus, Zagzebski offers an alternative object for doubt in re-
sponse to the possibility of a Cartesian Demon. Her proposal is
that when faced with such a demon we could maintain our
standard list of intellectual virtues, and doubt the criterion of
truth-conduciveness, or we can maintain the criterion of truth-
conduciveness and doubt those traits on the standard list. The
key point of contention that must be resolved in order to choose
between these two alternatives is whether to insist on maintain-
ing the standard list and then alter our criterion of intellectual
virtue, or insist on the criterion of intellectual virtue and then
alter our standard list. In what follows two reasons will be of-
fered for why it is more warranted to insist on the criterion of
truth-conduciveness, and then alter our standard list, than to
insist on the standard list and alter the criterion of intellectual
virtue.
To insist on the truth-conducive criterion, as opposed to the
standard list, appears to be the more warranted position that
follows from the Cartesian Demon possibility, first, because
both Montmarquet and Kvanvig still rely on the notion of truth-
conduciveness when offering their respective positions. Begin-
ning with Montmarquet’s position recall that he suggests that
the definitive characteristic of the intellectual virtues is that
they are desired by any agent who desires the truth. When con-
fronted with this criterion it seems reasonable to ask why the
intellectual virtues are considered desirable by such an agent?
Montmarquet’s answer is to propose that they are desired by the
agent who desires truth because such an agent is epistemically
conscientious and therefore tries her best to obtain true beliefs
and avoid false beliefs. Various character traits are deemed
truth-conducive by such an agent, and are therefore habituated
due the agent’s general desire to obtain truths and avoid false-
hoods. The desirability of these various traits are therefore de-
pendent on the fact that they appear to be truth-conducive. The
criterion of truth-conduciveness is therefore still maintained
with Montmarquet’s position, for it is through this criterion that
the epistemically responsible agent identifies various intellect-
tual virtues, deems them desirable, and, in turn, attempts to
form beliefs through their influence.
A similar conclusion emerges from consideration of Kvan-
vig’s position. Recall that he proposes we can construe the
intellectual virtues as conducive to subjective justification since
agents employ these virtues in order to try to obtain true beliefs
and avoid false beliefs. The agent is subjectively justified in
holding the beliefs she does because she has done her best to
aim at the truth, while avoiding the false, by adopting various
traits, skills and faculties that appear to her to be conducive to
these ends. The agent therefore employs means that appear to
be truth-conducive, by becoming intellectually virtuous, and
can, in turn, be described as trying her best to obtain true beliefs
and avoid false beliefs. Consequently, the ascription of “subjec-
tive justification” arises only because the agent has employed
mechanisms for belief formation that appear to her to be truth-
conducive.

M. C. YOUNG
Thus, with each position the “truth-conducive” criterion is
maintained. The intellectual virtues are deemed desirable be-
cause they appear to be truth-conducive, and they confer sub-
jective justification because the agent has adopted the intellec-
tual virtues with the belief that they will help her to obtain
truths and avoid falsehoods. If the former judgments presup-
pose judgments concerning the truth-conduciveness of such
traits, then this gives us a reason for maintaining the truth-
conducive criterion. For judgments concerning the desirability
and justification-conduciveness of the intellectual virtues for
agents in the demon world presuppose judgments concerning
their ability to be truth-conducive. It is the appearance of the
truth-conduciveness of the intellectual virtues that fulfills a
crucial step in getting to the claims that agents have done
something epistemically desirable or that they are subjectively
justified. Of course, it is possible to claim that certain traits,
skills or faculties are epistemically desirable on grounds other
than being truth-conducive, or that some agent is subjectively
justified without reference to truth-conducive intellectual vir-
tues. So one does not have to rely on the notion of truth-con-
duciveness to offer such claims, but this is not what occurs with
either of the positions offered by Montmarquet or Kvanvig.
Instead, both rely on the perceived truth-conduciveness of the
intellectual virtues in order to then establish their respective
claims concerning the individuating criterion of such virtues.
Since truth-conduciveness still fulfills this role in the attempt
to offer other criterion for the intellectual virtues one can main-
tain the truth-conducive criterion of the intellectual virtues. In
such a situation one could claim that agents in the demon world
identify the intellectual virtues on the grounds that they appear
truth-conducive, but nonetheless these agents are wrong be-
cause of the manipulations of a Cartesian Demon. Conse-
quently, their list of intellectual virtues is incorrect, but they
nonetheless have done something epistemically desirable, or are
subjectively justified in what they believe, because such agents
have attempted to employ traits, skills or faculties that appeared
to them to be truth-conducive. So the possibility of a Cartesian
Demon does not inevitably lead to the claim that we have to
alter the individuating criterion of the intellectual virtues, since
both Montmarquet and Kvanvig acknowledge that agents in a
demon world would still identify certain traits, faculties or ca-
pacities as intellectual virtues on the grounds of their being
truth-conducive. Upon discovering a Cartesian Demon we
would then say that they were wrong, but nonetheless subjec-
tively justified in what they believe or that they did something
epistemically desirable because they were concerned with true
belief. Nonetheless, the criterion relied on by demon world
residents to identify the intellectual virtues would still be truth-
conduciveness.
The second reason why the truth-conducive criterion should
be maintained, and the standard list doubted, which is built
upon the first, is that we are all in the same position as the
agents in the demon world thought experiment. The judgments
of agents in the demon world are made from the oblique posi-
tion. That is, such agents exist in an unprivileged position
where they are unaware that they are being systematically de-
ceived by a Cartesian Demon. Montmarquet’s and Kvanvig’s
reformulated positions suggest that it is appropriate for these
agents to identify the intellectual virtues on the basis of their
being truth-conducive, because these agents exist in the oblique
position. We too, though, are in the same oblique position. That
is, we exist in an unprivileged position where we do not know,
or are unaware, whether we are being systematically deceived
by a Cartesian Demon. So if it is reasonable for the agents in
the demon world scenario to still judge intellectual virtues to be
such on the basis of their being truth-conducive, because they
exist in the oblique position, then it would be reasonable for us
to do the same. Neither Montmarquet nor Kvanvig, nor anyone
else, claims that it is true that there is such a demon, that we can
be certain that such a demon exists or that we have discovered
such a demon. Instead, such a demon is only a possibility. The
demon represents, as Kvanvig puts it, a useful heuristic device
to convey the point that the world might be other than how it
appears to us and is not always cooperative in helping us obtain
and sustain true beliefs (Kvanvig, 1992). Since we do not know
whether such a demon exists, and it represents only a possibil-
ity, we are in the same oblique position as the agents in the
thought experiments upon which Montmarquet and Kvanvig
build their reformulated positions. That is, we all exist in the
unprivileged position of not being able to determine whether
the demon exists or not. Since we all exist in this oblique posi-
tion we can make judgments based on how things appear, as do
the agents in both Montmarquet’s and Kvanvig’s reformulated
positions. Consequently, when we formulate our criterion from
the oblique position we will identify intellectual virtues on the
basis of their truth-conduciveness (Kvanvig, 1992; Montmar-
quet, 2000). Again, if we discovered that there is such a demon
we may say something different about what occurred when we
employed traits, skills and faculties that appeared truth-condu-
cive. We may say that we were doing something epistemically
desirable, or that we were subjectively justified, but it would
still be the case that we identified various traits, skills and fac-
ulties as intellectual virtues on the grounds of their truth-con-
duciveness. Hence, the truth-conducive criterion for individu-
ating the intellectual virtues is still maintained.
The conclusion that then emerges is that we can maintain the
truth-conducive criterion for the intellectual virtues, and pro-
pose that if the demon exists we are simply wrong concerning
those traits on the standard list. We exist in the oblique position
so we assess traits, skills and faculties based on how they ap-
pear to us, as do the agents in Montmarquet’s and Kvanvig’s
reformulated positions. The possibility of the demon still gen-
erates scepticism, but this scepticism is now directed at the
virtues on the standard list. That is, since we are aware of the
possibility of a Cartesian Demon systematically deceiving us
we must exercise some doubt, or scepticism, somewhere. This
doubt is directed toward those virtues on the standard list as
opposed to the claim that the individuating characteristic of the
intellectual virtues is truth-conduciveness. This does not entail
that we can never identify specific traits, skills or faculties as
intellectual virtues, since certain traits will always appear to us
to be truth-conducive, but simply that there is always a possi-
bility that we could be wrong concerning those virtues currently
on the list. The possibility of a Cartesian Demon causes us to
formulate our claims concerning the intellectual virtues cau-
tiously . Kvanvig an d Montmarque t offer cautious formulations,
and the cautious formulation offered here, following Zagzebski,
is to hold that we could be wrong concerning those virtues on
the list.
Doubts Concerning Doubting the Standard List
It should be noted that both Montmarquet and Kvanvig con-
sider the possible response that we are simply wrong concern-
248

M. C. YOUNG
ing those virtues on the standard list, and both reject this possi-
bility. In order to maintain that truth-conduciveness should be
the means by which we understand the intellectual virtues their
reasons for rejecting this possibility must be addressed.
Beginning with Montmarquet, he rejects the response that we
are simply wrong concerning those traits on the standard list on
the grounds that it would sever connections between being
virtuous and being praised and being vicious and being blamed.
That is, he proposes that if we took the approach that we were
simply wrong concerning those virtues on the standard list, and
the roles of virtues and vices were reversed, then we would
have to, in turn, reverse our judgments of praise and blame:
blaming agents for possessing virtues now deemed vices, and
praising agents for vices now deemed virtues. Montmarquet
proposes that it would be inappropriate to reverse our judg-
ments of agents in this way, but this is what would occur if we
attempted to maintain the position that we were simply wrong
concerning those virtues on the standard list (Montmarquet,
2000).
In response it seems reasonable to suggest that even if we
reversed our judgments concerning what are vices and virtues
we would not reverse our judgments concerning praise and
blame. That we would not reverse such judgments is what we
would expect given other aspects of the virtue perspective.
Judgments concerning praise and blame within the virtue per-
spective are dependent upon the impetuses for action, i.e. the
virtues. Consequently, virtue ethics has been often described as
input driven as opposed to output driven (Garcia, 2003). There
is no reference to consequences, or a particular output, in the
assessment of actions within virtue ethics, but instead only to
particular inputs; or the virtuous traits of the relevant actors.
This is why, for the virtue ethicist, character is essential for
determining what is morally right or wrong, good or bad, and
the appraisal of action is derived from the appraisal of character
(Oakley, 1996). Thus, agents in the demon world still would be
praised for their virtuous effort; or the attempt to adopt motiva-
tions they perceived to be truth-conducive in order to guide
their behaviour. We would therefore not alter our judgments
concerning praise and blame in regard to such agents, since
they were attempting to be virtuous and, according to their best
judgments, acting through the influence of virtuous disposi-
tions.
Turning to Kvanvig, he objects to the claim that what the
Cartesian Demon brings into doubt are the virtues on the stan-
dard list by proposing, first, that this position would entail that
the inhabitants of the demon world possess no intellectual vir-
tues. This cannot be the case, he suggests, since those traits
identified as intellectual virtues by demon-world residents still
would be considered admirable, and therefore they must still be
virtues (Kvanvig, 1992). The problem with this argument is that
Kvanvig assumes, similar to Swank, that the demon’s influence
is limited to judgments concerning whether the intellectual
virtues are truth-conducive, and that such a malicious agent
would not deceive us concerning our value judgments. But, if
our world is a demon-world where we could be deceived con-
cerning the truth-conduciveness of certain traits, skills and fac-
ulties, then it could also be a world where we could be deceived
concerning what is admirable and not admirable. If this is the
case, then the criterion of being admirable is just as susceptible
to doubt, and is equally unhelpful, for identifying the intellec-
tual virtues as is the criterion of truth-conduciveness. Conse-
quently, we cannot rely on the criterion of being admirable to
claim that there are still intellectual virtues in the demon-world
in order to then reject the possibility that we are simply wrong
concerning those traits on the standard list.
What is more threatening to the position advocated in this
paper, though, is Kvanvig’s first premise in the former argu-
ment; i.e. that claiming the standard list is wrong would entail
that inhabitants of the demon-world possess no intellectual
virtues. Since it has been proposed that the demon possibility
leads to doubt concerning those traits on the standard list it
would seem that one must also concede that no intellectual
virtues exist in such a world; i.e. our world. To put the point
another way, since the possibility of a Cartesian Demon leads
us to doubt the intellectual virtues on the standard list, and this
situation is similar to the restrictions induced by uncooperative
environments, it would seem that one would have to concede
that in our world there are no intellectual virtues. This latter
claim, though, does not have to be conceded, for, as previously
argued, we do not know whether such a demon exists, or the
extent to which our environment misleads us into believing that
certain traits are truth-conducive when in fact they are not. We
are in the oblique position in regard to both, and perceive cer-
tain traits, skills and faculties to be truth-conducive, and thus,
as far as we can tell, there are intellectual virtues; i.e. traits,
skills and faculties that are identified as intellectual virtues
because they are truth-conducive. If we discovered that a de-
mon was deceiving us, or that aspects of our environment mis-
led us into believing that certain traits were intellectual virtues
when in fact they are not such, then we would have to concede
either that there are no intellectual virtues in our world or that
we have not correctly identified any such virtues yet. Since we
are in the oblique position, and have not made any such discov-
ery, we can conclude that our world does contain intellectual
virtues for we have been able to identify various traits, skills
and faculties as truth-conducive. Consequently, Kvanvig’s
claim that doubting the standard list, due to the possibility of
systematic deception, would lead to the conclusion that there
are no intellectual virtues in our world is unwarranted.
Conclusion
The main concern of this article was whether the possibility
of a Cartesian Demon would initiate scepticism concerning
truth-conduciveness as the individuating criterion for identify-
ing the intellectual virtues. Arguments offered by Swank,
Montmarquet and Kvanvig that proposed that the demon possi-
bility would initiate such scepticism, as well as the replacement
criterion each advocated, were considered. It was argued that
the demon possibility does initiate scepticism, but that this
scepticism can be directed toward our list of virtues as opposed
to the criterion of truth-conduciveness. Other possible criteria
offered by these authors for identifying the intellectual virtues
were found to be either subject to the same doubt that would be
directed toward the truth-conducive criterion, given the possi-
bility of a Cartesian Demon, or to be dependent upon the per-
ceived truth-conduciveness of the intellectual virtues in a de-
mon world. When formulating Cartesian Demon thought ex-
periments, agents in the demon world are construed as being in
the oblique position concerning the demon’s existence, and
therefore such agents identify the intellectual virtues based on
their perceived truth-conduciveness. Since we are also in the
oblique position concerning the existence of the Cartesian De-
mon it was proposed that we should also act on the perceived

M. C. YOUNG
250
truth-conduciveness of specific traits, faculties and skills when
identifying the intellectual virtues. Consequently, the truth-
conduciveness criterion is maintained and doubt is instead di-
rected toward our current list of intellectual virtues.
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