J. Itaya and D. Dasgupta, “Dynamic, Consistent Conjectures and Heterogeneous Agents in the Private Provision of Public Goods,” Public Finance = Finances Publiques, Vol. 50, No. 3, 1995, pp. 371-389.

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Evolutionarily Stable Conjectures and Social Optimality in Oligopolies

  AUTHORS: Swapnika Reddy Rachapalli, Praveen Kulshreshtha

  KEYWORDS: Conjectural Variations (CV); Consistent Conjectural Variations (CCV); Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS); Quantity Competition; Price Competition; Social Optimality

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.3 No.1, February 26, 2013

  ABSTRACT: Following the evolutionary game-theoretic approach to analyze Conjectural Variations (CV) in oligopolies, a model is developed to derive the Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) for quantity-setting and price-setting oligopolies with CV, producing heterogeneous goods. It is shown that ESS coincides with the Consistent CV in the oligopoly model. Earlier studies have demonstrated the above result only for duopolies. It is also shown that the market outcome induced by ESS is socially suboptimal if firms produce heterogeneous products, but can be socially optimal if firms produce homogeneous goods. In general, the market outcome approaches the socially optimal outcome, as the number of firms increases to infinity.