K. Nishizaki, “An Equivalence of Secure Implementability and Full Implementability in Truthful Strategies in Pure Exchange Economies with Leontief Utility Functions,” GCOE Discussion Paper Series No. 279, Osaka University, Osaka, 2012. http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/coe/dp/pdf/no.279_dp.pdf

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Secure Implementation in Queueing Problems

  AUTHORS: Katsuhiko Nishizaki

  KEYWORDS: Secure Implementation; Dominant Strategy Implementation; Nash Implementation; Strategy-Proofness; Queueing Problems

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.2 No.5, December 28, 2012

  ABSTRACT: This paper studies secure implementability (T. Saijo, T. Sjostrom and T. Yamato, “Secure Implementation,” Theoretical Economics, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2007, pp. 203-229) in queueing problems. Our main result shows that the social choice function satisfies strategy-proofness and strong non-bossiness (Z. Ritz, “Restricted Domains, Arrow-Social Welfare Functions and Noncorruptible and Non-Manipulable Social Choice Correspondences: The Case of Private Alternatives,” Mathematical Social Science, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1983, pp. 155-179), both of which are necessary for secure imple- mentation, if and only if it is constant on the domains that satisfy weak indifference introduced in this paper. Weak in- difference is weaker than minimal richness (Y. Fujinaka and T. Wakayama, “Secure Implementation in Economies with Indivisible Objects and Money,” Economics Letters, Vol. 100, No. 1, 2008, pp. 91-95). Our main result illustrates that secure implementation is too difficult in queueing problems since many reasonable domains satisfy weak indifference, for example, convex domains.