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has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Investment Timing with Incentive-Disincentive Contracts under Asymmetric Information

  AUTHORS: Takashi Shibata, Michi Nishihara

  KEYWORDS: Real Options; Asymmetric Information; Incentive-Disincentive; Principal-Agent Problem

  JOURNAL NAME: Technology and Investment, Vol.3 No.2, May 29, 2012

  ABSTRACT: This paper examines a manager’s investment timing in the presence of asymmetric information between an owner and the manager. In particular, we extend the asymmetric information problem by incorporating not only an incentive but also disincentive. Investment timing is delayed more under asymmetric information than under symmetric information. However, investment timing under asymmetric information converges to the symmetric information investment timing by making the disincentive (penalty) for the manager’s untruthful report sufficiently large. Consequently, by adopting an enlarged set of incentive-disincentive contracts framework, we showed that there is a relationship between the symmetric and asymmetric information problems.