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https://doi.org/10.2307/2171770

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Environmental Policy and Social Efficiency under Free Entry

  AUTHORS: Ting-Chung Tsai, Shih-Shen Chen, Yi-Shan Lu, Chu-Chuan Hsu, Jen-Yao Lee

  KEYWORDS: Pollution, Environment, Emission Tax, Social Efficiency

  JOURNAL NAME: Modern Economy, Vol.10 No.9, September 23, 2019

  ABSTRACT: In this paper, we first show that if the firm’s production leads to environmental damage and the government does not implement any environmental policy by using a two-stage game model, the “excess-entry” theorem holds. We then show that entry can be socially insufficient in the presence of production externality and policy mix is needed for pollution control in oligopoly industry with endogenous market structure. Hence, the anti-competitive entry regulation policy suggested by the “excess-entry” theorem does not always hold.