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has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Service Cooperation Policy in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Service Differentiation

  AUTHORS: Jun Chen, Ying Yang

  KEYWORDS: Supply Chain, Dual-Channel, Service Differentiation, Incentive Mechanism

  JOURNAL NAME: American Journal of Industrial and Business Management, Vol.4 No.6, June 26, 2014

  ABSTRACT: A service collaboration decision problem in a dual-channel supply chain is studied with the service level and the customer’s acceptance of the Internet channel is taken into consideration. Then the Stackelberg decentralized decision model and the centralized decision model are developed for two settings that the retailer provides the same service level in both channels or not. The conclusion implies that the system profits, the manufacturer’s optimal profit and retailer’s optimal profit are always higher when different services are provided than the same service, and the optimal service level for the direct channel is a little lower than that for the traditional channel under decentralized mode.