Eldridge-Smith, P. (2004). The Cretan Liar Paradox. In J. Lloyd-Jones, P. Dobrez, & L. Dobrez (Eds.), An ABC of Lying: Taking Stock in Interesting Times (pp. 72-92). Melbourne: Australian Scholarly.

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: The Liar Hypodox: A Truth-Teller’s Guide to Defusing Proofs of the Liar Paradox

  AUTHORS: Peter Eldridge-Smith

  KEYWORDS: Liar paradox, Hypodox, Truth, T-Schema, Substitution of Identicals

  JOURNAL NAME: Open Journal of Philosophy, Vol.9 No.2, May 8, 2019

  ABSTRACT: It seems that the Truth-teller is either true or false, but there is no accepted principle determining which it is. From this point of view, the Truth-teller is a hypodox. A hypodox is a conundrum like a paradox, but consistent. Sometimes, accepting an additional principle will convert a hypodox into a paradox. Conversely, in some cases, retracting or restricting a principle will convert a paradox to a hypodox. This last point suggests a new method of avoiding inconsistency. This article provides a significant example. The Liar paradox can be defused to a hypodox by relatively minimally restricting three principles: the T-schema, substitution of identicals and universal instantiation. These restrictions are not arbitrary. For each, I identify the source of a contradiction given some presumptions. Then I propose each restriction as a reasonable way to deal with that source of contradiction.