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Korzeniewski, B. (2013a). Formal Similarities between Cybernetic Definition of Life and Cybernetic Model of Self-Consciousness: Universal Definition/Model of Individual. Open Journal of Philosophy, 3, 314-328.
https://doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2013.32049

has been cited by the following article:

  • TITLE: Conceptual-Network-Based Philosophy of Science

    AUTHORS: Bernard Korzeniewski

    KEYWORDS: Philosophy of Science, Conceptual Network, Falsification, Representative Realism

    JOURNAL NAME: Open Journal of Philosophy, Vol.9 No.2, May 8, 2019

    ABSTRACT: Conceptual-Network-Based Theory of Science (CNBTS) is presented. It is confronted with the existing philosophies of science rather than with particular scientific theories. The conceptual network, constituting the “substance” of the human psyche, is composed of continuous concepts meaning by connotation. Concepts representing certain aspects of the reality are of completely different nature, than these aspects themselves. Nevertheless, the structure of the conceptual network of science is more or less isomorphic with the structure of the external world (semi-representative realism). The collective conceptual network of science is in a sense a less determined (less precise, more vague) sum, mean or resultant of the individual conceptual networks of particular scientists. During the science development, its conceptual network entwines the physical reality, as a spider web entwines a stony sculpture. The appearance of new theories, paradigms and research programmes consists in a development of new, differently structured fragments (conceptual maps) of the conceptual network of science. Scientific theories and hypotheses cannot be entirely true or false. They can only adhere better or worse to (various aspects of) the external reality, and the progress in science consists in an increase of the degree of this adherence. Hitherto well-working theories cannot be falsified, but only replaced with theories that are more isomorphic with, adhere better to vaster areas of reality.