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https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912909355716

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Independent Redistricting Commissions and Electoral Competition in the US House of Representatives

  AUTHORS: James de Vault

  KEYWORDS: Electoral Competition, Redistricting Commissions

  JOURNAL NAME: Open Journal of Political Science, Vol.9 No.1, November 9, 2018

  ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes whether redistricting commissions impact electoral competition in the US House of Representatives. Data from the last three redistricting cycles are used to estimate a fixed-effects regression model that controls for state and time invariant effects. The model shows that independent redistricting commissions enhance electoral competition and that this effect has become stronger since the introduction of these commissions in Arizona and California. The model also shows that other types of redistricting commissions as a whole produce districts that are no more competitive than those produced by partisan-controlled legislative redistricting.