TITLE:
A Game Analysis of Trade Dumping and Antidumping
AUTHORS:
Huachun Zhao, Jeffrey Yi-Lin Forrest, Benjamas Jirasakuldech
KEYWORDS:
China-U.S. Trade, Domestic Consumer, Nash Equilibrium, World Market
JOURNAL NAME:
Theoretical Economics Letters,
Vol.8 No.14,
October
19,
2018
ABSTRACT: This paper develops game theoretical models to study
the interactive, competitive plays and relevant decision making regarding the
dumping and antidumping actions between an importing nation and an exporting
nation. The latter considers potentially dumping its product in the domestic
market of the former, while the former attempts to protect its market and its
domestic firms from exiting the market by implementing necessary trading
strategies. Understanding how to deal with potential intruders, when to take
actions, and what appropriate actions to take under different sets of
conditions is very crucial both theoretically and practically, because countermeasures
may or may not be effective depending on what conditions one is constrained
with. The theoretical framework, established in this paper, will provide a
better understanding of anti-dumping policies and their implications for
regulators, policy makers, managers, and academicians, while the results
developed herein can be readily employed in real-life scenarios, making this
work practically useful for understanding how international trade conflicts
could be handled effectively.