Matutes, C. and Regibeau, P. (1988) “Mix and Match”: Product Compatibility without Network Externalities. The RAND Journal of Economics, 19, 221-234.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555701

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Bundling and Consumers’ Reservation Value: Effects on Market Entry

  AUTHORS: Qing Hu

  KEYWORDS: Bundling, Entry Deterrence, Multiproduct firm, Product-Specific Preferences

  JOURNAL NAME: Technology and Investment, Vol.6 No.1, February 16, 2015

  ABSTRACT: We consider a multiproduct incumbent which monopolizes one market but faces a potential entrant in another market. In a two dimensional Hotelling model, when consumers’ reservation value is relatively high, we show that the incumbent has an incentive to use bundling to deter entry only if a prior commitment is applicable. However, when consumers’ reservation value is low, the multiproduct firm even has no incentive to use bundling and bundling has no effect on entry deterrence.