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has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Agent Risk Taking and Efforts in the Context of Multiple Heterogeneous References

  AUTHORS: Qiong Wang, Chengyuan Wang, Liang Wan

  KEYWORDS: Behavioral Agency, Multiple Heterogeneous References, Risk Taking, Agent Efforts

  JOURNAL NAME: Journal of Service Science and Management, Vol.7 No.6, December 16, 2014

  ABSTRACT: The purpose of this paper is to discuss agent risk taking and efforts in the context of multiple heterogeneous references. We focus on two key references in terms of performance target and aspiration income. And we also introduce them into the principal-agent model. By the method of numerical simulation, our results show that performance target and the gap of psychological reference income have complex interaction influences on agent risk taking and efforts. In addition, profit-sharing coefficient plays moderating role in these complex relationships. Our results also provide good evidence and supplement to Pepper and Gore’s proposition.