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has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: The Most Persuasive Frankfurt Example, and What It Shows: Or Why Determinism Is Not the Greatest Threat to Moral Responsibility

  AUTHORS: Larry Alexander

  KEYWORDS: L?bertarian; Moral Responsibility; Normativity; Reasons

  JOURNAL NAME: Open Journal of Philosophy, Vol.4 No.2, May 6, 2014

  ABSTRACT: In this paper I argue that even if the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) is satisfied, moral responsibility is more seriously threatened if the Principle of Alternative Possible Reasons (PAPR) is not satisfied. Nor, I argue, is it clear how it could be satisfied. Finally, I suggest that not only moral responsibility, but also normativity itself, is threatened by the failure to satisfy PAPR.