

Revisiting Friends & Foes: US-Pak Relation's Turbulent History and Future

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Abstract

As a frontline ally, Pakistan shares a long history of fighting with the CIA since the Soviet invasion. The CIA, ISI, and Mujahedeen nexus weaponised the region. Punishing preparators and beneficiaries of 9/11 led the U.S. to initiate a “war on terror”. Pakistan faced human, financial, and security losses. It also demoralised democracy in Pakistan. The research proposes that Pakistan brought destruction to itself by choosing a side in global power politics. War with Afghan freedom fighters against the Soviet invasion blessed Pakistan with terrorism. Terrorism, nurtured under the surveillance of the CIA, turned out to be a death trap plotted by its foreign allies in the region. The literature attempts to connect major historical events since the Soviet invasion, which led the foundation to bleed Pakistan. The dissertation tries to underpin the importance of Pakistan for counter-terrorism, peace, and stability in the region. It also discusses Pakistan's role and efforts in the fight against terrorism.

Keywords

US-Pak Relations, Afghanistan, Convergent, Divergent, Terrorism, Afghan Freedom Fight, Pakistan Army, Regime Change

1. Introduction

Pakistan, being a complex state, has faced multi-faceted challenges since its independence. Initially, the very existence of a fragile state and the resilience to survive was a million-dollar question (Chari, 2009: pp. 74-75). Until the formal invitation from the United States in 1949, Pakistan remained hesitant to choose the power politics side (DAWN, 2010). The assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, followed by the demise of Muhammad Ali Jinnah (founder of Pakistan), left Pakistan an orphan state with no credible leadership. The governance vacuum was

the icing on the cake, and the absence of a constitution led to the extremities. Pakistan is a state sandwiched between fundamentalists. The dogmatic approach is the strength of the terrorist mindset that opposes the rationale approach expressed in Islam. Applying the rationale approach could help to eradicate polarisation and extremism.

Divergent or convergent, the U.S. has always focused on Pakistan for its regional strategic goals. The relationship had many ups and downs, but it remained tied to the knot of the marriage of convenience. From George W. Bush junior's doctrine to Donald Trump's, a series of harsh statements, "if you are not with us, you are against us", "must do more", "deep disappointment", and "little help" expressed the importance of the role of Pakistan in the "War on Terror" (Aziz, 2018; DAWN, 2016; E.T., 2018; F.P.M., 2002). Despite the blame game and allegations, why couldn't the U.S. just let Pakistan off the hook? The relationship revolves around terrorism and political stability within the region. Pakistan, as Afghanistan's permanent neighbour, has played an important role in Afghan politics.

Historically, Pakistan improvised and aided the Afghan freedom fight against the Soviet invasion (1979) and tried settling the civil War of 1992. In landlocked Afghanistan, mutual values and traditions with the tribal population of Pakistan have always required a channel to meet their requirements (Akhtar, 2008). The Jihad entered Pakistan with an Afghan freedom struggle and a U.S. proxy war against Soviet expansion. Pakistan has never been a direct battlefield, but the weaponising spillover effect has doomed the secular dream of Pakistan. By implementing Methodist Islam in Pakistan, the Zia syndrome brought religious intolerance to Pakistan. The syndrome refers to the polarisation and the weaponising of religious institutions. It strengthened the dogmatic side of Islam to legitimise his regime through religious sentiments. Zia is known as the "God-father of Global Islamic Jihad" (Riedel, 2012). The U.S., with the help of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, created and trained a Taliban force to fight for their benefit. The on-and-off relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan makes the condition worse. After the demise of the Soviet Union, a weaponised group of Taliban needed rehabilitation and a source of income to give up the Kalashnikov culture.

The study underpins the importance of U.S-Pak relations and revisits the bleeding points. Scholars have tried to investigate the relation through specific angles. This study takes the relationship as a whole and examines the economic, political, regional, and global effects of the relationship. The study tries to answer the question, "What makes Pakistan a friend and a foe in U.S-Pak relations?". It also tries to answer, "why has the relationship remained turbulent since its formation?". The scholarship also elucidates the factors that bled Pakistan and brought destruction to the state. It will focus on the U.S., the Pakistan Army, terrorist organisations, and corrupt democratic politicians. It will also try to connect the historical events which led to the formation of terrorist

organisations and the preparators for 9/11. This paper not only explores the relationship between Pakistan and terrorism. It also answers the question, “why terrorism is harboured in Pakistan and exported to the states in the region?”. Being involved in international terrorism and helping preparators makes Pakistan a foe for the U.S. There has been much discussion regarding US-Pakistan relations. A series of blame games and betrayals depicted the distorted relations between the established power, the U.S. The paper will try to gauge the importance of Pakistan in terms of power politics through geopolitical, economic, and military aspects.

Chapter One defines the term terrorism and gauge it against the concept of Jihad in Islam. It also addresses the Quran’s argument and challenges clerics’ misinterpretation. It uses Quranic verses to challenge the Muslim cleric’s cooked-up cognition of war. Chapter Two contextualises the historic liaison between the U.S. and Pakistan, especially in the context of the Afghan freedom fighters and its implications. It describes the geographical location of Pakistan and its importance to terrorist organisations. It also tries to build narrative for the importance of Pakistan for the U.S. Chapter three investigates the Taliban and other groups’ nexus with the army. These organisations’ formation and survival are the literature’s primary concerns. Chapter four analyses the perks and the dents “war on terror” made throughout history. It will also touch upon the achievements of Pakistan against such organisations. Chapter five conceptualises the foreign intervention that destabilised Pakistan. It also touches upon how it got pushed into the fire of extremism and terrorism. Chapter 6 tries to answer the question, “why the U.S. could not let Pakistan go off the table?”. It also touches upon the importance of Pakistan to the strategic goals of the U.S. in the region. Lastly, the conclusion is in a separate chapter.

The topic is of great importance considering the recent developments in the U.S. “War on Terror” and the results in Afghanistan. At first, it is at the heart of the significant and long-lasting U.S. “War on terror”. Secondly, being a frontline ally, Pakistan shares the U.S. vision for regional stability and peace. Thirdly, it gives an overview of how the U.S. and Pakistan have messed up their relationship in the past. Fourthly, the convenient marriage between allies could work in future power politics. Lastly, it overviews Pakistan’s role in the U.S. war on terror after the U.S. and its allies left Afghanistan. The research will define the terminologies and provide an understanding of the analysis.

The study uses a qualitative approach to answer the research question. The study uses both primary and secondary sources of information. It uses policy papers, speeches from the head of state and foreign officers, official interviews, and the transcripts of the meetings between the representatives of the states as primary sources. The primary source will provide the roadmap and guidance for secondary literature. It uses books, journal articles, dissertations, news articles, and reports about people and groups written by influential scholars as secondary

sources. The scholarly works of Bruce Riedel's avoiding Armageddon, Christian Fair's books *Fighting to the End*, and *Pakistan's Army Way of War* elaborates on the attitude. It will also focus on Christian Fair's counterinsurgency in Pakistan. Contrary to this, Feyyaz, the discourse and the study of terrorism in decolonised states: the case of Pakistan, will try to elucidate the root causes of terrorism in Pakistan. Various case studies, research papers, books, and ideologies answer the research question.

1.1. Literature Review

Terrorism is an act to instil fear, hysteria, and insecurity in a society in general and a government in particular. The purpose of terrorist activities is to achieve the end goals by driving fear (Romero, 2022; Silke, 2019). For Newman and Lynch, terrorism is an act based on the ideology to defend the action, which differs from other crimes (Newman & Lynch, 1987). The causative approach prioritises the root causes of terrorism instead of the ideology (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Schreer & Tan, 2019; Sageman, 2004; Crenshaw, 2012). The root cause of these insurgencies, civil wars, rebellions, and other separatist movements is the failure of a state (Schreer & Tan, 2019; Garner & Alarid-Hughes, 2021). It is more likely that failed insurgent movements in Muslim countries will become terrorist groups to achieve the same goals. It is not the duty of academia to define the word terrorism. It takes a multi-disciplinary approach to define the term and its associated activities (Townshend, 2009). From the literature mentioned above, terrorism is an act to inject fear and to achieve the result by any means available. The activities are independent of ethical considerations. Failed Muslim states are likely to fall into the trap of terrorism. The advancement of "communication, technology, weapons, and transportation" (Dyson, 2014) has made the small terrorist group more lethal. Ashfaq and Abbas provide individual characters who pushed Pakistan into extremism that converted to terrorism.

The persistent dream of a separate nation on land and choosing sides during the cold war caused deep troubles for the newly born orphan state (Chari, 2009: pp. 74-75). In its initial days, Pakistan allied with the U.S. to overcome economic needs and military disadvantages (Haqqani, 2013). The "murder of history" under General Zia's regime laid the foundation for a misinformed society, especially the new generation. It legitimised the use of violence under the flag of distorted history to shape the road map of the state (Feyyaz, 2016). Zia normalised extremism by appointing ulema in major sectors (Abbas & Sulehria, 2021).

The U.S. and Pakistan have faced trust issues since the formation of their bilateral relationship. On the one hand, Pakistan used the U.S.'s deep pockets to achieve a respectable status in the region. The United States, on the other hand, has used Pakistan in its fight against "communism and terrorism" (Markey, 2013). Pakistan got thwacked economically (Ali, 2010), politically (Markey,

2013), and regionally (Nawaz, 2016) and still advocates the U.S. narrative in the “War on terror”. Pakistan’s allegiance remained questionable because of her intentions (Shah, 2007). Zakaria et al. provide the economic loss to Pakistan in the wake of the “war on terror”.

On the one hand, it aligned with the Taliban against Pakistan, while on the other hand, it fought against the Taliban to destabilise them (Paliwal, 2017). Christine Fair, Bruce Riedel, and Hussain Haqqani’s scholarly work present the Pakistan army as the leading cause of terrorism in the region. They have been using militant outfits in Kashmir to achieve their goals. The Pakistani establishment’s nexus with militant groups has been a historical practice to permeate its local and international policy motives (Jones & Fair, 2010). Paliwal presents the Indian discourse towards the Taliban. India has followed a double diplomatic approach toward the Taliban. Jones, Fair, and Riedel share the idea of a “Jihadist state,” and the presence of militant groups in a nuclear state such as Pakistan is a global threat in both situations (Riedel, 2012; Jones & Fair, 2010). The post-9/11 definition of “terrorism” is to sideline the opposition or adversaries and to invoke the desired “draconian measure” to achieve the desired results (Saul, 2008).

1.2. Summary

The narrative above indicates that the relationship between states never strengthened for the greater good. The U.S used the relationship at the expense of Pakistan’s sovereignty, integrity, and survival. Whereas Pakistan used the relationship to strengthen its claws and power to make itself essential in the region to keep the U.S engaged. Pakistan used financial assistance from the U.S to grow militant groups. Riedel indicates that the relationship must be holistic and have good intentions (Riedel, 2012).

2. Revisiting the Concept of Jihad and Terrorism in Islam

This chapter addresses a general understanding of terrorism and Jihad. Initially, it provides the causative and cognitive approaches for terrorist activities. In the later part, it provides the Islamic teachings regarding Jihad. It tries to revisit the original perception created in the Afghan war.

For Newman and Lynch, terrorism distinguishes itself from other types of criminal acts based on the ideological explanation for the conduct of the terrorist (Newman & Lynch, 1987; Gearty, 1991). Terrorism is an act to instill fear, hysteria, and insecurity in a society in general and a government in particular. The purpose of terrorist activities is to achieve the end goals by driving fear (Romero, 2022; Silke, 2019). The nuance of literary work that differentiates terrorism and other activities presents “terrorism” as a phenomenon used to define a particular group and its activities. However, the group might not have any link to such activities at all. The differentiation uses causative and cognitive approaches in the later section.

2.1. Causative Approach

McCauley and Moskalenko argue that it is essential to understand the root cause of radicalisation and terrorist conduct at the individual, group, and mass levels (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). It is not mandatory that individuals fully understand the ideology or get driven by the factors of ideology. Most of the time, it is an association based on the preferences, priorities, feelings, and situations that drive radicalisation in all these tiers of classification of the public. Schreer & Tan presents a similar idea for the causative approach. The root cause of insurgencies, civil wars, rebellions, and other separatist movements is the failure of a state (Schreer & Tan, 2019). For Sageman, the network is of greater importance in terrorist organisations as compared to the ideology. New interns join these networks by finding bridges rather than having similar ideologies (Sageman, 2004). For Crenshaw, sharing similar beliefs of the terrorist organisation does not defend the terrorist conduct of an individual. Sharing the same faith might end up drifting away from conducting violence. An individual's psychological factor pushes him to act accordingly (Crenshaw, 2012). The causative approach provides the trigger effect for the terrorist conduct. It traces back the key findings which push people on individual, group, and mass levels to conduct such activities. It might link to a significant happening in an individual's life. It leads to the cognitive approach, where an event might create cognition and become integral to personal belief.

2.2. Cognitive Approach

Mumtaz Qadri, one of the squad members of Governor Salman Taseer, gunned him down on his remarks on the Blasphemy Act in Pakistan. The statement insisted anger in public, but the cognition moved Mumtaz Qadri to murder him. According to Festinger, "the original theory of cognitive dissonance concerned a situation in which individuals have two cognitions that are relevant to each other but inconsistent with each other" (Harmon-Jones et al., 2015). The theory states that every person carries a frame of reference to the predisposition based on the events and experiences learnt. It creates a particular type of behaviour in a person, which is visible when a new kind of information is received. The info gets measured against the predisposition, and upon contradiction, it takes the person into a situation of dissonance. Dissonance is a state where the person avoids or overlooks information. "The negative effect state of dissonance is aroused not by all cognitive conflict but, specifically, when cognition with action implications conflicts with each other" (Harmon-Jones et al., 2015). There is a choice to either change the action or the cognition in the cognitive dissonance. It applies to information or emotional clicks at some point. Nilsson presented a case study of a person who chose to become a Jihadist based on the injustice preached by a Muslim scholar in a mosque toward Muslims in Afghanistan (Nilsson, 2022).

Most activities conducted by fundamentalist Muslims or terrorist groups do not apply to the generality principle. It is easy to portray Muslims as terrorists by citing some references. It takes a lot more struggle to provide the nitty-gritty of the patterns of extremism and the targeted populous. According to Cordesman, the Muslim populace and states are the significant targets of terror activities (Cordesman, 2017). It again underpins the question of why Muslims kill in the name of Allah. According to Myers, Jihad is a mandatory policy for every person in the Muslim ummah to cast terror and carry out aggressive activities against non-Muslims. He also proves it with the outfit of Al-Qaeda and Zia's version of Islam to present the objectives of Jihad (Myers, 2006). On the contrary to this, Islam provides a different perspective. Chapter 9 (al-tawbah) provides a nuanced discourse on the action. The Hadith of the Prophet offers a supporting argument for the verses of the Quran. The translation of the verse into English is to provide ease to the reader. The Quran, the most important Muslim book, is a piece of literature that elaborates on actions in both war and peacetime.

After the sacred months are over, kill the polytheists "who violated their treaties" wherever you find them, capture them, besiege them, and lie in wait for them in any way you can. But if they repent, perform prayers, and pay alms-tax, then set them free. Indeed, Allah is All-forgiving, Most Merciful (Quran, 1995: p. 187). The question of what the Quran says about such activities can only be answered by reading it and consulting Hadith and supplementary arguments for the essence of the commandment. The Quran contains 20% of the commandments, while Hadith contains the remainder. Every sect in Islam follows a different approach to understanding and practising religion. The following Hadith as a supplementary argument is the only common ground for most of the sects of Islam. A Hadith is the saying of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), whereas the Sunnah is the act of the Prophet. Applying cognitive dissonance theory toward Islam as a violent religion and Pakistan as a terrorist state could provide different outcomes. The approach will try to elucidate the latter part to change the discourse of the former position in the application; whether Islam promotes terrorism or not has long been a topic of discussion. Most of the literature and pseudo-interpreters of Islam provide a part of the verse of the Quran without researching the context, background, and essence. The question is what role religion plays in formulating violent and extremist groups. The answer to the question will try to change the belief, add new information, or reduce the idea's effectiveness.

Verse 5 of Chapter 9 (Al-Tawbah) of the Quran is the most misquoted verse to legitimise the non-Muslim massacres by terrorist organisations. These organisations quote only suitable texts for their cause and repeat them over time to authorise their acts of terrorism. The following verse 6 of the same surah commands Muslims to provide protection and asylum to those who ask for it. The context of the verse comes from reading it from the start of the surah. In-

initially, the threat was a tactical tool to warn against breaching treaties and commandments. In times of War, the Quran even forbids killing children, women, the elderly, and those who pose no threat. Civil property shall remain secure, and non-believers' worship places shall not get destroyed. Quran and Sunnah command not to destroy the order of the society and let non-believer practice their religion (Aly, 2014). "And if anyone from the polytheists asks you for protection, O Prophet, grant it to them so they may hear the word of Allah, then escort them to a place of safety, for they are a people who have no knowledge" (Quran, 1995: p. 187). There is a clear distinction between the war-time issues practises with the non-Muslims. Those who choose to fight and those who want peace with you. The Prophet (S.A.W.s) said: three things are the root of faith: to refrain from killing a person who utters, "There is no god but Allah"... one must have divine decree" (Sunnah, 2012: p. 15, 56). The Hadith refrains from killing any Muslim, expelling any Muslim from Islam, and being just too other. The Quranic description shows that Islam negates bloodshed and constantly evaluates a truce for peace. The presence of clear commandments in the Quran and Hadith pushed Pakistan into an extremist situation. Several factors could be analysed while solving the puzzle. The initial answer to the question lies in interpreting the Arabic text into Urdu for the public. Religious clerics translate and interpret the Quran's verses within their sect's framework. Interpreting verses without the context and background to support their narrative fails. Thirdly, applying the desired commandment and leaving others.

The Quran provides an inclusive approach. Most Muslim clerics were part of Congress and opposed Jinnah's dream of Pakistan. Later, most of them migrated to Pakistan in the post-partition period. The Deobandi (extremist sect) populace was minimal and dormant in the initial days. The prime time for their expansion started with the Soviet expansion. The nexus in the name of Jihad against Soviet expansion helped two stakeholders, the U.S and Zia-ul-Haqq. Violent Jihad is not a spontaneous phenomenon but has been part and parcel of upbringing and the continuous learning process. "There is not an emotional outburst. It is not suddenness. It must be a permanent commitment within yourself, within your attitude. It must be one of the strongest approaches to the religion" (Akhtar, 2020: p. 30). This phenomenon was applied to the Muslims in Pakistan to defend the holy land against Soviet expansion. The formation of S.S.P. under the Zia regime had nothing to do with the teaching of Islam (Abbas, 2015: pp. 113-114). Zia's version of Islam led to creating extremities within the sects of Islam. Schools of thought like Deobandi do not take the Hadith as an authentic source to follow and pick the possible things from the Quran to make things their way. At the same time, Islam is the religion of peace and promotes peace over war unless it has become mandatory. If war is inevitable, it must get fought by abiding by the war law stated as per commandments in the Quran. The Quran is a complete code of life that guides all the affairs of life, ranging from social affairs,

domestic affairs, and clothing to the most critical war affairs. The U.S. and Zia's Jihad differs from the Jihad discussed in the Quran. The wrong interpretation of the U.S. strategic goals reshaped and deformed the real essence of the verses of the Quran. It pushed Pakistan into extremism and terrorism. The U.S. distorted Islamic teachings to instil aggression and extremism in Muslims to fight alongside their Muslim brothers in Afghanistan and protect their state in the aftermath of Soviet expansion. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to gain access to warm waters through Pakistan. The next possible target in that situation was Pakistan, which pushed the admiration to fight in the U.S. proxy war against the Soviet invasion.

3. A Terrorist Safe Heaven?

This chapter tries to present the role of Pakistan in creating terrorist organisations. It provides an overview of the U.S., K.S.A, and Pakistan's nexuses for creating the Taliban. It also touches upon Pakistan's failure to fight against terrorism.

Pakistan is known for harbouring and exporting terrorism across the globe. The issues come from the social structure of Pakistan. Pakistan was a newly born state with complex challenges that worsened over time. Most events meet half-way through, which shackled Pakistan. One key event was the Russian Invasion of Afghanistan. In the late '70 s, the USSR tried to access warm water for its far-reaching trade and other means. Afghanistan became a buffer zone during the invasion. Later, it became a battleground between the western and communist blocs.

States like the U.S. supported the Afghans' free fight and tried to contain the USSR through regional assistance. The whole approach empowers the public with a weapon and fighting techniques. The United States and its allies fought their adversary at the expense of law and order. The idea of separation from India was never pleasant to the United States. For the U.S., the idea would make both states ambitious neighbours in the region. The news media and U.S. diplomats were sympathetic to the struggle of Muslims in India and Muhammad Ali Jinnah (founder of Pakistan) (Kux, 2001: pp. 1-20). The region has hideouts and bases that provide a haven for terrorist organisations. The group remained a potential threat to the security of Pakistan. By June 13, 2015, the number of militants killed in the operation had reached 2763. Out of 2763, 218 were high-profile commanders of these organisations, in a total of 9000 "intelligence-based operations" (IBOs) (Ashfaq, 2016).

Every state has unique characteristics and distinctive elements that make it essential to other states. The features, in some conditions, provide leverage on the other states. The most crucial factor in Pakistan is its geographical location. Pakistan is a state with a population of 211.8 million, according to the 2017 census (Wazir & Goujon, 2019). It is situated in Southeast Asia, sharing a coastline with the Arabian Sea (GISGeography, n.d.). Pakistan situates between the four

central states of the region and international politics: India, China, Iran, and Afghanistan. Pakistan shares a border of 6774 kilometres with these states. China is in the northeast of Pakistan, sharing a border of 523 kilometres. A surging superpower and a great economic giant in the region. India shares a border of 2912 kilometres on the east side with Pakistan. It is also one of the financial giants in the area after China. On the West is its shared border with Afghanistan and Iran of 2430 and 909 kilometres, respectively. Four significant countries cover three sides of Pakistan, whereas the Arabian Sea covers the fourth side with a coastline of 1046 kilometres (DAWN, 2009).

The independence of Pakistan inherited territorial disputes with the neighbouring states, and the Durand line became one of the critical points of disagreement between India (Delhi) and Afghanistan (Kabul). Both states share a long border with Pakistan as compared to the other neighbours of Pakistan. King Zahir Shah initially rejected the demarcation of the Durand line between 1893 and 1896. The line gave the status of the official border between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1947. The Afghan government had already rejected it, but the issue broke up once again (Taye & Ahmed, 2021). Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan have a series of bitter disputes over the trade route. The state faces many difficulties depending on the path provided for trade. The conflict between the Durand Lines is the primary reason for the surge of the Pashtun movement in Pakistan, supported by Afghanistan and India (Weinbaum, 2006). Afghanistan confronted a more significant challenge in the form of the Soviet Union (USSR) in December 1979. Afghanistan has always been a buffer state in disputes between the empires. This time, the conflict between the West and the Communist bloc came to Afghanistan. The issues provided Pakistan with an opportunity to show her goodwill toward the U.S., revive her relationship and bring Afghanistan on equal ground to think above the territorial dispute (Taye & Ahmed, 2021).

The Soviet Invasion and Zia's promises to fight for the cause of the U.S. and the international community made him a blue-eyed boy overnight. He penetrated society at different levels. His closeness to Jamaat-e-Islami (J.I.) led him to formulate a student wing in universities in Punjab known as "Islami Jamaat-i-Tulaba" (I.J.T.) (Abbas, 2015: p. 101) to control local matters. Zia built madrasas (informal schooling systems) along the Durand Line "Pak-Afgan" border to serve in the Afghan war. He weaponised the madrasa, and the madrasa recruited young children to train for the activities in Afghanistan. General Zia introduced Islamic laws to the state, and it followed Islamic punishments too. He introduced the Qazi system (courts) that changed the discourse of justice in the state.

The introduction of the Zakat system proved a pivotal point for forming local terrorist organisations. The Zakat ordinance faced protests and started the "Tehrik-i-Niafaz-i-Fiqha-Jafria" (Shia) movement in 1981. The exercise aimed to protect Shia rights against the Sunni majority (Abbas, 2015: p. 113). It did

not defame Zia publicly but helped him gain more popularity in a divided society. 1984 presidential referendum presented a whole new result where the turnout remained at 62%. 97.71% of the population voted in favour of the cooked Islam presented by Zia (Abbas, 2015: p. 117). The Zia syndrome changed the whole outfit of the state from Jinnah's ideological Pakistan to a radical Islamist Pakistan. His interpretation harassed every citizen of Pakistan in their own country and questioned their faith (Abbas, 2015: p. 94, 103). The close ties to Jamar-e-Islamic and the dream of converting a secular Pakistan into an Islamist state met a new catalyst in 1977 in the form of Islamic media. He appointed Ulemas (theologians) members of the censorship board with the duty to modify films and dramas according to the shariah (Abbas & Sulehria, 2021). Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Jundullah, Al-Qaeda, Haqqani Network, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and Lashkar-e-Jangvi "were actively involved in terrorist activities in the area (Ashfaq, 2016). In the turmoil of the Shia-Sunni conflict, the Deobandi sect came up with an organisation, Saiph-e-sahabah (S.S.P.), to fight the Shia sect based on different religious sentiments (Abbas, 2015: p. 114). It opened a dark chapter in the history of Pakistan. Zia's obsession with power revealed his shady faith and dark desires, which had nothing to do with Islam.

In pursuing his version of Islam, Zia introduced intolerance into society and brought sectarian terrorism. Terrorism is one of the significant issues for Pakistan. It experienced several martial laws and political stalemate since its independence. In less than ten years, seven heads of state were either assassinated or changed (Al Jazeera, 2022). Suddenly, the game summed up with the first military quo with the narrative "the political elite is incapacitated". The same goes for police in Pakistan. Whenever there is a situation, a call for the army sums up the game, turning them into the hero of the problem. Though the military is too valuable to Pakistan, they should not enter the civil domain. Instead of fighting militants, Pakistanis should complete the prerequisites for the terrorism 101 course. According to Fair, there are three main reasons for Pakistan's incapacitated and incapable police (Jones & Fair, 2010).

Firstly, the police force in Pakistan is ill-equipped. Secondly, wages do not meet the financial requirements, as shown in **Table 1** (Abbas, 2016). It shows that the average pay for scale 14 falls between \$81.50 and \$263 per month. The highest pay scale is BPS-22, which falls between \$443 and \$884 per month. According to the median, the average pay of a police officer in the U. S. per month is \$5016 (Salary, 2022). The strength of Pakistan's police force is a prerequisite to fighting counterinsurgency and infiltration. These requirements either alienate them from work or make them corrupt. Thirdly, the army becomes a frontline warrior in critical situations, putting the police force in the passenger seat. Troops usually defend the border but protect whatever they want in Pakistan. Putting the police force on the burner incapacitates them and takes away the opportunity to fight against such events.

Table 1. Police salary 2021.

Punjab Police Pay and Salary			
No#	Designation and Scale	Min	Max
1	Sub-inspector SI BPS-14	15,180	50,280
2	Station House Officer SHO-BPS-16	18,910	64,510
3	Police Inspector BPS-16	18,910	64,510
4	Additional Superintendent Officer ASP BPS-17	30,370	76,370
5	Deputy Superintendent Officer ASP BPS-17	30,370	76,370
6	Superintendent of Police SP BSP-18	38,350	95,750
7	Senior Superintendent of Po-lice SSP/AIG BSP-19	59,210	120,210
8	Deputy Inspector General or Regional Police Officer or City Police Officer BPS-20	69,090	132,300
9	Additional Inspector General Additional IG/CCPO BPS-21	76,720	146,720
10		82,380	164,560

4. Army-Militant Nexus

This chapter tries to present the role of the Pakistan army in creating terrorist organisations. It presents the army goals behind the formation of these organisations. Conclusively it presents the loopholes of the U.S-Pak turbulent relations.

The U.S. evaluates Pakistan not for its alliance but for its geographical location. Pakistan is the shortest route that connects the rest of the world to Central Asia. In general, Pakistan helped the U.S. achieve its strategic goals in the past, specifically in two significant events: the war on terror and the Soviet invasion. Investigating the real culprits of the nexus between the Taliban and the Pakistan army requires two key things: history and critical thinking. An analytical approach is a prerequisite for the necessary thinking process, and both are needed to present the actual position of the Pakistan army against terrorist organisations. Searching for the word “terrorism” on the Google search engine provides almost 2.9 billion matches. At the top of the list are Indian websites presenting Hafiz Saeed and other individuals linking Pakistan with terrorism. According to Fair, Pakistan attempted to achieve its regional strategic goals by harbouring, supporting, and exporting terrorism. Pakistan fought three major wars with militants and the Pakistan army (Fair et al., 2010; Fair, 2014). It might be suitable to some extent. It is like an arms-producing and exporting U.S. initiative war for consuming its products. The Pakistan Army controls the reign of political parties and runs their “MILBUS” effectively. The express is the ultimate right to have anything within Pakistan and any nation. The army thought that they were the only saviours of the state. It provided them with supreme authority. By staying at the top position, Army officers create opportunities to benefit them in the

post-retirement period. “MiLBUS” is confined to Pakistan’s armed forces’ alleged business (Siddiqa, 2007). It is present in various militaries around the globe. Pakistan’s army is different from others because it carries a state at its disposal. The Pakistani army is also responsible for making militants and letting some of them grow.

According to FCCI officials, “A true Taliban will be a true Afghan, and a true Afghan will not let the country go back by destroying whatever it has built in the last decade.” Apart from parsing the valour of the Taliban and advising them not to fall into the hands of Pakistan, for them, there has always been a constant threat from Pakistan to destabilise Afghanistan (Paliwal, 2017: p. 231). The sources above present Pakistan’s use of militancy as a tool for domestic and international policy outcomes. Pakistan’s army has relied on such groups to destabilise the region for a power struggle. The scholar presents two main reasons for the nexus of Pakistan’s army with the Taliban. Firstly, the Islamic ideology of the state, military, and militants uses the doctrine to achieve the desired outcome in the Kashmir dispute. The most prominent argument in the literature is the failure of the Pakistan army to achieve a decisive result in the conflict between Jammu and Kashmir. Kashmir is the disputed region between India and Pakistan. Two sides of Kashmir: Azad (independent) Kashmir (Pakistan) and disputed Kashmir (India). One can clearly understand which part of Kashmir has progressed in the post-partition situation.

India claims Pakistan’s army exports terrorists in disputed Jammu and Kashmir for insurgencies. Secondly, it served as the strategic goal for power struggles in the region. Pakistan, a weak state with a weak army, used militant outfits to destabilise India and Afghanistan for dominance in the region. In both situations, the only disturbing thing is the army and militant nexus. Chapter 1 provides an Islamic ideology that negates bloodshed and promotes peace over war. Pakistan’s ideology lays its foundation on the Islamic creed, which promotes relaxation and a secular society for the majority and minority populace. Pakistan followed secular ideology until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s newly born state needed an alliance with the giant state to save its skin, which became one of the reasons for its tilt toward the U.S. The diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Pakistan got formally initiated on October 20, 1947. The U.S. applied to Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan to acquire a base for the C.I.A., considering the ongoing tensions against the Soviet Union (DAWN, 2012). “Pakistan is a democracy, and communism does not flourish on the soil of Islam. “It [is] clear, therefore, that our interests [lie] more with the two great democratic countries, namely the U.K. and the U.S.A., rather than with Russia” (Kux, 2001: p. 20). The U.S. and Pakistan found a meeting point to strengthen their relationship for mutual interest in the region. The “The ally from hell” headline published in the Atlantic expressed the position of Pakistan concerning the United States. India and the U.S. Since 9/11, India has used every opportu-

nity to portray Pakistan as a terrorist state and has tried to win the sympathies of the United States. The U.S. has always considered Pakistan, a shady friend. The U.S. policy towards Pakistan has shifted its focus toward India. A perception emerged that the U.S. was fighting with the wrong enemy. Since the beginning, Pakistan has been a true enemy of the U.S.

India's policy towards the Afghan Taliban shaped its obsession with Pakistan. Despite raising questions about the embassy bombings of 2009, India immediately blamed Pakistan for carrying out the attacks. According to K.R. Narayanan, ex-president of India and security advisor to Manmohan Singh, the Afghan Taliban had nothing to do with the attack but Pakistan (Paliwal, 2017: p. 226). Another attack on the Hamid guesthouse got counted in Pakistan's account despite considering the Taliban of Afghanistan. The tilt of India towards Afghanistan nominated her as the most favoured nation in 2007. The streak of attacks continued with the 2013 Indian consulate attack in Jalalabad. Lashkar-e-Taibah (LeT) got blamed for carrying out the attack. The only group labelled anti-India for their shared vision with Pakistan was the B.J.P. The Indian consulate witnessed an attack in 2014; the Park rest house and the Jalalabad consulate attack in 2015 got linked to Pakistan. Later, another group named Jayesh-e-Mohammad (JeM) emerged as the hijackers of IC-814. The change in Indian policy towards Afghanistan and the Afghan Taliban was to lure the Afghan Taliban from Pakistan. Indian security concerns were the first objective behind the paradigm shift in policy. It was purely to have the Afghan government as an ally due to the drawdown. India needed Afghanistan to come on the same page for an agreement on oil and gas supply from Central Asian states to India. India and Afghanistan need Pakistan as a prerequisite for successful transactions through oil and gas projects (Paliwal, 2017: pp. 227-225). The second goal was to use Afghan territory to counter Pakistan's infiltrations, insurgencies, and terror-related activities. The Indian obsession with Pakistan rests on multi-faceted challenges, including CPEC, the rise of China, the Taliban government in Afghanistan, and the Kashmir conflict. India has been playing a double role in Afghanistan.

On the one hand, India conspires with the Taliban against adversaries and tries to normalise the possible future relationship between India and the Taliban. On the other hand, she has been fighting with the Afghanistan National Army against the Taliban at the battle of Khost (Paliwal, 2017: p. 233). Jamat-u-Dawah is a notorious organisation that got a public endorsement for its social work in Pakistan (Reuters, 2013). Welfare work answers the question of why these organisations get blessings in Pakistan. They worked as frontline rescue support for the Pakistan army in multiple natural disasters, such as earthquakes in northern areas, food shortages in Thar and Sindh, and many other activities. It shows how the terrorist organisation got normalised in Pakistan. They have also served to handle dirty work for the army. On the one hand, they formulate ties with these organisations and let them flourish to be-

come a threat. In the meantime, much dirty work got carried out with their help, especially in the disputed area. Sensing the situation, they target such organisations and become the nation's heroes. It becomes a covert way to keep political gains under the carpet. Increased terrorism indicates an increased budget for the army, which is an additional burden on the fragile economy. As stated in Siddiqa's "Milbus", militancy is a perfect tool for running for the army. The Pakistan army gathers complete information regarding such organisations. They also account for their safe havens along the Afghan border and northern areas. The army's profile makes it a perfect candidate for stakeholders, especially the U.S.

3.3. Equations.

The equations are an exception to the prescribed specifications of this template. You will need to determine whether or not your equation should be typed using either the Times New Roman or the Symbol font (please no other font). Equations should be edited by Mathtype, not in text or graphic versions. You are suggested to use Mathtype 6.0 (or above version).

Number equations consecutively. Equation numbers, within parentheses, are to position flush right, as in (1), using a right tab stop. To make your equations more compact, you may use the solidus (/), the exp function, or appropriate exponents. Italicize Roman symbols for quantities and variables, and Greek symbols. Do not italicize constants as π , etc. Use a long dash rather than a hyphen for a minus sign. Punctuate equations with commas or periods when they are part of a sentence, as in

$$\alpha + \beta = x. \tag{1}$$

Note that the equation is centered. Be sure that the symbols in your equation have been defined before or immediately following the equation. Use "Equation (1)", not "Equation (1)" or "(1)", and at the beginning of a sentence: "Equation (1) is ..."

5. From Friends to Foes

This chapter tries to provide a vocabulary for friends to foe in US-Pak relations since the beginning. It provides chronological events to highlight the loopholes within the policy towards each other. It also touches upon the relative loss and gains following the neoliberal war approach.

Since the Soviet Union, Afghanistan has been the focal point for U.S. and Pakistan relations. The policy had many other determinants, such as the nuclear programme in the past. The "war on terror" changed the patterns and made them solely revolve around Afghanistan. The U.S. divorced Pakistan after the Geneva accord in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The U.S. played a crucial role in setting up the Kargil war between India and Pakistan. Pakistan has received a series of sanctions since then. 9/11 brought the U.S. to the door of Pakistan with a threatening call from George W. Bush for Pakistan's assistance in the war on terror. The U.S., with its most loyal allies, pushed the

most sanctioned ally (Pakistan) to provide a route to enter Afghanistan. At this point, referring to the historic liaison between the U.S. and Pakistan is essential. Why does the region produce terrorists? How has the area become a time-ticking bomb for the rest of the world? There is no straightforward answer to the question. One of the answers to the question lies in the weaponisation of the region purely for U.S. strategic goals. The Soviet obsession led the U.S. to follow a realist approach.

President Jimmy Carter signed the National Security Draft for weaponising Afghanistan and enrooting Pakistan in 1979. There has been a lot of discussion and confusion regarding weaponising freedom fighters with the U.S.-produced Stinger missiles. However, Zia expressed his reservation, but there was mixed feeling about the demand for the stinger. President Ronald Regan formally approved it in 1986 (Kuperman, 1999). The C.I.A. and I.S.I. trained almost 83,000 (Winchell, 2009) freedom fighters as Mujahedeen (plural).

Ronald Reagan's initial package for the war was \$400 million, which expanded to \$3.2 billion. The U.S. war gifted Pakistan with 3 million refugees (Furqan, 2021) as a burden on the fragile economy of Pakistan. It brought the two worst cultures to Pakistan: the Kalashnikov and the drug culture (Aziz, 2015). The U.S. and its allies spent money, weapons, and military support to exploit the region for personal desire and dominance. Pakistan tried to bounce back from the aftershocks of the U.S.-Soviet war, but the U.S. hostile attitude imposed a layer of sanctions on Pakistan.

A frontline ally turned into an imminent threat to U.S. Asia policy. Intentionally or unintentionally, the U.S. left the region unmanaged and the freedom fighters untamed and armed. The drug trade became a lifeline for the power struggle of the terrorist groups in Afghanistan. It provided a vocabulary for the "new war" theory presented by Marry Kaldor (Kaldor, 2012). The author explores the economic side, gathered through the drug trade, loot, and pillaging. Such wars target the public instead of the opponent and do not abide by international law. It applies to terrorist organisations in Afghanistan. It also demands that the war on terror must fight by focusing on the outcomes of the war. She also says there is no good reason to go to war, which explains why the Taliban chose to attack the World Trade Center on September 11.

The U.S. handled most of its wars unprofessionally and resigned at the End. It equipped the Taliban with modern weapons and Stinger missiles and quit after achieving the desired results (Kuperman, 1999). Zia was never in favour of providing the Taliban with such deadly weapons; instead, he wanted them for his troops. The decision to train freedom fighters got turned down many times. Finally, Ronald Reagan's administration overruled Jimmy Carter's discovery and deployed Stinger anti-aircraft missiles in Afghanistan. The U.S. wanted to remain undetected due to the trademark of the weapons. Pakistan feared it would push the USSR to invade Pakistan.

In contrast, the U.S. was able to persuade the war's stakeholders. The situation

provided a remarkable duo of guns and drugs in Afghanistan that brought a new war concept. It showed that the war never ended, but it broadened the spectrum of the conflict. Subscribing to the neorealist school and expecting neoliberal results was a “road to hell paved with good intentions”. Both neo-liberals and neo-realists lay their foundation on cooperation in the international system. Neorealists think that the structure of international politics is rigid and full of chaos. It tends to push a state for self-preservation, which is difficult, but to some extent, it gets into bilateral, where the relative gain gets considered. No external factor, such as an international organisation, can help to change the anarchic situation. It helps a dominant state to be more dominant through such organisations. For the neoliberal school of thought, corporations amongst the state could fill the anarchy vacuum. International organisations play a vital role in the heart of cooperation. The U.N. can help to resolve the issues in the anarchic global structure. Neorealism prevailed and strengthened the actions of powerful states, such as the U.S., in the wake of 9/11. NATO helped to undermine human rights, which the realist school of thought indicates, and the neorealists base their foundation on it. For realists, the rules, laws, treaties, or precedents get dismantled when they confront the strategic interests of a state (Hughes & Lai, 2011). The U.S. ended up facing the consequences and challenging its morality by subscribing to a neorealist approach to using drones in the western region of Pakistan. Neorealist theory underpins and justifies the action of a state, either at the expense of the other state’s rights or by undermining it to pursue its end goals (Rehman, 2013).

The drone issue could get settled via absolute gain for better results. It could have provided a face-off with the U.S. army. It was a blatant intervention in the local affairs of Pakistan and its sovereignty. It also killed civilians and inspired hate in public against the U.S. forces. In contrast, the neoliberal approach could have reduced the relative losses over the relative gains. The U.S. entered the War on Terror based on global cooperation, where interdependence plays a significant role. The U.S. felt a hostile act compromised the relative gain and made Pakistan cheat with its action to intervene in the state’s sovereignty. It followed a neorealist approach, on the one hand, trying to eradicate the lurking threat and the atrocities of the Taliban towards the U.S.

On the other hand, it entered the war with the notion of cooperation. It brings the actions as part of the strategy to achieve the relative benefits to the limelight. No state is the permanent enemy of a friend (Cai, 2020), which provides momentary cooperation between the states. The essence of relative gain for the pessimist school of thought is that it is only concerned with the security dilemma. Relative gains say that cooperation is momentary, while the states in cooperation should focus on the brief benefits. Realists believe that gains provide an advantage in the balance of power (Rousseau, 1999).

Contrary to this, neoliberalism keeps cooperation at its heart instead of yielding power compared to neorealism. The neoliberal school of thought subscribes to the absolute benefits irrespective of the relationship’s success or failure.

Another blunder by the U.S. forces' turned out the use of drone attacks on civilians (Lushenko, 2022) and NATO attacks on Pakistan Army soldiers (BBC News, 2011). "Power, security, economic, and cultural effects" is the vocabulary for absolute gain. The neoliberal school of thought is that it is the inevitable and long-run effect that provides benefits for a long time (Cai, 2020). Absolute gains strengthen the relationship and the cooperation through a win-win situation. The actual problem comes when the distribution of the gains takes place. For the neorealist school of thought, the distribution of absolute profits is not a peaceful process, according to the U.S. approach to neoliberalism. It becomes the real problem and brings in the dispute.

Pakistan paid a heavy price for choosing the western block and helping the U.S. achieve its strategic goals. Uncontrolled, uneducated, untamed, and equipped freedom fighters could not get back to their everyday life business. It brought them under "cognitive dissonance. Giving up a weapon was something like giving up their protection against other groups. The post-Soviet withdrawal left the Taliban with nothing to fight. It led to a civil dispute between militant groups. Terrorism got normalised to achieve the goals. The language they only understood was war, threats, and bullets. The issues didn't remain within the Afghan boundary, but they had spillover effects in neighbouring states, especially Pakistan. The war on terror caused Pakistan an irreparable economic dent and insignificant casualties. W.O.T. has cost Pakistan 83,000 deaths and 126 billion in losses. In Pakistan, a phenomenon of internally displaced persons (IDPs) emerged in the wake of the War on Terror (Jamal, 2021). According to another source, Pakistan has lost \$150 billion and 70,000 lives in the U.S. war on terror while receiving only \$20 billion in aid. Hussain Haqqani dismisses these claims as speculative for a suppository item (Ahmed, 2021).

Scholars claiming that Pakistan benefited from the aid must consider the facts provided by the government and the scholarly work of Zakaria et al. The link between terrorism and foreign direct investment proved fatal to the nation's economy. The sharp reduction in the percentage of FDI from 3.66 to 0.36 between 2005 and 2015, respectively, is directly linked with increased terrorism. It does not stop here. A similar pattern follows a drastic decline in the capital formation percentage from 17.46 to 13.51 between 2005 and 2015. It led to other phenomena of increased government expenditure percentage, from 7.84 to 11.84 in the timeline mentioned previously. The correlation of increased government expenditure with FDI decreases FDI returns as a net result (Zakaria et al., 2019). He made then-senator Obama and speculated on him as a future President but negated the national loss of Pakistan as the "X" and "Y" factors. Terrorist organisations have been a nightmare for dismantling Pakistan's security and the rule of law situation. The worst event occurred on December 16, 2014, when militants, especially Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), attacked Army Public School (A.P.S.). The attack registered a total of 141 casualties, out of which 132 were school-going kids, army personnel, and civilians (BBC News, 2014). Operation "Zarb-e-Azab" started on June 15, 2014. The TTP attacked Jinnah Interna-

tional Airport in Karachi before the operation and claimed responsibility (Ashfaq, 2016; E.T., 2016). There is a common saying: every action reacts. The event was a reaction to the actions taken under Zarb-e-Azab. The operation got initiated to cleanse North Waziristan and Khaybar Pakhtunkhwa (K.P.) of terrorist organisations (Gibson, 2014). The border area faced much infiltration from various local and trans-border organisations.

The United States has never admitted to making mistakes or committing atrocities in the name of freedom, democracy, and humanitarian intervention. Instead, the U.S. pushed Pakistan to do more and to go off-limits. Pakistan always got blamed for playing a double game and cheating the U.S. Thousands of people were killed in the War on Terror, including civilians, army personnel, intelligence personnel, security forces, politicians, and other prominent figures. The U.S. lost 3000 lives in the 9/11 attack (Tan, 2021), but it pushed Pakistan to lose 83,000 lives which is almost 28X greater than the U.S. loss. The war cost Pakistan more than 150 billion dollars, which is enormous for a state with a fragile economy. The domestic instability made it the worst place to live and created a security challenge inside out. Pakistan could have opted to stay neutral in the war, but international pressure and Indian media hysteria depicted Pakistan as a facilitator of the attack. When General Pervez Musharraf was President, Pakistan had to deal with the U.S., even though they knew what it meant. Pakistan has been blamed for decades due to multiple factors since its independence. Dictatorship is the most predominant factor that has caused severe damage to Pakistan. Multiple abrogations of the conditions made them useless and uncertain in Pakistan. It also deteriorated the rule of law in Pakistan. Initially, it derailed Pakistan from the track to achieving Jinnah's dream. It inserted extremism, polarisation, and demoralisation into society. Secondly, it questions the supremacy of the parliament. Publicly elected leaders through elections but "mere Aziz hum Watno" ("my dear compatriots") repeal or suspend the whole constitution with the ratification of the Judiciary. It has also questioned the role of the Judiciary in Pakistan. Thirdly, it has pushed Pakistan into terrorism and extremism. A similar framework prevailed in the Soviet War and the War on terror. A single person decides the fate of the state by allowing drone attacks, foreign intervention in sovereign states, atrocities towards institutions, suspension of the constitution, discrepancies in the budget, and forcing displaced people. An enhanced political system, constitutional supremacy, and the rule of law could provide a better image of Pakistan. It could only be achieved by strengthening the institutions and empowering them to exercise their power.

6. The U.S. Anti-Democracy Policy

This chapter addresses the question, "why could democracy not succeed in Pakistan?". It provides the U.S. policy at the expense of Pakistan's political stability. It presents the U.S. regime change model to appoint the desired head of state.

The democratic champion, the U.S., has supported the dictatorship in Pakis-

tan for its own strategic goals in the region. According to Riedel, the U.S. must comply with the democratic government instead of the military quo for better results (Riedel, 2016). The war on terror has been one of the strategic goals of the U.S. in the region. The U.S. has done everything possible that could help the more extensive interests of the U.S. The blatant intrusion of the U.S. into local affairs is nothing new to Pakistan. She experienced the exact “regime change” act of the U.S. in Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s time (Mehkri, 2022). An unclassified telegram states that Pakistan has been trying to achieve a nuclear programme and the plant from France. The U.S. had the information, but it allowed Pakistan to have its hands on the technology. The U.S. has been assisting Pakistan with its strategic goals in the region. The assistance has been economic, military, and by other means. The democratic government of Pakistan came to a dead-end which needed persuasion to allow us to achieve its regional goals (USDS, 1978).

Henry Kissinger warned Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto by making a “horrible example” of his achieving the end goals (InpaperMagazine, 2013). Later, he mentioned the U.S. official’s call for the “party to end.” In his speech at parliament, he replied, “The party is not over” (TCM, 2022, 03:00-04:00). The warning ZA Bhutto received was the cut to the U.S. economic aid of \$4.9 billion. When asked about the phone call, the spokesperson said, “The government monitors all correspondents’ telegraph and Telex, but a foreign reporter has not yet been subject to the censorship imposed on Pakistani news media.” The communication line is not secure abroad (Simons, 1977). Regime change has been a tool for the internal disintegration of the current government by people with the parliament of whatever the state system is. Prime Minister Imran Khan received a cypher from the U.S., indicating regime change or his removal from office (Syed, 2022).

A similar regime change took place in Ukraine, pushing Russia to invade (Ehsan, 2022). Prime Minister received a cypher after he denied letting the U.S. use its bases during the drawdown process. He gave this remark in an interview with Jonathan Swan of HBO (Khan & Swan, 2021). In the past, U.S. action pushed Pakistan into an extremism web in the shape of Zia. The U.S. has acted more as a foe than a friend. The practice of regime change affected Sri Lanka, Libya, and many other countries. There has been much discussion on a better approach to toppling the government. There has been an evaluation of practices among the representatives of the states (Rogin, 2011). Another impression is that the no-army chief reaches the top-notch position with the C.I.A.’s approval. General Hameed Gul, first in the line without the U.S. endorsement, could not make it to the office. The number six person got selected as the COAS of Pakistan. Pakistan became independent in 1947 but still lives under Samraj (foreign rule). The whole vocabulary provides the U.S. approach toward dealing with the things that come their way. Throughout history, Pakistan has remained subject to such U.S. interventions. The most prominent event happened with the assistance of Hussain Haqqani.

In November 2011, Hussain Haqqani got removed from office as Pakistani ambassador to the U.S. The “Memo Gate scandal” became the prime reason for his removal, which he denied, as it was a mutually agreed step from the then civilian government of Pakistan. Haqqani provided unconditional visa assistance to U.S. intelligence officers to carry out their activities in Pakistan. He defended his activities in the name of increased cooperation between Pakistan and the Obama administration and enormous U.S. aid (Shar, 2022). He could have invoked Article 6 for high treason according to the constitution of Pakistan for the action he conducted to undermine the legal requirement and put the sovereignty of the state at stake (Nasir, 2011). Another case that followed the spree of such activities by Haqqani was the killing of two civilians in Lahore by Raymond Davis. Direct involvement in the local affairs of Pakistan by the C.I.A. undermined the sovereignty of Pakistan. Davis was found allegedly to have had contact with a representative of two major militant organisations, TTP and Lashkar-e-Jahngvi. He contacted 27 militants and was involved in casting terrorist internees to conduct militant activities (Tribune, 2011). The U.S. Naval Seals raided a secure Populus city, Abbottabad, in 2011 and killed Usama Bin Laden. The reservations of the U.S. increased when they got intelligence about the presence of Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad. The event raised the question of how I.S.I. and other intelligence agencies could show negligence. The U.S. used to provide a package of \$2 billion to subsidies the Pakistani army in the wake of the “war on terror” (CNN, 2011; Goldberg & Ambinder, 2018). According to a former I.S.I. chief, Asad Durrani, operation Geronimo was conducted with the Pakistani Army and Intelligence’s assistance as the surrounding area got evacuated 24 hours before the operation.

Pakistan could not take credit for the process because it was not to create instability. It was merely a political move (TCM, 2021, 05:00-05:56). Cooperation or breach from one side makes the public feel cheated and threatened. The one who is victim of international politics and interaction is the public. When they feel deceived by their protector, it brings them to a situation of cognitive dissonance. They could not see the army doing wrong to them as they firmly believed they were protectors and saviours. A huge stakeholder in Asia, an economic giant, and a prerequisite to meet global needs for goods and services does not make India a saint with no harm to the neighbours. She has a long history of infiltration, interference, and hijacking the neighbouring states’ local affairs (Khetran, 2017). India has been deliberately denying its role in Afghanistan against Pakistan. Indian religious groups like Jamaat-e-ulama-e-hind, foreign ministers, and local ministers have been reaching out to Taliban personnel like Fazlur Rahman. He later had a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. There has been a meeting with the key representatives and leaders of Quetta Shura, such as Hekmatyar (Paliwal, 2017: p. 228).

Contrary to this, during the service timeline of Narayanan, India has been facilitating the Afghan Taliban financially to carry out anti-Pakistan activities (Paliwal, 2017: p. 230). Barahmadagh Bugti’s grandson, Barahmadagh, has been

actively participating in the smariest Baloch movement in Baluchistan by living in Afghanistan. He amplified his grandfather's vision of a separate land from Pakistan. The campaign led to an insurrection against the army and its installation. The then head of state, General Pervez Musharraf, blamed Indians for the insurrection. The Baloch Liberation Army (B.L.A.) has been actively sabotaging the region's development work. Chinese engineers were killed and kidnapped for their cause. Later, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti got killed in the Pakistan army's operation on August 26, 2006. The event raised the concern of the Indian M.E.A. The statement from M.E.A., "the unfortunate killing of a veteran Baluch leader; a tragic loss to the people of Baluchistan and Pakistan," expressed their interest in the movement. Later, the Marri group called for Indians, and the U.S. helped explain it.

India has provided a haven and protection to the separatist leader of Baluchistan. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's blunt statement during his visit to Bangladesh confirmed their obsession with Pakistan (Khetran, 2017). Adopting the Chanakya Kautilya Arthashastra (state affairs) has taken India far in the regional dominance game. She has been funding the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam because she cites instability in Sri Lanka. The ethnic outfit of the conflict lasted over three decades in the face of developmental work in the form of the Hambantota seaport—a Chinese project. The pattern of interference and supporting terrorism in Sri Lanka is like the ethnic conflicts in Baluchistan (Khetran, 2017). According to Zabiullah Mujahid (Taliban spokesperson), "Lashkar-e-Taibah and the Taliban have never taken part in any attack in India" (Paliwal, 2017).

7. Terrorism: A Threat to Pakistan

This chapter tries to highlight the effects of events where the U.S divorced Pakistan after gaining its share of the equation. It tries to pose militant groups a threat to Pakistan's nuclear program. It provides the reason for international pressure to give up its nuclear nukes, which compromises national interest.

Resolution 1371 under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter mandated states around the globe to enhance cooperation against terrorism at regional and international levels. The resolution got adopted on September 28, 2001, in the wake of the 9/11 tragic event (OHCHR, 2003). The United States launched a global campaign to rally support for the worldwide cause. The then President of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, received a threat from the then President of the U.S., George W. Bush, to choose the U.S. side to fight the war. An aggressive attitude with an aggressive tone "threatened to bomb Pakistan back to the stone age" (Goldenberg, 2017). The threats showed the U.S. discourse of action to remove any hurdle in their way. She could do anything, at anytime and anywhere, to punish the preparers and the actors of 9/11.

Pakistan was under layers of U.S. sanctions (CEIP, 2001). Pakistan faced Symington, Glenn, and Pressler sanctions for her various acts and programs. Pa-

kistan signed a deal for F-16 aircraft and paid a partial payment to the U.S., which got turned down due to the amendment in the Symington sanction. Most of them got imposed in the aftermath of Pakistan's nuclear program. The sanction followed a democratic boycott of General Musharraf's military quo in Pakistan. Pakistan was entirely off the table for Pakistan and faced problems at the international level. The 9/11 event abruptly altered the scenario, pushing the United States toward Pakistan and off limits. In doing so, the U.S. waived all the sanctions imposed on Pakistan. In return, Pakistan assured its assistance in fighting with the U.S. as an ally against terrorism. The U.S. also announced an assistance package to conduct the actions. Why does the U.S. oblige Pakistan so much? The answer lies in the geographical location of Pakistan, shared culture with Afghanistan; information and ties with terrorist organisations; and a long history since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Without any official opposition, the U.S. used Pakistani land, maritime, and airspace as a primary supply line for logistical support for U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

The presence of terrorist organisations in Pakistan is a multi-faceted challenge for the security of the U.S. Firstly, the Pakistan army has ties with other terrorist organisations in Afghanistan and other regions of the globe (Arnoldy, 2011). Every strategy that the U.S. tried in Afghanistan failed. Pakistan's army confronted great public resistance after the forts they did not share. Secondly, Pakistan is a fragile state; at least, it is a nuclear state. Nuclear warheads and the logistics used to mobilise them are not safe. They get moved through vans without any protocol. The possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organisations is a major concern for the U.S. (CNN, 2011; Goldberg & Ambinder, 2018). The U.S. knew that Pakistan was pursuing its nuclear program to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels. General Vernon Walter presented Zia with a photograph of the Kahutta facility. He refused, commenting that it was merely a "sheep shed". Later, in 1987, the nuclear program got disclosed with the remarks that Pakistan had already developed such weapons (Abbas, 2015: p. 119). Pakistan has ramped up its nuclear proliferation program with advanced nuclear weapons. According to the SIPRI report, "the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) possessed 13,080 nuclear weapons at the beginning of 2021." The United States and Russia possess the highest number of nuclear weapons. Pakistan possessed 140 - 150 nuclear warheads until January 2018. It seems to rise to 160 in 2020 and 165 in 2021 (SIPRI, 2018). In 1950, Pakistan became the 3rd non-communist state and the first Muslim state to formally recognise the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.). The recognition laid the foundation for the formal diplomatic ties between Pakistan and the P.R.C. The first official meeting between the states took place at the Bandung Conference in 1955. P.R.C. Premier Zhou Enlai formally visited Pakistan for the first time in February 1964, which followed Pakistani President Ayyub Khan's visit to China. After the War between Pakistan and India in 1965, the two new countries

met in the middle to control and watch their borders (Azeemi, 2007).

There are different angles to see the importance of Pakistan for established and emerging global leaders. There has been much anticipation that Pakistan is essential to the U.S. in the War on Terror. “Pakistan’s importance to the U.S. goes beyond terrorism” because it involves many different parts and ideas of world politics. The most fitting analytical approach to see the tension between the People’s Republic of China and the United States is Graham Allison’s “Thucydides Trap”. According to Allison, the conflict between the P.R.C. and the U.S. is inevitable (Allison, 2021). It backs up the idea that Pakistan is vital to the U.S. because it makes it harder for the P.R.C. to become another world leader. Thucydides refers to the unavoidable conflict between two states: rising and established power.

Meanwhile, the P.R.C. is surging as a new superpower against the established superpower; the U.S. Regional stability is essential for the surge of the state. Pakistan is a fast neighbor. For Mearsheimer, “there is a likelihood that Pakistan would side with China and the U.S. would try to peel Pakistan away from China in the emerging cold war” (DAWN, 2021). According to the realist approach to international power politics, the P.R.C. would not tolerate the existence of the U.S. in the region, especially in Pakistan. It would be a direct threat to the CEPEC under the massive B.R.I. project, which is the foundation for the rise of the P.R.C. In theory, the U.S. would not want the P.R.C. to stay in the area around it, primarily through Canada. “Might makes right” is a realist approach that applies to a situation where everything is legitimate that confronts the strategic interests of a state (Mearsheimer & Johnson, 2022, 03:12-08:30).

In this situation, if Pakistan claims to have a neutral international policy and divorces the U.S., she might face the consequences. The same goes for the P.R.C., as they have invested a lot in Pakistan, which is also a turning point for Pakistan. Mearsheimer’s approach states that Pakistan’s right to have its foreign policy has nothing to do with the U.S. and P.R.C. Wishlist, if it chooses a neutral policy, it will become an imminent threat to the P.R.C.’s strategic goals; if it decides to divorce the U.S., it must get ready to fight against India. The U.S. would want to create a challenging and unstable situation in the backyard of the P.R.C. that keeps her engaged with the regional problems. A pure realist approach where ethics, rules, laws, and precedents have nothing to do with the strategic goals of states (Hughes & Lai, 2011).

General Bajwa disagreed with Prime Minister Imran Khan’s view of Pakistan’s foreign policy (Korybko, 2022; Dawn.com, 2022). It was a recent example of a regime change that showed how ties with the U.S. were affected. Pakistan has helped the U.S. in the drawdown process after the Taliban takeover. The U.S. needs Pakistan to promote its counter-terrorism in the region to make it more peaceful (Gul, 2021). Pakistan has used its links to bring the Taliban to conduct dialogue and promote the peace process. Islamabad played a crucial role in intra-Afghan negotiations and emphasised the negotiation process to resolve the

conflict over two decades (Crisis, 2021). Pakistan thinks war cannot be the answer because it has not been in the last 20 years. The only way out is to bring the Taliban into the mainstream and let them work for their people. Imran Khan helped the U.S. and secured a peaceful process. The attitude of President Biden made things worse for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Despite the gradual and slow drawdown, the Biden administration hastened the whole condition and worsened it (Afzal, 2022). Pakistan was the only country that allowed U.S. and allied troops to use its airport.

8. Conclusion

The events of 9/11 shocked the global community, but the preparators were by-products of the Soviet War. The organisation they made kept on expanding, and the fire knocked at the door of the U.S. The U.S. threatened Pakistan to comply with their anti-terrorism initiative. Pakistan's being a nuclear state and possessing terrorist organisations makes it a concern for the U.S. (Arnoldy, 2011). Both the U.S. and Pakistan feel betrayed by each other. The U.S. asked Pakistan to do more to destroy "haven" and dismantle the terrorist organisation. Pakistan claims it has done more than enough to combat the U.S. war. The war cost Pakistan \$150 billion and 70,000 lives (Ahmed, 2021). Pakistan has been an essential ally of the U.S. since its independence. The formal diplomatic relations between the two states started with the U.S. invitation to Liaqat Ali Khan in 1949 (DAWN, 2010). Pakistan remained reluctant and desperate to pick sides in power politics. Liaqat Ali Khan tilted toward Moscow, but Muhammad Ali Jinnah's remarks supported the U.S. invitation. The relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan has been divergent and convergent since independence. Pakistan sought U.S. assistance in the 1952 War but got tricked in the hour of need. It brought distrust in U.S.-Pak relations for the first time. It brought both states on one page as the U.S. entered the Soviet War in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The United States accomplished its strategic goal and divorced Pakistan until the next major event.

The Soviet War brought many changes to the region. Drug culture and terrorism were two significant byproducts of the Soviet War. The U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan legitimised using force with distorted teachings of Islam. The Soviet War made society polarised and instilled extremism, leading to the formation of extremist organisations. It kept on feeding the local resources and emerged as a global threat. In the meantime, Pakistan developed its nuclear program (Abbas, 2015: p. 119) and fought the Kargil war against India. By the time the U.S. imposed sanctions on Pakistan for its nuclear program and military presence (CEIP, 2001). The U.S. destroyed Pakistan by supporting the military quo, toppling democratic governments, working closely with terrorist organisations, and intervening in the state's sovereignty with drone attacks (Simons, 1977; Riedel, 2008; Rehman, 2013). Pakistan contains numerous domestic issues, including corrupt police, politicians, and lax law and order. Supporting a democratic gov-

ernment could help Pakistan come closer to the U.S. The post-drawdown conditions require regional collaboration to fight terrorism in the region. The U.S. could not let Pakistan go off the table to promote such a notion. Trust building is the prerequisite to restoring and enhancing the U.S-Pak relationship for a better future.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

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