

# The G5 Sahel: Security Implementation and Challenges

Alassane Camara

Central China Normal University, Wuhan, China

Email: [alasscherif10@yahoo.fr](mailto:alasscherif10@yahoo.fr)

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## Abstract

During these last decades, insecurity has been one of the most relevant issues on the political circle as well as on the academic agenda. The security implementation in the Sahel is a complex issue and must be passed by a reflection and reciprocity of the efforts of the different countries and the different partners to assure the prevention against terrorism armed groups, the organized crimes and narcotics. These implementations meet some challenges that are political, socio-economic, military and strategic order, the mutual efforts of the G5 Sahel countries member must be an essential priority, because its results will make to emerge positive profits of the setting in work of the territorial redesign strategies. The G5 Sahel or the G5S is a young institution that has been put in place while a summit on 14<sup>th</sup> to 17<sup>th</sup> February 2014 with the coalition of five countries: Mali, Burkina-Faso, Niger, Mauritania and Chad. These countries are faced to the insecurity dangers in their Sahel's space since some years, and it is through this initiative of common efforts that the G5 Sahel was created. Most of these countries are faced to insecurity challenges in their territory and this work is a way to highlight the efforts that the G5 Sahel and its different partners have established for the security implementation in the Sahel of its countries member. We also focus this work on the fact that different points are seen as blockage to the objective of functioning of this coordination framework. This work is an advantage for us to edify our two main interest points, the one based on security which is a common vision of the G5 Sahel founding's purpose and the other that focuses on challenges is a determinant aspect whose its resolution should be an emergence of the isolated zone of the G5 Sahel.

## Keywords

G5 Sahel, Security, Challenges

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## 1. Introduction

Africa is a continent full of history and wealth, but however the civil war, the lack of development, the bad governance and the insecurity are monopolizing its sustainable emergence. The context of the G5 Sahel is a mean to show the efforts that the five countries member putted together to defend their Sahel space. The 2012 Malian's crisis is one of the most sources of degradation of the Sahel's security and has reached progressively different border countries as Niger and Burkina-Faso which is called the zone of three borders or the Liptako-Gourma. In the positive objective of this work, the satisfying ambition consists to make a deepened survey on the security realities undertaken by the countries member of the G5 Sahel. The insecurity in the Sahel zone of these countries is a very ambiguous debate that is hardly managed by the G5 Sahel countries because of the weakness of different national army faced to the terrorist armed groups. The will of the heads of states of the G5 Sahel consists to find a common solution to the perpetuated insecurity in their isolated zone, caused by certain terrorists armed groups or drug traffickers such as: Boko Haram, MUJWA: The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, Ansar-Dine, Al-Mourabitoun, AQIM: the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, ISGS: the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, JNIM or GSIM. The G5 Sahel since its creation is based on two aspects to know: security and development, but in this work we will focus only in the security aspect and the challenges that create a delay of the durable security implementation. The fight against terrorist armed group is one of the major missions of the creation of this institution, the countries member of the G5S are faced frequently to acts of depredations, murders and kidnappings orchestrated by terrorist armed groups without mercy and disturbed the quietude of the peaceful population. These missions of security are executed by a force established within the institution named the G5 Sahel Joint force and also supported by some international partners which already exercise military's actions in the targeted zone of the G5S countries member to know: MINUSMA, Operation Barkhane, EUTM-MALI.

The main objective of this research consists mainly to explain the strategies that is used for the security implementation in the Sahel by the G5 Sahel and its partners in order to defend the crisis perpetuated in isolated zone and the reason is as well academic as educative will to deepen and sensitive the vision of world on the danger that face this part of Africa. Many reasons make us interested to this research because the danger of terrorist armed group in the G5 Sahel countries becomes more and more bipolar and widen in other part. Without a mutual combat, the security implementation will be impossible that is why it is important for us to work on this subject and conduct international and regional partners to bring their support for the best objectives.

The G5 Sahel in this present context appears like a weapon of fight setting up by its heads of states to counter the terrorist armed groups in their Sahel's surface and this work comes to complete others writings that are used as source to

our literature review. These sources are related to the same issues or looked for the same issue for the positive purpose of the G5 Sahel. The scientific Survey of Mr. Issa KONFOUROU a post doctorate in his research titled: “Le G5: une tentative de coordination des efforts nationaux au regard des stratégies de sécurisation et de développement au Sahel” has been benefic to this research because the authors emphasis in particularly the G5 Sahel as a commencement of solution against terrorism and highlighted the implication of exterior partners in the security and development process. A report written by Abdelhak Bassou in OCP Policy Center in October 2017:”L’Etat, les frontières et le territoire au Sahel: Cas du G5 Sahel” was a relevant case study on G5S with its principles concepts of philosophy. The Joint Force that rallied to this institution plays a big role to counter the terrorist groups, this aspect has been enumerated well by researcher Djiby Sow in his article “*Force Conjointe Du G5 Sahel: Perspective Stratégique Sur L’appropriation Sécuritaire Par Les Etats Sahéliens*”: in this writing Mr. Sow evoked the implementation of the G5 Sahel joint force in the space of Sahel that make face to some potential obstacle in the area of intervention then also with its partners notably France.

This work analyses the security mechanism that the G5 Sahel through its partners have undertaken to secure its space and different challenges that can appear to its achievement, the main question is: how the G5 Sahel is fighting against terrorist armed groups despite the challenges? Our work compounds: 1) The convention establishing the creation the G5 Sahel; 2) The organ of the G5 Sahel; 3) The security implementation; 4) The challenges; and finally a conclusion.

## 2. The Convention Establishing the Creation of the G5 Sahel

The Group of Five for the Sahel or G5 Sahel is an institutional framework organization founded in while a summit of 14<sup>th</sup> to 17<sup>th</sup> February 2014 in Nouakchott (Sahel, 2014), by Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. The G5 Sahel is created with purpose of combining security and development through regional cooperation. It came about at a time of rising regional security concerns, marked by the proliferation of terrorist armed groups across the Sahel region. The presidency of the G5 Sahel in 2020 is assured by the Mauritanian president Mr. Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani and its permanent secretariat station is confided to the Nigerien Maman Sambo SIDIKOU. The G5 Sahel works in partnership with different international organizations that bring a logistical and financial supports for the achievement of its daily missions.

The G5 Sahel in its convention established on December 2014 had stipulated in its preamble some main points permitting the good achievement of the organization. These points play an important role in the execution of the G5 Sahel’s tasks. They are based mainly on the founding on the ties seculars and multiform that unites the peoples of the Sahel; to conjugate their efforts in order to make the Sahel a space of peace, concord and prosperity. The interdependence of the challenges of security and development is also an essential point to con-

sider with the challenges that face the region of the Sahel. The preamble also stipulated a common action of the G5S countries to raise these challenges of integration and the solidarity between States that are indispensable for the optimization of the potentialities exploitation and the backing of resilience. This convention had encouraged the countries member of the G5 Sahel to a common will to cooperate between them and to negotiate with the technical partners and public or private financials in order to find some harmonious solutions to the problems that touch the security and the development of the States of the G5 Sahel and Renewed their firm condemnation of terrorism under all its forms and reaffirmed their determination to preserve the territorial integrity of the States and to work together in order to assure the security in the Sahel space.

This convention is the main basic that permitted the setting of the different organs of functioning of the G5 Sahel, and these organs play an important role in the G5S missions in the security aspect. Five organs have been approved and each of them works on a strategic issue within its Executive Secretariat. In this convention the interest is also to permit to all countries member to participate at the defense of Sahel territory and establish through its organs some mechanism of security strategy for sustainable and prosperous future. The will and researched goal of the heads of states of the G5 Sahel determine plenty the role that these organs exercise in the bureaucracy and in the tasks of security implementation. The following part below of this work will permit to know these organs and their functioning.

### 3. The Organs of the G5 Sahel

As each institution the G5 Sahel have five organs of working that consist to elaborate the system of work implemented by the different representative of countries member as a road map for the reinforcement of security and durable development. The organs of the G5 Sahel are the work center of the institution that permit to undertaken the various project and agreement establishing a durable security in the Sahel's space and to resolve the challenges that the security faces. Each organ has its own assigned mission established by the heads of states and its objective is to coordinate and organize the security missions of the G5 Sahel. These organs are: The Conference of the heads of state; The Council of Ministers; the Executive Secretariat; the Defense and Security Committee; the National Coordination Committees of the G5 Sahel Actions. Then there is also a support organ which is not part of the five main organs above, but plays a relevant role in the achievement of the missions named: the Meeting of Experts.

**The Conference of the Heads of State:** It meets once in ordinary session per year. It can meet in extraordinary session on convocation of the President of the Conference or to the demand of one or several heads of state every time that of need. It assures the political tutelage and the management of the political interfaces of the strategy. The conference of the heads of state being the supreme organ of the institution with the five heads of member states of the G5 Sahel, it is the main basis of all decisions taken in the projects and actions of the G5 Sahel.

The most recent conference had taken place in February, 25, 2020 in Nouakchott the Mauritania's capital under the presidency of Burkina-Faso head of state Mr. Roch Marc Christian KOBORE incumbent president of the G5 Sahel, replaced at the time of this 6<sup>th</sup> conference by his homologue of Mauritania Mr. Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani president of the Islamic state of Mauritania (Session, 2020).

**The Council of Ministers:** It unites the ministers in charge of the economy and the planning of the Development of the countries members of the G5 Sahel and ministers of which the programs and projects are registered on the agenda of the Conference.

**The Executive Secretariat:** The Executive Secretariat of the G5 Sahel assures the management of the strategic interfaces, the administration of the common fund of financing, the piloting and the impulse operational, the management of the operational interfaces, the operational management, the follow-up and assessment of the strategy.

**The Defense and Security Committee:** The actions of the Defense and Security Committees consist in acting together for the control of the border spaces of the Sahel against the groups terrorist and criminal armies that are played of the borders, and its objective also aims to control the border spaces in order to isolate these armed groups and to limit their liberty of action then to reduce them. The perspectives of this committee of defense and security are henceforth foreseeable to capitalize on this experience to put some place of the permanent mechanisms of coordination and cooperation in the border spaces. Then in this ideology only two words of order must guide this progression: Efficiency and pragmatism.

**The National Coordination Committees of the G5 Sahel:** this committee represent the focal point of the G5 Sahel, Created by decree n° 2015-1136/PRES/-TRANS/PM/MEF of October 07, 2015, the National Coordination Committees of the G5 Sahel is a structure interdepartmental setting up in every member state of the G5 Sahel, to assure the coordination and the follow-up of the setting in work of the strategies and actions developed in the setting of Cooperation between the States of the Sahel. The inaugural session of the NCC Sahel was held October 20, 2017 and had allowed the participants to put up to date the lists statutory members, to share some information on the G5 Sahel and to plan the activities for the rest of the year 2017 and 2018.

**The Meeting of the Experts:** It is charged of the technical preparation of the files submitted to the Council of ministers of the G5 Sahel. It regroups the experts of the five countries members of the G5. The expert members of the national committees having assured the mastery of work of the files of projects in the preparation or the execution participate to the meeting of the experts. The meeting of the experts brings a technical support to the Executive Secretariat. It is convened and is organized by the Executive Secretariat. It is preside by the Ministry in charge of the economy and the development planning of the country that welcomes it or his representative. The secretariat of the meeting of the ex-

perts is assured by the Executive Secretariat of the G5 Sahel.

#### **4. The Security Implementation**

The relevant role of the G5 Sahel to consolidate the security is established with the support of the partner forces that had already started to take place in the Sahel zone mainly in the north Mali since the 2012 crisis. To the G5 Sahel Joint Force adds the French military operation Barkhane, the mission of the United Nations MINUSMA and the European Union's mission for training in Mali. In this work we should understanding that the achievement of G5 Sahel mission for the security cannot be resolve without external supports.

The G5 Sahel is a young institution that is in its execution phase, to this effect it needed of a financial, materiel and logistics supports. France is an important partner for this support and occupies a strategic place in the fight against terrorist armed groups in the Sahel. Nevertheless because of the proliferation of Jihadist groups France was frequently criticized of complicity by the population of the G5 Sahel countries member, but suite to the conference at PAU (PAU, 2020) between the Heads of State and the French president Mr. Emmanuel Macron many explanations had been underlined for a new vision of cooperation.

##### **4.1. The G5 Sahel Joint Force**

The countries of the G5 Sahel are confronted to the progression of the terrorist acts that creates the destabilization of the region and facing these common challenges, the answer must be political and military. This is how the heads of states of the G5 Sahel announced on November 20, 2015 the formation of a military joint force anti-terrorist who illustrates the will of the Sahel leaders to take in charge their own security, it has been named the G5 Sahel Joint Force or the FC-G5S. Unfortunately this FC-G5S lingered to get in place until February 2017 where it was reactivated and recognized by African Union in April 2017 and validated by the council of Security of the UN by its resolution 2359 on June 21 2017 ranged by France (Resolution 2359, 2017). The Joint Force was officially launched on July 02, 2017 by the presidents of the five States of the Sahel exposed to the terrorist threat.

The G5 Sahel joint force is the military force that falls under the auspices of the Group of Five of the Sahel, a sub regional organization formed in February 2014 to bolster cooperation around development and to unify collective action against common threats such as terrorist armed groups and organized crime. It can be categorized as what the AU calls "ad hoc security initiatives coalitions" (Commission, 2017) that are authorized but not mandated by the Peace and Security Council, and which create security pacts to enable their forces to conduct cross-border operations to target common threats. The G5 Sahel joint force is a flexible device planned to adapt to the evolution of the threat and to be flexible according to the priorities of intervention. Its mandate is to fight against terrorism, the cross-border crime organized and the traffic of human beings in the

space of the G5 Sahel. Its first operation had taken place in November 2017 with the army of Burkina-Faso, Mali and Niger baptized Operation Hawbi. The second named Pagnali was conducted in January 2018 in the border zone between Mali and Burkina Faso with the objective of destroying the supply chains of the terrorist armed groups and to contain their movements. The joint Force gathers 5 000 men in full operational capacity: 7 battalions distributed on three spindles West, Center and East. It intervenes on a strip of 50 km on both sides of the common borders.

The G5 Sahel has developed a Concept of Operations CONOPS, approved by the AU peace security council on 13 April 2017 ([Communiqué, 2017](#)). This mandate contains all the elements of a stabilization strategy which combines counter terrorism with softer tasks such as: facilitating humanitarian assistance and development. Other aspects of the mandate are the responsibility of actors like national governments and external partners. The current priority is to detect and neutralize all terrorist groups of concern as well as to prevent trafficking and disrupt supply chains; to cut off the groups from their sources of funding. Some specific operations consist to isolate terrorist and criminal groups to deny them of their support basis, neutralize these groups, protect the local population and control the area. The joint force also aims to make more permanent the national military presence in the border posts.

#### **4.2. The Operation Barkhane**

Barkhane is a French military operation succeeded to Operation Serval launched in Malian territory on 2013. The operation barkhane has been launched on August 1st, 2014 ([Barkhane, 2014](#)) with wider geographic focus. This force has approximately in its commencement 4500 soldiers spread out between Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad and its headquarters is in N'Djamena Chad's capital. Barkhane has in its possession some fighter aircraft and basis for intelligence collection and operations in Niamey the Nigerien capital, Agadez, Arlit, Tillabéry, and several other sites, as well as around 1500 troops in northern Mali scattered between the large basis at Gao, Kidal, Timbuktu, and Tessalit, and more recently a basis at Gossi closer to central Mali as well as the border with Burkina Faso.

Operation Barkhane is France's largest overseas operation, it engages in everything from combat patrols alongside Malian forces and training to local development activities that is a means to fill the hole left the absent government. Despite this social assistance, French officers insist that Barkhane's priority is counterterrorism and it has demonstrated in northern Mali in killing important jihadist leaders and destroyed their hiding area. In order to participate in the stabilization of the Sahel zone, Barkhane pursues its struggle against the terrorist armed groups in eradicating their possibility to reconstitute their refuge zones, in cutting their logistical fluxes and collaborating with the partner forces to face the security challenges. The operations aims to reduce the liberty of action of the

terrorists and to deprive them of their means of fight, by dismantling their arms hide munitions, explosives and means of communication.

Around 4 700 soldiers are expanded, in the setting of the operation Barkhane. Since July 26, 2019, they are placed under the command of the General of division Pascal Façon that operates from an inter-army commandment post of unique theater parked to Ndjamenia in Chad. The mechanism of intervention of Barkhane articulates around three permanent points of support: Gao in Mali, Niamey in Niger and Ndjamenia in Chad.

### **4.3. MINUSMA**

MINUSMA is the United Nations multidimensional integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali created on April 25, 2013, following a resolution of the UN Security Council ([Resolution 2100, 2013](#)). It replaced the International Mission of support in Mali under African leadership called Support Mission for Mali MISMA that was under the commandment of ECOWAS and African Union. The present strategic objective of the mission is to push the implementation of the agreements of peace and the restoration of the authority of the Malian state. The mission consisted on March 31, 2019: 16,453 people, 12,644 soldiers, 1734 policemen, 454 Officers of major state, 1421 civilians, 39 special experts and 161 volunteers.

MINUSMA in its commencement was focus in the stabilization mission in Mali, but the degrading security situation in the north of Mali which reached other borders countries has called the UN mission to bring their support to different forces located in Sahel for the struggle against the terrorist armed groups and this support is mainly closed to the G5 Sahel joint force. The Security Council of the UN gave its agreement for cooperation between the joint force of G5 Sahel and its multidimensional integrated stabilization mission in Mali and Henceforth MINUSMA had been able to push operational and logistical way to the G5 Sahel joint force.

The partnership between MINUSMA and the G5 Sahel is as well necessary as the operation barkhane, regarding what we has notified before this institution needs of all its partners for the implementation of its security mission and for the resilience of population to believe to the emergence of their territory. The heads of states of the G5 Sahel still continues to call the UN Security Council to reform the mandate of MINUSMA considering the actual situation of the Sahel in putting under the article VII of the UN's charter. The interest of this required reform will permit a closer partnership of the MINUSMA to act military with the G5 Sahel joint force.

### **4.4. EUTM-MALI**

EUTM-MALI is a military mission of the European Union aiming to contribute to the training of the Malian armed forces, it is also able to provide a military aid to the G5 Sahel joint force as well as to the national armed force in the countries of the G5 Sahel, by advice, actions of training and a framing soldiers. The mis-

sion has been established in 2013, to the demand of the Malian government, in order to answer the need to reinforce the capacities of the Malian armed forces, with for ultimate objective to assure a sure and secured environment inside the Malian borders and to reduce the threat that the terrorist groups represent. On last March 23<sup>rd</sup> the European Union council has extended its mandate until May 18, 2024. The Council also endowed the mission of an indicative budget of 133.7 millions of Euros for a period of four years. The activities of the mission continue to be led in coordination and narrow cooperation with other actors as the United Nations, the operation Barkhane and the Economic Community of West African States. The EUTM-MALI appears in the setting of the integrated approach of the EU concerning security and development in the Sahel. To this effect, the EUTM-MALI contributes to improve the operational capacities of the Malian armed forces. The tasks done by the mission are under the control of the legitimate civil authorities of Mali without any fight operations.

As we have affirmed above, we should recognize that the security implementation of the G5 Sahel is mainly sustained by international support and the different one mentioned such as: Barkhane, MINUSMA, EUTM-MALI and the G5 Sahel joint force are some missions since their implementation in the Sahel countries have played an important place in the fighting against terrorist armed groups. Each of them have created an indispensable link with the G5S countries member, the security implementation should not be continual without their daily support in several sectors such as: logistic, military, infrastructure and training. The fact that Sahel space is large and isolated creates the lack of governance and the multiplicity of jihadist group that is made difficult its secure and this bilateral cooperation with international supports are necessarily advantageous for a durable security.

## 5. Challenges

The G5 Sahel countries Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger are confronted with multiple challenges. These challenges causes a lot delay in the sustainable functioning of the G5 Sahel missions, this part of our work is a manner to enumerate these specifics points which since the creation of the institution are intervening in the Sahel and they are based in the order of financial, territorial, military, and governmental.

### 5.1. Challenges of Financial and Military Viability

The G5 Sahel was set up after the one of regional Multinational Joint Task Force MNJTF which was established and began operations to tackle the Boko Haram uprising in the Lake Chad basin. The MNJTF cited as an example to follow due to its relative success of containing the expansion of Boko Haram (EU, 2017). In the case of the G5 Sahel the imitation is difficult at least for three reasons: firstly the armies' capabilities are not comparable. The MNJTF had benefited of power military materials from Nigerian army, the veteran soldiers of Chad, and the long experience of Cameroon army contrarily to the three countries of danger

zone of Liptako-Gourma Mali, Burkina-Faso and Niger which are more weaknesses than strengths. The army of Burkina Faso and intelligence services is immersed in a restructuring process after President Compaoré's downfall in October 2014. The army of Niger must operate with a budget that has a chronic deficit, and the Malian army exists on paper, its operational capability is weak. Its reorganization process is progressing very slowly, and it largely remains the same disorganized armed force as it was before Captain Sanogo's coup d'état in March 2012. Not as weak as its neighbors in the central Sahel region, the armies of Mauritania and Chad are far to be desperate. Despite a good reputation for its intelligence services and rapid intervention units, Mauritania has not participated in any major combat situations for the past four years which is weakened the military capacities of the G5 Sahel. Chad's soldiers also start to get tired and discouraged regarding their multiple participation in various field. Despite having superior capabilities than the other three members of the G5 Sahel, both of these armed forces are distanced from the current struggle in the central sector, around the Liptako-Gourma region.

Secondly, the G5 Sahel lacks of donor among its members able to disburse an important sum from its own money, as happened in the case of Nigeria in the MNJTF. Each of these countries pains hardly to finance their national army and it will be impossible to support a great part of funding of the institution. The initial budget for its functioning was set at 423 million of Euros for its first twelve months of operations. This amount was envisaged as follows: 230 million for investments, 110 million to cover initial operations, and 83 million to pay the troops. The EU has donated 50 million of Euros, not including France's 8 million, and the G5 Sahel countries member have each contributed 10million of Euros, while Saudi Arabia has pledged to donate 84.8 million of Dollars. Thirdly, the MNJTF was fighting against a single common enemy Boko Haram, isolated in a relatively confined area in the Lake Chad basin. The G5 Sahel countries are facing a different reality. Their troops are fighting in a far wider area containing a proliferation of terrorist armed groups that are intertwined and often split up into different fractions, making it hazardous even just pinpointing the actual target: "Right now, we don't really know who we're going to be fighting against", admitted a high-ranking member of Burkina Faso's army (Gendarmerie, 2016). This rising of armed groups is the most challenges that the countries members of G5 Sahel are faced continuously. This challenge in our work cause a doubt on the financial achievement of the institution and show the weakness of different national armies of the G5S face to the accelerated expansion of the jihadist groups.

## **5.2. Challenges of Jihadist Groups Expansion**

In recent years jihadist groups in the Sahel have increased both in number and scope. Mali is often considered to be the epicenter of violence, following the Islamic occupation of three of northern regions of Mali: Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal (Group, 2013). While the French Operation Serval succeeded in containing the

progress of the Islamist coalition, its protagonists retreated and regrouped in the rural hinterlands had begun to be reform. Since 2015, insecurity has been escalating in the central regions of Mali precisely Mopti and Ségou and many acts of insecurity was targeted MINUSMA, Barkhane and and FAMA (Thiam, 2017). The main jihadist actor operating in this area is known as the Katibat Macina or Macina Liberation Front (Group, 2015), led by Fulani preacher, Hamadoun Kouffa. The group is considered to be an offshoot of Ansar Dine and collaborated with the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims known by its Arabic acronym, JNIM. Violent activities perpetrated by jihadist groups have also emerged in the North of Burkina Faso notably in provinces of Soum, Loroum and Yatenga, and south-western regions of Niger at Tillabéri and Tahoua. In Burkina Faso, the jihadist insurgency by Ansaroul Islam is a product of discontent within the social order of the north, and should therefore not be interpreted as only a spillover from central Mali (Group, 2018). Ansaroul Islam, led by a close friend of Kouffa named Malam Dicko has had appeal in Soum province, because it channeled the grievances of the lower social classes, who were frustrated about rigid social stratification. It also tapped into the sense of abandonment and lack of confidence in Burkinabe state institutions.

Since early 2017 in Niger, several attacks have been perpetrated along its border with Mali by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara ISGS a Daesh offshoot led by Abou Walid Al Sahraoui. The Institute for Security Studies found that jihadist insurgent groups operating on the Niger-Mali border have recruited among the Fulani community and mainly by exploiting longstanding tensions between the Fulani Tollèbè of Niger and the Touareg Daoussahaq of Mali (Studies, 2017). The merging of Islamist groups in March 2017 into JNIM including Ansar Dine, Al-Mourabitoun, the Katibat Macina and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is a strategic move to create a common, united front against the G5 Sahel joint force in order to attack more sophisticated and frequent in area of Liptako. The jihadist group expansion in the Sahel is became very frequent these last years in the countries member of the G5 Sahel and in general it is because of instability crisis that happens in the political governance, most of the G5S countries have suffered of insurrection and post electoral crisis that more affected the stability of governance.

### 5.3. Challenges of Governance and Stability

Many countries in the Sahel are locked in a vicious cycle. Continual attacks of instability disfavor democratic gains and the prospects of consolidation. At the same time, fragile political systems, fragmented societies, weak party systems and the limited authority of the government facilitate political instability. This cycle is rooted in the fact that the state has yet to achieve a monopoly of the legitimate use of force. Reflecting their colonial inheritance and the challenges of state-building with limited resources, the G5 Sahel countries characterize a centre-periphery in which the capacity of the government to maintain order decrease further it moves from the centre to the periphery. When it comes to the

quality of democracy, there is considerable variation within the Sahel. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger all feature fragile democratic systems with some level of competition. According to the latest release of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index BTI, Niger and Burkina Faso are defective democracies while Mali is a highly defective democracy. However, these are all relatively new political dispensations, as they emerged out of the 2014 insurrection in Burkina Faso, the coups d'état in Mali on 2012 and Niger in 2010. These countries maintain relatively a political landscape, in which public grievances can be aired, but stability and good governance are limited and the democratic gains achieved in recent years are vulnerable to reversal. By contrast, Chad and Mauritania can be considered like authoritarian regimes, with the BTI ranking Mauritania as a moderate autocracy and Chad as one of the most authoritarian states on the Sahel continent are source of the level of government repression and the fragmented nature of opposition parties and civil society groups and the political liberalization appears unlikely in the short-term. The countries of the G5 Sahel are faced to the incapacity to manage their territory in general and their Sahel space in particular which is became the surface of traffickers business and rebel groups 'exactions. The good governance is an important source of development of a country but if it is failed, that can create economic, social and security disorganization. The heads of states of the G5S should review their policy of governance in order to facilitate the military actions within their crisis zones and mainly the deployment of the different forces located in the Sahel such as the G5 Sahel joint force.

#### **5.4. Challenges of the G5 Sahel Joint Force Effective Deployment**

The effective deployment of the G5 Sahel joint force or the FC-G5S is as well military, financial and as territorial, because the armed forces of different countries member are not completely trained to make face to the dangers perpetuated in the Sahel by terrorist armed groups. The Sahel's territories are frequently left under occupation of the various jihadist groups or traffickers that terrorize the peaceful population and create a sentiment of abandon of the localities or a sentiment of joining these groups by the youth of the Sahel. The finding of the force is also one the major challenges for its deployment, the assigned budget for the operations are hardly achieved. In 2018 the attack of the headquarters at Sèvaré in centre of Mali has negatively marked the ambitions of the joint force to face the jihadist groups. As mentioned above the solicited budget is around 423M of Euros and to reach the Operational Commandment Force, the FC-G5S should raise many challenges of which most obvious and knew is the question of financing. This sum consists on one hand of the cost of installation of the Commandment Post and equipment of the battalions, and of the other the cost of yearly working of the joint force once they reached operational commandment force.

The North part of Mali is still not in definitive control of Malian authority, this inexistence can affected the process of the joint force to implement its hegemony in the space of three borders. The positive progress of this zone called

Liptako-Gourma depends automatically with the common will of countries member of the G5 Sahel to combine their force in order to secure the Sahel's space for a sustainable deployment of the joint force. We should remind that the heads of states of the G5 Sahel are motivated to plenty exercise the military actions of the joint force that remain the final objective. According to the exactions inflicted to the population in these zones, the bad souvenirs have also created a lack of confidence and fear to collaborate with the military authority for the fight against the terrorist armed groups. These last months the concerning situation of insecurity has provoked a lot of questions about the position of France on the struggle against Terrorist in the Sahel, and these thoughts have stopped temporarily the partnership between France and G5 Sahel countries. The challenges of the G5 Sahel countries are also the same challenges for the European countries. The actions of France are recognized especially and are appreciated in western Africa countries and specifically in the region of the Sahel. France is in first line of the international effort to support African capacities concerning peace and security. It is the sense of the Barkhane Operation, loaded to lean the armed forces of the G5S countries in their joint operations against the terrorist groups. And the clarification of cooperation between France and the G5 Sahel countries will permit to give credibility to their mission. Thus, if France must absolutely intervene militarily to protect the civil populations and to fight against the terrorist groups, it should commit that to the demand of the countries concerned without any dark interest and respecting the rule of political authority of these Sahel countries, the respect of these rules to improve the challenges that faced the countries member.

## 6. Conclusion

The creation of the G5 Sahel is the beginning of a meaningful answer, in what it marks the will of the leaders of its five countries members to join their efforts in the fight against these common threats. The organization is the setting of cooperation between the concerned countries and their international partners and some progress have been achieved in this perspective. However, the G5 Sahel must again and especially raise the multiple and complex challenges that stake out its progress toward a stability and a durable security. The ambient insecurity context in the region, caused by the absence of state, the presence of groups terrorist, the obstinate internal crises, the populations poverty, the bad governance remain the major challenges for the countries of the Sahel region. At the term of this work we can affirm that this institutional framework of the G5 Sahel must be encouraged and assisted by international and regional partners. Presently the combat in the Sahel is not only a matter affecting the Sahel's countries but the whole world and we should combine our efforts for a common force to eradicate the dangers of terrorism, organized crime and jihadist groups.

## Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

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