



(In)Effectiveness If Military Intervention under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P): A Case Study of Libya

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How to cite this paper: Wamulume, W.G., Tajari, A. and Sariburaja, K. (2022) (In)Effectiveness If Military Intervention under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P): A Case Study of Libya. *Open Access Library Journal*, 9: e8688.
<https://doi.org/10.4236/oalib.1108688>

Received: April 6, 2022
Accepted: May 21, 2022
Published: May 24, 2022

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Abstract

One of the worst conflicts that happened after the Cold war was the Rwanda Genocide in 1994, which can be defined as a crime against humanity. The Rwandan genocide had demonstrated the limits of state sovereignty and an emerging norm in international society; the Responsibility to Protect (hereafter R2P) has had significant developments both in academic and policy debate and has raised fundamental issues about the legitimacy and effectiveness of humanitarian intervention and the protection of civilians in international relations. Founded on the ideational underpinnings of humanitarian intervention, the doctrine has been confused to be a legitimization for military intervention in an era of a different understanding of state sovereignty and the response to mass atrocities. This article integrates both theoretical insights of neorealism and constructivism as well as discussions such as human security, national interest, and state sovereignty. This is done using data derived from qualitative research methods as a perspective exploring the framework of the R2P doctrine and the factors that justify the sanctioned UNSC use of force under the framework of the R2P in response to the systematic and widespread nature of the violence committed during the civil war in Libya between rebel forces and the Gaddafi regime in 2011. This article then analyses the (in)effectiveness of the military intervention under the framework of the R2P doctrine and the impacts of the military intervention on Libya, and the future of the doctrine using content analysis as the adopted methodology is influenced by the nature of the research problem and objectives using single case study research.

Subject Areas

International Security, International Relations, Military Intervention

Keywords

R2P, Military Intervention, Libya, Legitimacy, (In)Effectiveness

1. Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the increase in internal conflicts and domestic violence had opened many options for order and security. The complexities of intrastate conflicts in International Relations continue to challenge the Westphalian traditional conceptions of state sovereignty and the norms of non-interference in domestic affairs of sovereign states. The failure of the international community to intervene in Rwanda 1994 to protect civilian populations from genocide and systematic ethnic cleansing, coupled with the debates on the humanitarian interventions during the 1990s. These horrors still loom fresh at the failure of the UN and the wider international community in the protection of civilians [1]. According to former UNSG Kofi Annan, “*if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of fundamental human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?*” This question had challenged the international community and raised the most often problematic and controversial topic of military intervention which was an essential part of an emerging norm in international society and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was to answer this question. The R2P was an initiative by the Canadian government established at the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001 (hereafter ICISS). The ICISS aimed at finding the solution to military intervention and the clash in norms between the protection of vulnerable civilian populations and state sovereignty in international relations [2].

The development of the R2P doctrine has since had a major shift on the humanitarian intervention discourse as established by the ICISS report and later further developed at the 2005 UN World Summit with the introduction of new ways of reconciliation with state sovereignty which was the outcome document. Sovereign governments and heads of states have the final shape of the new principle as a functional and accepted norm in international society seeking to reinforce the fundamental element of state sovereignty to protect populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. The emphasis was made on the sovereign rights which are also described in IHL and further reaffirmed by the R2P doctrine with a focus on the ethical, political, and legal status of future humanitarian interventions [3]. The concept of human security established in 1994 by the UNDP Report is at the core of these developments which shifts the paradigm further from security threatening statehood to a much more human-centered approach which is the foundation of the R2P doctrine as identified by the ICISS report. The concept of human security had significantly

shifted the language of humanitarian interventions to the responsibility to protect thus making the doctrine even more contested as initially put in rather general terms by the international community at the 2005 World Summit drawing the limits of state sovereignty and the protection of vulnerable civilian populations [4].

The Libyan case is indeed unique as this was the first time in the history of the UN system where the UNSC authorized the use of force without the consent of the state but with some form of regional consent which proved vital regarding the R2P authorizing resolution 1973 to enforce military intervention for the sole protection of civilians. This case proved the acceptance by the international community of the norm of R2P and its growth in response to fundamental human rights violations, particularly the right to life. The R2P principle established at the UN 2005 World Summit was the Outcome Document and later adopted by the UNSC in 2006, the emerging norm has since been a major development in international society restricted to four crimes namely genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. These crimes are the threshold that would trigger military intervention when all peaceful means fail and the sovereign government is unable or unwilling to protect their populations from the four crimes mentioned above as the R2P prioritizes human security over state security in the 21st century.

The R2P doctrine recognizes and emphasizes the responsibility of the international community to assist sovereign governments in the fulfillment of their responsibility to protect civilians as a duty inherent in state sovereignty. However, much of the academic literature confuses the R2P doctrine as a legitimization for military intervention and the Libyan case is unique as it shows the controversies of military intervention and the need for effective implementation of the R2P doctrine in dictatorial regimes making it even more problematic given the complexities involving mixed motivations of military intervention by hegemonic powers particularly when regime change is the primary objective for the use of force [5]. Notwithstanding, the R2P doctrine is not limited to military intervention but rather has other preventive measures that can be applied for the protection duty under the R2P framework. This encompasses a continuum for intervention as follows: 1) the responsibility to prevent, 2) the responsibility to react, and 3) the responsibility to rebuild. The international community must assist and utilize early warnings, heavy diplomatic pressure, sanctions, political, and the responsibility to react with coercive measures such as military intervention as a last resort would be utilized after all peaceful measures have been exhausted. The military intervention must be represented for legitimate humanitarian purposes to prevent genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against humanity under the R2P framework with a responsibility to rebuild after the intervention to ensure durable peace [6].

It is worthy to mention that the guidelines on military force and when foreign intervention could be justified primarily for civilian protection on humanitarian

grounds are not new as the roots date back to the international relations theory of Michel Walzer found in his Just War theory which distinguishes under what circumstances it would be legitimate to resort to the use of force and how this force must be applied in extreme circumstances that in his words “shock the moral conscience of mankind”. He argues that the state concerned has a moral obligation to protect fundamental individual rights within its domestic borders. These guidelines remain relevant for the R2P doctrine and provide a starting point to assess the (in)effectiveness of the military intervention in Libya under the R2P framework as the problem most importantly remains after the authorization of the use of force during military intervention which must be consistent with the criteria for the use of force to ensure more accountability and success [7].

2. Framework of Analysis and Literature Review

2.1. Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis

This article seeks to explain the (in)effectiveness of military intervention from different points of view. Different concepts and theories can be used to examine such problems and ways to deal with them. Concepts and theories such as human security, sovereignty, national interests, theory of Constructivism, and (neo)realism can be applied to understand the issues.

The R2P doctrine takes its roots from a human security approach and it is cardinal to sell the idea that the concept of Human security is one with the primary focus on the people to protect individual beings from want of freedom and poverty to bring about fundamental changes in societal perceptions of the concept of human security through human development as a tool for the security of the people [8]. As mentioned earlier, the end of the Cold War opened many options of order and security within domestic borders with the increase in complex intrastate conflicts, the concept of security remains one of the most contested concepts in international relations. However, in line with the UNDP, this Human Development Report of 1994 is a human security agenda promoted by the UN as a legitimizing tool for the new concept of Human Security beyond national security which has for a long time been perceived in terms of geography and military power as one way to force states to pay more attention to the needs and protections of their citizens [9].

Secondly, the debates of humanitarian intervention and the proliferation of civil wars since the end of the Cold War challenged the traditional concept of sovereignty by reconceptualizing it to include a state responsibility to protect and prevent the occurrence of gross and systematic violations of fundamental individual human rights within domestic borders grounded in the value of human dignity. This reconceptualization of sovereignty is to be responsible and accountable for the welfare of citizens as a respected member where the international society would not live up to its responsibility. The international community has the responsibility to assist the sovereign in the fulfillment of its respon-

sibility. Nonetheless, the concept of sovereignty continues to be one of the most contested concepts in International Relations and to include the protection of civilians where the interests and safety of the individuals are to be paramount and the state subordinate with the primary purpose of the state is the assurance of the protection of the individual interests of human beings [10].

Thirdly, the concept of national interest is the domain of international politics and gives special importance to a conventional perspective of the study of international relations as the international system in the context of international relations is a power struggle, and this reason, national interest is the primary objective of a nation-states' foreign policy. Morgenthau asserts that "every political action is seen as directed towards keeping, increasing or demonstrating power" in other words national interest can be defined as maximizing power wherein an international anarchic system without any central capable police of guaranteeing security, states' will continue to intervene where their national interests are vital and where state power gives a chance for the demonstration of successful military capabilities [11].

The theory of constructivism at its core is focused on ideas or rather shared ideas, the role that consciousness plays in social life in shaping state behavior adopting different attitudes towards nation-states from a constructivist approach on the individual level of analysis of state leaders whether friends or enemies. Constructivism has a deep view of world politics and acknowledges the significance of power and interest in international relations arguing that identities and interests are social constructions. This theory focuses on how the world works and how agents relate to the social international structure resting on the assumption that actors in the international system do anything rationally with both individual and national interests in the pursuit of social norms and ideas. Indeed, for the constructivists material capabilities in international relations matter most in a condition of international anarchy where the extent to which this capability matter depends on norms, beliefs, ideas, and with shared expected behaviors with these factors influencing decisions by referring to them as factors justifying their actions, for example, the shared notions that shape the use of force [12].

Realism remains the most dominant school of thought in international relations and can be used as the foundation and the starting point of debates on humanitarian interventions. The theory is also a starting point to the formation of any state foreign policy as states recognize each other as moral and legal actors in their internal and external security functions [13]. Regional conflicts which failed states cannot provide the necessary order and security, and the theory of neorealism most exploits such opportunities for survival in the contemporary global international anarchic system [14]. Neorealism further explains this as due to the structure of the international system where intervening states' interest is fixed and gravitates around the desire for more security, wealth, power, and survival. This theory supports that the international system is a re-

flection of the demonstration of material capabilities and the balance of power where intervention is motivated by material needs with options that maximize benefits and minimize costs to the national interest [12].

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P hereafter) is now one of the most prominent contexts that which humanitarian interventions are debated in international relations academic literature, however, the subject of military intervention under the R2P framework remains contested both in the academic discourse and policy realm [15]. Here now the focus will be on the relevant literature on the subject matter of the (in)effectiveness of the military intervention in Libya under the framework of the R2P doctrine.

2.2. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

Following the catastrophic failure of the UN and the wider international community to take action in Rwanda 1994 where the sovereign government was unable to avoid genocide and ethnic cleansing within its borders coupled with Kofi Annan's troubling question. The breakthrough came in 2001 with the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS hereafter) an initiative by the Canadian government which issued the report entitled the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This had a fundamental shift in the debates of the 1990s of the "right to intervene" to the "responsibility to protect" emphasizing the obligation of individual states' responsibility to protect population within their sovereign territorial jurisdiction [16]. The conceptual breakthrough of the long heated debates regarding sovereignty versus HI is the ICISS report which redefines the traditional conception of sovereignty in international relations to a more human-centered approach where when sovereign governments engaged in or failed to protect their populations unwillingly from massive human rights violations, the report argued the sovereign temporarily loses its claim to sovereignty where the relationship between the R2P and sovereignty is complementary to the protection of civilians rather than contradictory to the notions of sovereignty [17]. These state-centric notions of the security approach have since been weakened by the concept of human security with the shift from the national security approach which was too narrow to focus on state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The focus is on the transformation of the concept of security to include security of the people against any threats to personal safety, life, and human welfare including those that come as a consequence of the states' failure where the concept of human security is fundamental to guiding policies of protection and the prolongment of individual human life [18].

Indeed the modern international system in international relations is established based on the principle of non-intervention in internal and domestic affairs. However, the ICISS report reframed sovereignty to include the responsibility of states to protect civilians from harm under extreme circumstances when governments were unable to protect populations or unwillingly not protecting.

The 2005 Summit Outcome Document was officially adopted by world leaders as heads of states who agreed in paragraphs 138-139 respectively acknowledging that “each sovereign state has a primary responsibility to protect its populations through appropriate and necessary means” and that “the wider international community through the UN, have the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter to protect populations” affirming a determination of the international community to protect populations against genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes or crimes against humanity [19]. The prevention of international crimes such as the abovementioned is arguably the moral duty of first the sovereign state and then the international community to prevent their occurrence during throes of war within the domestic jurisdiction of the state unable or unwilling to protect populations. The protection of populations from these crimes is not new in both international relations and IL. However, the major development of R2P has been its inclusion under the field of ICL as an appropriate way in response to contemporary cases under IL of which to emphasize, sovereignty remains the principal battlefield of its legal status. Notwithstanding, within the UN framework, the principle of international peace and security is fundamentally vital as sovereignty and is the cornerstone of IL of which the R2P doctrine recognizes the responsibility of sovereign states to fulfill the promise in the maintenance of international peace and security holding both the sovereign state and the international community accountable to the rule of law [20].

Notwithstanding, the ICISS report also identified the three important principles or pillars of R2P which encompassed the responsibility to prevent, react, and rebuild. The first pillar is to address the root causes putting populations at risk under the four crimes of the R2P framework, and the second pillar includes more coercive measures such as international sanctions, prosecution of perpetrators of mass crimes under ICL, and the use of military force at last resort for civilian protection within the domestic jurisdiction of the state. The third pillar is the responsibility to rebuild by ensuring post-recovery through international reconstruction and the reduction of the risks of further escalation of the conflict through assistance in creating reconciliation to achieve durable peace [21]. Within the framework of the R2P doctrine, of the three pillars the responsibility to react has caused major controversy in international relations as the doctrine which is not limited to the use of force, however, demands the role of the international community to intervene in humanitarian situations which meet the use of military force at last resort for the protection under the UNSC authorization to the four core crimes under the R2P framework. Furthermore, the UNSC remains the only legitimate international body to regulate the use of force and the authorization of military interventions for humanitarian purposes without undermining the states’ sovereignty which remains paramount in the conduct of international relations and is the core of R2P doctrine [22].

The subject of prevention is an important instrument of the three core prin-

principles and must be fully explored before reacting with measures among others ranging from full diplomatic negotiations formulating different approaches to prevent potential catastrophic humanitarian atrocities with early warnings with the structural root causes well recognized ensuring that the government is assisted to live up to its responsibility. However, should all preventive measures prove inadequate with different alternative exhausted as to prevent potential atrocities, the UNSC would utilize other measures more coercive such as political and economic sanctions with the threat the use of force to the purpose of protecting civilians at risk of atrocities while still utilizing approaches beyond military intervention [23]. The emergence of the R2P doctrine is still contested as the shift to protecting civilians as a human security concern with the justification of military intervention to such concerns continues to present significant challenges to sovereignty and is one of the most compelling issues of foreign policy in international relations. However, this shift to a more human security perspective of rights of people and not states has nonetheless gained widespread acceptance and is arguably the bedrock of a more just and secure world founded on the assumptions that states have a responsibility to protect their populations from fundamental human rights abuses and other large scale crimes. As per the R2P framework, the duty of safeguarding the lives and livelihoods of civilians within domestic borders remains that of the sovereign state, and if this duty is not upheld, the duty rests upon the international community authorized by the UNSC should all necessary preventive measures prove inadequate, other governments have a moral duty to act including with the use of military force at last resort to protect populations at risk [24].

2.3. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Military Intervention in Libya

The UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1970 which evoked imposing an arms embargo, travel bans, assets freezes, and other non-military sanctions demanding an immediate cease-fire to the hostilities. The Libyan government had been reminded that their action could warrant an international intervention if the duty inherent in state sovereignty to protect civilians is not upheld as the case was also referred to the ICC calling upon the R2P doctrine in its resolution [25]. The resolution had passed due to influential regional organizations support for more coercive action particularly from the LAS which emphasized the need to establish a no-fly zone with the OIC and the GCC all calling for a military operation to prevent further mass atrocities hence pushing for stronger action by the UNSC under Chapter VII of its Charter setting the context for discussions [26]. However, the AU objected to any form of coercive military intervention to the already hostile environment as it did express through former South African President Jacob Zuma during a delegation meeting at the General Assembly in 2011 asserting that “the mediation efforts of the AU had not been given the chance to work”. This distinguished the views of many states in the Global South

from those in much of the Global North by highlighting the extent to which prevention under the R2P as a strategy is or should be a priority in maintaining the consensus behind the norm. According to the ICISS report, prevention was critical to generating consensus leading up to the R2P endorsement at the 2005 UN World Summit [27].

However, Welsh asserts that “the main challenge the R2P doctrine faces is not about building a normative consensus but how to act under the R2P framework” as the protection of civilians conceptually refers only to situations of armed conflict while the R2P doctrine goes beyond and is broader as the rights of civilians in the armed conflict going beyond the protection of mass atrocities by assisting and developing noncoercive tools which third parties could employ to address the root cause of the mass atrocities. It becomes clear that Western countries represented by NATO preferred coercive force even at the expense of increasing harm to civilians [28]. This was challenged and proved controversial among emerging powers (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) BRICS, while the P5 Russia and China abstained from vetoing the resolution. Thakur asserts that “the use of force for moral reasons is dangerous and is counterproductive in its practical effect”. Wherein the context of international relations, viewed from the theory of neorealism it shapes the power struggle hence provides the vital need to take up the moral and military slack. The situation in Libya proves to illustrate principles that justify the R2P doctrine in use, however, its implementation demonstrates a need for legitimacy criteria on military intervention and the guiding decisions on authorization [29]. Notwithstanding, the R2P debate in Libya focused much on protection with the use of force rather than prevention as former UNSG Ban Ki-moon reaffirmed in 2010 that “there is need for not only protection but for the prevention of the four crimes with a need for an understanding of the different kinds of measures that would be taken for the prevention of tensions between groups from escalating into conflicts” [30].

The military intervention two days after adoption of Resolution 1973 led by France, the UK, and the United States which took the command and control of airstrikes following the establishment of a no-fly zone’ provides a great understanding of how positional forces translate into power dynamics around multi-lateral diplomatic negotiating tables where norms, structural forces, and interests play a vital role and are as effective as the distribution of material capabilities in the shaping of outcomes of which according to the theory of neorealism, this remains indeterminate and is helpful to the understanding of how strings are pulled [31]. Understanding the position of states is crucial as the doctrine remains open to different interpretations with the UNSC becoming more consistent in viewing situations through the lens of R2P. This makes the ongoing contestation over R2P military intervention difficult to reconcile with conventional constructivist accounts of the norm life cycle with the normative struggle over its continuing legitimacy as a norm once it has been accepted and its prospects for practical implementation [32]. According to Wiener, constructivist literature in

international relations suggests that its theoretical framework of conventional constructivism explains the structuring of power, norms, and their influence on state behavior in decision-making situations where norms guide deliberations in world politics. Weiner further explains that this process of contestation reflects a specific re/enacting of the normative “structure of meaning-in-use” which would eventually constitute norm change [33].

Indeed, legitimacy helps breed legality by observing and fully respecting the necessary criteria after passing a just cause for human protection as a measure accepted in exceptional circumstances under the R2P framework. The UNSC authorization of military intervention in Libya reflects the deep internalization of civilian protection norms in response to the actual or predicted loss of large-scale human life and sufferings perpetrated by the Libyan government against its people as to the regime losing its legitimacy. However, it raised the problem of the legality versus legitimacy issue of who should intervene, the only regional alliance with the capability is NATO raising questions back as to an intervention might be legal but, notwithstanding the challenge remains in satisfying the legitimacy criteria of intervention which has raised many debates in international relations [34]. NATO took over the enforcement of the no-fly zone with more precision strikes and since the interventions of the 1990s, NATO has emerged as an international actor with the capability to carry out robust military interventions and for a large part, the organization has been seen as a legitimate agent to fulfill the R2P. However, the issue of separate chains of command raised fundamental problems of coordination imperilling the effectiveness of the operation hence the assisting of rebels to attack Libyan forces beyond the UN mandate of the Resolution demonstrated the military nature of a powerful military organization like NATO which arguably does not fit the political and normative purpose of R2P. The objective was not to defeat the Libyan government but to pursue the promise of the R2P doctrine by neutralizing the threat against civilians and not supporting the uprising undermining effectiveness a key factor in determining the legitimacy of military intervention [35].

Notwithstanding, as the global powers pushed for intervention, NATO was the only legitimate international actor with the capabilities of operating such robust military intervention under the R2P for humanitarian purposes. However, on one hand, the nature of the organization remains the greatest challenge when it comes to military operations with different interests of states from economic, geopolitics, and migrations. The challenge is whether NATO could be used as an agency to fulfill the R2P framework provisions of collective security. If NATO is to increase its legitimacy, its effectiveness in military operations is very cardinal and the case in Libya is important for exploring the role of NATO as a possible enforcer of the R2P. On the other hand, the organization remains a military alliance and does not necessarily fit the political and normative purpose of the R2P doctrine because the organization as a military alliance cannot be considered or held accountable [35].

3. Research Methodology

The article uses a qualitative approach as the main research design. The methodology used was the guiding principle of this research in terms of the philosophy that was used as developed from the literature review of the investigation. The article uses qualitative case study research with the collection of secondary data further analyzed through qualitative content analysis.

Research methodology refers to the systematic way of thinking and searching for information in an organized and coherent manner on a specific topic (Kumar, 2014). As above mentioned, for this article, data was gathered from different sources and analyze used content analysis. For this article, content analysis will be the main approach of data analysis. To analyze the data that was collected using qualitative research from secondary data, the method to analyze the data was content analysis and is the fundamental distinction between qualitative and quantitative analysis. Qualitative content analysis is done by organizing and classifying content reviewed systematically into some forms of themes describing a topic interpretively to allow the research to describe themes and contexts that are most meaningful for the research objectives of the investigation topic [36].

4. Analysis

4.1. An Analysis on Justifying Military Intervention under R2P Framework in Libya

The R2P doctrine in Libya represents a theoretical shift in the modern understanding of sovereignty thus providing an opportunity to analyze the theory that justifies R2P and its practical outcomes as the first robust military operational application. From the lessons that can be drawn as demonstrated in Libya, the R2P doctrine had not to be based on the idea that war crimes are to be treated as universal but rather that they are defined with political selectivity as global superpowers took their strategic interests in the application of the R2P doctrine [37]. However, Thakur asserts that R2P in Libya illustrated the development of the international community working under the auspice of the UN structures and procedures of multilateralism in the prevention of a massacre that could have ultimately constituted war crimes core to the R2P framework [29]. The use of artillery by the Gaddafi forces in the conflict justified the response by the international community both under the R2P doctrine and on a moral imperative. Today the case has been widely seen as a model for how the doctrine of R2P can be applied, however, what is important to notwithstanding is the moral risk in applying the use of force other than for humanitarian purposes. The complexity of the situation in Libya highlights the shortcoming in the application of the R2P doctrine's core responsibility to prevent and rebuild in favor of the responsibility to react [38].

Indeed, what proved to be a decisive factor justifying the military intervention was the language that was used by Colonel Gaddafi dehumanizing his opponents and threatening to execute door to door thus this is arguably a basis and driving

factor to be a justification with the conflict raging on, Gaddafi had also vowed to die in Libya than surrender [39]. In applying the R2P, there was no consent from the Libyan government however, the Council had referred the situation to relevant regional organizations for their positions on the crisis with the Libyan authority under Gaddafi already called upon to meet their international responsibility to protect, arguing that the regime demonstrated its unwillingness to protect or stop the use of disproportionate force. This consent from relevant regional authorities supporting the military intervention proved vital and paved more way for NATO as the only legitimate actor given its military capabilities to take robust actions to protect populations from the imminent threat of massacre as the alliance would be likely to meet the principle of a reasonable likelihood of success [25].

However, the military intervention in Libya illustrates the dangers that are associated with the R2P doctrine when powerful states follow their national interest. Shortly after the resolution authorizing the military intervention, the coalition of states had armed rebel groups in the fight against Gaddafi and his forces. The justifications of the intervention had also been a capture of the way the events in Libya had been framed by the media in favor of the intervention lacking accurate information. Nonetheless, what was important for the R2P doctrine is the willingness the operation demonstrated where the international community was able to react to the humanitarian situation that triggers a military response under the R2P framework without a veto from the P5 members. Notwithstanding, the misapplication of the doctrine by UN-NATO-led intervention has hindered the development of the doctrine and for it to be applied elsewhere in the spillover countries as a result of the loss of trust [40].

4.2. An Analysis on (In)Effectiveness of the Military Intervention in Libya

According to Pattison, the conception of legitimacy is an important element of military effectiveness, therefore, it is a necessary condition for an intervention to be legitimate as it is vital in evaluating the (in)effectiveness of military intervention under certain circumstances which meet a certain threshold of the R2P framework [41]. As Finnemore explains, like in any society, the use of force and its regulation among members in international society is shaped by shared norms on its use [42]. The military intervention in Libya under the framework of the R2P has raised newfound special dual responsibilities of power distribution among the P5 members and the great power environment on the nature and linkage of sovereignty and responsibility [43]. Notwithstanding, according to former UNSG Ban Ki-moon “it is important to go away from the culture of reaction to a culture of prevention”. The R2P doctrine should not be viewed as a legitimization for military intervention and the Libyan case is an example that demonstrates the need for a focus on the complex nature of violence and its root causes beyond simplifying complex causes and moral outrage if the R2P doctrine is to be an aspiring norm guiding military intervention when required [44].

The ICISS report identified that military intervention would have to be for exceptional circumstances where the commission reached back to the moral guidelines for military intervention to be legitimate during R2P must satisfy certain conditions of the Just War theory elements known as *Jus ad Bellum* and *Jus in Bello* respectively. The former is based on the decisions to military intervention for humanitarian purposes and the latter is the conduct that must be satisfied if an intervention is to be legitimate. The military intervention in Libya was conducted under the framework of the R2P doctrine and this criterion consists of the following: 1) the right authority; 2) a just cause; 3) the right intentions; 4) military intervention at last resort; 5) applied proportionality; and 6) a reasonable likelihood of success. These guidelines of natural law principles provide an analytical framework for analyzing the (in)effectiveness of the military intervention in Libya under the framework of the R2P doctrine [45]. Over the past years, the military intervention in Libya has raised different debates regarding the legitimacy and effectiveness of the use of force because the military intervention meant overriding the principle norm of non-intervention in international relations. The UNSC remains the only legitimate authority to authorize the military aspect of the R2P doctrine operations at its functional core because the subject of military intervention is arguably the most controversial form of intervention and it is vital to recognize that aspect of the R2P framework. Legitimacy is fundamental in the conduct of armed force for humanitarian purposes and military effectiveness is a significant element of robust action and as demonstrated in Libya, the military capabilities of states are core to the (in)effectiveness of R2P operations under the R2P framework. According to the notions of just war, the intervention had been indeed authorized by the right competent authority and can be considered the most legitimate meeting the first criterion under the R2P framework [46].

Both mandates under Resolutions 1970 and 1973 called upon the responsibility to protect with the referral of the case to the ICC as, from the view of the UNSC, it could be asserted that crimes against humanity would have been committed in Benghazi. The fact that Colonel Gaddafi threatened to engage in deliberate actions which would have ultimately fallen under the idea of “large scale loss of life” and of “outright killing” defined by the Commission as a just cause had arguably also been met for the R2P doctrine proposed by the ICISS as the grounds for military action [25]. The adoption of Resolutions 1970 and 1973 offer significant insights into the ongoing evolution of the R2P doctrine. The deliberations that took place showed the position of BRICS countries on the R2P doctrine and more importantly, BRICS countries have shown that the bar for the use of force must be set high for the R2P doctrines intervention authorized by the UNSC. Their abstention from voting on the resolution highlights the possibility of other alternatives to resolving the situation in Libya had still been possible thus the skepticism of the reaction measure of the no-fly zone over Libya [47].

Pape also asserts that the R2P framework lacks a clear stand as to what constitutes a certain level of atrocities necessary to justify military intervention for humanitarian purposes. The bar or rather the threshold that calls for military intervention is so low without a criterion for what constitutes serious harm to justify military intervention, particularly to authoritarian regimes. Although politics played a major role in justifying the military intervention in Libya, to guide better decisions for future interventions, the international community should consider the adoption of a new responsibility to protect stand [48]. When responding to any humanitarian crisis under the framework of the R2P, the international society must be willing to use non-coercive measures as argued by the commission that prevention was the most important aspect of the R2P doctrine. The ICISS report limits itself to the just cause and precautionary principles to guide military intervention and limit the potential abuse of unilateral actions with the responsibility to protect. Furthermore, the 2005 World Summit had also clarified the limits of R2P or rather the threshold that the doctrine would apply in the prevention of the four crimes which also have precise meaning under the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court [49]. Notwithstanding, the principle of a reasonable likelihood of success is as important as the just cause and thus is critical for the effectiveness of the military intervention and must only be justified on humanitarian grounds [24].

The principle of right intention as included by ICISS as a motivation to intervention under the R2P is of great significance as this principle is a lens to determine whether an intervention was humanitarian or not. Based on the intentions for the military intervention in Libya, perhaps and rightly so, the intervention seemed to have the right intention to protect civilians from the start with the initial airstrikes that destroyed the regime air force and managed to halt the advances of the regime's forces. However, notwithstanding, as NATO took over in the preceding months, if the intentions had been humanitarian then it should have allowed and facilitated negotiations for an attempted ceasefire rather than continued airstrikes even though Gaddafi had been willing to negotiate during the intervention. From this view, the primary and military intention of the intervention was not indeed to protect civilians as per mandate but rather revolved around the idea of regime change as the insurgents were not been asked to lay down their weapons working as a coalition with increased support from NATO misapplying the R2P doctrine and thus the principle of right intention had not been satisfied as to the mission change from the original mandate [50].

By going beyond the protection of civilians, the military intervention sided with anti-government forces thus openly violating the interventions own arms embargo is a complete violation of international law and this then affects the principle of proportionality as the intervention was already choosing sides in supporting and arming the rebels and the coalition formed under the NTC with the primary focus on regime change. The principle of proportionality is fundamental to the effectiveness of the intervention and as defined by the ICISS, pro-

portionality is to mean the duration, scale, and intensity of the intervention strategy which should be achieved with the minimum necessary force to secure the primary humanitarian objective [51]. The use of the no-fly zone under the R2P framework in Libya had played a major role during the intervention that it feels like a war against Gaddafi by the coalition forces with the use of modern airpower capabilities to kick start a habit of foreign intervention and further raising another problem of recognition of the NTC following the fall of Colonel Gaddafi. Nonetheless, the enforcement of the no-fly zone in Libya was abused and cannot be justified according to the just war tradition under the R2P framework [52].

Ignoring the cease-fire of Gaddafi hindered both the effectiveness and the UNSC mandate that the resolutions aimed to achieve. As Pattison explains, the problems and dangers of regime change are greater than that of humanitarian intervention arguing that the bar must be set so high because as in the past, forcible regime change has proved that it does more harm than good in the long term. However, the predicted imminent attack on Benghazi and Gaddafi's famous "no mercy speech" indeed give a just cause for intervention with the fact that support from regional organizations such as the Arab League also arguably give more backing to the requirement of last resort which indeed had also been met as there was no other alternative than to utilize the use of force under the R2P framework. Notwithstanding, the establishment and use of the no-fly zone for the protection of civilians and their populated areas as under Resolution 1973 if the intention had been legitimate and humanitarian, its use would have given the operation to meet the criteria of a more likely reasonable expectation for success if the intentions were purely humanitarian given the military capabilities of NATO [53].

The intervention was authorized strictly to protect civilians and the helping of rebels in the civil war undermined the mandate which was restricted to the enforcement of the no-fly zone, the arms embargo, surveillance, and providing humanitarian assistance with the primary objective to protect civilians. What makes matters worse is that the intervention had only ended when Gaddafi was killed. The disproportionate application of airpower hindered the operation because, given the military capabilities of NATO, the intervention could have ended when the imminent threat was dealt with in Benghazi. Furthermore, the scale, duration, and complexity of the no-fly zone coupled with the violations of the UN mandate undermined the international legitimacy and effectiveness of the intervention under international law [54]. The political goal of regime change under any circumstances should never be an instrument in the implementation of the protection of civilians under the R2P framework. However, according to Gartner, "unless the reasonable likelihood for success cannot be achieved otherwise". Nonetheless, the use of force implemented by the coalition of NATO member states should have been no other than humanitarian. Regime change is a political goal and in itself does not meet the R2P framework for

whatever reasons as it undermines the legitimacy and thus the effectiveness of the military intervention. Even though the UNSC resolutions undeniably meet the criterion of the right authority, the politics of the military intervention and regime change as the order of the day was characterized by contradicting justifications and thus not satisfying the criterion of last resort, proportionality, and right intentions under the R2P framework [55].

4.3. An Analysis on the Impacts of the Military Intervention and the Future of R2P after Libya

The consequences of the misuse of authority and the use of force in Libya by the UN-NATO have had major implications for the future of the norm as the result of a lack of effective implementation of the R2P doctrine to dictatorial regimes thus decreasing its likelihood of actions elsewhere notably in Syria today. However, in Libya what we saw was an emerging norm misapplied, the intervention's full impact has led to different conclusions than immediate analysis as the long-term outcomes and future of Libya remains uncertain [56]. The UN and regional organizations should now manage the more complex issue of international peace and security in North Africa and member states particularly those that took the forefront of the intervention should play a better role in the impact on international security and the Middle East. The impact of the military intervention in Libya has led to the rise of new issues of international security in international relations and it can be suggested that the notions of international security should now include the R2P framework in the protection of civilians from the core four crimes [57].

The application of the R2P doctrine in Libya has also had a major implication on the effectiveness of the doctrine working through the UN system. The lead-up to the intervention was with the abstentions of key global powers in terms of making the norm a reality hence also undermining legitimacy because of the lack of wider international support even though the intervention had some form of regional consent. The Arab League indeed did support the intervention however, the AU had rejected any form of military intervention and condemned the airstrikes that in the view of the AU, military intervention with continued airstrikes was not a solution to the conflict fearing the consequences that the operation to spill over to neighboring countries as was the case following the removal of Gaddafi [58]. The way the military operation had been conducted in Libya has triggered spillovers in many countries in Africa. Not following the just war notions guiding military intervention have had significant growing future impacts for the R2P as an emerging norm in international relations. As the intention for the motivation was not purely humanitarian, waging war and serving as one of the parties in the conflict has had a major implication on the legitimacy of NATO and their allies. The very fact that BRICS countries representing almost half of the world's population opposed the use of force due to their skepticism thus abstaining during the UNSC vote will have a major im-

pact on international relations when it comes to future interventions. The doctrine, however, should not be viewed as another Western form of imperialism in securing the countries natural gas reserves and oil instead, it should be looked at from the view of its potential in the protection of civilians in future interventions with increased effectiveness and legitimacy [50].

Notwithstanding, the doctrine is widely accepted that if it could be applied or implemented consistent with the just war theory with well-developed mechanisms for checks and balances considering the crimes identified as genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes or crimes against humanity coupled with the Brazilian version developed because of the misuse of the doctrine also known as the Responsibility While Protecting (RWP). The R2P doctrine in Libya had stood a great test and the way the doctrine was applied in Libya raising issues regarding the interpretation of the principle to dictatorial regimes with a lack of consistency in the application of the principles of the doctrine such as the principle of proportionality as witnessed with NATO in the aftermath of the military intervention raising sustained debates regarding future interventions [39]. The concept of RWP has had a twist on the R2P doctrine as the new concept represents the inclusion of the principle of “non-indifference” regardless of the country concerning situations that pose the threat to international peace and security [59]. Following the death of Colonel Gaddafi, Libya has gained the status of the failed or weak state where the country is in a condition of anarchy arguably because of the misapplication of the R2P doctrine as now different rebel groups and Islamic State fighters have taken center stage instead of the initial transition government intended to be set up has resulted in lawlessness with different militias fighting for power and territory. Before the intervention, Gaddafi had been in power for over 40 years and indeed the intervention did lead to the fall of a tyranny leader, however, the so-called success was exchanged for failure and has left challenging and unresolved issues and questions regarding what the military intervention means for Libya and R2P [60].

5. Conclusions

It was a decade since the ICISS report and six years since the 2005 World Summit did the R2P come to life in Libya with a test of robust R2P operation. The normative development of the R2P doctrine and its conceptual and theoretical contribution to the reconceptualization of sovereignty has been a significant milestone in covering the protection gap of mass atrocity crimes illustrating the triumph of human security in Libya.

This article rests on the assumptions of the theory of constructivism which supports that, in the lifespan of a norm, ten years is not long enough in the life of a norm or principle such as R2P as its lifespan can be successfully measured in centuries rather than years. Notwithstanding, with all the unsettled tensions and debates on understanding between countries of the global South and global North about the R2P doctrine, the Libyan case remains contested. Nonetheless,

the intervention at least comes with some good news which remains that there is a general acceptance by the international community with little or no opposition in regard to the prevention of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against humanity central to the framework of the R2P doctrine [61].

In summary, the military intervention in Libya was not a humanitarian success as the intervention did not satisfy the legitimacy criterion to constitute a legitimate and effective military intervention under the R2P framework. However, the operation demonstrated the political will of the international community when it comes to responding to crimes under the R2P doctrine where the strategic interests of states are put before legitimate humanitarian concerns. This will make future interventions under the R2P doctrine less likely due to the selectivity in its application where if the national interest of states is not at stake, sovereign states will not intervene in other humanitarian crises thus the development of the norm will remain contested. Furthermore, when intervention is required, the legitimacy of the operation under the R2P doctrine breeds the effectiveness of military intervention.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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