

The Saudi Arabia and Iran Factor in Sectarian Conflict of Pakistan: Critical and Analytics Study in Historic and Contemporary Scenario

Amara Tul Kubra, Jiang Zhen*

Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, Northwest University, Xi'an, China

Email: *jiangzh@nwu.edu.cn

How to cite this paper: Kubra, A. T., & Zhen, J. (2022). The Saudi Arabia and Iran Factor in Sectarian Conflict of Pakistan: Critical and Analytics Study in Historic and Contemporary Scenario. *Open Journal of Social Sciences*, 10, 168-185.

<https://doi.org/10.4236/jss.2022.105013>

Received: February 17, 2022

Accepted: May 17, 2022

Published: May 20, 2022

Copyright © 2022 by author(s) and Scientific Research Publishing Inc. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY 4.0).

<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>



Open Access

Abstract

This research will take a close look at the often unseen and unheard situation of these countries. In terms of Saudi Iranian relations, this quantitative research examines Pakistan's complexity of sectarian conflicts and divisions. Pakistan has emerged as a country more vulnerable to internal dangers than external threats at the moment in recent history. However, external forces have exacerbated these internal dangers. Every level of its society is mucking up Islam for egotistical interests, either directly or indirectly. Because of its ancient, traditional fundamental framework, Islam means that peace, fraternity, and harmony are usually truly in effect. Sectarianism, turbulence, turmoil, anarchy, pessimism, superstitious questioning, terrible illiteracy, and massive poverty are all consequences of these wrongdoings. This growth was continually fuelled by Iran and Saudi Arabia. Because of internal political changes and the repercussions of the Islamic revolution in Iran and orthodox approach of Saudi Arabia, a sectarian rift emerged in Pakistan in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The mentioned foreign locations' ideological and geostrategic squabbles have had a direct impact on Pakistan. Pakistan had been a suitable heaven for non-state actors to promote their agenda for achievement of their core objectives of divide and rule. The research will find out causes, remedies and diagnosis to analyze the real picture of future prospects.

Keywords

Iran, Pakistan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Rivalry, Sectarianism

1. Introduction

The fault lines of violence in today's Middle East are becoming increasingly sec-

tarian. Sunni-Shia Muslim bloodshed rages in Iraq, sectarian strife stymies political reconciliation in Lebanon, and restive Shia minority plague Sunni Gulf monarchies. While Shia-Sunni instability has been a defining feature of Middle Eastern politics, it has also extended to Pakistan, a Sunni-Muslim majority country with a Shia minority that might account for as much as 20% of the population. According to Khaled Ahmed, Pakistanis are “in denial” about sectarianism in their nation, despite the fact that hundreds of Pakistani Shia have perished as a result of sectarian violence (Ahmed, 2011).

In Pakistan, the sectarian conflict is a major destabilizing factor in the usage of a political, social, religious, and security system. The sectarian conflict in Pakistan has resulted in hundreds of deaths as a consequence of suicide bombings, bomb explosions, assassinations, and other terrorist activities during the previous 27 years, while generating discontent, sickness, and violence in society. Rather of pursuing control and settlement of a war that has split Muslims along sectarian lines, kingdom actors tried to use the situation for political gain. Regardless of isolated incidents of Shia-Sunni conflict, sectarian harmony in Pakistan has evolved into a form of tolerance and fraternity across distinct factions within the Islamic faith (Ahmar, 2007).

While Shias account for about 15% - 20% of the population of Sunni-ruled Pakistan, they lived in peace and harmony until the early 1980s, when a sequence of events triggered sectarian bloodshed. In the anti-Ahmadi campaign of 1974, the Shia network faced up against the Sunni majority in a facet-by-facet battle. While the Ahmadis were declared non-Muslims by the Pakistani Parliament, the Shia community looked forward to the important role played by Iran’s clerics in the historic revolt against the Shah. The Islamic Revolution of February 1979 was a turning point in organizing Pakistan’s Shias for a more aggressive role in the country and society (Ahmar, 2007).

Different Muslim countries, notably Pakistan, which is currently on the verge of civil war, have suffered a setback as a result of Iran and Saudi Arabia’s ideological and geopolitical rivalry. People of all sects despise one another, and the cleric’s problems dictate that various groups be labelled infidels and condemned to death. They also label all persons or security personnel who may be directly or indirectly aiding NATO soldiers as unbelievers. As a result, the state is facing one of the most difficult challenges in its history, while society is split in two directions 3. Notably, the connection between Pakistani admirers of the Wahhabi regime in Saudi Arabia dates back to the time of the fundamentalist thinker Sayiad Abul Ala Modudi, who sympathized with the Kingdom Strict Islamic Code. However, the second OIC summit in Lahore enhances Pakistan’s significance for Riyadh. The overthrow of Bhutto in 1977, the Islamization process of President Zia, the Islamic Revolution of Iran in February 1979, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made Saudi Arabia a critical player in Pakistan and Afghanistan. On one hand, Riyadh played one side of the sectarian battle in Pakistan against Iranian interests, while on the other hand, provided full assistance to Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet Union (Ahmad, 2011). This Saudi as-

sistance later became the major cause of tension between Islamabad and Tehran (Khan & Ahmad, 2008).

Pakistan, when entering the international dynamics of Shia-Sunni schism, faces the dilemma of balancing between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It is worth noting that Pakistan has been one of the threats for Iran-Saudi sectarian battle, where both the sides have funded their proxies that often jeopardize Islamabad's internal security dilemma (Ahmad, 2011). And when Islamabad's tries to cushion its Sunni patron (Saudi Arabia) it irritates its Shia neighbor, Iran. For example, in March 2011, Riyadh deployed its troops to Bahrain Support ruling Khalifa family to quell Shiites uprising. The deployment was in response to government allegations Bahrain government says Tehran involved in accelerating Shiites Uprising against the Sunni Khalifa family. Iran not only denies these Initial allegations, after GCC forces entered Bahrain, but Iran's tone has completely changed. Iran's Supreme Leader Outlines Iran's Policies.

He stated that the "policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is predicated on defending the people and their rights against all dictatorial and egotistical rulers without distinguishing between Sunnis and Shiites." The supreme leader further added that "Saudi Arabia committed a mistake by sending its forces into Bahrain because this enrages the Islamic nations" (Bassiouni, 2011). If I take the license of interpreting the words of Iranian Supreme Leader that "Saudi Arabia committed a mistake" by sending its troops to Bahrain, and "this enrages the Islamic nations" in the sense that Riyadh's deployment of troops to Bahrain has enraged the Islamic Republic of Iran, then it can be argued that Pakistan's decision to support Riyadh was also an error of Pakistan's policy with respect to its neighbor Iran. When reports of Islamabad's involvement surfaced, Islamabad emphatically denied all the allegations of sending troops to Bahrain (Khan, 2014). However, the Government of Bahrain even testifies the presence of foreign troops including Pakistani military personnel. News reports indicate that around 2500 Pakistani soldiers were deployed to quell the Shia uprisings in 2011 (Zakaria, 2013).

Pakistan, being one of the world's prominent Muslim countries, faces a difficult task in combating intolerance, hatred, extremism, and violence directed towards Shia or Sunni communities. Despite the fact that sectarian violence was given a boost in Pakistan until recently, many people were slain in sectarian violence in various parts of the nation (Ahmar, 2007).

External causes like as Iran's Islamic revolution, Saudi Arabia's role in marketing the Wahabi branch of Islam, and Afghanistan's participation in Pakistan's internal affairs further complicate the sectarian battle. The assistance provided to various Shiite and Sunni enterprises in Pakistan by Iran, Saudi Arabia, and a few other Muslim worldwide locations led in the emergence of sectarian proxy warfare. One must consider how the possibility of sectarian polarization and violence in Pakistan may be managed delicately, as well as why sectarian conflict fault lines have not been adequately addressed up to now. If Pakistan and its equipment work hard to weed out terrorist and violent elements from various Sunni and Shiite groups, as well as reduce the role of the outside world in fan-

ning sectarian emotions, a lot can be done to sort out the issues that motivate and sell sectarian violence in the United States. Why has Pakistan been unable to atone for the consequences of its Afghan policy during the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan, while tens of thousands of local and international Jihadis following rigorous Sunni teaching have been allowed a free hand? Following the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, different Wahabi organizations sprung up in the country, preaching enmity towards Shias not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan (Ahmar, 2007).

2. Hypothetical Framework

Conflicts are extensive ranging and diverse. Practically every one of us is passing through a variety of conflicts. Various nations have taken on remarkable techniques to get rid of them. Encounters and slip-ups of the states have offered conveyance to one kind of speculations. Scholastics and battle choice researchers have developed particular speculations holding in to see the person, power, and demography of the mind-boggling place. Struggle change hypotheses have gained traction on the basis of their adequacy and potential to resolve limitations. Senghaas 1973 and Krippendorf 1973 did early paintings on warfare transformation theories. Adam Curle turned into any other theorist who prolonged the work of Galtung and cautioned that conflicts can be resolved via methods of conscientisation, confrontation, negotiation, and development (Melzoff & Moore, 1977). This exploration utilizes a contention examination structure created by Matthew Levinger in his book; Conflict Analysis: Understanding Causes, Unlocking arrangements in 2013. The structure comprises a contention appraisal system, war planning, and partner assessment in an approach to perceive the multi-measurements of the contention and foster amazing harmony building techniques (Levinger, 2013). Identifies war assessment systems as “subjective insightful stuff to help produce a common arrangement of inquiries regarding the nature and limit direction of fight and a common jargon with which to talk about promising circumstances for preventive moves” Also, he makes reference to that this structure presents data of the area of agreement and basic conflicts. Through this structure, the vital, political, socio-financial, social, and mental components of the contentions may be added with accentuation working on it investigates these examinations, and it is upheld through speculations from unmistakable getting regions. Additionally, this exploration presents the accounts of war’s partners, Sunni and Shia Muslims, to help experiences into the fight from each view. Additionally, fight planning gives a graphical portrayal, which works in entertainers, their interrelationships, and the various components of the contention as a way to improve on the intricacy of the conflict and to assist with anticipating the doable strides inside the fighting (Levinger, 2013).

In 1990, Edward Azar, one of the circles of war goal’s forefathers, presented his extended social conflict hypothesis. He has taken uncommon factors beginning from essential human requirements and collective substance and examining beginning, framework elements, and impacts examination the battle of pro-

vincial prevalence and notoriety among Iran and KSA dependent on philosophical varieties experiences put the area harmony in question (Burton, 1991). Dougherty shed light on the issue that social researchers are divided on whether social conflict should be portrayed as something normal, good, and socially acceptable or something unreasonable, obsessive, and socially ineffective. There are two battling measures that change the nature of their conflicts and implications (Dougherty, 1971).

Moreover, a battle map allows the reader to visualize the dynamics of the battle through synthesizing facts and figuring out the principal actors among the gadgets. There are extraordinary kinds of war planning methodologies including geospatial planning, fleeting planning, and social planning, however I utilize social planning in this proposition (Levinger, 2013).

3. Background of the Study

Iran and Saudi Arabia were the most powerful powers in ancient times in their respective locations, and their patterns were preserved. Iran takes pride in staying a part of one of the oldest known and most renowned Persian Empires, as well as the fact that it has never been occupied by Western world (Pfaltzgraff, 1981). On the other hand, the Al-Saud family (Saudi Arabia's reigning dynasty) was established in 1928 (and is now accompanied by nearly one billion Muslims across the world) and does not forget their role as guardians of the holy cities of Makkah and Medina. Iraq on the western side and the Persian Gulf on the eastern side are divided by the two Middle Eastern countries, which proudly show their cultural identities, Saudi Arabia as Arab and Iran as Persian. The two states maintained diplomatic relations in 1932, despite a history of difficult bilateral relations, particularly following Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979. The two countries' geostrategic location along the same and compete for the Persian Gulf, a determined urge to control the Islamic community, different understandings of Sharia, and nearby dominant designs have resulted in a potential conflict of interest over control of OPEC's oil export policy and Saudi Arabia's acceptance of the US influence in the Middle East. Within the structure, both perceive authority and control as a zero-sum reaction (Pfaltzgraff, 1981).

4. Research Methodology

Research methodology is a way to answer research problem in an organized way and it enables a researcher to solve the research problem effectively. Research is a mechanism of assembling, interpreting and analyzing the data to answer the certain questions. This section of introductory chapter discusses in detail the data sources and methodology i.e., research tool, methodology used for the selection of study area, data collection and data analysis techniques.

4.1. Research Design

Research design is a tentative plan, a probable scheme, a complete structure and

a thorough framework that deals with the whole procedure of research to answer the raised questions. Research methodology has two approaches i.e. qualitative and quantitative. Research design is being adopted according to the nature of the study. It must be flexible in nature to meet all the requirements of the research. This research follows a mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches and uses exploratory research design. This research is explanatory in nature because it is being conducted to gain deep knowledge of the research problem. Explanatory approach is composed of qualitative and quantitative methods i.e. mixed methods. Since the advent of the 21st century, mixed method is being employed in social science research. Qualitative method is explanatory in nature and helps to study the phenomenon in a comprehensive manner. This is the reason social science research are more inclined towards qualitative research methods.

The qualitative data is used to investigate the historiography of the phenomenon of sectarianism, sectarian bases and networks of sectarian conflict and evolution of sectarian violence in Pakistan and the role of Saudi Arabia and Iran in exacerbation of the phenomenon. The quantitative method is also a part of this study as it measures the sectarian violence in Pakistan because quantitative methods emphasize quantification not only to collect data but analyze the data as well. Quantitative method has been employed in this study to measure the quantity and frequency of sectarian incidents in the country. This study provides a detailed description of the phenomenon of sectarianism in Pakistan.

4.2. Data Sources

Data sources are important and basic aspects of any research. Data sources are used to start any kind of study and play the role of a block builder. The need for suitable data is related with the aims and objectives of the study. Keeping in mind the aims and objectives of this study, the historical research methods have been used. Historical evidence comprising historical data has been used to scrutinize the various points of view related to this study. Historical research allows solutions to contemporary problems located in the past and also highlights the present and future trends in certain issues.

This research has been carried out using various data collection techniques; documented based analysis and case studies. Historical, descriptive, explanatory and interpretive research methods have been used on qualitative and quantitative data sources. Both primary and secondary sources have been used while conducting this research. Primary sources included case studies, reports and government documents while secondary documents included books, research studies, journals, e-journals, periodicals, newspapers, magazines and internet sources. For such research and finding, the most relevant data will be collected from books, journals, research papers, and government and organizational archives. The results of the analysis will help to support policy making. All these sources helped to interpret the data and to reach a logical and realistic conclusion.

In order to conduct an in-depth analysis of the available data and official government documents on this issue, it is necessary to use evidence-oriented statistics available in national and international research surveys, reports, journals, police stations and other related fields.

The research design is also in the form of descriptive study. Descriptive studies are also called observational because one observes the subjects without otherwise intervening. The simplest descriptive study is a case study which reports data on only one subject (Hopkins, 2000). In this study, qualitative survey and fact-finding enquiries of different kinds have also been included. The methods of research utilized in descriptive research have surveyed methods of all kinds including comparative and co-relational methods. In analytical research, on the other hand, the researcher has to use facts or information already available and analyze these to make a critical evaluation of the material (Bhattacharjee, 2012). In this study, secondary data have been used to reach at the topic in more analytical, judgmental, and logical way.

4.3. Analysis of the Data

Descriptive and statistical measures have been used to analyze the data in this research. Tables have also been a part of the study in order to make it more effective. Analytical, interpretive and historical methods have been used to reach a realistic conclusion.

5. Pakistani-Iranian Relations in the Past

Spiritual affinity and cultural concord are used to shape ties between Islamabad and Tehran, in addition to geographical closeness. Quaid-e Azam (the Great Leader) Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan's founding chief, regarded Iran as a brother and friend, emphasizing the value of geographical relationships among near and dear ones (Sattar, 2010).

Despite Saudi Arabia's wish for the new Democratic nation to prosper and progress, the Imam of Iran was the first president to conduct a lawful visit to Pakistan after the time of independence. As members of CENTO and the Regional Cooperation and Development (RCD) commercial initiative with Turkey, Pakistan and Iran have assisted in the tighter integration of the two nations. During the 1960s, Iran not only helped Pakistan in modernizing its fleet, but it also aided Pakistan in its conflicts with India in 1965 and 1971 (Sattar, 2010). Despite maintaining good ties with Iran's Shah, Pakistan became the first country to identify the new system that led to the 1979 Islamic revolution. A terrible event occurred in the same year, when three hundred to six hundred terrorists attempted to seize BAIT-ULLAH (holy vicinity for all Muslims) belonging to different nationalities including Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Iran. Pakistani SSG soldiers joined the anti-terrorist effort (at the Saudi government's invitation) and successfully freed the holy web page. Despite Islamabad's best efforts, Iran's supreme religious, political and spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, reportedly

issued instructions his people to aid Pakistan's Shia, to promote his ideology in the masses of Pakistan with preaching and peaceful manner. As a consequence of Iranian aspirations to transfer the revolution to neighboring and fierce US-Iran animosity (the US gained Pakistan's nearest and most significant political and military partner in the Afghan-USSR war), relatives did not correctly handle and remained unsure. During the protracted Iran-Iraq conflict (1980-88), Pakistan refused to help Iraq against Iran and then only offered just few material resources to Iran throughout the war, fearing rivalry from Arab nations like Saudi Arabia. Pakistan walked a tightrope, facing threats from all sides, fearing sectarian violence at home, backed by Iran, while maintaining stability with Arab allies, especially Saudi Arabia and the United States, which were Pakistan's closest allies in comprising the Russian Empire in Afghanistan and old rival India on the Japan border (Huntington, 1965).

6. Relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (Pak-Saudi)

Many Pakistanis used to have a favorable opinion of Saudi Arabia since the Saudis were seen to be the caretakers of Islam's sacred sites (Khaitous, 2009), however it is only recently that Saudi Arabia has begun to play a significant role in Pakistan's foreign affairs. Despite the fact that both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were members of the Western camp in the 1950s and 1960s, Saudi Arabia was influenced by Egyptian-subsidized Arab nationalism and formally protested Pakistan's participation in the Baghdad Pact (when Indian Prime Minister Nehru paid a respectable visit to Saudi Arabia in September 1956); the information was obtained calmly in Pakistan. It is fitting that President Ayub Khan visited Saudi Arabia in 1960, and Pakistani professionals began flocking to Saudi Arabia for jobs in the early 1970s (Razvi, 1981), especially following the 1973 oil catastrophe. Saudi Arabia has intervened more strongly in Pakistan's foreign policy. Even though the Shah of Iran did not attend in the second Islamic Conference, Lahore in 1974 due to tensions with the Saudis at the time, Pakistan was able to host it (Arif, 1998).

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia became closer in the 1980s and 1990s, and have since become the region's most significant strategic, political, and economic allies. Even though historically, social bonds among both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were solely based on mutuality, with the Saudis supplying oil and heavy items aid to Pakistan in moments of need, Pakistan also offered its navy skills to assist the custodians of the Two Holy Mosques in attaining their military goals. The Iranian camp has traditionally viewed this affinity negatively, complicating Pak-Iran relations.

7. Ethnic Tensions in Pakistan

In the case of Pakistan, it does show that the ruling elite is still unable to actively maintain racial identity. Due to the lack of economic resources and the uneven distribution of different social strata, the political socialization and institutiona-

lization of the masses cannot be realized. Following the deaths of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Prime Minister Khan Liaquat Ali Khan, political leaders in power are politically weak and unable to develop a strong democratic political system necessary for equal representation of all ethnic identities in Pakistan. The ruling elites are not only the military but also the civilian population using differences between different religious groups to strengthen their power base. Religious groups such as Jamat-e-Islami and Jamiat-ul-ulema-e-Islam have always had the opportunity to manipulate their identities in a restrictive atmosphere during military rule. However, religious leaders are still unable to formulate cohesive policies for the well-being of ordinary people due to serious ideological differences among them. In the particular case of Pakistan, the differences between Shia and Sunnis (Shias and Sunnis differ in different rituals of Islam) preclude the whole nation from accepting a true religion with a single religious ideology any possibility of the country (Weinbaum, 1996).

A very small number of Pakistani Sunni minority utilizes blasphemy felony points to track down and punish anyone they consider to be “heretics.”

Syed Kareem* (*Name has been changed to protect identity) has been in hiding for weeks. He fears if he is seen on the streets of Karachi, the Pakistan town he calls home, he can be a useless man strolling. His suffering began in early September 2020 with a Facebook post in which he criticized the assassins of a Shia Muslim martyr from centuries ago. Though Kareem had meant it as a post of non-secular devotion, it stuck the attention of an extremist Sunni Muslim organization, who called him a traitor to Muslims. Two days later, the 21-year-old student was the subject of a police report, accused of breaking Pakistan’s harsh blasphemy laws. He is one of more than 50 Shia Muslims arrested in Sunni-majority Pakistan in the previous month on blasphemy and anti-terrorist accusations. The youngest changed into 3 years vintage (Petersen, 2020).

“I’m afraid they’ll kill me,” Kareem whispered, his voice quivering as he talked from his hiding place. ‘I am being persecuted because I am a member of the Shia religious minority.’ ‘I am concerned for myself and my family.’ With the police on their way to question him and fearing the horrific fate that extreme Sunni groups in Pakistan inflict on anyone accused of blasphemy, Kareem and his family decided to flee last month” (Petersen, 2020).

8. As Sectarian Violence Escalates in Pakistan, Shia’s Fear for Their Lifestyles

Pakistan’s Shia minority, which makes up 15 percent to 20% of the Sunni-majority nation and is home to the world’s largest Shia community outside of Iran, has experienced a dramatic spike in attacks and arrests in the previous month. Five had been killed due to the fact September and plenty of greater Shia households and well-known figures have lengthy long gone into hiding. Last week, in Punjab, police beat up and arrested 22 Shia Muslims, consisting of seven ladies, who had been taking detail in a rite to mark a Shia martyr (Petersen,

2020).

In Pakistan, blasphemy is a deadly offense, and even unfounded accusations can result in mob violence and lynchings of the accused. According to Bakhtawar Jaffri, a Shia rights activist in Punjab, she recently submitted a police case for anti-Shia hate speech, but it was ignored. “In contrast, even frivolous and fabricated cases from the opposing side are being investigated,” she stated (Petersen, 2020).

The state of affairs worsened further last week while an influential Sunni non-secular scholar, Maulana Dr Adil Khan, modified into being killed in an assault. Hardcore Sunni companies publicly accused Shia Muslims of orchestrating the assault (Petersen, 2020).

Muslim Anti-Shia Campaign

It first started out amassing tempo on social media in September, stressful that Shia Muslims were declared heretics. The hashtag “infidel, infidel, Shias are infidel” started out trending. Then, in mid-September, a march of greater than 30,000 humans, organized via extremist Sunni Muslim businesses, gathered in Karachi over days to name Shia Muslims “unbelievers” and “blasphemers” and known as for their beheading. It turned into the most important anti-Shia march visible in a long time in Pakistan and turned into copied in different cities which include the capital Islamabad (Farook, 2015).

When it was revealed that Shia Muslims had been declared heretics, it gained steam on social media “Infidel, Shias are infidel” rapidly became a trending hashtag.

Shia Muslims are also afraid that laws would limit their non-secular liberties. The Punjab legislature enacted the Tahaffuz-e-Bunyad-e-Islam [protection of the basis of Islam] bill in July which solely recognized the Sunni interpretation of Islam, eliciting a strong reaction from the Shia community (Hanif, 1994).

“It looks that the Shia minority will face persecution,” Hamza Baloch, a founding member of the advocacy group Secular Shia Voices, warned.

“They used hashtags at first, then killed us and gathered around us. Now they’re drafting legislation to expel the Shia minority.”

Ahl-e-Sunnat-Wal-Jamaat (ASWJ) and Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan, two extremist Sunni Muslim organizations in Pakistan, are at the head of the anti-Shia campaign. Despite the fact that ASWJ was formerly proscribed in Pakistan under the Anti-Terrorism Act before being decriminalized in 2018, it is still regarded as a terrorist organization worldwide (Farook, 2015).

In addition to the United States’ “War on Terror,” sectarian persecution of Shia Muslims has been a long-running rift in Pakistan, exacerbated by proxy battles between Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia and Shia-majority Iran on Pakistani soil. “We can’t overlook about the role of regional and international forces in sectarianism in Pakistan.” “Right here, Iran is assisting Shia militias” (Hanif, 1994).

9. Saudi Expectations of Pakistan in Relation to Iran's Nuclear Program

The Iranian nuclear problem has become even more delicate as a result of the never-ending desire for regional hegemony, which has been compounded by the unpredictable political and security situations that have afflicted the Middle East for decades. The Iranian atomic program, on the other hand, has piqued international interest from its inception, particularly because it has lasted two decades. It is mostly due to the fact that Tehran has a world-class international presence and a prominent role in major Middle Eastern initiatives. Despite the fact that its atomic programming was delivered in the 1950s, the "Particles for Peace" application was developed with the assistance of the United States (Ofek, 2011).

A series of old and ceaseless conflicts prompted intense doubt between adjacent rivals, and atomic Iran has been accepted as a matter of rare hazard for Saudi Arabia and its Arab stakeholders. As Riyadh acknowledges that thermal power may be sufficient to boost Tehran's strength inside the continual middlemen opposing it, both are brutally linked across the region for influence and incomparability. The Post-2003 age has explicitly irritated the partisan firmness and heightened Saudi reservations concerning the Iranian atomic program. Ruler Abdullah suggested on many events that if Iran will expand atomic warheads "anyone inside the space could do the equivalent, alongside Saudi Arabia" Though Iran put away on guaranteeing that its atomic program is intended for peaceful capacities and for sure helped out IAEA when M. Khatami changed into in work environment as president in any case, IAEA guaranteed that they assembled adequate confirmations that to make atomic firearms were the significant time-frame desires of Tehran (Chubin, 2009).

As the BBC expressed that "the IAEA couldn't avow Iran's affirmations that its atomic program was only for serene purposes and that it had at this point not tried to increment atomic weapons" (Razvi, 1981). M. Khatami suspended uranium improvement and permitted global review team after repayment with "EU 3" intentionally, because of outrageous "worldwide strain" and "falling apart money related conditions". Saudi Arabia's fear is that atomic power will not only change Iran's reliance on force but will also set off an unending atomic arms race throughout the region. Finally, it will raise or agitate Shiite people against group of Sunni Arab governments for system trade in a horrific method, allowing Iran to interfere in the concerns of comparatively more modest Arab nations predicted with its vested side interests. The Guardian reported in September 2003 that the Riyadh government had begun a critical insurance assessment that encompassed the possible acquisition of atomic weapons, and those three alternatives had been considered.

- To produce a nuclear functionality for deterrence.
- For safety in case of any aggression, input into an alliance (with nuclear energy).

- To war to reach out a nearby pact or settlement on having a nuclear-free place (Black & Tisdall, 2010).

Saudi experts responded quickly to the document and ruled out any arrangement for purchasing atomic programming or its participation in any collusion for an atomic umbrella. Nonetheless, "Cicero," a German magazine, asserted satellite TV for pc proof that during 2004-05 under the hajj explorer cover, not many Pakistani atomic researchers visited Saudi Arabia, and legitimate chances exist that Riyadh may additionally purchase atomic weapons from Pakistan in the future. The exchange demonstrates that Pakistan is once again embroiled in the issue of "atomic weapons" between Tehran and Riyadh, as Islamabad has been dealing with troublesome claims on the global front for shifting atomic age to Iran, on the other hand consistent with surveys. For many years, Riyadh has been actively funding Pakistan's nuclear program, believing that an atomic-equipped customer country would provide the Kingdom with ultimate security. The decisions for Pakistan are difficult hitting as well as inadequate, as Pakistan needs Saudi financial assistance due to its delicate monetary real factors and most likely won't have the option to disregard the requests with the Saudi government's guidance at any necessary situation, which may irritate Tehran. The hostility from Tehran can exacerbate problems and create genuine impediments for Pakistan, particularly as India works hard to break its ties with Iran (Javaid & Kataria, 2018).

10. Facts and Findings

According to the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, around 203 episodes of partisan aggression in Pakistan occurred in the previous year and a half, resulting in 1800 fatalities, including 717 deaths, 635 of whom were Shia Muslims (see **Table 1**). Between January 2012 and June 2013, Pakistan was plagued by partisanship and profound brutality (see **Figure 1**). The Shia people have been the most heinous survivors of those episodes (MacAskill, 2003).

The Pakistan Human Rights Commission has stated the same thing. Babar Ayaz recounts in his book "What is wrong with Pakistan" how Saudi Arabia, with its fundamentalist Wahabi philosophy, has been pumping the Sunni community in Pakistan since the 1960s. The fact that Deobandi madrassas have rapidly increased to 64 percent of all madrassas in Pakistan, despite the fact that just 15% of Pakistan's population adheres to this sect, is particularly remarkable (Ayaz, 2013).

This is probably the saddest situation in which our nation is passing (**Figure 2**). This bleak situation is similarly floating over the contrary Muslim casualty countries. The signs and side effects of those breaks visit the countries taken inside the speculations.

So, sectarianism is based on the exclusive group identity of religious groups that can be classified as a political or military entity. This group identity is full of negative attitudes towards its environment, often leading to social or political

Table 1. Statistics on targeted violence against religious communities in Pakistan (January 2012-June 2013).

Religious Communities	No. of attack	N. of killed	N. of injured
Shia	77	635	834
Christians	37	11	36
Ahmadis	54	22	39
Hindu	16	2	4
Sikh	3	1	0
Other groups	16	46	195
Total	203	717	1108




Figure 1. Statistics on targeted violence against religious communities in Pakistan (January 2012-June 2013).




Figure 2. Sectarian violence in Pakistan (1989-2013).

action in the form of condemnation and discrimination—even violence—against people outside their own communities (see **Table 2**). This identity-based mobilization can be seen as a process of building boundaries—separating “us” from “them”—and using it systematically violence as a dissociative, dichotomous tool.

Table 2. Faith-based violence against Shias in post 9/11 Pakistan.

Year	Bomb Blasts	Firing Incidents	Urban	Rural	Killed	Injured
2001	0	7	6	1	31	6
2002	0	6	6	0	29	47
2003	1	4	5	0	83	68
2004	5	4	9	0	130	250
2005	4	2	2	4	91	122
2006	2	3	2	3	116	unknown
2007	2	11	4	9	442	423
2008	6	10	7	9	416	453
2009	8	27	19	16	381	593
2010	7	16	16	7	322	639
2011	2	33	26	9	203	156
2012	11	310	247	74	630	616
2013	20	283	269	34	1222	2256
2014	7	262	251	18	361	275
2015	11	99	100	10	369	400
2016	2	54	49	7	65	207
2017	4	34	26	12	308	133
2018	1	28	24	5	58	50
2019	2	15	16	1	38	9

Source: <https://lubpak.net/archives/132675>.

conflict and violence reinforce negative stereotypes about others and legitimize the use of violence (Jackman, 2002). Identity idiom should understand as a discourse of self-legitimation produced by violence, it seems to be only representative. This sectarianism is at the heart of the conflict studied here. Furthermore, in protracted conflicts, group identities are inevitably constantly being redefined and re-enactment during conflict, not just its “pre-existing” cause.

Sectarianism can be analyzed by looking at where, why, and how sectarian identities are politicization, and why it has been brought to the center of political practice. It is equally important to know about who is maintaining and supporting the sectarian discourse, and through what actions identity is communicated to the “other”. In the literature, two broad identity-based approaches conflicts can be identified based on how they are defined. A concern about identity, such as requiring cultural autonomy or recognizing certain kinds of minority rights, leads to conflict resolution approaches that seek practical solutions to discrimination. 6 second strategies to reduce and transform the relational aspects of intergroup tensions negative stereotypes, fears, misunderstandings and hatred that divide society (Leatherman & Väyrynen, 1995).

11. Conclusion

Sectarianism is a curse on the essence of any general public. However, most religions are separated into numerous orders (along with the Christians who had been, for the span of the skirt of the Renaissance), which has unfavorably influenced the Muslims. Immediately after the loss of life of the Last Prophet Muhammad, PBUH Islam split into Shia and Sunni. As it is stated in the Holy Quran in Sura Ale-Imran, keep fast all of the time, by using the Rope that Allah (loosens up for you), and be no longer divided among yourselves; and review with gratitude Allah's like on you; for you had been foes and He joined your hearts in adoration, so that by using His beauty, you became brethren; and additionally you had been on the place. As a result, Allah makes His manifestations clear to you: you will be directed (Aal-e-Imran). In any case, the throb became more intense over time. As a result, Muslims today are divided into innumerable organizations, with everyone ensuring that they are on the right track and as diverse.

Pakistani society is isolating people from one another. This separation is causing a slew of problems. Indeed, religion and organization are associated with even private conflicts. Shias and other non-Muslim people groups are treated unequally by Deobandis. As a result, the number of cases of anxiety and target killings is increasing. But Pakistan is much better country for minorities than other Muslim countries. The concerned nations need to moreover perceive that their continuous tussle will at last debilitate them. Eventually, they also will confront equivalent conditions. Time needs discernment of the profundity of the difficulty. The realm of Pakistan ought to moreover accept tough measures as pushed for its ceaseless turn of events and success. The realm needs to ensure that all of its occupants are without a doubt Pakistani with equivalent rights and obligations, and it ought to not the slightest bit oblige the way of life of position, conceal, statement of faith, group, and religion. This is the way Pakistan can dispose of this issue.

This exploration distinguished and examined many elements of the partisan fighting in the Middle East dependent on a subjective investigation of the historical backdrop of Islam, speculations of Conflict Resolution, writing of International Relations, and the response of Saudi Arabia and Iran to late close by occasions, including the Iranian Revolution, the U.S. Driven intrusion to Iraq, the Arab uprisings, and Iran Nuclear arrangement. The Iranian Revolution acquainted the priests with strength with a regulation of sending out unrest and support to the Saudi opposition in the area. Given the intricacy of the conflict, use the multi-dimensional conflict analysis rather than a single hypothetical technique. Analysis Framework with the guide of Levinger was utilized to dissect the Saudi Iranian dispute through exploring vital, political, financial, mental, and social elements of the contention to give multidisciplinary data to policy-makers, who might need to decide, adding to the dependability of the Middle East. As represented through the fighting guide and the partners' investigation,

the fight is intricate, with extraordinary entertainers. The contention between the 2 forces has influenced the stability of the Middle East. Numerous partners are roused with the guide of financial diversions or political pursuits, which incorporate withdrawal or regional segment. Moreover, this postulation reasons that political diversions are basic elements to recall when data and investigating the ascent of partisan viciousness inside the Middle East. The political utilization of religion succeeded, immediately and indirectly, in molding partisan accounts inside the Middle East. The utilization of religion inside the partisan fight has been a capacity component in the Middle East contentions. Given the wide understanding of the Quran and the strengthening of pastors through the country, religion has been an apparatus to support systems and blast partisan accounts. Through the strict understudies, Islam, viewed as a source to legitimize the conflicts and give rulers exemption.

Pakistan has had come to be the “fighting subject” for non-mainstream put together struggles with respect to event. The sectarianism and profound savagery added to the fanatic’s exercises being refined in the country. Followings are the clues with a reason to surrender the otherworldly struggles inside the country: 15 the jobless and uneducated people are incognizant in regard to the strict playing a card game being played through the fanatic gatherings. They ought to be provided with work prospects. The partisan addresses and the disdain writing through the pioneers or donors of the otherworldly occasions need to not be permitted inside the country. The vast majority of the partisan based otherworldly gatherings are supposedly financed by utilizing the abroad helpful asset. The mayhem and shakiness made by means of the partisan gatherings can most successfully be wiped out with the guide of the appropriate laws and rules made through the Government of Pakistan. The laws should be made to adapt to the issue of strict savagery in the realm.

The Madrassahs have also added to making narrow mindedness and contempt towards different orders and minorities by utilizing focusing on the youthful personalities regularly “conditioning” them. The Madrassah should give present-day schooling to the understudies with Islamic and Quranic research. The “Trap ul Islam” Madrassa situated in Talagang, Punjab is viewed as one of those otherworldly foundations introducing both Islamic and cutting-edge tutoring to the researchers. The understudies of that Madrassah had likewise affirmed for the finals of TEKNOFEST (a mechanical rivalry held in Turkey). The genuine lessons of Islam and resistance ought to be outfitted by means of the Ulema of the particular order without making disdain contrary to the elective group and minority. In the closing notification, it very well might be said that Pakistan has seen a spike inside the charge of profound contentions and savagery in the current residency. Pakistan remains dealing with the issue of non-mainstream bigotry and the issue should be tended to harshly. Sectarianism might be dispensed with from Pakistan by taking appropriate measures. The specialists should answer to the scorn exercises finished through those gatherings and make amazing guidelines to debilitate them. The specialists should at-

tempt to satisfy the advocated needs of the profound struggles. Albeit the realm can't wage the contention towards them however can boycott the partisan addresses, writing, and abroad guides outfitted to the one's organizations. The energy and impartiality should be convinced via the Ulemas. The State's handiest succeeds while its kin is joined together.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

References

- Ahmad, K. (2011). *Sectarian War Pakistan's Sunni-Shia Violence and Its Links to the Middle East*. Karachi.
- Ahmar, M. (2007). Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan. *Pakistan Vision*, 9, 1-19.
- Ahmed, K. (2011). *Sectarian War: Pakistan's Sunni-Shia Violence and Its Links to the Middle East*. Oxford University Press.
- Arif, G. M. (1998). Reintegration of Pakistani Return Migrants from the Middle East in the Domestic Labour Market. *The Pakistan Development Review*, 37, 99-124. <https://doi.org/10.30541/v37i2pp.99-124>
- Ayaz, B. (2013). *What's Wrong with Pakistan?* (p. 352). Hay House, Inc.
- Bassiouni, M. C. (2011). *Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry*. Project on Middle East Democracy (pomed). <https://pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/BICI-Report.pdf>
- Bhattacharjee, A. (2012). *Social Science Research: Principles, Methods, and Practices*. University of South Florida.
- Black, I., & Tisdall, S. (2010). *Saudi Arabia Urges US Attack on Iran to Stop Nuclear Programme* (p. 28). The Guardian.
- Burton, J. (1991). Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy. *Interdisciplinary Peace Research*, 3, 62-72. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14781159108412733>
- Chubin, S. (2009). Iran's Power in Context. *Survival*, 51, 165-190. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330902749772>
- Dougherty, J. E. (1971). *Connecting Theories of International Relations*. Digital Library Fakultas Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik Universitas Gadjah Mada. <http://digilib.fisipol.ugm.ac.id/handle/15717717/11981>
- Farook, S. K. (2015). *Shia-Sunni Sectarianism: Iran's Role in the Tribal Regions of Pakistan*. Georgetown University.
- Hanif, M. (1994). Islam: Sunnis and Shiites. *Social Education*, 58, 339-344.
- Hopkins, W. G. (2000). Quantitative Research Design. *Sportscience*, 4, 1-8.
- Huntington, S. P. (1965). Political Development and Political Decay. *World Politics*, 17, 386-430. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009286>
- Jackman, M. R. (2002). Violence in Social Life. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 28, 387-415. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.28.110601.140936>
- Javaid, U., & Kataria, M. J. R. (2018). Political Socialization in Pakistan: A Study of Madrasa Education System. *South Asian Studies*, 32, 363-398.
- Khaitous, T. (2009). Arab Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Iran. *Policy Focus*, 94, 23.

- Khan, M. S. (2014). The Saudi Factor in Pakistan-Iran Relations. *Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs*, 4, 31-57.
- Khan, Z. A., & Ahmad, S. (2008). Pakistan and Iran in Afghanistan: From Soviet Intervention to the Fall of the Taliban. *Central Asia Journal*, 64, 5.
- Leatherman, J., & Väyrynen, R. (1995). Conflict Theory and Conflict Resolution: Directions for Collaborative Research Policy. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 30, 53-82. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836795030001003>
- Levinger, M. B. (2013). *Conflict Analysis: Understanding Causes, Unlocking Solutions* (Vol. 2). United States Inst of Peace Press.
- MacAskill, E. (2003). Jihad Has Worked—The World Is Now Split in Two (p. 8). *The Guardian*.
- Melzoff, A. N., & Moore, M. K. (1977). *Legislation and JJDP Act Milestones*. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. <https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/about/legislation>
- Ofek, H. (2011). Why the Arabic World Turned Away from Science. *The New Atlantis*, No. 30, 3-23.
- Petersen, H. E. (2020). Pakistani Shias Live in Terror as Sectarian Violence Increases. *The Guardian*.
- Pfaltzgraff, R. L. (1981). Intelligence, Deception and Surprise: Implications for United States Policy in the 1980s. In R. L. Pfaltzgraff, U. Ra'anan, & W. Milberg, *Intelligence Policy and National Security* (pp. 297-314). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-05828-0_23
- Razvi, M. (1981). Pak-Saudi Arabian Relations: An Example of Entente Cordiale. *Pakistan Horizon*, 34, 81-92.
- Sattar, A. (2010). *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: 1947-2009* (Vol. 76). Oxford University Press.
- Weinbaum, M. G. (1996). Civic Culture and Democracy in Pakistan. *Asian Survey*, 36, 639-654. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645714>
- Zakaria, R. (2013). *No Soldier for Sale*. Dawn.