

# The Democratic Republic of Congo at a Crossroads

## —Democratic Republic of Congo in Electoral Challenges and Foreign Occupation

Utangisila Bena Osée

Central China Normal University, Wuhan, China

Email: oseebena@yahoo.com

**How to cite this paper:** Osée, U. B. (2019). The Democratic Republic of Congo at a Crossroads. *Open Journal of Political Science*, 9, 203-219.  
<https://doi.org/10.4236/ojps.2019.91011>

**Received:** December 27, 2018

**Accepted:** January 20, 2019

**Published:** January 23, 2019

Copyright © 2019 by author(s) and Scientific Research Publishing Inc. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY 4.0).

<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>



Open Access

---

### Abstract

The current political issue in the DRC seems to be reduced to the use of the voting machine and the cleaning of the electoral file. These are two important prerequisites, probably to think of transparent, credible elections even if the opening of the political space should have had the same importance as the other two requirements. In order to better grasp the relevance of the present problem, we must summarize the speeches of the Congolese opposition to the Cleptocratic power of Joseph Kabila in three key points, in particular the elections of 30 December 2018, the occupation of the DR. Congo by Rwanda and the Domination of the DR. Congo by Multinational Corporations.

### Keywords

DRC, Elections, Occupation

---

## 1. Introduction

Today the issue of political topicality in the DRC seems to override that or reduce itself to the use of the voting machine and the cleaning of the electoral file. These two neo-prerequisites introduced into the political class are undoubtedly important to think of transparent elections whose opening of the political space should have had the same importance as the other two requirements. By opening the political space we mean the release of political prisoners (both in the country and outside the country), and access to the State media by all protagonists. These requirements are in our opinion the visible part of the Congolese iceberg.

This is what I call in other writings, empiricism, superficiality, and appearance. However, the motives behind these prerequisites seem to be ignored by the

opinion. One of the key issues would then be how we got there. Methodologically, an assessment from the Congo alone cannot be enough to understand what will happen to us.

We should link the Congo's gaze to the universal to understand the essence of the stakes of the electoral situation, for it is said; only the universal perspective will give the light of the singular. In other words, it is by traversing its full path of negativity that the first reality can be seized in all its magnitude. In order to improve the electoral process, the opinions of Congolese politicians including opposition political groups are summed up in three points which are: 1) the 30<sup>th</sup> December 2018 elections, 2) the occupation of the country by the Rwanda and 3) the domination of the country by Multinational Corporations. This also includes the kleptocratic tendencies of the Kabila Administration.

After the justifications linked by security problems, the President of the Democratic Republic of Congo had justified the non-holding of elections at the end of 2016. Elections were initially scheduled at the end of December 2017 before they were finally postponed to December 2018. Another problem delaying the elections of 30 December 2018 is the proposal of the voting method by the chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) for him; it requires a semi-electronic voting method to reduce the cost of elections. According to him, this method of voting to involve the machine in the voting process will save hundreds of millions of dollars. Several people intervened on this CENI proposal, stressing that, despite its speed in transmitting the results of the vote, the semi-electronic vote could not allow the holding of the elections according to the agreement of 31 December 2016. In spite of this, this method of voting requires a lot of time to prepare and raise awareness so that the population is to its appropriation. This can also cause problems in the traceability of the voting result in the handling of electoral disputes. Some NGOs ask the CENI to continue with the ballot vote already experienced in 2006 and 2011.

It should be noted that this method of voting applied to the electoral process of 30 December 2018 made the circumstances of exceptions relating to the agreement of 31 December 2017. However, the CENI should leave the Congolese voters in the voting system to which they are accustomed so that all voters participate in the vote. With the occupation of the country by Rwanda's, there is no doubt that there is a vast clandestine network of the Rwandan Tutsi lobby infiltrated within the army and the Congolese national Police. The majority of these infiltrators have even fraudulently received identity names from the Congolese ethnic groups and have even dispersed particularly in several military regions based in the eastern Province and those of Maniema, North and South Kivu at the eastern of the Democratic Republic of Congo, with the aim of preparing for the balkanization of the country and its annexation to Rwanda.

It should be noted that the armed conflict in the east of the country was only a proxy war for the small eastern neighbors, which, with the support of some powers through the large multinational firms, succeeded in putting in place an impressive military arsenal to lend strong hands to the various rebel fractions led

by neighboring countries namely Rwanda, Uganda as well as Burundi (Sabakin, 1999). That since the Democratic Republic of Congo has always been regarded as a geological scandal, since many of multinational firms have made it clear that the balkanization of this country would be a better way of being able to achieve their goals. It should be stated that multinational corporations are illegally exploiting Congolese natural resources because they benefit from the weakness of the Congolese state in the face of the many armed groups that live in the day.

## 2. Elections of 30 December 2018

Still as controversial as ever seen in the DRC, the use of the voting machine is the subject of sharp criticism throughout the world in general and in Argentina, where the authorities had attempted to introduce a similar system in 2016 where a delegation of the South Korea company had travelled to offer its services by introducing an electronic voting system for the forthcoming legislative elections.

But the initiative was a long shot following the lifting of shields from a skeptical civil society about the ability of this method of voting to preserve the integrity of the vote. And even some activists had proven that it was possible to falsify electronic ballots, thanks to a simple application on a visible mobile phone. The author explains: that there is no mode of electronic system that preserves the three fundamental aspects of the vote. He believes that the most proven technology for the credible Electoral Act remains the ballot paper (Liffran, 2018). Whether in the DRC or in Argentina, NGOs and activists believe that this is an “electronic voting system and is therefore subject to the same threats and risks as any other computer-voting system”.

The use of the voting machine for the elections scheduled for 30 December 2018 in the DRC makes a lot of ink flow in the Congolese political class. The parties of the presidential majority swear by it, while the opponents see it as an instrument of electoral cheating, going so far as to call it a “flying machine”. Can we trust this machine? Are we obliged to use it to better organize the elections? These are the Epiphenomena and the lung of political news in the DRC to be deshelled.

From the legal point of view, the Independent National Electoral Commission is established in the DRC in accordance with article 211 of the Constitution of 18/02/2006 as amended is supplemented by Act N° 06/006 of 09 March 2006 on the organization of Presidential, legislative, provincial, urban, municipal and local elections with the main mission being the organization of elections and referendum in the DRC.

In the light of this aforementioned law, in its explanatory statement, it is guaranteed the impartiality and transparency of electoral operations by the CENI. The electoral law defines the modalities of the organizations which can ensure the aspects of this principle by guaranteeing the secret characters of the vote by the installation at the level of each polling station of one or more booths.

The CENI retains the ballot system in order to facilitate the counting of the

ballots and make it easier to organize several votes simultaneously. By the current reality in the DRC which is the subject of the decorations on the voting machine, it is nowhere taken up by the legal provision in force the use of an electronic machine which does not guarantee the secrecy of vote, the reliability and the transparency of operations that do not aspire to the candidates and voters.

Technically, the DRC, which is in its first experiences of the use of the New Information and Communication Technology or the vast majority of its population, does not have access to the tools of New Information and Communication Technology is in the obligation to use the voting machine which seems new.

In reality electronic voting is prohibited in the Democratic Republic of the Congo even if the voting machine is good, but it should not be used in these elections, the fear for the use of the so-called machine is linked to the “cheating”. On the technical level, the English audit was able to demonstrate this. Noting that there are several possibilities of cheating through the voting machine, among others a probable related to hacking, even though data transmission and even compared too many sources that can be truncated during the manufacture of this tool. The Congolese in its entirety do not know yet appropriate the voting machine. Another technical point: the fact that the Congolese voter has not yet appropriated this machine and will not have enough time to take ownership of it.

As we can see, that the vote is simple for any Congolese without the use of the voting machine, but it should be pointed out that the majority of Congolese is illiterate and even those who studied did not, for the most part, used the computer. Asking them to vote through a computer may be very complicated for them. The voting machine did not obtain the consensus of the whole political class, politically; the position of the opposition was motivated by political reasons. On the legal level, electronic voting is prohibited for elections held of 30 December 2018 in D. R. Congo.

In addition, in the Saint Sylvester agreement, it was said that all the decisions that were to be taken during this process after the elections were not organized in 2016, should be done by consensus. However, it is the fact that the voting machine did not achieve the consensus of the entire political class. The observation is that “a good percentage of Congolese people were at risk of excluding the electoral process because of the voting machine.” All these questions together show us that the voting machine, although it may be good, is not in the elections of 30 December 2018, which it should be used.

The machines have faced months of criticism, with opposition figures, diplomats and others asking how a country with little reliable electricity, and many people without computer experience, can successfully vote in a single day (Boussion, 2018). Earlier this month, nearly 8000 of the voting machines were destroyed in a fire in the capital, Kinshasa, leading to the latest election delay.

The CENI is its partners who should hold first the same languages to ensure

the good awareness of the elections, they did not agree on the voting machine, and also, given the vast expanse of the DRC and its demographics Impressive, the stakeholders of the electoral process have failed to raise awareness until the day of vote the large number of the Congolese population who is calling to vote with the machine. However, the CENI that should ensure the proper training of its agents for the manipulation of the voting machine which is a new system of voting operations, did not succeed given the very limited number of machines destined to raise awareness of training.

From this point of view, voting machine does not guarantee the smooth operation of the operations in the light of the following technical aspects:

- The machine-counting of equipment reception center to the center or polling station; place by excellent voting operations,
- Machine maintenance in case of a loin cloth during the time of operations,
- The reliability of the machines results in relation to the result of the counting and also at the level of the National Office of Operations (Central server).

From the social point of view, the experience of voters in the DRC has historically risen from the vote in hand raised in 1997 passing through the manual ballot paper in 2006 and 2011 to experiment Finally, for the first time to voting machine what remains an object of Arvind and political discord not only at the level of Congolese political classes see also within the Congolese population, but also at the level of the international community which in doubts about the transparency of the voting and the reliability of Result.

The CENI with this voting machine is always keen to cast off ears of teammates, while the DRC has several localities whose CENI will not be able to silicone to reach all the 80 million of Congolese and will not know how to reach all 40 million of voters. But the CENI wants to take the risk of organizing the elections with its voting machine in disregard of what this could entail as consequences. It is high time that the leaders of the CENI recapture themselves. That they adequately probe the state of mind of the Congolese in relation to this flying machine and realize how many are willing to give their human life.

Paul Ndiaye defines this machine as a “touch screen computer that allows the voter to make his choice on screen and not on a pre-printed paper ballot”. This machine is equipped with a printer that allows the ballot to be printed with the voter’s choice after it has finished voting. However, in the event of a vote, rather than check his choice on a pre-printed paper ballot, the voter makes his choice on touch screen, and the machine prints the paper ballot, which is introduced into the ballot box by the voter. This is different from the electronic vote which, according to the author, is “a dematerialized voting system because it does not provide a paper trail, with an automated voice counting”. In the end, the author who is an expert in electoral matters gives five good reasons to use the voting machine (Momath, 2018):

- **The voting machine reduces the cost of elections**

In referring to the previous elections (2006-2011), if the CENI does not im-

port pre-printed ballots, it will save nearly 200 million dollars due to having no pre-printed ballots to transport foreign countries neither to the DRC, nor to Kinshasa to the provinces. The volume and weight of the ballots to be transported is also reduced, due to the reduction in the size of ballot which is adapted to the voting machine.

- **Ballot counting is both manual and automatic**

Counting ballots was one of those other problem items in the previous elections. This machine will use the manual count (counting of ballots inserted in the ballot box) and automatic (count done by the machine that compiles the votes made), which allows to compare the results of the ballot boxes and those printed by the machine. This can reduce voter fraud. At the same time, at the close of the ballot, the witnesses shall have minutes of recounts automatically printed by the machine for each polling station. “This ease of access to results helps to enhance reliability and transparency of the voting process,” the expert said.

- **Speed in the transmission of the result**

Not only is the transmission of results faster with the voting machine, but it is also secure thanks to Thuraya modem or V-SAT. The risk of piracy of transmitted data is minimized. The results are therefore forwarded to both the local results compilation Centers (CLCR) and the CENI headquarters in Kinshasa. This results in a reduction in the reporting period.

- **Multiple uses of the same machines**

Contrary to what was known in 2006 and 2011, voting machines can be used for several electoral cycles after their first use. The Congolese can thus dream of continuing with the electoral process after the presidential and legislative elections.

- **Use adapted to illiterate masses**

The voting machine is easy to use even by the non-literate population. This one makes a choice based on the photos of the candidates in competition, which are integrated into the machine. If the voting machine continues to suffer a crisis of confidence and a lack of credibility in Congolese opinion, it returns to the CENI, suggests Paul, to organize as many demonstrations as possible for all its partners and Congolese, in Using in particular the traditional media to social networks in order to create a peaceful and political citizen dialogue on the credibility to be granted to this voting machine.

According to some studies, the Senegalese population is composed of 43.3% literate. It is therefore considered that illiteracy affects more than 70% of the population. 51.1% of men are literate (almost one on two) whereas in women this figure is 29, 2% (one on five). Indeed, young girls are often less likely to be sent to school (<http://www.planete-senegal.com>). The alarming situation of illiteracy in the DRC is a major concern for his government. Indeed, 27, 1% is the illiteracy rate in the DRC, 13% for women and 14% for men according to a study conducted in 2004 in DRC (Demographic and Health Survey (EDS 2004)); In absolute value, over 71 million of the country's population, more than 19 million

of them are illiterate, people who do not know how to read, write or calculate.

In addition, 7 million children whose age range between 5 and 17 years are not in school and out of school, according to the Survey of children and adolescents outside the “EADE” school, in acronym. In view of this situation it is difficult to say that the voting machine is easy to use even by the non-literate population.

Intellectual opponents who seem to know this scenario well that do not get involved in the concrete solutions to the use of the voting machine which in few days will be the elections. But, none of the successful candidates are able to beat campaigning throughout the Republic; it requires several million US dollars that only the government is able to spend using the money from the public purse. In this configuration therefore all other presidential candidates will accompany the majority candidate and legitimize his election. To circumvent this trap of pre-won elections, a civil society group proposes a transition without Kabila to level the playing field so that all candidates have the same chances. The transition without Kabila will have advantage of opening up the public space and making available to all the candidates the same financial advantages for a balanced competition.

This solution can be based on the fact that President Kabila’s mandate ended on 19 December 2016. It is therefore, in principle, suspended, but a reprieve which can last another ten years if the elections are not organized or if the elections are organized under its control to impose its dolphin which will continue its system of predation. A transition without Kabila would at least respect the Constitution to the extent that in the absence of the President who is ineligible, and who could not organize the elections for two successive years, the power reverts de facto to the first sovereign who will choose its own leaders in a healthy and transparent way.

After several repetitions of the delays, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo has made progress in recent months in the holding of the elections of 30 December 2018. But there are still important concerns about the transparency, credibility and quality of the ballot. While there are still many uncertainties, the prospects for this year’s elections have improved, partly because of the increased pressure on the Congolese government on the part of African leaders. Regional and international actors should emphasize the confidence-building measures contained in the Saint Sylvester agreement, focusing on the steps that help to create equitable conditions and increase confidence in Electoral preparations. The majority in power and the opposition should participate in the process in a constructive way and avoid verbal overbidding and aggressive tactics.

It is worth noting that the elections present many challenges for the regime, in the first place to find a successor in whom President Kabila trusts. However, overall, the regime is rather in a strong position: it firmly controls the state and the electoral machinery, and the opposition remains divided. While the regime is visibly moving towards a poll, opponents of President Kabila and international

actors must adapt quickly. African, western and other governments should put pressure on some essential reforms to make this election more credible, build confidence in the main electoral aspects and establish conditions for a vote Fair. African powers and Western governments could build a similar consensus on a series of crucial measures to make the elections fair and increase the chances of a credible vote, and then put pressure on the Congolese authorities to implement them, even if a rigorous application of the Saint Sylvester agreement is now unlikely.

Beyond the problems of routing and technical problems, the political problem arises, these machines being always at the heart of the disputes. Several opposition figures have already announced that they will challenge the use of these machines in polling stations. We must therefore expect acts of sabotage, or even vandalism in many polling stations, which, after a certain scale, will lead, if not to the invalidation of these elections, in any case to a reinstatement (Musavuli, 2018). General cause of their credibility, especially at the international level, a president who comes out of such a chaotic election will be so lacking in legitimacy that the country will have to plunge into a deep political crisis.

In her article of August 3th, 2018, the American journalist Sam Madnick understands that the Kinshasa regime is preparing troubles across the country. She says that generals have been in Masisi territory where they have made contact with armed groups, persuading them that the elections will not take place and that they must prepare to launch actions (Mednick, 2018). Still in the context of premises chaos, the M23 announced in early August that he was already back on Congolese soil. This Tutsi militia, sponsored by Rwanda (Musavuli, 2017),

The following measures should be envisaged to consider transparent and credible elections:

- CENI should continue to consult with opposition and civil society on key aspects of electoral preparations, in particular the audit of the voter register and procedures for the use of new voting machines, while allowing their representatives to check these aspects; the recent meetings organized in this spirit are an encouraging first step.
- The Government should ensure the security of all political actors and prevent the majority party activists from taking part in intimidation of opposition candidates and their supporters. Like all Congolese political actors, it should commit itself to avoiding verbal overbidding and refraining from fanning ethnic tensions, possibly through establishment of a code of conduct.
- CENI should also quickly reach agreement on the role of the joint team of international experts with the participating agencies—the United Nations, the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the International Organization of the Francophonie (IOF). Experts should be integrated into the CENI and continually assess the progress made to build a common vision within these organizations. They should also carefully monitor the voter register audit and



test the new voting machines (Electoral Poker in RD Congo, Africa Report, 2018).

### 3. The Occupation of the Country by Rwanda

For several years, DRC and Rwanda have come closer, to the extent that several regional actors even speak of a secret pact between the two presidents of the aforementioned countries that some even go so far as to present as cousins ... Considering that it would not be able to combat both the encroachments of Uganda in the Lake Albert area, and against those of Rwanda in Kivu, the president of the DRC would have made share of fire, leaving North Kivu in Rwanda through its Congolese allies (Lugan, 2018). In exchange for what, Kigali would have “reconvened” him South Kivu with his own Banyamulenge allies. Hence the unusual rally of the latter to the MRCD ...

In this context, presidential, legislative and provincial elections of 23 December, 2018, is only exploding the situation, the question of the oil deposits of lake Albert with reserves estimated at several billion barrels, would be in the heart of the countryside. However, the aquifer under the waters of the lake, on either side of the Uganda border and DRC (Real Africa, 2010), the first of which would like to negotiate with a reliable Congolese partner, no longer supporting the maneuvers destabilizing measures to prevent a serious settlement with Kinshasa. All the aforementioned elements would explain President Museveni’s wish to have an election whose new president would be less “subservient” in Rwanda. Two main assumptions may be considered in this epiphenomenon.

The first hypothesis, the facts are proven. Uganda, which wants to settle the oil issue of Lake Albert with a reliable Congolese government, decided to dispose of Paul Kagame as President Kabila’s ally. As for Hutu Burundi, its opposition to Tutsi Rwanda is enshrined in regional policy. Second hypothesis, we are in the presence of manipulation. The latter would be orchestrated by both Kigali and Kinshasa, i.e. by the two presidents, in order to allow the postponement of the Congolese elections and first of all presidential elections to which President Kabila cannot present himself. The President of Uganda cannot accept the election of a president who will make the recovery of Kivu a national Union fight because, without the looting of the riches of that region, the Rwandan economy would be dark and the regime included.

In this context, the “fighting” in the south of the country would therefore be a pretext, in the name of the right of prosecution against a postulated movement “heir to the genocidal”, to be able to bring war to the DRC. If the eastern DRC were to embrace, the elections of 23 December 2018 would be postponed and president Kabila would remain in power ...

For years, the ceasefire agreements imposed on the DRC by the international community have served as a useful ploy to facilitate the infiltration of Rwandan soldiers into the FARDC and the PNC. The Congo’s enemies each time presented these agreements as sesame that would bring peace to DR Congo. But history has shown us that the main and unawed objective was to strengthen the

Rwandan presence within the FARDC and the PNC, in order to establish the occupation power of the DRC. Among the operations of these agreements we can cite the “demobilization of negative forces” and the “reintegration of armed groups into the FARDC”.

These two operations are result of the various peace agreements, mainly: “Lusaka agreement”, “Sun City Agreement”, “Kampala agreement” and the “Addis Ababa Agreement”. All these agreements have facilitated one after other, the infiltration of Rwandan soldiers into FARDC and PNC through the manipulation and trafficking of men in the false rebel movements created and equipped by Rwanda and Uganda, and which have followed by the east of the RD Congo. These include RCD-Goma, MLC, CNDP and M23. As we can see, five steps are in the process of infiltrating the Rwandan network in DRC (*Investigative Document on Rwandan Infiltration in the DRC, 2015*):

- In accordance with the plan approved by the President of Uganda, whose execution is entrusted to the Minister of Defense of Rwanda, Rwandan soldiers leave their country of origin every two weeks, in groups from 150 to 300 and arrive in the two provinces Neighboring north and South Kivu in DR Congo where all the strategic command posts of the Congolese national Army and Police are in the hands of Rwandan Tutsi officers assisted by certain Congolese officers.

These Rwandan officers in the FARDC and the PNC are issuing roadmaps to the Rwandan infiltrators in the same way as the FARDC officers of the 8<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> garrisons of North or South Kivu on assignment. It should be noted that the commander of the 10<sup>th</sup> Military Region in South Kivu (according to the former FARDC structure) is no more than a Rwandan Tutsi general. In North Kivu, a general, chief of operations in the 8<sup>th</sup> garrison for years, as well as a Colonel, responsible for intelligence in the 8<sup>th</sup> Military region in North Kivu and promoted to general rank on 7<sup>th</sup> July 2013 by the President of the DRC, were all two occupied the cover of this operation of “granting of the roadmaps” to the Rwandans for several years.

- Thanks to these roadmaps, Rwandan soldiers “in transit” are embarked on FARDC or UN military aircraft to the Kitona military base (BAKI) in Central Kongo south province of Kinshasa! And this Congolese military base is also under the full control of Rwandan network. Indeed, a Rwandan Tutsi general, assisted by a Second commander of the same ethnic group, is those who manage the secret of the operation!
- After a briefing and acclimatization period for Rwandan soldiers infiltrated into the base, these two Rwandan Tutsi commanders grant them other roadmaps as if they were elements of the Kitona base assigned to Kinshasa this time.

According to very strict instructions, the infiltrators are transferred on board the military vehicles, which are carried exclusively by Rwandan Tutsi soldiers committed to this special mission.

- Once in Kinshasa, the infiltrated military personnel are taken directly to

another Tutsi Rwandan who has an imposing reception infrastructure for their housing and food for several days.

- After an intense briefing of a few days on the nature of their mission and the Code of their behavior in Congolese land with a view to their perfect “integration” within the FARDC and the PNC, the infiltrators are transferred to a Major general, who occupies the strategic position of Chief EM responsible for Administration of FARDC.

It is he who ultimately officially affects the Rwandan infiltrators, with mechanical numbers and new Congolese identities (drawn up from Kigali), in various FARDC units across the country, according to the need for the Rwandan agenda set by the Minister of Defense of Rwanda and mastermind of all operations. The latter goes down every week to Kinshasa to take a look at the progress of the operation and to give guidance on the continuation of operations across the DRC. It is directly accountable to the Rwandan President.

This powerful clandestine network of the Rwandan Tutsi lobby has managed to lock down the entire control mechanism of the Congolese national Army and Police. In July 2014, according to the report-Summary of a general presented by the President of Rwanda and the President the DR Congo, Rwanda managed to infiltrate the FARDC and the PNC in 14 years, that is to say since 2001, more than 25,000 military and 354 Rwandan officers including some generals, Colonels and majors. And to give way to the Rwandan infiltrators, the DRC president has carried out a massive retreat of the Congolese generals and officers.

In 7<sup>th</sup> July 2013, by 3 Ordinances number 13/082, 13/086 and 13/087, the Rwandan Trojan Horse at the head of DRC, the president of the DRC, therefore retired some generals, and Congolese senior officers! Today, the key and strategic positions of the Congolese national army and Police are almost all under the control of the Rwandan Tutsi officers ‘network.

Like the military and security network managed by some Tutsi Rwandans, under the supervision of Rwandan President, there is a local political superstructure, a sort of “parallel government”, composed of civilians and officers exclusively Rwandan Tutsi. This group is the real government that runs the DRC (Honoré Nband-Nzambo Ko Atumba, 2015). It is within it that the real debates on the DRC take place and this is where the real decisions are made which are then passed on to the puppets and Congolese collaborators for a simple execution. An increasingly large group of Congolese opponents, especially in the diaspora, believe that it is not yet time to hold elections because the country is under Rwandan occupation. For the proponents of this thesis, the power of Kinshasa is under the control of Kigali.

On this side of the Atlantic, we all know that to go to Congo you have to ask for authorizations in Kigali, especially for its eastern part. For this frankness of the opposition, it is impossible to make elections in a country under foreign occupation (Okeke, 2014). This thesis does not have many followers in the international world because if it is to be taken seriously, it would be necessary to go af-

ter Kagame. No one at the moment is ready to do so.

The thesis of occupation is verifiable by all those who go to the east of the country. The repeated massacres of Beni or Masisi bear the presence of a Rwandan hand with the complicity of the Congolese government who prefers to talk about terrorism in order to be in tune with the world. In the light of the aforementioned elements, we believe that this occupation is also a symptom of interests of the multi-nationalisms of which the Congo is a victim of its richness.

How to get out of a guided occupation? That is the question we have to answer. The elections as they profile on the horizon will bring the dolphin out of power because only the state is able to make propaganda worthy of that name throughout the country. A popular uprising could both solve both problems in one action. But the conditions seem not to be met for such an action. The quantum of the forces in action is not yet ready for this eminently citizen Act, but it will come in its time.

However, this undercover work has almost reached its culmination, which heralds the imminent outbreak of the DRC's actual balkanization operation. The same is the Congolese army. General Etumba's symbolic presence at the head of the FARDC is a mere parody for the consumption of national and international opinion. Today, in addition to the national Police, it is the Rwandan Tutsi general who combs the Congolese EMG chief and gives him instructions from the hierarchy. And for the better phagocytize, the president of the DRC has assigned four Tutsi colonels from the direct entourage of the Rwandan president, whose mission is to ensure the faithful execution of the special orders coming from above and to monitor the facts and actions of the chief EMG to the control of all his communications.

These four "guardian angels" would therefore have the right to access all of his e-mail boxes. To facilitate the movement of immigrants and the massive integration of Rwandans, the Directorate-General for Migration (DGM) is also in the spotlight of the Rwandan lobby. The current director of the DGM for the Rwandan Tutsi in the city of Kinshasa is approached as number two to monitor and oversee the DG. If Rwanda has arrived today to succeed in its project of occupation and Balkanization of the Democratic Republic of Congo, it is mainly because of the treason of some Congolese, because there are Congolese officers in complicity with Rwandan occupants. And of all these betrayals, that of the military elites are the most harmful, because they are in the process of depriving the entire country of instrument of defense of its integrity and sovereignty.

In 2008, a report openly accused Rwanda of supporting the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), a rebel movement created for the defense of Tutsi minorities in the DRC, and Kigali had finally arrested the Congolese general while his Troops threatened to seize Goma, the city in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and thus ridicule the so-called impartial forces. On the basis of this argument for the protection of minorities, the Congolese argue that no ethnic group is a majority in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

(Nkoko, 2012), all are minority. According to some sources confirm that Rwanda and Anglo-Saxon allies would like to formally occupy Kivu-Ituri in February/March 2016, leaving their accomplices of the international community to share the remaining part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Freddy Monanga of Code 234 TV, 2016). As always, the great unknown of this equation of the balkanization of the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains the reaction of the Congolese population.

In the army, there are no fewer than 9 Tutsi generals. The number of general and senior officers of the only Tutsi tribe (Banyamulenge) exceeds the number of generals and colonels held by all the tribes in North and South Kivu. On this list, add the number of more or less 300 captains in the regular FARDC (Mutu, 2017). The name “Banyamulenge” is no longer limited to that of the Congolese Tutsi of South Kivu, occupying the plateaux of the Itombwe, but applies to the Tutsis of the two Kivus and to all the Tutsis who claim Congolese nationality.

So far, since the beginning of the Rwandan-Burundi-Ugandan war of aggression, the Congolese have seen Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan soldiers assist their Congolese puppets in looting the natural resources of R.D. Congo. For several years, this conglomerate of men in arms and uniforms has begun to ogle on and occupy the Kivu and Ituri lands (Vertas, 2010). To achieve this, it was necessary to crack down on the Congolese indigenous populations with unparalleled violence, the massacres of the people, the murders of young people and executives, the rape of women and men, the burning of houses, the movement of Congolese populations, etc. Note that this violence is inflicted on the Congolese indigenous populations under the nose and beard of the United Nations represented in DR Congo first by MONUC and currently by the MONUSCO.

#### **4. The Domination of the DR. Congo by Multinational Corporations**

The lesson of the 2006 elections that gave birth to a parallel government that holds true power in R.D. Congo to the detriment of the elect and the primary sovereign is that the solution to the Congolese conflict is not elections but the reconquest of power by the Congolese people. The Congolese people cannot regain power through elections designed, financed, and organized by the same great powers and multinationals whose project is the economic and territorial balkanization of the DRC is underway. In 2006, the elections were a diversion to demobilize the armed resistance of the east of the country in favor of the deployment of the CNDP throughout the eastern part of the DRC.

In 2011, elections are likely to give birth to violence whose responsibility would be falsely attributed to the electoral duel between majority and opposition but which in reality is skillfully planned by the parallel government to enable the CNDP and its Rwandan sponsors, to make a final assault on the civilian populations that still resist him in the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema and Orientale province.

In his latest book, *The American Law* Lawrence Lessig concludes that the holder of the real power in a country is the financier of the elections (Lessig, 2011). Even in the USA, a country considered as a model of democracy, corruption is also present. Americans like the Congolese realize that their country is no longer theirs because decisions that jeopardize their lives are often taken to serve the interests of the corrupters and not the voters. Lessig calls it an institutional corruption which makes a government, whether left or right, to serve the interests of the financiers before those of the voters.

For this, elections have become a theatre, a comedy where voters are the turkeys of farce. Also, the true power of a nation-state like the USA is neither in Parliament nor in the presidency, but elsewhere. The hand that finances the winner's election campaign is the one that holds the levers of real power. This is the situation around the world since political power depends on the economic power that is exercised by the multinationals that are also called transnational.

The third is the last hypothesis of this article is that the Congo contains minerals that modern technology needs. It does not belong to those who live there to control these countries, but to those who advance the technologically in the world. The Congolese leaders are "Kapita", "gatekeepers" that protect these riches on behalf of the most powerful in the world by discarding the less powerful.

The country that the king of the Belgians Leopold II had secured after the Berlin conference contained rubber for the nascent automobile industry, copper for the electricity that had just been invented, uranium to finish the World War, coltan for Democratize mobile phone and computers, cobalt for future electric cars. This country contains everything that supports the world economy (even oil is there). So it must not belong to the Congolese. And the multinationals that make huge profits with the products extracted from Congo are seem to be the real owners of this country. Profit has become the unsurpassable horizon of human action since the Neolithic revolution.

To take over the DRC's rudder, the Congolese have as a size adversary the multinational mining companies. Until then, only a few Congolese have tried to reconquer Congo to remove it from the lion's mouth. We can cite Beatrice Kimpa Vita, Prophet Simon Kimbangu, Emery Patrice Lumumba, Pierre Mulele, Mgr Christophe Munzehirwa, Mgr Emmanuel Kataliko, Mzee Laurent Désiré Kabila, etc. The lives of these men were brutally shortened by the major powers and multinational mining companies because they tried to open the eyes of Congolese and to serve them before the multinationals.

Why have these valiant sons and daughters of the DRC not been long in the fire? It is certainly because they were easily isolated from the rest of the Congolese people before they created a national movement firmly united and organized for the revolutionary struggle.

To win back R.D. C, the Congolese people must take advantage of the electoral campaign to create the foundations of a national movement for the Congolese

revolution. The success of such a project necessitates liberation of the Congolese people of its crooked politicians, of its elites carrying briefcases, of its belly politicians who are both in the majority in power as in the opposition, of white misleading, etc. According to Lessig, the revolution to overthrow the current system will not be like the previous revolutions but with a new knowledge, a new method... The Congolese must thus put themselves without further delay at the new School of the revolution.

It is not for us to place in power the one that the people will choose. The “Kapita” will always be imposed on us by those whose ores make it extremely rich and powerful. Finally our effort to liberate Congo should concern the three levels. Sound and transparent elections in a political space liberated for all, without voting machines, fictitious voters, political prisoners, or exiled forces, or monopoly on state property. The popular uprising will bring the country out of the occupation of Rwanda. The agents of status quo will defend themselves spouts and fingernails, but the law of the large number on the street will do the job of the Congolese. Finally, the fight against multinationals will be both ideological and popular.

## 5. Conclusion

From its three elements mentioned above, we can conclude by saying that the use of the voting machine is not bad in the sense that the CENI and the stakeholders were mutually agreed to discuss and review the advantages and disadvantages of this machine before it is published to public opinion. Because of this lack of communication, the voting machine makes a lack of credibility in the eyes of the whole world and the Congolese people.

Since the occupation of the country by Rwanda there is a clear and well defined domination of the DRC security organs by Tutsis who are Rwandese who closely collaborates with the Rwandese President, Parallel governmental structures which are composed of and officers who are mainly Rwandese Tutsis and this is allegedly done at the influence of the Rwandese President. Multinational Corporations collaborate with some Congolese nationals to extract mineral resources and this does not benefit the Congo since all the profits are taken to the mother countries of the Multinational Corporations.

## Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

## References

- Boussion, M. (2018). *Voting Machines Worry Congolese as Election Nears*.  
<https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2018/dec/26/voting-machines-worry-congolese-as-elec/?news>
- Freddy Monanga of Code 234 TV (2016). *Rwandan Occupancy of Kivu-ituri: It Pass or It Broken?*  
[https://www.google.com.hk/search?q=Freddy+Monanga+of+Code+234+TV%2C+\(201](https://www.google.com.hk/search?q=Freddy+Monanga+of+Code+234+TV%2C+(201)

[6\).+Rwandan+Occupancy+of+Kivu++ituri%3A+It+Pass+or+It+broken+in+2016%3F&rlz=1C1CHBF\\_enGB817GB817&oq=Freddy+Monanga+of+Code+234+TV%2C+\(2016\).+Rwandan+Occupancy+of+Kivu++ituri%3A+It+Pass+or+It+broken+in+2016%3F&saqs=chrome..69i57.30968j0j9&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8](https://www.google.com/search?q=Document+d%27investigation+sur+l%27infiltration+rwandaise+en+RDC%2C+Paris%2C+12+e+f%C3%A9vrier+2015.&rlz=1C1CHBF_enGB817GB817&oq=Document+d%27investigation+sur+l%27infiltration+rwandais+en+RDC%2C+Paris%2C+12+e+f%C3%A9vrier+2015.&saqs=chrome..69i57.30968j0j9&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8)

Honoré Niband-Nzambo Ko Atumba (2015). *Investigation into the Operation of the Infiltration Network and Occupation System of the Democratic Republic of Congo by Rwanda*.

<http://www.info-apareco.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Dossier-Enquete-sur-le-fonctionnement-du-reseau-dinfiltration-et-du-systeme-doccupation.pdf>

*Investigative Document on Rwandan Infiltration in the DRC, Paris, 12<sup>th</sup>, February 2015.*

[https://www.google.com.hk/search?q=Document+d%27investigation+sur+l%27infiltration+rwandaise+en+RDC%2C+Paris%2C+12+e+f%C3%A9vrier+2015.&rlz=1C1CHBF\\_enGB817GB817&oq=Document+d%27investigation+sur+l%27infiltration+rwandais+en+RDC%2C+Paris%2C+12+e+f%C3%A9vrier+2015.&saqs=chrome..69i57.5802j0j9&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8](https://www.google.com.hk/search?q=Document+d%27investigation+sur+l%27infiltration+rwandaise+en+RDC%2C+Paris%2C+12+e+f%C3%A9vrier+2015.&rlz=1C1CHBF_enGB817GB817&oq=Document+d%27investigation+sur+l%27infiltration+rwandais+en+RDC%2C+Paris%2C+12+e+f%C3%A9vrier+2015.&saqs=chrome..69i57.5802j0j9&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8)

<https://www.rfi.fr/africa/20180926-election-rdc-inquietudes-machines-voter-retard>

<https://www.mediacongo.net/article-actualite>

[http://www.planete-senegal.com/senegal/alphabetisation\\_senegal.php](http://www.planete-senegal.com/senegal/alphabetisation_senegal.php)

<https://www.mediaterre.org/actu,20170916135113,6.html>

Lessig, L. (2011). *Republic, Lost, How Money Corrupts Congress and a Plan to Stop It* (12th ed., pp. 8-9). New York, Boston.

[https://www.google.com.hk/search?q=Lessig%2C+L.++\(2011\).+Republic%2C+Lost%2C+How+Money+Corrupts+Congress+and+a+Plan+to+Stop+It+\(12th+ed.%2C+pp.+89\).+New+York%2C+Boston.&rlz=1C1CHBF\\_enGB817GB817&oq=Lessig%2C+L.++\(2011\).+Republic%2C+Lost%2C+How+Money+Corrupts+Congress+and+a+Plan+to+Stop+It+\(12th+ed.%2C+pp.+8-9\).+New+York%2C+Boston.&saqs=chrome..69i57.7799j0j9&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8](https://www.google.com.hk/search?q=Lessig%2C+L.++(2011).+Republic%2C+Lost%2C+How+Money+Corrupts+Congress+and+a+Plan+to+Stop+It+(12th+ed.%2C+pp.+89).+New+York%2C+Boston.&rlz=1C1CHBF_enGB817GB817&oq=Lessig%2C+L.++(2011).+Republic%2C+Lost%2C+How+Money+Corrupts+Congress+and+a+Plan+to+Stop+It+(12th+ed.%2C+pp.+8-9).+New+York%2C+Boston.&saqs=chrome..69i57.7799j0j9&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8)

Liffran, O. (2018). *DRC: The Use of the Voting Machine Strongly Criticized by Argentine*.

<https://www.jeuneafrique.com/564559/politique/rdc-lutilisation-de-la-machine-a-voter-vivement-critiquee-par-des-ong-argentines/>

Lugan, B. (2018). *What Is Really Happening in Rwanda and Kivu?*

<https://medium.com/@humekaamahoro/what-is-really-happening-in-rwanda-and-kivu-by-bernard-lugan-c2169ffd5639>

Mednick, S. (2018). *Will Congo Go to the Polls or Go to War?*

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/03/will-congo-go-to-the-polls-or-go-to-war-Kabila-drc-KivuRwanda/>

Momath, D. (2018). *Five Reasons to Use the Voting Machine in the DRC*

<https://habarirdc.net/cinq-raisons-recourir-machine-voter-ceni-congolais-rdc/>

Musavuli, B. (2018). *DR Congo-Elections: Sabotage, Safe Chaos and Greek Ballot*.

<https://www.agoravox.fr/tribune-libre/article/rd-congo-elections-sabotage-chaos-209322>

Musavuli, R.B. (2017). *Congolese Genocide* (p. 146).

<https://www.amazon.fr/G%3c3%8910CIDES-CONGOLAIS-crime-lhumanit%3c3%A9-co-ngo/dp/1549574213>

Mutu, J.-M. (2017). *The Rwandan Occupation Is Confirming, Defend You Else*.

<http://www.congovox.com/l%E2%80%99occupation-rwandaise-se-confirme-d%C3%A9fendez-vous-sinon%E2%80%A6>

Nkoko, N. (2012). *Why Rwanda Does Not Want to Let Go of Eastern DRC*.

<http://www.slateafrique.com/88733/guerre-congo-rdc-kivu-rwanda-rebellion-ressources>



Okeke, C. (2014). *Rwandan Occupancy in Progress: This Is How the DRC's Institutions and Security System Are under Rwanda's Control and the Congolese Officials Infiltrated by Rwandan "Swallows"!*

[http://changeincongo.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=507:loccupation-rwandaise-en-marche-voici-comment-les-institutions-et-tout-le-systeme-de-securite-de-la-rdc-sont-sous-controle-du-rwanda-et-les-officiels-congolais-infiltres-par-des-lhir-ondelles-rwandaies&catid=47:nos-realisations&Itemid=107](http://changeincongo.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=507:loccupation-rwandaise-en-marche-voici-comment-les-institutions-et-tout-le-systeme-de-securite-de-la-rdc-sont-sous-controle-du-rwanda-et-les-officiels-congolais-infiltres-par-des-lhir-ondelles-rwandaies&catid=47:nos-realisations&Itemid=107)

Sabakin, K. (1999). *Democracy and Peace in DRC, PUK.*

Vertas (2010). *DRC: Rwanda Occupation on the Move: 1<sup>st</sup> Contingent in Kirumba/Lubero.*

<http://www.veritasinfo.fr/article-rdc-occupation-rwandaise-en-marche-1er-contingent-a-kirumba-lubero-61391414.html>