The Impact of Government Supervision and Consumer Purchasing Behavior on Food Safety


This paper aims at the theoretical analysis to the impact of government supervision and consumer purchasing behavior on food quality security, so as to look for safety strategies and measures to strengthen and improve the level of food safety in China. Reputation mechanism is introduced and Bayesian approach is based on, in which government supervision as well as consumer purchasing behavior is taken as crucial factors to impact on the food quality security. As to the proposed quantitative indicators, government supervision includes exposure rate, fine and etc.; at the same time, consumer purchasing behavior includes consumer’s WTP for security food and consumer expectations to food safety. Taking China’s dairy industry as an example, it makes simulation by Netlog. The results show that consumer purchasing behavior alone has little effect on the dairy companies’ decision-making to be honest or counterfeiting enterprises. However, combination government supervision with purchasing behavior has great impact, and plays very good effects on food safety.

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Chen, Y. , Tang, X. , Chen, K. and Liu, H. (2014) The Impact of Government Supervision and Consumer Purchasing Behavior on Food Safety. Journal of Agricultural Chemistry and Environment, 3, 7-12. doi: 10.4236/jacen.2014.34B002.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.


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