Increased Fertility Rate Improves House Hold Utility, Despite Reducing the Wage Rate: The Burden of Long-Term Care Services

Masatoshi Jinno

Faculty of Economics, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan.

DOI: 10.4236/jss.2014.26046                

Abstract

In many developed countries, fertility rates are in decline and longevity is increasing. While greater longevity is cause for celebration, a growing elderly population increases the overall demand for expanded social security programs, particularly those pertaining to long-term care services. By considering and measuring the care burden per capita, we show that an increase in the fertility rate can improve household utility, even though it reduces the wage rate. The findings of this analysis imply that improvements in the fertility rate are desirable, as it eases burdens relating to long-term care services, as well as those relating to public pension plans.

Keywords

Eldercare, Long-Term Care Services, Exogenous Fertility Rate, Social Security

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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