Kant on Self-Awareness
Thomas W. Smythe
North Carolina Central University, Durham, USA.
DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2013.34077   PDF    HTML     13,990 Downloads   31,476 Views   Citations


This paper has three main parts. First, I discuss Kant on self-awareness in terms of inner sense, why he failed to make this account coherent, and why he failed to give such an account. Second, I give two reasons why such an account is bound to be inadequate. In the last section, I discuss another attempt Kant was tempted to give in terms of transcendental self-awareness involving a nonsensory intuitive perception that helps solve some of his problems.

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Smythe, T. (2013) Kant on Self-Awareness. Open Journal of Philosophy, 3, 531-535. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2013.34077.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.


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