My Body: Is It Me?

Abstract

In this paper I will take the term “my” in the phrase “my body” to be typically used to refer to the self or person whose body it is. This raises a problem for materialism over how a body can own or have itself. I will articulate some ways in which we are and are not related to our bodies, and try to undo the linquistic knot of a body owning itself.

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Smythe, T. (2012) My Body: Is It Me?. Open Journal of Philosophy, 2, 179-182. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2012.23027.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

References

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