The History of 13 Greek-Owned Shipping Companies, Evaluated by Management, plus a Case-Study ()
1. Introduction
1.1. What Strategy Has to Do with Enterprises?
As shown in Graph 1, a strategy deals with the basic long-term goals and objectives of the Enterprise. Then, the Enterprise has to plan the proper courses of action to achieve them. The crucial stage concerns the provision of the means, enabling the implementation of the previous stages.
Source: author; based on a definition given by Chandler (1962); Besanko et al. (2017).
Graph 1. The strategy in enterprises.
Company’s Manager has to calculate carefully company’s working capital1, as well company’s capital, we believe. In shipping industry, there is a “trap” set by the banks, not on purpose, because they lend money as much as 60%, on average, for a 2nd hand ship and 80%, on average, for a newly-built one. Managers must also remember that finance is a necessary condition for success, but not a sufficient one. The relevant know-how is also required, either by the Manager, and/or by company’s staff.
For a shipping company, we believe, that its basic goals/objectives are (Graph 2).
Source: author.
Graph 2. The Goals & objectives of a shipping company.
The graph we believe is self-explanatory.
1.2. The Greek-Owned Fleet
The Greek-owned shipping owned 4221 units of ~354 m dwt, in 2024, according to the Greek Shipping Cooperation Committee. Greece managed the 20% of the world tonnage, 25% of the bulk carriers, 30% of the tankers, 25% of the LNGs, 8.1% of the containerships, 8.3% of the car carriers and 3.6% of other types. Fleet’s average age was 12.5 years (dwt), with 456 units under construction. The fleet belongs to about 1200 international shipping companies, mostly island and family, some traditional, and some established since 1850, all of Greek interests by majority.
1.3. The World Shipbuilding
China had the leadership, according to “Intermodal”, in building 3454 ships out of 5735 (60.23%), followed by S. Korea and Japan. The above 3 countries covered the ~93% in GT, and this is due to the “clean fuel” fleet concerning 2119 ships, according to the “Offshore Energy”.
1.4. The Business History of Greek-Owned Shipping Companies
Published material about the business history of the Greek-owned shipping companies is limited, for various reasons, one of which is the fear that their business strategies will be revealed to their competitors. Thus, we consider this work—part of a larger one—to be interesting, analyzing the business patterns, as well the strategies, followed, which led to success or failure. This may help the existing, or the future, shipping companies, to avoid the mistakes of their predecessors, and copy only their successful endeavors. The business history of 95 of them—out of a total of about 150—was analyzed already in a series of articles (Goulielmos, 2025a, 2025b, 2025c, 2025d).
1.5. The Wars in Which the Greek-Owned Shipping Companies Lost Their Battles
Two battles the Greek-owned shipping companies were unable to win: the premature death of their owner, and a shipping depression, like the one in 1981-1987.
2. Aim, Structure & Contribution of This Work
Our aim was to present, as briefly as possible, the business history of 13 Greek-owned shipping companies out of 150. Our particular interest was to underline those, certainly, few, companies, which grew rapidly by ordering newbuildings, based on economies of scale, and applying also a low-risk chartering policy. The Greek shipowners, who built-up a close cooperation with their big charterers, like Onassis, Niarchos, and others, through appropriate new-building programs, they proved to be industry’s Champions.
This work is cast in 4 parts and 6 appendices, after a literature review. Part I, dealt with a brief historical account of 13 Greek-owned shipping companies; Part II, dealt with a case-study of a Greek-owned shipping company. Part III, dealt with the nonlinear balance sheets and the Return on Assets, and part IV dealt with the “learning curve” in businesses.
Appendix 1, dealt with the Liberty ships “lent-leased” to Greek shipowners (1947) by the US government; appendix 2, dealt with the corporate growth strategies; appendix 3, dealt with the “Game of Assets”; appendix 4, dealt with the diversification strategy; appendix 5, dealt with the policy of the 7 oil companies; and appendix 6, dealt with the Renewal strategy. Finally, we concluded.
The contribution of this work is novelty, we believe. Moreover, it is recognized the superiority of Greece in creating a disproportional, to its population, number, of international shipping enterprises. Worth noting is the fact that, company after company, the same strategies followed by all Greek shipowners (tradition?), but one: “building very large and ultra large ships”.
3. Literature Review
Stokes (1997) argued that the family-controlled shipping enterprises, which make up the majority of the industry, are not listed, fearing a hostile takeover (Graph 3).
Source: author; data from Stokes (1997). The case-study company had all these 3 (*) characteristics.
Graph 3. The reasons for shipping companies to stay away from Stock Exchanges or to resort to them.
As shown in Graph 3, the desire of a shipowner to exercise his/her personal dominion prevails among shipping enterprises, together with the freedom to preserve the entrepreneurial decision-making. Moreover, the private empires created so far, and their rapid expansion, were possible due to the availability of “long-term employment commitments”—on profitable terms—from a number of strong charterers, like the 7 “Oil companies” (Stopford, 2009).
Stokes (1997: p. 200) argued, indirectly, that private shipping companies have to have a proper size, (e.g., in number of ships, not to mention quality), in order to serve adequately their very large charterers, and this requires a resort to SEs. Moreover, the market depressions can quickly turn a cash flow from positive to negative, and diminish company’s permanent capital…
Couper (1999: p. 63) attributed the growth & the success of Greek shipping to the following major factors (Graph 4).
Source: author; data from Couper (1999).
Graph 4. The major factors for the growth & success of Greek shipping.
As shown in Graph 4, the Greek shipping companies are organized on island and kinship ties. Moreover, there is a dominant personality: the Father, and Captain, who mobilized his sons—in most cases 3 or 4—as well crews from his island together with their savings… The ties secured the devotion to the cause, and the respect, and the proper discipline on board, to the Leader. In addition, worth noting is the establishment of the first “Nautical Academy/School” in Greece, at “Hydra” island, in 1749.
Notable is that the “management of shipping companies” taught authentically in Greek Universities by the author—for the first time—in 1992. This specialization is difficult to find, internationally, because persons working in a shipping company, as managers, lack a doctoral degree.
As far as taxation is concerned, an adjustable, over time, “tonnage tax” system exists, adopted in 1975 by the Greek Government, taking into account the size and age of the vessels, bringing then to the Treasury about $20m p.a. according to the author (see also Marlow & Mitroussi, 2012).
Moreover, the “one-man leadership”, adopted by Greek shipowners, in managing their companies, a la their families, obviously facilitated the useful rapid and flexible, but also autocratic, decision-making, required on board.
Nevertheless, the above management practice created often disagreements among partners, who disputed frequently the decisions of the leader. As a result, partners split up.
The above is a characteristic of the Greek Race, “the Agamemnon syndrome” let us call it—present since the time of Iliad, where General Agamemnon used to decide with no attention, especially, to the opinion of Achilles—which caused the creation of a plethora of personal shipping companies, where their new leaders believe to know, (and act), better than their previous one…
The 1967-74 dictatorship helped the Greek-flagged shipping—mainly via new legislation. The 1947 Government, however, helped, substantially, the Greek-owned shipping because it provided its guarantee for buying the 107 Liberties, amounting to about 1.07m dwt. This tonnage added to the 466,000 GRT of the then Greek fleet2. By 1984, the fleet arrived3 at 50 m GRT4.
Greeks consider 2 dates important: the 16/07/1774, when a convention signed at “Kucuk Kaynarca” with the Ottoman Empire, providing freedom of action to the Greek-owned shipping—under various flags, including the Russian—in the occupied Greece, and the 07/01/1947, when signed the final “lent-lease” of the 107 Liberty-type ships. We have also to add the 12 m pounds for hires of Greek-owned ships paid by the UK Government to the Greek one, and the war compensations for the Greek ships war-losses. If the Greek-owned ships were not insured in the UK (free) insurance market for war risks, given their substantial losses, there it would be no way for Greek shipping to ever be re-born.
Lorange (2009) argued that five, particular, know-how, are needed for a shipping company to be successful (Graph 5).
Source: author; data from Lorange (2009: pp. 254-255).
Graph 5. The particular know-how needed for a shipping company to be successful.
As shown, a successful shipping company understands its markets, and if possible, feels their turning points (more difficult). In order to apply “Charterer-focused strategies”, the company understands its charterers. Also, the enterprise has to be willing to adopt the technical innovations available so as to arrive at better solutions, e.g., a better forecasting (also more difficult).
Moreover, a manager should have the proper financial knowledge5—being always the key—required to manage company’s financial flows & budgets. This means to understand currencies, interest rates, new financial instruments & derivatives, or what we mean by “Financial Engineering”.
This is the weak point of the Greek shipowners, we believe. Finally, the enterprise has to understand its ship’s operations—making the good even better—by employing6 efficient and effective crews—providing “the best possible services at the lowest possible cost”.
Lorange & Fjeldstad (2010) argued that the family businesses dominated the shipping industry, because they were able to make faster decisions, while the large publiccompanies had first to go to their decision committees (e.g., the board of directors)7. Family companies’ CEOs, accordingly, are more entrepreneurial and dynamic.
Niamie & Germain (2014) reviewed8 Shipping Industry’s “Strategies” and found a literature scarcity on their formulation & implementation. They found only 33 main references, in 22 years, mainly after 2008. In their additional 15 references, almost all, but one, non-maritime, they mentioned the 4 seminal publications, in our opinion, of: Penrose (1959); especially Porter (1980, 1985), and Mintzberg (1987).
With “Greek shipping” dealt Lagoudis & Theotokas (2007). With shipping companies, and ocean going shipping, dealt Lorange (2001), Lorange & Datson (2014), Progoulaki & Theotokas (2010) and Kim et al. (2011).
4. Methodology
This work made possible by studying a number of books, which dealt with the history of certain of the Greek-owned shipping companies such as: Stokes (1997), Couper (1999), Harlaftis & Theotokas (2007), Stopford (2009) and Lorange9 (2009). Fortunately, the maritime authors wrote more frequently about the activities of the shipping companies, especially the listed ones, as time went-by. The epoch of the absolute secrecy—for the fear of the antagonists—is rather largely gone.
In our case, a number of the majority of the business histories is a product of interviews with companies’ executives, making them more important and reliable. The degree to which this material is rare is clear to those dealing with the industry. In order to make our analysis as brief as possible, we did not deal with the history of the companies during their steam/sail period. We also left out all companies not dealing with ocean-going ships serving the world shipping known as “Tramp shipping”.
5. Part I: The History of 13 Greek-Owned Family Shipping Companies
1) This, island, company, established by 3 brothers, and merchants: C (b. 1870), L (b. 1859) and Z (who died in 1935). In 1946, C went to NY to buy 2 of the 107 Liberties (appendix 1). They opened offices in Piraeus, London & NY. By 1948, they managed 35,000 dwt (4 dry cargoes). In 1951, the 2nd generation of 3 sons joined. Then, the 2 sons out of the three, and owner’s widow, split up. In 1958, they managed 75,000 dwt (7 dry cargoes), and during the 1960s, 100,000 dwt (10 dry cargoes, mainly Liberties). In end-1970, the company renewed (appendix 6) its fleet with bulk carriers. By 1981, the company managed 120,000 dwt (4 units) and in 1985 it built 1 bulk carrier of 40,850 dwt. This company achieved a low growth (1990-2000) (appendix 2).
2) This family branch of a son (b. 1924) established a shipping company in 1968. By 1970, he owned 100,000 dwt (7 units), and opened a London office. He renewed his fleet with 5 new buildings, mainly SD14, (from a Greek shipyard), and with bulk carriers (from Japan). By 1976, he owned 200,000 dwt, and by 1982, 160,000 dwt (6 units). During the 1981-1987 depression, the company sold its vessels. In end 1990, the 3rd generation joined. This company achieved a low growth.
3) This company, from Peloponnesus, dealt heavily, and till the end-1980s, with a “ship agency/ship-broking”, opening a Piraeus office, since 1916 by G (b. 1896). The 2nd generation, of 3 brothers, also joined. In 1960 N (b. 1939) joined—after his postgraduate studies in London. He made a partnership with another Greek shipowner in 1964, acquiring 1 ship, and by 1966, establishing a shipping company—which destined to be one of the largest ones. In 1974, the cousins of one of the owners, joined, and then split up. The company in mid-1990s ran by the 3rd generation of 2 daughters and 1 son10. In 2002, the company ordered 2 ships, (product-carriers & handy-maxes) (S Korea). This company achieved a low growth.
4) This company established by KM (b. 1917), from Cyprus, who lived in London, and in 1963, acquired 1 liberty. The 2nd generation joined in 1972, consisting of 2 sons: Z, (b. 1941) and G, (b. 1955). The 3rd generation joined in the 2000s, where K was in charge, since 1999. By 2002 E and A joined. The company owned dry cargo ships, tween-deckers, handy-sized bulk carriers, & latter Capes. In 1997, the company ordered 2 Capes (in S. Korea). It applied the “Game of Assets” (1980s beg. 1990s) (appendix 3) and diversified in real estate, tourism and air-transport (appendix 4). This company achieved a low growth.
5) This, non-island, company, established by AM (b. 1926) in 1969, with a partner, by acquiring 1 reefer, and by 1970, 4 units, with 4 partners. In 1971, the partners bought-out, and the company, in 1977, owned 8 units (reefers & general cargoes). The remaining 2 partners, in 1977, split up. The AM by 1981 owned 13 units (bulk-carriers & reefers), and by 1983, 17. The fleet sold out (from 1985 to 1988) for scrap. In 1988, the company specialized in bulk carriers and by 1995, in tankers. The 2nd generation of B (1992) and E (1995) and their Mother, joined. The company diversified in real estate.
6) This company established by an industrialist (PMA, b. 1891) from Asia Minor. Beginning 1950s, and till 1965, he was partner with a Greek shipowner. In 1969, he established a new shipping company with a friend this time, owning 2 units, and acquiring soon another 2 (dry cargoes). His 3 nephews joined. By end 1980, the company owned 10 units, and eventually, by 1999, it stopped its operations.
7) This, island, company, established by DIN (b. 1915), who by 1947, acquired 1 Liberty ship from the 107, in partnership with his uncle. By 1958, managed 7 Liberties and by 1965, 11, and by 1970s 1-3 units. This company achieved a low growth.
8) This company established by SN (b. 1909), specializing in tankers. He became one of the so called “golden” Greeks (Goulielmos, 2021a). In 1939, he went to London and bought 1 ship, and in 1947 bought additional 4, in NY, as well 2 from the 107 Liberties. He applied the economies of scale and cooperated with the 7 oil companies (appendix 5). In 1947, he owned 14,480 GRT; by 1958, 1.02m (64 units; 56 tankers), and eventually 1.4 m GRT (70 units) (of which 55 tankers), where by 1975, he owned 46 units, of which 31 tankers. A rapid growth. The 1981-1987, depression found his company with bulk-carriers by majority (2/3). By 1985, he owned 1.9m GRT (8 tankers; 20 bulk-carriers; 3 combination carriers). A further rapid growth. In 1990s, the 2nd generation joined, where by 1995, the company returned to tankers (8 out of 18), and 22 by 2000 (4 tankers; 5 product carriers; 2 bulk carriers). By 2000s, he renewed his fleet by ordering (in S Korea): 1 VLCC, & 2 Suez-maxes. In 1957, he established the “Skaramangas” shipyard (Greece), till 1985. In 1958, he established a refinery in Greece, with a partner—till 1976. Moreover, he was one with an active application of the international public relations a la Onassis. The 2nd generation, consisting of 3 sons, (one died in 1999), and 1 daughter, joined. The growth of this company was indeed remarkable.
9) This island, traditional, company, established by NGN (b. 1908). He bought 2 from the 107 Liberties and opened a NY office, after the ones in London and Piraeus. He ordered 6 dry cargoes (1955-1959). In 1958-1970, the company owned 100,000 dwt (10 units; 1 tanker). The company achieved a low growth. In 1975, the company withdrew from the industry.
10) This, island, traditional, company, established by L (b. 1886) and N (b. 1920) and D (b. 1924), made up by 2 family branches and 4 companies, as follows: (10a) in 1950, the 2nd generation, of 2 sons, joined. One lived in London, in 1954, and ran the company’s office there, and one ran the Piraeus one. In 1965, they managed 150,000 dwt (21 dry cargoes) (of Liberty & Empire type). The company ordered 12 units in mid-1960s till mid-1970s. N took-over, having the policy to own ships of maximum 10 years of age. In 1976, he owned 125,000 dwt (5 units) and by 1982, 135,000 dwt (5 bulk carriers). This company achieved a low growth.
(10b) This family branch established a company with the 2 sons of M: A, & P (b. 1865). MPN (b. 1898) established in 1931 a London and a Piraeus office. He bought 1 of the 107 Liberties. Beginning 1950, he undertook a 10-yearly shipbuilding program of 10 units (1953-1964) (3 tankers; 7 dry cargoes). By 1965, he opened a NY office and managed about 300,000 dwt (16 units) and by 1970 330,000 (12 units). Beginning 1970, his son P (b. 1932) took-over. By 1976, the company owned 550,000 dwt (13 units: tankers & bulk carriers) and by 1981 800,000 dwt (6 units, tankers & bulk carriers). This company achieved a medium growth. The 1981-1987 depression, however, shrunk this fleet to 1 unit (by the 1990s)...
12) EPN, (b. 1902), bought 1 of the 107 Liberties, and between 1953 and 1964, undertook a serious shipbuilding program of 6 units (in Japan). In 1958, the company managed 70,000 dwt (7 dry cargoes), and by 1965 120,000 dwt, having offices in NY, London and Piraeus. The NY office managed, in 1975, 380,000 dwt (11 units: 5 newly-built tankers & 6 bulk carriers). The 1981-1987 depression shrunk this fleet to 6 units, which by 1995, increased to 10 (bulk carriers; containerships & tankers). By 2000, the company owned about 90,000 dwt (1 tanker; 1 general cargo and 3 containerships). This company achieved a low growth.
13) This company ran by MAN (b. 1892), a Captain, graduate of the “Nautical School at Southampton” (1955). In 1959, he bought 1 vessel and opened a Piraeus office, together with 1 in London. By 1965, he managed 3 dry cargoes, and by 1970, 43,000 dwt (7 units) and in 1982 opened a new office in London. His 2 daughters: K (b. 1956), & A (b. 1957) and his son M (b. 1965), joined; by 1993, they owned 200,000 dwt (8 bulk carriers; 9 years of av. age). The 4th generation joined, and by 2000, the company managed more than 320,000 dwt (8 bulk carriers). This company achieved a low growth.
Concluding this part, we saw that 5/13 of the companies bought 1 or 2 Liberty-type ships from the 107, while 4/13 came from an island. Only 1/13 of the companies were traditional, and 11/13 established, since 1908, 17 offices in NY, Piraeus and London. The split up syndrome was limited in this group, where only 2 partners split up. The number of generations was rather serious, however, where: 5/13 of the companies had 2 generations, 3/13, 3 generations, and 1/13, 4 generations. The 4/13 of the companies affected by the 1981-1987 depression.
As far as the growth strategy of the companies is concerned: a LGS adopted by 6/13 of the companies; while 2/13 only adopted a RGS. Certain companies had at least 3 brothers, and 2 partners, where only 1 was a prior merchant, but many were prior Captains. Impressive in this group, was the 9/13 of the companies which renewed their fleets with new-buildings.
Appendix 1: the 107 Liberty type ships “lent-leased” to Greek shipowners by the USA Government (1947)
The US Government, after obtaining a guarantee from the Greek Government, “lent-leased” to Greek shipowners 100 dry cargo Liberty-type ships, plus 7 tankers. During 1941-1944, 18 USA shipbuilders launched about 2,742 Liberty-type ships (about 10,500 dwt each, of 11 k. speed). These ships were in business for the next about 25 years (till 1972). Greeks eventually obtained more than 800 Liberty-type ships from the market.
Appendix 2: The corporate growth strategies (Robbins & Coulter, 2018)
Important function in managing an enterprise is Planning, and especially, the Strategic one. In Shipping Industry, the more important function is Control, and especially the effective one. This is so because the “factory” of the company, (the vessel), is thousand miles away from her management… a case-study of “Management by distance”. Planning in an unpredictable industry, like shipping, is a rather frustrating function. Of course, planning which is not strategic does not sound superior nowadays. The enterprises, in order to follow a “strategic management”, they have to develop … strategies, implemented by the 4 functions of the enterprise (Graph 6):
Source: Data from Robbins & Coulter (2018), p. 314.
Graph 6. The strategic management is implemented through company’s 4 basic functions.
When we say “strategies”, we mean “strategic plans”, especially those of how the company is going to compete, with success, and how it will attract, and satisfy, its customers (Thompson et al., 2005).
In shipping, enterprises work-out, efficiently and effectively, during October or so -in each year—their next year’s Budget, taking into account the costs of vessels, and of administration, using the latest “zero budgeting” techniques. The economics Manager of the company investigates thereafter the deviations between the computerized planned and actual expenses. “Control through Budget”.
The above exercise ends-up in determining the computerized daily “running cost” of every, and all, ships of the company, and it is used by the Chartering department, when it negotiates a charter-party with cargo brokers, to find out the so called “expected voyage result”. The accuracy of which is based on the quality of company’s Budget. Given that the freight rate is determined by Supply and Demand, shipping enterprises are the Kings in their industry, if they control, effectively and efficiently, their expenses.
Planning shipping company’s revenue is not easy, unless ships are time-chartered. Thus, shipping managers have to do 1/2 the work of their colleagues in other companies. Worth noting is to underline that research found (Robbins & Coulter, 2018: p. 315), that there is a positive relationship between strategic planning and company’s performance (Song et al., 2011).
In addition, it is well recognized that managers face continually changing situations, meaning that they have to “manage the change”, by using more flexible strategies than hitherto. Moreover, the “strategic management” is important—especially in the large (shipping) companies—which are more complex and diverse, consisting of over 17 departments, and managing 30 - 50 ships. These, usually, lack coordination and focus over their goals and objectives. Management suggests the famous six-step SWOT11 analysis, as a part of the so-called “strategic management process”-SMP, consisting of a mission statement having 9 important components (Davic, 2011).
Above, we have distinguished, arbitrarily, 3 levels of corporate growth strategies12: the low growth one (up to 1/2 m dwt), the medium one (from 1/2 m + 1 to 1m dwt) and the rapid (from 1 m dwt + 1 and over). Table 1 shows the top 10 Greek-owned shipping companies and their growth between 2016 and 2018 in dwt.
Table 1. The growth rates of 10 top Greek-owned shipping companies, 2016-2018.
Company |
Position 2016 |
Dwt 2016 m |
Dwt 2028 m |
Growth % (rounded) |
Anangel |
1 |
22.3 |
24.5 |
10 |
Euronav |
2 |
16.8 |
- |
- |
Navios |
3 |
14.5 |
17.2 |
19 |
Dynacom |
4 |
13.2 |
15.2 |
15 |
Cardiff |
5 |
12.99 |
16.22 |
25 |
Gener8 |
6 |
9.4 |
- |
- |
Star bulk |
7 |
8.6 |
13.7 |
59 |
Alpha |
8 |
8.1 |
9.3 |
15 |
Tsakos |
9 |
7.9 |
9.1 |
15 |
Thenamaris |
10 |
7.42 = ~121 m out of 321 m = ~38% |
9.03 Out of 342 m |
22 |
Source: author’s archives.
As shown, only 1 company had a substantial13 growth, i.e., 59%, in 2 years, meaning that the growth of a shipping company is a personal decision of company’s management. These 10 companies owned the 38% of the total tonnage in 2016.
Appendix 3: The Game of Assets
The 2nd hand market is one of the 4 shipping markets known as “Sales and Purchases (S&P)” market. This market is based on ship price’s volatility. In 2006 almost 1500 deep-sea merchant vessels were sold of a value of $36b, of which 250 bought, on average, by Greek shipowners at a cost of $600m financed partially by the sale of about 180 units (on average). The Game of assets concerns a vessel which her sale price increased several times vis-à-vis her purchasing one. To this, one adds her accumulated depreciation. The profitable game of assets-GA is preferred by shareholders. We have witnessed sales of ships at 10 times their purchasing price. The main reasons for selling a ship-asset are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Main reasons to sell a ship-asset.
Policy to replace her at a certain age (*) |
Not any more suitable for
company’s trade |
Falling future prices |
Distress sales (out of cash flow pressures) |
Source: author; data from Stopford (2009: p. 198). (*) We saw this among Greek shipowners.
Distress sales are those when a ship—especially a profitable one—is sold for the company to raise cash to pay its daily obligations (bunkers or loan installments). The GA concerns also ships built as optional. The 2nd hand prices are mainly determined by freight rates, ships’ age, inflation and buyers’ expectations (Stopford, 2009: pp. 204-206).
It goes without proving it that the 1st best to buy a vessel, or order one, is when their prices are at their rock-bottom level, and the 1st best to sell a vessel is when her price has reached its top. According to Stopford (2009: p. 202) the asset play’ profits earned from a well-timed buying and selling activity are important source of income.
Table 3 outlines the magnitude by which ship prices have changed over time.
Table 3. The price of a Panamax bulk carrier, 1977-2007.
A Panamax. Bulk carrier (prices in $m) |
|
|
|
Dec. 1977: $6m |
Dec. 1980: $22m (3.7+ times) |
1982: $7m (less 3.1 times) |
1989: $22m
(plus 3.14 times) |
Feb. 1999: $~14m
(less 0.64 times) |
End 2003: $28m (plus 2 times) |
Oct. 2004: $34.50m
(plus 23.24%) |
Dec. 2007: $92m
(plus 2.67 times) |
Source: author, data from Stopford (2009: p. 202).
As shown, a shipowner can buy a Panamax ship in 1977 at $6m and sell her in 2007 at $92m, provided she is alive at her 30 years of age. Perhaps 1989 or 2003 are more probable. Greeks (Figure 1) prefer to buy a 2nd hand ship of 5 years of age (or even 10 years)—e.g., a Panamax14—at ~$15m (or $11.5m), instead of building a Panamax at a cost of ~$19m. By doing so, they reduce their obligations to their lending bank.
Source: modified from that in Stopford (2009).
Figure 1. A regression line of the prices of a Panamax bulk carrier on her age (2002 first 9 months).
As shown, by buying a ship of 10 years of age, a shipowner pays $11m, while his/her competitor pays $19m (for a newly-built one). The difference between a newly built bulk carrier of 60,000 dwt, e.g., and a 5-years of age one in 1981 was from $5m to $9m (1983).
Appendix 4: a diversification strategy
This is one out of 3 Corporate Strategies (Graph 7).
Source: author; inspired by Robbins & Coulter (2018: pp. 321-323). (**) see appendix 6. (***) see appendix 4.
Graph 7. The 3 Corporate Strategies.
Diversification is the case of a firm producing for/serving, a number of markets. Economies of scope provide the principal rationale. Diversification is due rather to managers’ preferences.
Appendix 5: The 7 oil companies’ strategy
The seven oil companies in the past (mainly in 1974 and before) adopted a clever policy by inviting the independent private crude oil tanker shipowners to build ships, and transport their oil in long-term charter parties of 15 - 20 years. Their thinking was, by so doing, to boost the supply of ships (or diminish the demand for them), and thus to lower freight rates (which they also paid). Shipowners accepted the deal, and in order to derive a maximum profit, they exploited heavily the economies of scale by building very large and ultra large tankers (a la Onassis), and also relying on the efficient Greek crews. Finance on a charter party as the above was secured.
Appendix 6: the Renewal strategies
Many large international companies, in 2013, lost substantial amounts. The managers, in such cases, developed 2 strategies, known as “renewal”. These are destined to address company’s declining performance, and are known as retrenchment and turnaround (Robbins & Coulter, 2018: p. 322).
We saw, during our experience, companies to apply the “retrenchment short run strategy” by reducing crew wages, or changing the nationality of their seafarers, postponing also their major repairs, and drydockings—with Class permission—and delaying bank installments in agreement with their bankers…
In case of a depression, we saw shipping companies to apply extensive cost reductions, even postponing payments to their suppliers (dangerous), and renegotiating their loans with their bankers. Moreover, selling profitable ships, and cancelling ship orders at a cost (both undesirable).
In addition, certain shipping companies had to postpone even to pay crew wages, meaning by doing so to enter in their room of bankruptcy (Couper, 1999). All the above outcomes are the result of the absolute inability of shipowners to forecast the freight rate market, as well the coming of a depression, when 1 newly-built vessel, or more, are added to company’s fleet, for which no employment has been secured—by a reliable charterer—since the time of her order…
6. Part II: The Case-Study of a Greek-Owned Shipping Company, 1985
Diagram 1 may help the reader to recognize the state of the markets when the case-study company started its businesses. This case-study was made possible when the company gave us its balance sheets for its 1st 7 years of operation to make our remarks.
As shown in Diagram 1, in April, 1983, the laid-up tonnage arrived at its maximum of 100m dwt, while in July 1987 it started to fall from its 14m dwt mark. Markets improved from April 1989, and thereafter. Thus a company, wisely, had to buy ships at its 1st best in 04/1983, and in its 2nd best, in 1982 (till 1986). The case-study company bought ships in 7/1985 at a rather 2nd best timing.
Diagram 1. The laid-up tonnage of tankers and dry cargoes, 1979-1992, monthly—dwt m—source: author.
6.1. The Time When the Company Started and Owner’s Age
The company established in 01/07/1985, by GP, at his 70 years of age (who died in 2003). The 2nd generation took over, since the beginning of the 1990s, made-up by M, V, and the husband of their sister A.
Company’s start in 7/1985 shows that its manager decided to operate it, voluntarily, 2 years inside the 1981-1987 depression… The company, we assume, bought 5, 2nd hand, rather old, ships, at very low prices in need of repairs15, in 07/1985. However, the years 1/1986-1/1987 were the proper ones to buy ships, given the rock-bottom freight rates at that time. If the company started in 1/1989, it would benefit16 from the higher profits of $5.5m. Thus our first remark is that the company had to start in 1/1989 at its 1st best or 1/1988 at its 2nd best.
6.2. Company’s Revenue17 (Figure 2)
As shown in Figure 2, the 1981-1987 depression obliged the company to lower revenues between 1987 and 1988. Figure 1 supports our opinion for the company to have better started in 1/1988 and/or 1/1989.
Source: author; data from company’s balance sheets.
Figure 2. Revenue from voyages, 1985 (01/07)-1992 (31/12).
6.3. Company’s Expenses (Figure 3)
Source: as in Figure 2.
Figure 3. Company’s expenses, 1985-1992.
As shown in Figure 3, vessels’ expenses p.a. increased drastically, from $7.2m in 1991 to $11.3m in 1992 (~57.3 % up)18. Worth wondering is why the “commissions paid” treated as expenses19? The commissions varied from $0.74m (1985-86) to $1.18m (1992). The administration expenses increased too from ~$0.27m (start) to $0.90m (1992) (3.3 times up in 7 years). This is something to be expected, if the company increased its staff.
6.4. Company’s Fleet
According to our records, in 2016, the company owned 6 ships (342,158 dwt). In 1991, the company owned 5 bulk carriers of a total of 95,055 dwt, Table 4.
Table 4. Company’s fleet (1991) (dwt).
15,589, 20 years of age |
8,551, 20 years |
21,754, 17 years |
35,522, 10 years |
13,639, 17 years |
|
Source: our archives.
Worth noting is that the company increased its fleet by about 3.6 times in 25 years (1985-2016) (having the 145th position out of 200 Greek-owned shipping companies in 2016).
6.5. The Interest Paid
Important are always the amounts paid for interest on long term debt: $1.62m (at its start); $1.08m (1987); $0.98 (1988); $0.91m (1989); $0.69m (1990); 1.47m (1991) and 2.05m (1992) (a total of $8.8m). Important is also the proper timing in applying for a loan from a bank, because the interest rate basis, known as LIBOR20, varies (Figure 4) over time.
Source: author.
Figure 4. LIBOR, 1990-1997, %.
As shown in Figure 4, borrowing from the banks was proper during end-1992-start-1994, at a 3% LIBOR, compared with the 6.5% in 1991, when company borrowed in order to buy its 1 vessel.
6.6. Company’s Loss21
Company realized a loss, from a foreign currency loan, of $1.82m. This, together with $2.4m depreciation, led the company to a serious deficit and this during its first 18 months of operations. This surely had a bad psychological impact on shareholders. In addition, the above “foreign currency loss” could be avoided, if the amount of the foreign currency required paying the loan installments (plus interest) in future, vis-à-vis company’s $, was pre-bought at the time the loan was signed to avoid subsequent changes in $/Currency parity…
6.7. Company’s Dividend Policy
The first dividends paid in 1989 of $3.6m and $4.2m (1990); 2.8m (1991) and $0.2m (1992) (total $10.8m). Our opinion is for any company to provide to its shareholders a return higher than what they could earn in a year bank deposit, but no more. In 1989, the company paid $3.6m dividend against $10.8m a total shareholders’ equity. This means ~33% return. However, a 5% p.a. on equity could be sufficient (total 17.5% for the first 3.5 years), we believe (i.e., $3.8m total). The amounts devoted to dividends, could, of course, be used instead in repaying company’s loans, or building-up “a depression-facing-up” fund.
We believe that the “dividend policy” of a company, the retained earnings one as well its “depreciation” policy have to be strategic decisions. Surely, all shareholders dislike depreciation, unlike managers. Thus, the above cases are such where the manager has to have “the dog satisfied and the pie untouched”…
Shareholders may be happy, we believe—if asked—with a fixed dividend each year—whether out there is sun, rain or snow—e.g., by using company’s retained earnings. Managers have to be careful for the fact that they cannot rely on either shareholders or bankers or stock exchanges for help during a depression…
6.8. Company’s Retained Earnings
Company retained earnings in 1988 of $0.23m; $4.25m in 1989; $2.8m in 1990; $2.85m in 1991 and $0.99m in 1992 (total ~$11m). This amount, e.g., could be used to smooth-out the repercussions of a shipping depression, so that to pay to shareholders a fixed return on their equity, as suggested.
6.9. Company’s Ships at Cost
Company’s ships valued between 1985 and 1987 at $30.4m, while in 1988-1990 it fell to $27.2m—due to the sale of 2 vessels. The company seems to have bought 6 ships, 5 in 1985 at a total of $21.3m, and 1 in 1991at $29.2m. The 1/3 of the prices paid in 1991 by company’s shareholders, but we believe they had better to pay 1/2. In addition, in 1991, the company could use the accumulated retained earnings of $11m, as suggested.
6.10. Company’s Profits from Vessels’ Operations (Figure 5)
Company’s profits (Revenue less Expenses) have to be maximized according to economic theory.
Source: as in Figure 2.
Figure 5. Profits from vessels operation, 1985-1992.
Interesting is to see what amounts company’s profits are destined to cover (Table 5).
Table 5. What company’s profits are destined to cover?
Interest (on long term debt) ◊ $8.8m |
Depreciation ◊ $17.2m
(accumulated by 1992) |
A foreign exchange loss $1.82m |
Retained earnings ◊ $11m |
Dividends ◊$10.5m Total $47.5m |
The result from the sale of vessels: plus $7,000 less $23,000 |
Source: author.
As shown in Figure 5, the one main claim on profits comes from the interest and the dividends, i.e., a total of $19.3m. Next the profits make company’s serious savings: for depreciation and for retained earnings, i.e., a total of $28.2m. This amount is important as it guarantees company’s liquidity. It seems that the company planned the acquisition of 1 vessel in 1991 at about $29m by saving serious amounts of profits (depreciation $17.2m) and retained earnings ($11m).
6.11. Total Shareholders’ Equity
Total shareholders’ equity varied (Figure 6).
As shown in Figure 6, total shareholders’ equity was fixed most of the time—except in 1991—due to the increase in company’s fleet. If we compare total shareholders’ equity with the value of ships, (at their cost), we see a relationship of $53m against $11m = ~21%, meaning that shareholders participated with about 1/5 in company’s fleet. This further means making business mainly (79%) with other people’s money a la Onassis. Increased risk? We suggested 50% as a better share.
Source: as in Figure 2.
Figure 6. Total shareholders’ equity, 1985-1992.
6.12. Company’ Ships Sold & Bought
The company quoted its ships, between 1985 and 1992, as follows (before depreciation) (Figure 7).
Source: as in Figure 2.
Figure 7. Company’s ships at cost, 1985-1992.
The company acquired ships when it started (1985) at a total cost of $21.3m, and then in 1991, at a cost of $29.2m. Company also sold 2 ships: 1 at a small (1988) gain ($7000) and 1 at a small loss ($23,000, in 1991). To find-out if company’s timing was proper for its ships’ sales/purchases, we used Figure 8.
Source: author.
Figure 8. The $ price of a 25,000 bulk carrier, 1988-1998, & its % deviations from her 10-yearly average.
As shown, the timing of the sale of the 2 vessels in 1988 and in 1991, chosen by the company, was wrong, because the prices of the ships—assumed in the 25,000 dwt size area—were 16% (1988) and ~28% (1991-1992), lower than their 10 year average. The best time to sell was early 1996 (~36% up) (Goulielmos, 2021b). As shown, the ship purchases also had a better timing in the 2nd semester of 1992, when about 28% on their 10 yearly—average price could be saved.
6.13. Company’s Long-Term Debt (Figure 9)
Source: as in Figure 2.
Figure 9. Long term debt, in $m, 1986-1992.
As shown, the company wisely reduced its “long term debt” from ~$12m in 1986 (at its start) to ~$5.4m in 1990. But in 1991, the company increased it to ~$31m, due to a ship acquisition. The company used to pay to its bankers about $2m p.a. between 1987 and 1989 (a total of $6m), and ~$2.9m in 1992 (& ~$0.7 in 1990) (a total of $9.6m)… As we saw, the company had about $11m by 1992 (cumulative retained earnings), enabling it to reduce its debt further, but it did not.
Let us now apply the nonlinear management.
6.14. The Nonlinear Management
1) The nonlinear balance sheets
A company’s assets are made-up by its “liabilities” and “shareholders’ equity” (Priesmeyer, 1992: p. 114). The assets are either financed by debt, or by shareholders’ equity. Important here is leverage (“debt to total assets” or “debt to equity”). If the leverage increases, the debt increases, and the risk increases, but shareholders’ return also increases. Figure 10 maps the phase plane for leverage.
Source: author; inspired by Priesmeyer (1992).
Figure 10. A map of the conditions on the leverage phase.
Any company’s desirable position is in quadrant 1 (*), because there the company expanded and reduced, at the same time, its leverage. The case-study company, however, preferred the 2nd best (**) position (1991)—not necessarily undesirable. Unwise is for a company to be in quadrant 2, where more debt is created though ships/assets sold. To be in quadrant 3, the company has sold ships by paying-off its debts (fewer liabilities). This is a usual procedure, provided the sale proceeds are positive22.
2) The nonlinear measures of performance
Company’s ROA: return on assets—(profits divided by total assets) (Priesmeyer, 1992: p. 116) was as follows (Figure 11).
Source: author; inspired by Priesmeyer (1992).
Figure 11. The return on assets Phase Plane.
Any company’s desirable position is of course in quadrant 1 (*), where the number of assets and profits increased. To be in quadrant 2, there must be a wise sale of assets, together with higher profits. This means that the company sold its assets, deliberately, by getting rid of any unprofitable ones. To be in quadrant 3, profits have to fall in proportion with assets (ships) sold. This means that the company had a poor performance, where both company’s assets and profits fell. To be in quadrant 4, any company has to expand unwisely with fewer profits and higher assets. This means excessive investment in unprofitable assets (ships).
The case-study company owned more ships (+assets) and derived higher profits (+profits), in 1991, which means in quadrant 1, i.e., in the desirable position (*). It had also higher profits from 1985 to 1987, with the same assets; company’s assets fell in 1988, while profits rose (quadrant 2); profits rose in 1989, while assets did not change; profits fell in 1990, with fewer assets (quadrant 2 again); profits fell in 1992, with the same assets. Thus the case-study company found itself frequently in quadrant 2—something tolerable.
6.15. Final Conclusions on the Case-Study Company
From a better timing in selling ships, the case-study company could benefit slightly (Figure 12).
But, from a better timing of buying ships, it could benefit substantially. Moreover, by asking shareholders to participate, (quadrant 4 in Figure 10), at least by 1/2 in company’s purchases, the company could save serious amounts of interest on its long-term debt... and reduce its risk.
The case-study company bought 5 ships in 7/1985, presumably, at about $4.25m each on average. The difference between the ship prices, in the above two years, was $22m ($25m less $3m), e.g. for the 115,000 dwt (Figure 11). The case-study company by having a wrong timing paid additional a total of $6.25m.
Source: author.
Figure 12. Market values of bulk carriers (estimated).
6.16. The Strategy Recommended
Shipping is an unpredictable global industry, where its basic variable—the freight rate/price—is determined by Supply & Demand for all cargoes transported by sea (CIF). Maritime Managers, therefore, should have efficient and effective control over their company’s expenses. In reducing them, we believe, there are 5 economies (Graph 8).
Source: author.
Graph 8. The maritime strategy recommended.
Greeks have applied the strategy to sell ships of smaller sizes (Table 6) and buy larger ships (Table 7). Greeks first bought and then sold.
Table 6. The average size of the ships sold by Greeks, 1985-1993.
Year |
Tonnage sold GRT m |
Number of ships |
Average size GRT |
1st and 2nd best to sell? % fall or rise in prices |
1985 |
4.57 |
276 |
16559 |
Wrong timing; a 40% fall |
1986 |
4.58 |
287 |
15972 |
Wrong timing 1/1986; a 60% fall |
1987 |
3.01 |
178 |
16908 |
Wrong timing 1/1987; a fall 50% |
1988 |
4.13 |
221 |
18702 |
Less wrong timing 1/1988; a 15% fall |
1989 |
4.42 |
261 |
16927 |
2nd best timing 1/1989; a 14% rise |
1990 |
3.82 |
147 |
26019 |
1st best timing 1/1990; a 50% rise |
1991 |
1.59 |
88 |
18091 |
Less wrong timing; a 9% rise |
1992 |
1.16 |
83 |
14029 |
2nd best timing; a 30% rise |
1993 |
1.57 |
106 |
14836 |
Wrong timing; a 5% rise |
Source: author’s archives; Stopford (2009: p. 203).
As shown, the timing of the company to sell was not always perfect or even at its 2nd best (1985-1987). However, sales in 1991-1993 by Greeks were reduced, although 1992 was not so bad year to buy ships.
Table 7. The average size of the ships bought by Greeks, 1985-1993.
Year |
Tonnage bought GRTm |
Number of ships |
Average size GRT |
1st & 2nd best timing to buy. Price fall/rise |
1985 |
6.50 |
254 |
25590 |
2nd best 1/1985; fall 40% |
1986 (*) |
8.58 |
275 |
31200 |
1st best 1/1986; −60% |
1987 |
6.93 |
290 |
23904 |
1st best 1/1987; −50% |
1988 |
5.65 |
251 |
22510 |
1/1988; a fall 5% |
1989 |
3.32 |
172 |
19302 |
Wrong timing; a rise 30% |
1990 |
4.60 |
160 |
28743 |
Wrong timing; a rise 50% |
1991 |
4.96 |
226 |
21946 |
Less wrong timing; rise 10% |
1992 |
7.08 |
259 |
27343 |
Wrong timing; a rise 30% |
1993 |
9.58 |
313 |
30,606 |
Less wrong timing; a rise 10% |
Source: author. (*) best year to buy.
As shown, the ships bought are larger 1.5 times, on average, vis-à-vis those sold. The timing was not always at its 1st best or even at its 2nd one (1988-1993). The company acquired a ship in 1991 (Diagram 2) at a less wrong timing.
Source: modified from that in Stopford (2009: p. 202).
Diagram 2. Price cycles for Tankers & Bulk carriers, of 5 years old, 1976-2008.
Shipping industry has particularly to apply the so called “Competitive strategies” (Graph 9), meaning of how to compete in its businesses.
Source: author; inspired by Robbins & Coulter (2018).
Graph 9. The shipping competitive strategies.
As shown, shipping industry has a tween objective: to provide “quality” services, good for charterers, at an efficient and effective manner, good for the company. Quality, however, in shipping means “safety” and “security” (after the 11th of September) governed also by 2 international conventions (ISM & ISPS codes). Effectiveness in large shipping companies of over 4 - 7 vessels is pursued by forming groups operating smaller efficient numbers of ships so that to satisfy charterers in a better way.
Since everything nowadays can be found on line, why not also chartering? There are also the great advantages of using robots on board as well as the big data, the use of social media and the design thinking philosophy. But there are additional economies.
7. Part III: Does the Experience of an Enterprise Count?
Management talks about the so called “growth/share matrix” (Levitt, 1965). A shipping company may categorize its ships in 4 classes as follows (Graph 10).
Source: author; inspired by Besanko et al., 2017. See also Robbins & Coulter, 2018.
Graph 10. The BCG growth/share.
As shown, “the growth/share matrix” divides company’s products into 4 categories, according to their potential for growth, vis-à-vis their relative market share of the next-largest competitors. Some strategists recommend using the profits earned from the “cash cows” to ramp-up the production of the “rising stars” and “problem children”. This is so because 2 from the above 4 products—as they move down their learning curves (Graph 11)—become “cash cows” in their next investment cycle…
Source: author; inspired by Besanko et al., 2017.
Graph 11. The learning or experience curve.
In shipping, we saw certain ships to bring-in profits and others losses, and others nothing; thus the profitable ships subsidize the non-profitable ones. A “cash cow”, is a vessel in a stable, (or even declining), market with a high relative market share; a “problem child”, is a vessel in a growing market with a low relative market share; a “dog”, is a vessel in a stable, (or even declining), market, with a low relative market share; a rising star, is a vessel in a growing market with a high relative market share.
The above management strategy may manage successfully, we believe, a portfolio of vessels by taking advantage of their learning curves, and their life-cycles. This concerns the enterprises which use profits from established “cash cows” to fund the increased operations of early-stage “problem children” and “rising stars”.
In other words, Management, using the above theory, wished to introduce into the existing strategies the importance that experience, and the know-how, sometimes called also “learning by doing”, can have... The benefits of learning manifest themselves in lower costs, higher quality and more effective pricing and marketing (Besanko et al, 2017: p. 71). This is where the duration of the life of a company matters. “Learning economies” refer to reductions in the unit cost due to the accumulated experience over time, and are independent from the economies of scale.
8. Conclusion
The patterns we saw in our previous works (Goulielmos, 2025a, 2025b, 2025c, 2025d) were also met in this group of 13 companies, with the exception of building ships and following a rapid growth strategy. This indicates that the traditional fear of Greek shipowners ordering ships during a boom and having to charter them during a depression still exists.
As shown, there were five economies to be exploited in a clever maritime strategy, given the indisputable fact that the shipping companies work in a cyclical industry. If a shipping company is not prepared to exploit, strategically, the cycle, then it will be perished by it. The shipping cycle is a curse, but at the same time, it is also a blessing (Goulielmos, 2020, 2022, 2023).
NOTES
1A shipping company looks forward for receiving the freight, or hire, so that to pay its expenses. But, if an unforeseen need for money appears, (say for a repair due to a marine accident), the company will be in distress. The freight is not “prepaid”, if not agreed so. The case-study company, e.g., maintained a working capital of $872,000 (1985-6).
2The Greek fleet owned 115 steamers (>500 tons). The ships survived from the 2nd WW were 88 ocean-going dry cargoes (405,000 GRT) (28% left from the fleet before the war).
3In 1939, Greece held the 9th world position with ~1.8 m GRT out of 68.5 m, where the 1st position held by UK, (plus Commonwealth), with 21m GRT (~31%), followed by USA with 11.4 m GRT (of which 2.45 m in the lakes fleet).
4The Greek-owned shipping, since 1887, owned a “steam” fleet of 31,000 GRT. By 1894, 89,000, by 1901 169,000 and by 1904, 353,000; in 1912: 434,000. By 1915, 894,000 and by Oct.1918: 126,000 (a war loss of 768,000 tons). In Sept. 1939, the fleet arrived at 1,686,000, while in 1945 registered 508,000 GRT (a war loss of 1,178,000 GRT).
5Mrs. Frangou A. is an exception.
6If one listens to Greek shipowners, he/she will hear their permanent demand for a greater quantity, & a better quality, of crews of Greek nationality.
7A doctoral thesis in 1974 mentioned the case of a large UK oil company, which paid a double amount for building a number of tankers by delaying to order them 3 months, till their board of directors decided.
8Their review focused mainly on “Liner shipping” (8 papers), on “Containerships” (7), including “logistics” (8) and “Supply Chains” (2) (a total of 25 papers ~76%).
9Lorange is a rare case of a Professor, who was also a shipowner... He, and his co-authors, greatly enriched—since 1974—the maritime literature with papers, and books, where if their English were better, their scientific impact would be deeper.
10This family is an example of having its members not only to attend university studies, but also to attend postgraduate ones (in LSE & City University); he also attended postgraduate studies.
11Every company has to have: mission, goals, and strategies; also, to analyze company’s opportunities, threats & strengths, as well its weaknesses, and to formulate strategies, and implement, and evaluate, them, for results.
12A “corporate growth strategy” concerns company’s expansion in a greater number of markets, than hitherto, or in new products/services than previously.
13A case, most probably, of buying-out companies in a SE.
14Between 2002, and 2007 and Sept. 2003 (high), China’s steel production grew from 144 m tons p.a. to 468 (3.25 times up), coupled with higher oil imports and exports of minor bulks. This had as a result for the bulk carriers/tankers to face a very strong market.
15It seems that company’s policy was to own a small number of advanced age, cheap, ships, in need of further, rather cheap, repairs. This was a practice among poor Greeks who wanted to become shipowners.
16Due to the fact that the ships bought in 7/1985, then they had to be laid up till the market improved in 1/1988 or 7/1987. In shipping one cannot buy low-priced ships and being in a high freight rate market at the same time.
17Company’s revenue excluded other income (meaning a total $1.82m) made-up mainly by company’s 2 insurance claims of $543,000 and $591,000. Excluded is also the “receivable interest” of $900,000.
18The company paid ~$2.6m for improvements on the ship bought in 1991.
19We believe that commissions should be better subtracted from revenues. This would exert a psychological pressure on management to reduce them.
20LIBOR is the acronym of the “London interbank offer rate”, determining the cost of money between London banks, and it is used as a basis, to add on it, a % for bank’s profit (the spread). Best customers pay spread something from 1/2% to 11/2% for loans for building ships & for a tenor of 6 - 7 years.
21Apropos one shipping “Nestor” (Mr. M. Kulukundis), said that Greek shipowners know how to manage their ships, but they do not know how to manage their money...
22Company collected ~$1m in 1988.
23Company collected ~$1m in 1988.