Research of the Game and Countermeasure about Collusion between Executives of State-Owned Enterprises and Government Officials

Qiuyue Wei; Hanmin Liu

doi:10.4236/jssm.2015.84054

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Journal of Service Science and Managemen... > Vol.8 No.4, August 2015

Research of the Game and Countermeasure about Collusion between Executives of State-Owned Enterprises and Government Officials ()

Qiuyue Wei, Hanmin Liu

Management School, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China.

DOI: 10.4236/jssm.2015.84054 PDF HTML XML 2,407 Downloads 2,790 Views

Abstract

In recent years, the cases which the executives of state-owned enterprise and government officials, internal staff, the third party audit institutions to realize the conspiracy for acquiring enterprise assets or increase their welfare are increasing in China. For maximizing their economic interests, executives of state-owned enterprise and government officials often conspire to obtain extra gains under asymmetric information. This article first analyses the stakeholders of state-owned enterprise in China, and sets up a game model about collusion between the executives of state-owned enterprise and government officials in order to obtain the condition of the collusion. And then, the paper focuses on the trilateral game model of executives of state-owned enterprise, government officials and commission for discipline inspection and puts forward discipline inspection strategy to overcome the collusion problem. The study results show that commission for discipline inspection can effectively reduce collusion motivation by enhancing the supervision success rate, reducing the examination costs, and increasing the punishment force.

Keywords

Executives of State-Owned Enterprise, Government Officials, Game Model of Collusion, Discipline Inspection, Supervision and Restraint System

Share and Cite:

Wei, Q. and Liu, H. (2015) Research of the Game and Countermeasure about Collusion between Executives of State-Owned Enterprises and Government Officials. Journal of Service Science and Management, 8, 536-544. doi: 10.4236/jssm.2015.84054.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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