Analysis of the Chemical Safety Facility Investment Performance in China

Kang Sun, Long Bai, Xiaohong Li

Center for Studies of Marine Economy and Sustainable Development, Liaoning Normal University, Dalian, China.

DOI: 10.4236/aces.2015.51011                

Abstract

This paper adopts the accident incidence, the gross industry output value, the investment in safety facilities, and per capita wage of employment as the indexes to empirically analyze the investment performance of chemical safety facilities using time series data by VECM in China. The empirical results indicate that for China’s chemical industry, increasing investment fails to improve the short-term safety level significantly because of the offsetting behavior of workers. Over the long term, the offsetting behavior tends to disappear, and the chemical accident incidence can be decreased through increasing investment. Poor safety awareness among workers is one of the causes of accident incidences. The conclusions provide theoretical support for China to perfect chemical industry safety management.

Keywords

Chemical Safety Management, Peltzman Effect, Offsetting Behavior, VECM

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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