Political Modernisation: The Rule of Law Perspective on Good Governance

Jan-Erik Lane

Charles Humbert, Geneva, Switzerland.

DOI: 10.4236/ojps.2015.51002                

Abstract

The United Nations, the WB as well as the IMF speak much of “good governance”, but what is the meaning and reference of this elusive expression? In this paper, I will link it with the concept(s) of rule of law. Rule of law notions are spreading around the globe, being relevant for the transformation of monarchies and one-party states. Thus, world media are now reporting that for instance China’s leadership is seriously debating making state reforms that would be conducive to more of the rule of law in the country. This is not be interpreted as a push towards western democracy. To clarify the relation between rule of law and competitive party democracy, this paper presents an enquiry into rule of law I and rule of law II. This distinction has a long history in political thought and constitutional developments. Data from the encompassing World Bank Governance project is used to validate these concepts referentially.

Keywords

Good Governance, Constitutional Law, Principal-Agent Model, Dimensions of Rule of Law: Rule of Law I, Rule of Law II, Democracy, World Bank Governance Project, Dimensions of Good Governance, Principal-Agent Theory of Politics and the State, Measuring Rule of Law von Mohl

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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