A Museum Cost Sharing Problem

Abstract

Ginsburgh and Zang [2] consider a revenue sharing problem for the museum pass program, in which several museums jointly offer museum passes that allow visitors an unlimited access to participating museums in a certain period of time. We consider a cost sharing problem that can be regarded as the dual problem of the above revenue sharing problem. We assume that all museums are public goods and have various (e.g., ser-vice) costs. These costs must be shared by museum visitors. We propose a cost sharing method and provide an axiomatic characterization of the method. We then define a game for the problem and show that the cost sharing method is the Shapley value of the game. We also provide a comparative statics analysis for both the Shapley value of the museum pass game and the Shapley value for the cost sharing game when the number of museums and/or the number of visitors change.

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Wang, Y. (2011) A Museum Cost Sharing Problem. American Journal of Operations Research, 1, 51-56. doi: 10.4236/ajor.2011.12008.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

References

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[4] H. Moulin and F. Laigret, “Equal-Need Sharing of a Network under Connectivity Constraints,” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 72, No. 1, 2011, pp. 314-320. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.002
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[7] C. Trudeau, “Cost Sharing with Multiple Technologies,” Working paper, University of Montreal, Montreal, 2007.

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