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The Menu-Induced Core of an Economy with an Excludable Public Good

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DOI: 10.4236/tel.2014.44039    3,246 Downloads   4,559 Views  
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ABSTRACT

This paper introduces a core concept in an economy with an excludable public good. In the economy, we assume that each coalition is allowed to achieve an allocation via a menu, a kind of a nonlinear price. Our core concept is called the menu-induced core that is defined as the set of allocations achievable by menus that are robust against all coalitional improvements achieved via menus. We show that the menu-induced core is nonempty. We also investigate certain properties of the menu-induced core that show the difference between the menu-induced core and the core defined in a standard way.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Cite this paper

Hirai, T. (2014) The Menu-Induced Core of an Economy with an Excludable Public Good. Theoretical Economics Letters, 4, 289-295. doi: 10.4236/tel.2014.44039.

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