Additive Property and the Physical Reducibility of the Mind ()
Abstract
It is controversial
whether the mind is physically reducible or not. If the mind is physically
reducible, it must share properties with the physical world. To find out how
the mind can be characterized, an “additive property” is used to describe the
mind. The additive property is shown where many causes result in one effect.
The additive property is shown in the biological domain when the senses process
received input. It is also shown in the intellectual activities of daily life.
In the physical world, there is no cause without an effect. The additive
property of events is not satisfied in physical domain. If the mind is
physically reducible, the additive property of the mind should not be
satisfied. Because the additive property is shown in the mind, the mind cannot
be physically reduced in terms of relationships of cause and effects.
Share and Cite:
Hyun, K. (2014) Additive Property and the Physical Reducibility of the Mind.
Open Journal of Philosophy,
4, 91-95. doi:
10.4236/ojpp.2014.42013.
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
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