Three Criticisms of Newton’s Inductive Argument in the Principia

DOI: 10.4236/ahs.2014.31002   PDF   HTML     4,513 Downloads   6,415 Views   Citations

Abstract

In this paper, I discuss how Newton’s inductive argument of the Principia can be defended against criticisms leveled against it by Duhem, Popper and myself. I argue that Duhem’s and Popper’s criticisms can be countered, but mine cannot. It requires that we reconsider, not just Newton’s inductive argument in the Principia, but also the nature of science more generally. The methods of science, whether conceived along inductivist or hypothetico-deductivist lines, make implicit metaphysical presuppositions which rigorously require us to make them explicit within science so that they can be critically assessed, alternatives being developed and assessed, in the hope that they can be improved. Despite claiming to derive his law of gravitation by induction from phenomena without resource to hypotheses, Newton does nevertheless acknowledge in the Principia that his rules of reasoning make metaphysical presuppositions. To this extent, Newton has a more enlightened view of scientific method than most 20th and 21st century scientists and historians and philosophers of science.

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Maxwell, N. (2014). Three Criticisms of Newton’s Inductive Argument in the Principia. Advances in Historical Studies, 3, 2-11. doi: 10.4236/ahs.2014.31002.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

References

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