[1]
|
M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, “A Course in Game Theory,” MIT Press, Cambridge, 1994.
|
[2]
|
G. H. Von Stackelberg, “Market Structure and Equilibrium,” Springer-verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12586-7
|
[3]
|
E. Rasmusen, “Game and Information,” Basil Backwell Ltd., Oxford, 1989.
|
[4]
|
J. Nash, “Non-Cooperative Games,” The Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 54, No. 2, 1951, pp. 286-295. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1969529
|
[5]
|
D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, “Game Theory,” MIT Press, Cambridge, 1991.
|
[6]
|
J. Nash, “Equilibrium Pints in n-Person Games,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, Vol. 36, No. 1, 1950, pp. 48-49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.36.1.48
|
[7]
|
D. A. Debreu, “Social Equilibrium Existence,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, Vol. 38, No. 10, 1952, pp. 886-893. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.38.10.886
|
[8]
|
R. B. Myerson, “Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict,” Harvard University, Cambridge, 1991.
|