Scientific Prediction in the Beginning of the “Historical Turn”: Stephen Toulmin and Thomas Kuhn

DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2013.32053   PDF   HTML     8,980 Downloads   11,599 Views   Citations

Abstract

This paper considers the similarities and differences between Toulmin and Kuhn on the problem of prediction. The context of the analysis is the beginning of the “historical turn” in philosophy of science (i.e., the period before the 1965 international colloquium held at Bedford College). The comparison between these authors takes into account several levels: semantic, logical, epistemological, methodological, ontological, and axiological. The main goal is to analyze whether there are influences of Toulmin in Kuhn regarding scientific prediction or, at least, if the former reached similar positions to the latter on the issue of the role of prediction in science.

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Gonzalez, W. (2013). Scientific Prediction in the Beginning of the “Historical Turn”: Stephen Toulmin and Thomas Kuhn. Open Journal of Philosophy, 3, 351-357. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2013.32053.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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