Objects, Elements, and Affirmation of the Ethical

DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2013.32045   PDF   HTML     8,490 Downloads   9,633 Views   Citations

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the theory of material objects often referred to as mereological nihilism supports a fine-grained and analytically coherent reading of Emmanuel Levinas’s concept of “elements” as articulated by Levinas primarily in Totality and Infinity. This reading, in turn, allows for a second conclusion, namely the affirmation of the ethical as the possible ground of all other philosophy.

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Donnelly, M. (2013). Objects, Elements, and Affirmation of the Ethical. Open Journal of Philosophy, 3, 285-291. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2013.32045.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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