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Utility-Based Node Cooperation Mechanism in Wireless Sensor Networks

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DOI: 10.4236/ijcns.2013.65026    3,246 Downloads   4,672 Views   Citations

ABSTRACT

In wireless sensor networks, due to the energy and resource constraints, nodes may be unwilling to forward packets for their neighbors. This can render severe deteriorations in the network performance and malfunctions of the system. To tackle such selfish behaviors and enhance the cooperation among sensors, based on reputation and energy consumption of each node, we present a utility function to punish the malicious nodes and encourage cooperation among nodes. Specifically, we firstly give a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution for the two nodes. Then we extend the model to multi-nodes scenario. With the unity function, each sensors reputation is evaluated according to its degree of cooperation. The extensive simulation results have shown the effectiveness of the mechanism, in that the cooperative behaviors are encouraged, which can ensure the normal functioning of the network system.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Cite this paper

X. Lin, J. Zhang, C. Hu, Y. Huang, B. Chen, N. Xie and H. Wang, "Utility-Based Node Cooperation Mechanism in Wireless Sensor Networks," International Journal of Communications, Network and System Sciences, Vol. 6 No. 5, 2013, pp. 236-243. doi: 10.4236/ijcns.2013.65026.

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