A Comparative Analysis of Tools for Verification of Security Protocols

DOI: 10.4236/ijcns.2010.310104   PDF   HTML     6,611 Downloads   13,654 Views   Citations


The area of formal verification of protocols has gained substantial importance in the recent years. The research results and subsequent applications have amply demonstrated that the formal verification tools have indeed helped correct the protocols even after being standardized. However, the standard protocol verification tools and techniques do not verify the security properties of a cryptographic protocol. This has resulted in the emergence of the security protocol verifiers to fill the need. In this paper, taking the two popular security verification tools namely Scyther and ProVerif as the basis, we identify a few security protocols and implement them in both Scyther and ProVerif, to aptly evaluate the tools, in terms of the security properties of the selected protocols. In the process, we not only characteristically present a comparative evaluation of the two tools, but also reveal interesting security properties of the protocols selected, showing their strengths and weaknesses. To the best of our knowledge, this is a unique attempt to juxtapose and evaluate the two verification tools using the selected security protocols.

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N. Dalal, J. Shah, K. Hisaria and D. Jinwala, "A Comparative Analysis of Tools for Verification of Security Protocols," International Journal of Communications, Network and System Sciences, Vol. 3 No. 10, 2010, pp. 779-787. doi: 10.4236/ijcns.2010.310104.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.


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