Study on Supply Chain Cooperative Games between Airport and Cargo Airways within International Air-Transport Hub

DOI: 10.4236/jssm.2012.51007   PDF   HTML     6,966 Downloads   10,536 Views   Citations

Abstract

Speed economy, proposed by Japanese scholars Masaki Tamura, refers to get the cost savings flow by accelerating the transaction process [1], which brings the a large market space to the cargo/express delivery industry [2]. Due to the rapidly growth of China air cargo/express market and the ongoing increasingly opening up of the sky, inter-national cargo/express giants have set up their hubs in China. The arrival of these global logistics integrators has brought a lot of influence to the development of airport. Hereinto, the unbalance between the scales of China cargo hubs and the rapid demand of air cargo/express development, the cooperation model of airports and air cargo/express have become the most urgently issue to explore. Therefore, on the basis of airport and airway co-competition analysis, the characteristics of the air cargo supply chain, and the airports and cargo airlines supply chain behavior, this paper will use the non-co- operative game of principal-agent model and the cooperative game model to analysis the revenue distribution of airport and cargo airway on the supply chain, this paper applies the cooperative game theory within a supply chain to analyze the cooperation model of airports and air cargo/express, so as to makes strategy suggestions on airport development.

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D. Shen, "Study on Supply Chain Cooperative Games between Airport and Cargo Airways within International Air-Transport Hub," Journal of Service Science and Management, Vol. 5 No. 1, 2012, pp. 51-58. doi: 10.4236/jssm.2012.51007.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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