Weakly Stable Sets of NTU Game

Han Qiao, Hong-Wei Gao

Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China.
College of Mathematics, Qingdao University, Qingdao, China.

DOI: 10.4236/ajor.2012.21010                

Abstract

In this paper, the definition of weak dominance is proposed for a NTU game and two new solution concepts of NTU games are introduced: the refined core and weakly stable set. The relationship is explored among the core, the weakly stable set and the refined core.

Keywords

NTU Game; Weak Dominance; Core; Weakly Stable Set

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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