Open Journal of Philosophy

Volume 7, Issue 3 (August 2017)

ISSN Print: 2163-9434   ISSN Online: 2163-9442

Google-based Impact Factor: 0.58  Citations  h5-index & Ranking

Does Matter Matter? Should We Mind the Mind? —Can Philosophy Be Reduced to Neurophysiology?

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DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2017.73017    1,351 Downloads   2,980 Views  Citations

ABSTRACT

The neural network in the human brain underlies the conceptual network in the mind. Sensations and primary and secondary concepts in the conceptual network correspond to integrative structures and lower-and higher-level associative structures in the neural network, respectively. Both networks co- evolve during biological evolution (phylogenesis) and individual development (ontogenesis). Subjective psyche and (self-) consciousness emerge when the cognitive center in the human brain becomes recurrently directed on itself (receives signals from itself, forms its own representation within itself). Matter (external world) corresponds to the region of the neural (conceptual) network that is not directed on itself, while the mind (self-consciousness) corresponds to the region of the neural (conceptual) network that is directed on itself. The very sharp separation/opposition within our psyche of the external word (physical reality) and internal world (content of our consciousness) results from the special kind of functional complexity of the human brain. We have only a very vague idea about what is “out there” in the “real” external world, as we have direct access only to our conceptual network. Matter does not matter and we should not mind the mind as much as we usually do. Generally, all of the main philosophical problems can essentially be reduced to human neurophysiology.

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Korzeniewski, B. (2017) Does Matter Matter? Should We Mind the Mind? —Can Philosophy Be Reduced to Neurophysiology?. Open Journal of Philosophy, 7, 265-328. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2017.73017.

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