Theoretical Economics Letters

Volume 7, Issue 2 (February 2017)

ISSN Print: 2162-2078   ISSN Online: 2162-2086

Google-based Impact Factor: 1.34  Citations  

Implementability by a Canonical Indirect Mechanism of an Optimal Two-Dimensional Direct Mechanism

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DOI: 10.4236/tel.2017.72016    1,247 Downloads   1,897 Views  
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ABSTRACT

The present paper investigates the multi-dimensional mechanism design in which buyers have taste and budget as their private information. The paper shows an easy proof of a two-dimensional optimal direct mechanism by a one-dimensional indirect mechanism: A canonical mechanism in the traditional one-dimensional setting, i.e., function of one variable, the buyers taste. It also sheds light on where the difficulty lies implementability of a general direct mechanism—not optimal—by a canonical mechanism.

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Kojima, N. (2017) Implementability by a Canonical Indirect Mechanism of an Optimal Two-Dimensional Direct Mechanism. Theoretical Economics Letters, 7, 187-192. doi: 10.4236/tel.2017.72016.

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