Open Journal of Philosophy

Volume 8, Issue 3 (May 2018)

ISSN Print: 2163-9434   ISSN Online: 2163-9442

Google-based Impact Factor: 0.60  Citations  

The Affective Moral Judgment

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DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2018.83017    866 Downloads   1,569 Views  Citations

ABSTRACT

The affective though and the intuition in moral judgment has been discovered lately (Haidt, 2001). This article analyzes the Moral Judgment theory (Kohlberg, 1964) and the basic logical operations (Piaget, 1950). The rational stages with a few intervention of emotion have been historically assumed by moral judgment theory, which judges the affective as a mistaken notion and as a simple cognitive extension (Greene & Haidt, 2002). This paper demonstrates that the Piagetian basic operations, seriation and categorization are applicable to an affective system. In addition, the intuition is a moral determinant and finally, that neuronal activity confirms an intuitional cognition for the resolution of social problems. It is expected that the present deliberation guides and stimuli researches on the intuition and emotion in moral judgment.

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Hugo Robles Francia, V. (2018) The Affective Moral Judgment. Open Journal of Philosophy, 8, 225-242. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2018.83017.

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