Theoretical Economics Letters

Volume 1, Issue 3 (November 2011)

ISSN Print: 2162-2078   ISSN Online: 2162-2086

Google-based Impact Factor: 0.79  Citations  

Elective Affinities

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DOI: 10.4236/tel.2011.13028    4,849 Downloads   8,304 Views  

ABSTRACT

We propose a marriage model where assortative matching results in equilibrium for reasons other than those driving similar results in the search and matching literature. A marriage is a joint venture where husband and wife contribute to the couple’s welfare by allocating their time to portfolios of risky activities. Men and women are characterised by different preferences over risk and the optimal match is between partners with the same level of risk aversion. In our model no two men (women) rank the same woman (men) as most desirable. Given that there is no unanimous ranking of candidates, everyone marries in equilibrium their most preferred partner.

Cite this paper

D. Cagno, E. Sciubba and M. Spallone, "Elective Affinities," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 1 No. 3, 2011, pp. 134-136. doi: 10.4236/tel.2011.13028.

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