American Journal of Industrial and Business Management

Volume 6, Issue 7 (July 2016)

ISSN Print: 2164-5167   ISSN Online: 2164-5175

Google-based Impact Factor: 1.24  Citations  h5-index & Ranking

The Economic Analysis of Crime Behavior—Deduction of the Game Model between the Law-Man and the Offender

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DOI: 10.4236/ajibm.2016.67076    1,555 Downloads   1,975 Views  
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ABSTRACT

George Tsebelis (1989) first uses the game model to analyze the behavior of police and public, but he has been questioned by many scholars in the related research. George’ conclusion and the scholars’ opinions are based on the premise that no pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in the game. In fact, pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in certain conditions, and it is necessary to study it because of the stabilization. In this paper, we research on the interaction of the law-man and the offender, and study how the law-man type and the conviction rate influence the behavior of the game participants. This paper also tests the conclusion of George, in the 1V1 game with the 100% conviction rate, the conclusion is correct that the increase of punishment can’t reduce the crime. This paper further discusses the law enforcement range that the law-man can be competent, and how the law-man type, law enforcement costs and the number of law-men impact the law enforcement range.

Cite this paper

Pan, S. (2016) The Economic Analysis of Crime Behavior—Deduction of the Game Model between the Law-Man and the Offender. American Journal of Industrial and Business Management, 6, 822-828. doi: 10.4236/ajibm.2016.67076.

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