Author(s)

M. C. Young

Department of Philosophy, Lakehead University, Orillia Campus, Orillia, Canada.

Within contemporary epistemology, notions of intellectual virtue have come to fulfill a prominent role in attempts to provide an account of knowledge. Notions of such virtue can vary, and one particular aspect of this variance concerns how to construe the relationship between the intellectual virtues and particular epistemic ends. The goal of this article is to defend an instrumental connection between the intellectual virtues and the epistemic end of true belief. One type of skeptical argument that attempts to sever this connection, a Cartesian Demon argument, is considered. This Cartesian Demon argument will be summarized, as well as three responses to it. The claim that truth-conduciveness is a tenable criterion for identifying the intellectual virtues is then defended. It is acknowledged that the possibility of a Cartesian Demon does initiate scepticism, but that this scepticism is directed toward identifying specific intellectual virtues and not toward the instrumental connection between intellectual virtue and true belief.

Intellectual Virtue; Cartesian Demon; Subjective Justification; Truth-Conduciveness

Young, M. (2012). Identifying the Intellectual Virtues in a Demon World. Open Journal of Philosophy, 2, 244-250. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2012.24036.