

ISSN: 2164-0505 Vol. 5, No. 1, January 2015



Open Journal of Political Science



www.scirp.org/journal/ojps

Journal Editorial Board

ISSN 2164-0505 (Print) ISSN 2164-0513 (Online)

<http://www.scirp.org/journal/ojps>

Editor-in-Chief

Prof. Peter Richard Moody

University of Notre Dame, USA

Editorial Board

Dr. Casimir Kingston

University of Nigeria, Nigeria

Chukwunonyelum Ani

Dr. Manoj Atolia

Florida State University, USA

Prof. Paul Brace

Rice University, USA

Dr. Raymond K. H. Chan

City University of Hong Kong, China

Prof. Joseph Yu-shek Cheng

City University of Hong Kong, China

Dr. Chau-Kiu Cheung

City University of Hong Kong, China

Dr. Chien-Peng Chung

Lingnan University, China

Prof. Daniele Conversi

University of Pais Vasco, Spain

Dr. Rekha Diwakar

University of London, UK

Dr. Shahira Fahmy

The University of Arizona, USA

Prof. Leila da Costa Ferreira

State University of Campinas, Brazil

Dr. G. L. A. Harris

Portland State University, USA

Prof. James C. Hsiung

New York University, USA

Prof. Patrick James

University of Southern California, USA

Prof. Howard A. Palley

University of Maryland, USA

Dr. Christine H. Roch

Georgia State University, USA

Prof. Carlos Seiglie

Rutgers University, USA

Prof. Richard J. Stoll

Rice University, USA

Prof. Stephanie Anne-Gaelle Vieille

The University of Western Ontario, Canada

Prof. Peter Kien-Hong Yu

National Quemoy University, Chinese Taipei

Table of Contents

Volume 5 Number 1

January 2015

The Turn to Problematization: Political Implications of Contrasting Interpretive and Poststructural Adaptations

C. Bacchi.....1

Political Modernisation: The Rule of Law Perspective on Good Governance

J.-E. Lane.....13

A New Explanation of K. J. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: On Conditions of Social Welfare Functions

Z. Yuan.....26

Political Change in Jalisco, Mexico

A. A. Ríos.....40

Open Journal of Political Science (OJPS)

Journal Information

SUBSCRIPTIONS

The *Open Journal of Political Science* (Online at Scientific Research Publishing, www.SciRP.org) is published quarterly by Scientific Research Publishing, Inc., USA.

Subscription rates:

Print: \$59 per issue.

To subscribe, please contact Journals Subscriptions Department, E-mail: sub@scirp.org

SERVICES

Advertisements

Advertisement Sales Department, E-mail: service@scirp.org

Reprints (minimum quantity 100 copies)

Reprints Co-ordinator, Scientific Research Publishing, Inc., USA.

E-mail: sub@scirp.org

COPYRIGHT

COPYRIGHT AND REUSE RIGHTS FOR THE FRONT MATTER OF THE JOURNAL:

Copyright © 2015 by Scientific Research Publishing Inc.

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY).

<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>

COPYRIGHT FOR INDIVIDUAL PAPERS OF THE JOURNAL:

Copyright © 2015 by author(s) and Scientific Research Publishing Inc.

REUSE RIGHTS FOR INDIVIDUAL PAPERS:

Note: At SCIRP authors can choose between CC BY and CC BY-NC. Please consult each paper for its reuse rights.

DISCLAIMER OF LIABILITY

Statements and opinions expressed in the articles and communications are those of the individual contributors and not the statements and opinion of Scientific Research Publishing, Inc. We assume no responsibility or liability for any damage or injury to persons or property arising out of the use of any materials, instructions, methods or ideas contained herein. We expressly disclaim any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. If expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought.

PRODUCTION INFORMATION

For manuscripts that have been accepted for publication, please contact:

E-mail: ojps@scirp.org

The Turn to Problematization: Political Implications of Contrasting Interpretive and Poststructural Adaptations

Carol Bacchi

The Department of Politics & International Studies, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, Australia
Email: carol.bacchi@adelaide.edu.au

Received 5 November 2014; revised 2 December 2014; accepted 22 December 2014

Copyright © 2015 by author and Scientific Research Publishing Inc.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY).
<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>



Open Access

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to introduce and elaborate the varied meanings of problematization in contemporary policy theory. The primary focus is on the different meanings and uses of the term in interpretivism and in Foucault-influenced poststructuralism. The paper argues that interpretive/argumentative adaptations direct attention primarily to how policy makers/workers develop problematizations (ways of understanding a problem) while Foucault-influenced poststructuralists critically scrutinize problematizations (the ways in which “problems” are produced and represented) in governmental policies and practices. It concludes that Foucault-influenced adaptations provide a more substantive critique of extant social arrangements than interpretive approaches, which tend to be reformist in design and inclination.

Keywords

Problematization, Poststructuralism, Policy, Foucault, Interpretivism, Problem Representations

1. Introduction

It seems fair to say that the term problematization has taken the western theoretical world by storm. Alvesson & Sandberg (2013: p. 116) identify “various ‘problematization turns’ (for example, interpretive, political, linguistic, constructionist and postmodernist)”. Here are a few of the many theorists for whom problematization is an important concept in their analytic repertoire. They are listed in alphabetical order: Mats Alvesson, Carol Bacchi, Michel Callon, Hal Colebatch, Mitchell Dean, Gilles Deleuze, Norman Fairclough, Frank Fischer, Paulo Freire, Michel Foucault, Jason Glynos, Susan Goodwin, Steven Griggs, Barry Hindess, Robert Hoppe, David Howarth, Colin Koopman, Peter Miller, Michael Meyer, Uma Narayan, Thomas Osborne, Paul Rabinow, Malin Rönnblom,

Nikolas Rose, Jörgen Sandberg and Nick Turnbull.

These theorists include philosophers and political theorists. Some are associated with specific schools of thought or specific analytic traditions, with overlaps in perspective. For example, Michel Callon is associated with Actor-Network theory. Paul Rabinow and Colin Koopman are associated with the Anthropology of the Contemporary Research Collaboratory (ARC) and the Critical Genealogies Collaboratory. Miller, Rose, Osborne, Hindess and Dean all work with the concept of “governmentality”. Fairclough is best known for his development of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Hoppe, Turnbull and Fischer align themselves with an interpretive approach to policy analysis. Alvesson and Sandberg are management theorists. Turnbull and Meyer are philosophers. Glynos, Griggs and Howarth are associated with the Essex School of Discourse Analysis and Political Discourse Theory, influenced by Laclau. They describe themselves as poststructuralists and locate their stance “alongside other types of interpretive policy analysis” (Howarth & Griggs, 2012: p. 306). Goodwin, Rönnblom and Bacchi, whose work is influenced by Foucault, also call themselves poststructuralists but do not associate themselves with interpretivism¹.

It is difficult for readers who encounter the terms “problematize” or “problematization” to make sense of the varied adaptations associated with these numerous contrasting perspectives. This article attempts to provide guidance to the specific usages within interpretive and Foucault-influenced poststructural analytical approaches. Where relevant, comparisons will be drawn with other theoretical positions that offer “problematization” as a key concept.

To be clear from the outset, there is no claim in this paper that the term “problematization” has a single correct meaning and/or ought to be used in only one way. Borrowing from Tanesini (1994: p. 207), concepts are not descriptive of anything. They have no fixed meaning. Rather, they are “proposals about how we ought to proceed from here”. Therefore, they can be defined to certain purposes and redefined to other purposes. Their meaning is contested. Hence it should be no surprise to discover that researchers give the term “problematization” a meaning that fits their analytic paradigm and/or political vision. In this situation, the task becomes understanding particular usages of the concept and their purposes, as undertaken below. The argument is developed that Foucault-influenced adaptations of problematization provide a more substantive critique of extant social arrangements than interpretive approaches.

2. A Little Bit of Grammar

At the risk of oversimplifying, the term “problematization” tends to be used either as a verb (i.e. to problematize) to describe what people (policy makers/workers, researchers) do, or what governments (broadly conceived)² do, or as a noun (i.e. problematizations), generally to refer to the outcomes of problematizing. The verb form can be used in two ways: first, to describe a form of critical analysis; second, to refer to putting something forward, or designating something, as a “problem”—that is, to give a shape to something as a “problem”³.

The first verb meaning—problematizing as critical analysis—aligns with the colloquial use of the term to describe interrogating or questioning an issue. Researchers often use the term in this way to describe what they are doing in a particular text—i.e. problematizing a stance or an issue. However, when taken up in political theory, the term usually carries with it an understanding that the interrogating or questioning takes place at a level somewhat deeper than commonly assumed in everyday usage.

For example, some scholars have developed problematization as the basis of an analytic practice that takes place at the level of deep-seated presuppositions—necessary meanings antecedent to an argument—and assumptions about the world. Alvesson and Sandberg (2013: p. 71) put forward what they describe as “the problematization methodology”, a way to critically assess assumptions and presuppositions in political and social theories. Bacchi’s (1999; 2009) WPR (What’s the Problem Represented to be?) approach to policy analysis offers a Foucault-influenced mode of problematization analysis that “consists in seeing on what type of assumptions, of fa-

¹This last point illustrates that theorists use descriptors of analytic traditions in diverse ways. For the purposes of this paper the interpretive tradition is associated with those who are primarily concerned with the roles of social actors in political processes. Foucault-influenced poststructuralism is marked off from this tradition because of its commitment to questioning foundational conceptions of the political subject (Bacchi & Rönnblom, 2014: p. 6). This point is elaborated later in the paper.

²This sense of broad governing practices is captured in the analytic concept, governmentality, which is discussed later in the paper.

³The use of inverted commas around “problems” indicates that the term is being problematized (i.e. put into question as part of a critical analytic practice—the first verb usage). In places where a specific theory appears to accept problems as real in some way, inverted commas are omitted.

miliar notions, of established, unexamined ways of thinking the accepted practices are based” (Foucault, 1994 [1981]: p. 456). Webb (2014: p. 368) also offers a “policy problematization” approach that “seeks explanations about the ways thinking is practiced and produced”.

The second verb use—to put something forward or constitute something as a “problem”—can refer to:

- How people (citizens, policy makers/workers, policy analysts) “frame” an issue, as in the interpretive tradition (Colebatch, Hoppe, & Noordegraaf, 2010b: p. 231);
- How social scientists form a problem or an explanandum—that which is to be explained—as a “dialectical moment” in social science practice (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: p. 34-38); or
- How governing (broadly conceived) involves problematizing, shaping issues as “problems”, as in the Foucault-influenced poststructural tradition (Rose & Miller, 1992: p. 181).

As a noun, problematizations generally refer to the outcomes of the processes of problematizing, be these the ways in which “problems” are framed or governmental problematizing processes. Analysts tend to refer, therefore, to the need to interrogate *problematizations*, in the plural, or to offer an adjectival adaptation, “problematized phenomena” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: p. 205). However, at times the noun form appears simply as the nominalization of the process of problematizing. So, you could talk about people engaging in *problematization*.

3. Analytic Applications

Analytic traditions do not divide along grammatical lines. That is, theorists across the analytic spectrum often use variations of the verb and the noun form in relation to each other. For example, Foucault uses problematization both as verb to describe his analytic strategy of “thinking problematically” and, as noun, to refer to the *objects for thought* that emerge in historical problematizing practices, including governmental practices (“the forms of problematization themselves”) (Foucault, 1986: p. 11-12; Bacchi, 2012; Koopman, 2013: p. 98). Post-structuralists in the Essex School use the verb form to identify the need to problematize, or interrogate, the different ways an issue has been problematized, or shaped as a “problem”, by key social actors. They describe what social actors produce as *problematizations* (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: p. 168) or as “problematized social phenomena” (Howarth, 2013: p. 267). Meanwhile, researchers in the interpretive tradition, who use problematize in the verb form to mean framing an issue as a “problem”, use the noun form (“a problematization”) to describe the outcome of this process.

Within these developments it is possible to identify two distinct analytic foci:

- A first, which encompasses those who broadly identify themselves as interpretivists, including the Essex School (see above), who emphasize the role of people, be they policy makers/workers or social scientists, as problematizing agents; and
- A second, Foucault-influenced perspective which directs attention to problematizations as the products of governmental practices.

To elaborate this distinction, in the interpretive tradition, the emphasis is on how people, mainly policy makers/workers, engage in problematizing, that is, how they offer an interpretation of a problem. The Essex School of poststructural theory shares this focus on the people engaged in problematizing (see above) but their interest is primarily in how social scientists construct a problem for analysis. In Foucault-influenced poststructuralism, by contrast, the analytic focus is on the conceptual underpinnings of identified governmental problematizations, “the forms of problematization themselves” (Foucault, 1986: p. 11-12), rather than on social actors as problematizing agents.

These contrasting forms of analysis reveal a basic ontological disagreement about the nature of political subjectivity. For interpretivists political subjects are seen as “agentic”, that is, as sovereign or foundational subjects, who stand outside of and shape “reality”. By contrast, in Foucault-influenced poststructuralism political subjects are constituted in discourses, understood as broad, socially produced forms of knowledge (Bacchi, 2009: p. 35). In the place of the “irreducible ‘real person’ who is ‘made’ (becomes a girl), or who ‘makes’ the world” (Jones, 1997: p. 262), Foucault-influenced poststructuralism proposes a non-essential “subjectivity which is precarious, contradictory and in process, constantly being reconstituted in discourse each time we think or speak” (Weedon, 1987: p. 32).

The Essex School of poststructuralism (Howarth, Norval, & Stavrakakis, 2000: p. 18), influenced by Laclau, offers a complex understanding of political subjectivity. In line with a poststructuralist framework, it sees subjects as assuming “subject positions within a discursive structure”. However, it also adopts an understanding of

political subjectivity that “accounts for the agency of subjects”. As a result, their political analysis, which necessitates acknowledging “a subject’s contextualized self-interpretation” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: p. 15), aligns with interpretivism and stands at a distance from Foucauldian perspectives.

For Foucauldians, problematizations are ways of thinking that emerge from practices rather than from people as agents (Bacchi, 2012: p. 3). For example, in his study of “madness”, Foucault (2009) argues that “madness” did not exist as an object for thought outside the practices that constitute it. He says that to see how “the mad” came to be thought of as a specific kind of “entity”, we need to look at how they were treated (1969 in Eribon, 1991: 214)—how they were “set aside, excluded from society, interned, and treated”. By examining these *practices* (what people did) you can see how “madness” was thought about or “problematized” (Bacchi, 2012), and that is what “madness” came to mean.

The same can be said to apply to the whole range of governed “objects”, e.g. “delinquency”, “out-of-wedlock births”, “welfare”, “population”, “binge drinking”, “problem gambling”, and so on. These governmental categories, which we commonly think of as “entities”, are produced through the very practices that create them as categories—e.g. practices of measurement and comparison. Moreover, these condensations of thinking and other practices shape and influence people in profound and uncharted ways. Attention, therefore, is directed away from an intentional, agentic human subject, as seen in interpretivism (above), to the myriad complex strategic relations that produce “subjects” in continual formation. Foucault (1986: p. 12-13) identifies “practical texts”, such as regulations and decrees, as key sites where governmental “objects” and “subjects” are produced through problematization.

A task becomes considering how these different configurations of problematization—the interpretive focus on political agents who problematize, and the Foucauldian emphasis on the problematizations within policies that shape us as subjects—map onto political visions and political agendas, and what this might mean for those involved in policy development. At one level it might appear that the two positions simply align with different analytic tasks, with interpretivists primarily concerned with those involved in processes of policy formulation while Foucault-influenced poststructuralists assume, as their primary work, critical interrogation of the problematizations within *existing* policies. However, Foucault-influenced perspectives have significant implications for interpretivist goals and objectives, raising important questions about the form of critique they offer, as the paper proceeds to argue.

4. Common Threads and Analytic Tensions

As a generalization it is possible to say that the appearance of the term “problematization” in an analysis always signals a critical intent. One can assume that some species of challenge to the social and political status quo is envisaged and that, as a consequence, there are some shared premises among those who adopt the term. For example, both interpretivism and poststructuralism (Turnbull, 2008: p. 1; Glynos & Howarth, 2007: p. 104) describe current social relations as contingent to suggest that things commonly taken for granted as simply “the way things are” could be quite different. Moreover, in both interpretivism and poststructuralism, there is a common antipathy to positivist methods of analysis (Howarth & Griggs, 2012: p. 335), a tendency to prefer qualitative over quantitative research⁴, and serious reservations about standard understandings of policy design as involving “merely cognitive or rational processes” (Hoppe, 2011: p. 56; see also Turnbull, 2008: p. 15).

In addition, researchers who adopt the terms “problematizing” and “problematization” indicate by so doing that they share a conviction that “problems” are more interesting than “solutions”. At a basic level this stance suggests links with Meyer’s philosophy of questioning, called “problematology”, and described by Turnbull (2008: p. 10) as a “philosophy of problematisation”. There is also shared disquiet about the current emphasis in policy circles on problem-solving and evidence-based policy, on the view that these approaches treat “problems” as fixed and readily identifiable (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: p. 167). By contrast references to “problematization” signal that “problems” are considered to be forms of construction, though there are different interpretations of what social construction entails that parallel the earlier distinction between agentic (agency-focused) and anti-foundational (anti-essentialist) perspectives.

Contrast can be drawn between *constructivism*, which sees the person as “actively engaged in the creation of

⁴The Essex School (2009: p. 6) argues that discourse analytic approaches select “different methods or techniques in the study of discourse, whether these are qualitative, quantitative, or some combination of the two”. Specifically, they integrate Q Methodology into their repertoire of analytic methods.

their own phenomenal [sense-perceptible] world”, and social constructionism, which emphasizes the extent to which our understandings of the world are the product of social forces (Burr, 2003: p. 19-20). These two foci fit the two analytic tasks identified above, with interpretivists paying primary attention to how policy actors shape problematizations in ongoing policy processes while Foucault-influenced poststructuralists examine the deep-seated conceptual logics that underpin governmental problematizations in existing policies, problematizations which shape who we are.

Interpretivists in the main, therefore, are social constructivists (Hoppe, 2011: p. 59). Theorists in this tradition describe, as the “essential process”, “the joint construction of problems as a condition for joint responses”. “Participants in policy making” are encouraged to problematize (or form problems) in ways that will “create some common or shared understandings” (Hoppe, 2011: p. 50). The objective is to direct attention to “the development of *shared problematization* which frames and justifies collective action” (Colebatch, Hoppe, & Noordegraaf, 2010b: p. 236; emphasis added). By contrast Foucault-influenced poststructuralists do not engage the question of *how people shape* problematizations for instrumental ends. Rather, they focus on teasing out and interrogating the meanings within, and political implications of, *existing* forms of governmental problematization.

To tie this distinction back to meanings of problematization, in interpretive approaches, problematizations are considered to be competing understandings or interpretations of a problem which people (e.g. policy makers/workers, citizens, researchers) put forward (Colebatch, Hoppe & Noordegraaf, 2010b: p. 228), while in Foucault-influenced poststructuralism, problematizations are deeply ingrained ways of thinking (conceptual schema) that shape (to different degrees) who we are and how we live. It follows that interpretivists are primarily interested in the people engaged in problematizing (giving a shape to a problem) while, in the Foucault-influenced poststructural tradition, the mode of analysis focuses primarily on studying problematizations (the ways in which “problems” are produced and represented).

Put in other words, interpretivists direct attention to *how people make meaning together* (Colebatch, Hoppe, & Noordegraaf, 2010b: p. 230; Hoppe, 2011: p. ix; Hoppe, 1999), whereas Foucault-influenced poststructuralists emphasize the need to *scrutinize and question meanings that are in place*. As signaled earlier, a basic ontological issue—how the political subject is imagined—separates the two traditions. Whereas interpretivists support a degree of rational agency (Colebatch, Hoppe, & Noordegraaf, 2010a: p. 8; Turnbull, 2005: p. 275), Foucault-influenced poststructuralists emphasize how subjects are constituted (or formed) within the very discourses (knowledges) that shape understandings of “problems”. These contrasting views involve opposing conceptions of power with interpretivists developing a view of power as “power over”, as the possession of “powerful elites” (Turnbull, 2005: p. 210), while Foucault-influenced poststructuralists describe power as productive, shaping subjects of particular sorts (Bacchi & Rönnblom, 2014: p. 6). These differences play out in the kinds of political projects that are advanced, as elaborated in the following section.

5. Problem Setting versus Governmentality

As mentioned above, the use of the term “problematization” signals a critical intent. Indicating the critical agenda of interpretivism, Fischer & Mandell (2012: p. 352) see a connection between Freire’s (1970; 1973) concept of “problematization” and Schön’s (1983) concept of “problem setting”. Both interventions, say the authors, are intended to challenge hierarchical relations, in Freire between students and teachers, in Schön between practitioners and their clients. In problem setting, practitioners are invoked to initiate what Schön calls “a conversation with the situation” in order to define the problems that arise in specific situations. In other words practitioners are invited to problematize or form problems in particular ways that fit the circumstances.

Alongside “problem setting”, interpretivists refer to “problem posing” (Turnbull, 2005: p. 177, 212), “problem sensing”, “problem definition” (Colebatch, Hoppe, & Noordegraaf, 2010b: p. 230), “questioning and problem finding”, and “problem structuring” (Hoppe, 2011: p. 4-5). In each instance the emphasis is on some person or group of people engaging in problematizing, in the sense of shaping or framing a particular interpretation of a problem. Those involved in “problem structuring” are described as engaged in “processes of problematisation” (Hoppe, 2011: p. 23). The primary focus is on policy makers/workers and the challenges they face in developing shared understandings of a problem, described as a shared problematization (Colebatch, Hoppe, & Noordegraaf, 2010: p. 236).

By contrast Foucault-influenced poststructural policy analysis examines how issues *have been* problematized in governmental practices in order to draw attention to possible gaps or silences in problematizations, and to the

ways in which “subjects”, “objects” and “problems” are constituted within them. The objective is not to develop a “shared problematization” but to facilitate critical interrogation of existing governmental problematizations. Government, in this view, involves the multiple agencies and groups (academics, professionals, experts) who contribute to societal administration—described as “the conduct of conduct” (Gordon, 1991: p. 2)—through the knowledges they produce⁵. Government is understood to be a “problematizing activity” (Rose & Miller, 1992: p. 181), in which “policy cannot get to work without first problematizing its territory” (Osborne, 1997: p. 174). To intervene, it is argued, government, including but beyond the state, has to target something as a “problem” that needs “fixing”. The critical task, in this account, becomes examining the ways in which specific issues are problematized.

The status of “a problem” marks a further distinction between interpretivism and poststructuralism, despite the apparent consensus that “problems” are constructions rather than fixed “entities” (see above). Those operating in the interpretive tradition agree with poststructuralists that it is necessary to challenge the notion of “problems” as “the pre-existing reason for the institution of a policy process” (Colebatch, Hoppe, & Noordegraaf, 2010b: p. 239). Yet there remains a tendency among interpretivists to refer to problems as if they exist separate from interpretive processes, reflected in the languages of “*problem* setting”, “*problem* structuring”, and so on (see above; emphasis added). In this vein, Colebatch (2010: p. 33; emphasis added) declares that policy is a process “driven by a desire to identify and solve *problems*, and marked by uncertainty and disagreements about the nature of the *problems* and the effectiveness of the responses to them”. Hoppe’s (2002: p. 309; emphasis added) typology of kinds of public problems includes as one category, “structured *problems*”, “characterized by high degrees of certain knowledge and consent”. Turnbull (2005: p. 269; emphasis added) describes “policy *problems*” as arising “from the *problems* of collective life”. This fixing of problems and claims to “certain knowledge” would generally be rendered problematic in a poststructural analysis.

Moreover, interpretivists tend to talk about problems in ways that give them a status as negative entities. Hoppe (2011: p. 23), for example, describes a problem as “a gap between a current situation and a more desirable one”. For Turnbull a “*problem* is a worry, or concern” and a policy problem is “something we are concerned about that we refer for collective deliberation” (Turnbull, 2005: p. 238; emphasis added). In Foucault-influenced poststructuralism, by contrast, while it is accepted that troubling conditions may exist, calling them “problems” is held to give those conditions a particular, fixed meaning that needs to be interrogated. To this end scholars working with this perspective create an analytic space to inquire into how the particular issue (the “problem”) has been understood and represented (problematized).

For example, the Foucauldian scholar, Rose (2000: p. 58), uses the language of “questions” and “answers” rather than of “problems” and “solutions” to study governing practices⁶. He suggests that we should approach issues such as marketization, imprisonment and community care as answers, and direct attention to the implicit questions that produce such “entities” as answers. In his view this relationship between questions and answers creates the opportunity to inquire into the form of problematization—how the issue is constructed as a “problem”—that produces marketization, for example, as an intelligible answer. Pursuing this line of inquiry, he argues, makes it possible to reflect on the presuppositions and possible limitations in the identified problematization. Attention is directed to entrenched “problematizations” (such as marketization) that potentially limit current thinking about specific issues⁷.

Foucault-influenced poststructuralists, such as Rose, propose the usefulness of identifying patterns of use, which they refer to as “govern-mentalities”, in these entrenched problematizations. The suggestion is that governing is facilitated through styles of problematization that affect our lives and impel us to act in particular ways. Dean and Hindess (1998: p. 9), for example, argue that, in a neoliberal “mentality of rule” (or governmentality), individuals are created as “the problem”, as the ones responsible for their own health, welfare and economic

⁵Hoppe (2011: p. 4) notes the role of “bureaucratic policy staff and science-based experts” in helping governments “translate problems into actionable policies and programmes”. While this comment acknowledges the role of groups outside of conventional political institutions in governing, the emphasis remains on the active participation of experts in shaping policies in contrast to Foucault-influenced approaches, which are concerned to highlight the role played in governing practices by expert discourses or knowledges.

⁶The philosopher, Michael Meyer (Turnbull, 2014), treats “problem” and “question” as “equivalent terms” (Turnbull, 2005: p. 231). In his analysis problematizing refers to critical questioning, aligned with the first verb meaning, discussed at the outset, of problematization as critical analysis. For example he refers to answers that close off further questioning as “deproblematizing” (Turnbull, 2008: p. 13). Hoppe (2011: p. 4) also, at times, speaks about problems as questions in a “question-and-answer game”.

⁷Meyer (see fn 6) also emphasizes that for every answer there is an implicit question. However, he does not look to the forms of problematization that render some “answers” intelligible.

success (see also [Turnbull, 2008: p. 23](#)). Hence, they are impelled to assume responsibility for stresses and challenges in their lives, instead of considering how governing practices shape the constraints within which they live and work. In this way, particular *styles of problematization* make governing possible by producing individuals as “governable subjects”, highlighting the importance of identifying and interrogating these “patterns of rule”.

This fundamental challenge to governing practices stands in contrast to the declared goal of interpretivists which, as described above, is to assist policy makers/workers to develop a “shared problematization” and to “set problems” *within* current political arrangements. We turn next to probe more deeply these contrasting political agendas.

6. Political Agendas

Researchers in the interpretive tradition have, as their primary objective, training policy makers/workers to “problematize” (to shape problems) in ways described as effective, that is, in a manner that confronts, evaluates and integrates “as much contradictory information as possible” ([Hoppe, 2002: p. 321](#)). They promote “the art and craft of policy analysis” ([Hoppe, 2011: p. 55](#)). The objective is to endow “forensic policy analysts” with “skills of problem reframing”, such as rhetoric and persuasion, in order to “avoid controversies and break deadlocks” ([Hoppe, 2002: p. 321](#)). With these skills, it is suggested, policy makers/workers will be better able to manage the diversity of meanings they encounter ([Colebatch, 2010: p. 41](#)). There is a clear link here with what is described as the “argumentative turn” in policy analysis ([Fischer & Gottweis, 2012; Hoppe, 2011: p. 173](#)). Through learning how to structure problems (how to *problematize*), it is argued, policy analysts will be able to “move from inchoate signs of problematic situations, through the unraveling of multiple stakeholders’ problem representations, to doable, solvable problems for public policy” and “shared problematization” ([Hoppe, 2011: p. 29; Colebatch, Hoppe, & Noordegraaf, 2010b: p. 236](#)).

The focus on “doable, solvable problems”, and continuing references to “problem framing” and “problem definition”, illustrate important conceptual connections between current interpretive approaches and earlier “political rationalists” such as Lindblom, Wildavsky and Dery (see [Bacchi, 1999: Chapter 1](#)). There are links, for example, between Dery’s and Wildavsky’s understanding of the place of problems in policy processes on the one hand, and Hoppe’s “problem-solution couplings” on the other. [Dery \(1984: p. 40\)](#) offers an “interventionist model” which “requires a problem to be defined in one way only, one that will promote its solution (amelioration or transformation)”. [Wildavsky \(1979: p. 3\)](#) concurs: “in public policy... creativity consists of finding a problem about which something can and ought to be done. In a word, the solution is part of defining the problem”. This pragmatic view is echoed in [Hoppe’s \(2011: p. 68; emphasis in original\)](#) position that, in “moderately structured and unstructured problems”, “*the problem fits the solution*—and not the other way round”.

Foucault-influenced poststructuralists have serious qualms about an agenda of creating “doable problems”. Rather, their focus is on interrogating existing constructions or representations of “problems” (problematizations) in order to point to possible deleterious consequences that potentially accompany these ways of thinking. As indicated in the previous section on governmentality, the primary target consists of *governmental problematizations*, with governing understood broadly to refer to the “conduct of conduct”.

[Bacchi \(2009\)](#), for example, has produced an analytic strategy that builds on Rose’s premise (see above) that we need to initiate our analysis from “answers” or “proposed solutions” and inquire into the problematizations that render these answers intelligible. Her WPR (What’s the Problem Represented to be?) approach rests on the simple idea that what we propose to do about something indicates what we think needs to change and, hence, what we think is problematic. Following this line of thought, policies can be seen to contain implicit representations of the “problem” (problem representations) they purport to address⁸. As in Rose, the analytic task is to reflect on the “unexamined ways of thinking” ([Foucault, 1994 \[1981\]: p. 456](#)) in identified problematizations. To this end, the WPR approach offers six questions which together probe the following issues: the conceptual premises underpinning particular problematizations; the contingent practices and processes through which certain representations of the “problem” have gained authenticity and authority; the effects or implications of specific problem representations, including subjectification and lived effects; and the possible benefits of alternatives.

⁸It is helpful to contrast [Bacchi’s \(2009\)](#) concept of problem representation with the reference earlier, in [Hoppe \(2011: p. 29\)](#), to “multiple stakeholders’ problem representations”. Hoppe here is referring to how stakeholders understand a problem whereas in Bacchi problem representations are located within policies.

The underlying conviction among Foucault-influenced poststructuralists that governmental problematizations shape who we are and how we live leads Bacchi to build into the WPR approach a practice of self-problematization (see also Webb, 2014). To this end researchers and policy makers/workers are enjoined to seek out possible forms of domination in *their own* proposals and problematizations by subjecting them to the six questions that make up the approach. Instead of offering “skills” to policy makers/workers to help them shape a “shared problematization”, as in the interpretive tradition, Bacchi’s poststructural initiative produces ways to interrogate and rethink common forms of problematization in policies and policy proposals, including in one’s own proposals.

What implications accompany these distinct perspectives for those involved in policy development?

7. Policy Design and Political Visions

Both interpretivism and poststructuralism offer policy makers/workers suggestions for how they might engage in their work and, as Tanesini (1994) anticipated, problematization is defined in terms of their distinct projects. Interpretivists recommend that policy makers/workers become familiar with the tools of “reframing”, including rhetoric, narrative and discourse analysis (Colebatch, Hoppe, & Noordegraaf, 2010b: p. 241), in order to more successfully manage the diversity of views they have to deal with. These tools, it is argued, will assist them to problematize (shape problems) in ways that produce a shared problematization (understanding of the problem) and “doable” problems. Foucault-influenced poststructural policy analysis, by contrast, encourages policy makers/workers to problematize (interrogate) the problematizations (deep-seated conceptualizations of “problems”) in the policies and policy proposals they develop and implement. Further, it incorporates a recommendation for a practice of self-problematization.

These contrasting agendas rest on contrary perspectives on the uses of theory. Interpretivists tend to want to use theory to develop interventions and techniques to guide and facilitate reform initiatives. Despite expressed concerns about the excessive focus on “problem-solving” in current governing practices, problem-solving remains a declared objective: “Both problem finding and problem solving are indispensable moments in high-quality policy making” (Hoppe, 2011: p. 27). There is a willingness to accept “partial answers” to “complex” problems (Turnbull, 2005: p. 206, 251; Hoppe, 2011: p. 15) in order to “repress unregulated questioning” and to avoid “social disorder” (Turnbull, 2008: p. 27–28). Consensus is seen as a desirable outcome of effective problem management⁹.

For Foucault-influenced poststructuralists, by contrast, the aim of theory is to *trouble* consensus, which they see as inherently problematic, and to avoid commitment to “problem-solving” *tout court*. While this position might, at face value, appear to be somewhat perverse (why wouldn’t you want to *solve* problems?), the argument is that problem-solving initiatives invariably accept “problems” as some sort of identifiable ill instead of recognizing them as the effects of political processes. The suggestion, therefore, is to open up existing governmental problematizations to a process of continuous questioning and critique as a move towards contesting problematizations in specific contexts that are deemed to produce possible deleterious consequences.

Interpretivists are not alone in their conviction that the goal of policy theory is to offer advice to policy makers/workers on how to *manage* problems. Callon (2009: p. 543), for example, one of the initiators of Actor-Network theory, describes problematization as a method for turning broad “issues” into “treatable” problems. The Foucault-influenced scholars Rabinow (2012) and Koopman (2013) also support a pragmatic orientation in policy analysis. Koopman (2013: p. 139), in fact, makes a case that Foucault had a pragmatist tinge, that he often took up experimentation “as a model of reconstructive problem-solving”, a view that requires further discussion given its distance from the position on Foucault developed in this paper¹⁰.

⁹Fairclough & Fairclough (2012) have produced a version of Critical Discourse Analysis that incorporates argumentation theory (see Fairclough, 2013: p. 177–178). However, Norman Fairclough expresses qualms concerning some analyses—his example is Fischer (2003)—that associate an argumentative focus with a “search for consensus” (Fairclough, 2013: p. 193). Fairclough also takes issue with the ways in which some poststructural researchers create a link between problems and solutions. Fairclough (2013: p. 185) declares himself committed to “(critical) realism” and a “moderate constructivism”, in which the point of critique is to ask “what the problems really are”. Problematizations, in his account, represent the views of various groups of social actors about the nature of those problems. This understanding of problematization is similar both to interpretivism (despite the disagreement about consensus) and to the version of poststructuralism in Glynos and Howarth (2007; see above). It sits at some distance from the focus in Foucault-influenced poststructuralism on the implicit problematizations within policies and policy proposals.

¹⁰For a critique of Koopman’s argument, see Thompson (2010).

While Koopman (2013: p. 3) is sensitive to Foucault's project, which he describes as "this great problem of who we are and who we can be", he fails to take on board Foucault's "purgative practice of historical nominalism" (Flynn, 2005: p. x). For Foucault "madness" and "sexuality" are problematized *objects for thought*, produced in practices—no more, no less (see above). Hence, the critical task becomes considering how these "entities" emerge in practices as "problems", *not* to assign a problem status to them, as Koopman (2013: p. 3) tends to do. This tendency to affix meanings to "entities" such as sexuality is necessary to Koopman's argument that Foucault intended to give us the tools to "specify the details of a problematic situation" and to assist us "to appropriately perceive *problems*" (Koopman, 2013: p. 247; emphasis added). In the process, Foucault's insistence on the importance of problematization, "*perpetual* reproblemization" and self-problematization—problematizing "even what we are ourselves" (Foucault, 1984b: p. 1431; emphasis added)—tends to get lost. So too does Foucault's commitment to a "philosophical ethos" as "a *permanent* critique of our historical era" (Foucault 1984a: p. 42; emphasis added).

As part of the practice of "permanent critique", it is possible to reflect on the complex array of implications that problematizations entail in specific contexts and to modify interventions in ways that reduce deleterious consequences¹¹. However, this kind of intercession does not make problematization a "diagnostic" tool to assist the pragmatist "to articulate and innovate practices that promise a *resolution* of the problematic situation" (Koopman, 2013: p. 225; 2011: p. 7; emphasis added). There is no attempt to seek "solutions" to "problems" because there is no presumption that a problem exists¹². Moreover, any proposal for change becomes subject to self-problematization, as in the undertaking in the WPR approach to apply the six questions to one's own proposals (Bacchi, 2009: p. 19).

8. Conclusion

Both interpretive and poststructural approaches cultivate new thinking about how policy is done and encourage practitioners to challenge technocratic styles of policy development. There is also a shared concern about finding ways to engage and critique dominant "problem definitions" (Hoppe, 2011: p. 49) or pervasive "problem representations" (Bacchi, 2009). The different languages here mark the distance between the two approaches. "Problem definitions" are seen as negotiated interpretations that sit outside of problems that exist. By contrast, problem representations are the ways in which particular policy "problems" are constituted in the real (Bacchi, 2009: p. 35). In addition, whereas interpretive and some poststructural approaches work through the self-understandings of political subjects (Glynos & Howarth, 2007; see above), Foucault-influenced poststructural approaches offer strategies, including a practice of self-problematization, to help us to think about how we become the people we are.

In the end the two analytic traditions—interpretivism and Foucault-influenced poststructuralism—line up with divergent political projects. An interpretive view of problematizations as competing understandings of problems, together with the conviction that the goal of the analyst is to train policy makers/workers in problematizing skills, supports a reformist agenda. By contrast, the study, in Foucault-influenced poststructural accounts, of problematizations as deep-seated conceptual schema that shape lives, offers a more thoroughgoing analysis of how we are governed, a level of analysis that prefers "unregulated questioning" to "partial answers" (Turnbull, 2005: p. 206, 251; Turnbull, 2008: p. 27-28).

Interpretivists turn their attention to assisting policy workers to learn how to problematize (to shape understandings of problems) in order to negotiate shared problematizations (interpretations of problems) that will enable a reform agenda. Foucault-influenced poststructuralists, by contrast, recommend that we all (i.e. researchers, policy makers/workers, etc.) engage in problematizing (critically interrogating) existing problematizations (deep-seated conceptualizations of "problems" in policies and policy proposals), including our own problematizations. Whereas the former aims to produce "doable problems", the latter recommends a process of continuous critique.

These reflections have implications for political theory more generally, specifically for Shapiro's (2002) widely endorsed "problem-driven research" (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: p. 167; Fairclough, 2013: p. 185). Glynos and Howarth (2007: p. 84) are concerned by Shapiro's critical realism yet they quote him to support, as a

¹¹See Question 5 in Bacchi's (2009) WPR approach to policy analysis.

¹²There is slippage in Koopman around the term "problem". While he makes the point that the nature of a problem is ambiguous and open to contestation, at times he (2013: p. 147) refers to problems as if they are incontrovertible.

project, to “illuminate a problem that is specified independently” of a particular theory¹³. Glynos, Howarth and others in the Essex School of Discourse Analysis (Glynos et al., 2009: p. 6; emphasis in original) state that they take “problem-drivenness as a basic starting point” for “inter-approach conversations”, and wish to refocus the debate “around common *problem* areas”. No specification is offered of what is meant in these references to “problems” or how “problem areas” are to be identified. Given the ambiguity around the meaning of the term “problem”—whether it signals a concern, a gap between the current situation and a more desired state (Hoppe, 2011: p. 23), or simply a question—perhaps it is time to leave the commonly used and vague notion of problem out of political theory altogether and to institute problematization-driven analysis (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011). As we have seen, however, recalling Tanesini’s (1994: p. 207) proposition that concepts are “proposals about how we ought to proceed from here”, this initiative would need to be accompanied by robust discussion about the political visions that underpin our uses of the term. This paper initiates this discussion.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Anne Wilson for comments on this and earlier drafts of the paper.

References

- Alvesson, M., & Sandberg, J. (2011). Generating Research Questions through Problematization. *Academy of Management Review*, 36, 247-271. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/AMR.2011.59330882>
- Alvesson, M., & Sandberg, J. (2013). *Constructing Research Questions: Doing Interesting Research*. London: Sage.
- Bacchi, C. (1999). *Women, Policy and Politics: The Construction of Policy Problems*. London: Sage.
- Bacchi, C. (2009). *Analysing Policy: What’s the Problem Represented to Be?* Frenchs Forest, NSW: Pearson Education.
- Bacchi, C. (2012). Why Study Problematization? Making Politics Visible. *Open Journal of Political Science*, 2, 1-8. <http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojps.2012.21001>
- Bacchi, C., & Rönblom, M. (2014). Feminist Discursive Institutionalism—A Poststructural Alternative. *NORA—Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research*, 22, 170-186. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08038740.2013.864701>
- Burr, V. (2003). *Social Constructionism* (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.
- Callon, M. (2009). Civilizing Markets: Carbon Trading between *in Vitro* and *in Vivo* Experiments. *Accounting, Organization and Society*, 34, 535-548. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2008.04.003>
- Colebatch, H. (2010). Giving Accounts of Policy. In H. Colebatch, R. Hoppe, & M. Noordegraaf (Eds.), *Working for Policy* (pp. 31-43). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/9789089642530>
- Colebatch, H., Hoppe, R., & Noordegraaf, M. (2010a). Preface. In H. Colebatch, R. Hoppe, & M. Noordegraaf (Eds.), *Working for Policy* (pp. 8-9). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Colebatch, H., Hoppe, R., & Noordegraaf, M. (2010b). The Lessons for Policy Work. In H. Colebatch, R. Hoppe, & M. Noordegraaf (Eds.), *Working for Policy* (pp. 227-245). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Colebatch, H., Hoppe, R., & Noordegraaf, M. (Eds.). (2010). *Working for Policy*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/9789089642530>
- Dean, M., & Hindess, B. (1998). *Governing Australia: Studies in Contemporary Rationalities of Government*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dery, D. (1984). *Problem Definition in Policy Analysis*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
- Eribon, D. (1991). *Michel Foucault*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Fairclough, I., & Fairclough, N. (2012). *Political Discourse Analysis: A Method for Advanced Students*. London: Routledge.
- Fairclough, N. (2013). Critical Discourse Analysis and Critical Policy Studies. *Critical Policy Studies*, 7, 177-197. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2013.798239>
- Fischer, F. (2003). *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019924264X.001.0001>
- Fischer, F., & Gottweis, H. (Eds.). (2012). *The Argumentative Turn Revisited: Public Policy as Communicative Practice*. Durham: Duke University Press. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/9780822395362>

¹³In context Shapiro (2002: p. 601) offers this critique of what he describes as theory-driven research: “... if a phenomenon is characterized so as to vindicate a particular theory rather than to illuminate a problem that is specified independently of the theory, then it is unlikely that the specification will gain much purchase on what is actually going on in the world.”

- Fischer, F., & Mandell, A. (2012). Transformative Learning in Planning and Policy Deliberation: Probing Social Meaning and Tacit Assumptions. In F. Fischer, & H. Gottweis (Eds.), *The Argumentative Turn Revisited: Public Policy as Communicative Practice* (pp. 343-370). Durham: Duke University Press.
- Flynn, T. (2005). *Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason: A Poststructuralist Mapping of History Vol. II*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. <http://dx.doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226254722.001.0001>
- Foucault, M. (1969). Pamphlet Submitted to Professors of the Collège de France. Cited in D. Eribon (1991) *Michel Foucault* (pp. 214-216). B. Wing (Trans.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Foucault, M. (1984a). What Is Enlightenment? In P. Rabinow (Ed.), *The Foucault Reader* (pp. 32-50). New York: Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, M. (1984b). A propos de la généalogie de l'éthique: Un aperçu du travail en cours (Rewritten Version). *Dits et Ecrits. Tome II* (1994) (pp. 1428-1450). Paris: Gallimard.
- Foucault, M. (1986). *The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality Vol. II*. New York: Vintage.
- Foucault, M. (1994) [1981]. So Is It Important to Think? In J. D. Faubion (Ed.), *Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984* (Vol. 3, pp. 454-458). Trans. R. Hurley and Others, London: Penguin.
- Foucault, M. (2009). *History of Madness*. Trans. J. Khalfa. New York: Routledge.
- Freire, P. (1970). *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. New York: Seabury.
- Freire, P. (1973). *Education for Critical Consciousness*. New York: Seabury.
- Glynos, J., & Howarth, D. (2007). *Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory*. London: Routledge.
- Glynos, J., Howarth, D., Norval, A., & Speed, E. (2009). *Discourse Analysis: Varieties and Methods*. Colchester: Centre for Theoretical Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Essex. ESRC National Centre for Research Methods; NCRM/014.
- Gordon, C. (1991). Governmental rationality: An introduction. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller (Eds.), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (pp. 1-52). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Hoppe, R. (1999). Policy Analysis, Science, and Politics: From "Speaking Truth to Power" to "Making Sense Together". *Science and Public Policy*, 26, 201-210. <http://dx.doi.org/10.3152/147154399781782482>
- Hoppe, R. (2002). Cultures of Public Policy Problems. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, 4, 305-326. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13876980208412685>
- Hoppe, R. (2011). *The Governance of Problems: Puzzling, Power and Participation*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Howarth, D. (2013). *Poststructuralism and After: Structure, Subjectivity and Power*. Houndmills: Palgrave. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137266989>
- Howarth, D., & Griggs, S. (2012). Poststructuralist Policy Analysis: Discourse, Hegemony, and Critical Explanation. In F. Fischer, & H. Gottweis (Eds.), *The Argumentative Turn Revisited: Public Policy as Communicative Practice* (pp. 305-342). Durham: Duke University Press.
- Howarth, D., Norval, A., & Stavrakakis, Y. (Eds.) (2000). *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Jones, A. (1997). Teaching Post-Structuralist Feminist Theory in Education: Student Resistances. *Gender and Education*, 9, 261-269. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09540259721240>
- Koopman, C. (2011). Foucault and Pragmatism: Introductory Notes on Metaphilosophical Methodology. *Foucault Studies*, 11, 2-10.
- Koopman, C. (2013). *Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Osborne, T. (1997). On Health and Statecraft. In A. Petersen, & R. Bunton (Eds.), *Foucault, Health and Medicine* (pp. 173-188). London: Routledge.
- Rabinow, P. (2012). How to Submit to Inquiry: Dewey and Foucault. *The Pluralist*, 7, 25-37. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/pluralist.7.3.0025>
- Rose, N. (2000). *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought* (1st ed., 1999). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rose, N., & Miller, P. (1992). Political Power beyond the State: Problematics of Government. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 43, 173-205. <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00071315%28199206%2943%3A2%3C173%3APPBTSP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y>
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/591464>
- Schön, D. A. (1983). *The Reflexive Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action*. New York: Basic.
- Shapiro, I. (2002). Problems, Methods, and Theories in the Study of Politics, or What's Wrong with Political Science and

- What to Do about It. *Political Theory*, 30, 596-619. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3072623>
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0090591702030004008>
- Tanesini, A. (1994). Whose Language? In K. Lennon, & M. Whitford (Eds.), *Knowing the Difference: Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology* (pp. 203-216). New York: Routledge. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203216125_chapter_13
- Thompson, K. (2010). Response to Colin Koopman's "Historical Critique or Transcendental Critique in Foucault: Two Kantian Lineages". *Foucault Studies*, 8, 122-128.
- Turnbull, N. (2005). *Policy in Question: From Problem Solving to Problematology*. Sydney: University of New South Wales.
- Turnbull, N. (2006). How Should We Theorize Public Policy? Problem Solving and Problematicity. *Policy and Society*, 25, 3-22. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1449-4035\(06\)70072-8](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1449-4035(06)70072-8)
- Turnbull, N. (2007). Introduction: Problematology: A New Paradigm for Thought. *Revue internationale de philosophie*, 4, 349-352.
- Turnbull, N. (2008). Legitimation in Terms of Questioning: Integrating Political Rhetoric and Sociology of Law. *Workshop on Normative and Sociological Approaches to Legality and Legitimacy*, Oñati, 24-25 April 2008, 1-29. www.dcern.org.uk/documents/TurnbullLegitimation.pdf
- Turnbull, N. (2014). *Michael Meyer's Problematology: Questioning and Society*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Webb, P. T. (2014). Policy Problematization. *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education*, 27, 364-376. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09518398.2012.762480>
- Weedon, C. (1987). *Feminist Practice and Post-Structuralist Theory*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Wildavsky, A. (1979). *The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis*. London: Macmillan.

Political Modernisation: The Rule of Law Perspective on Good Governance

Jan-Erik Lane

Charles Humbert, Geneva, Switzerland
Email: janeklane@gmail.com

Received 22 October 2014; revised 12 November 2014; accepted 8 December 2014

Copyright © 2015 by author and Scientific Research Publishing Inc.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY).
<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>



Open Access

Abstract

The United Nations, the WB as well as the IMF speak much of “good governance”, but what is the meaning and reference of this elusive expression? In this paper, I will link it with the concept(s) of rule of law. Rule of law notions are spreading around the globe, being relevant for the transformation of monarchies and one-party states. Thus, world media are now reporting that for instance China’s leadership is seriously debating making state reforms that would be conducive to more of the rule of law in the country. This is not to be interpreted as a push towards western democracy. To clarify the relation between rule of law and competitive party democracy, this paper presents an enquiry into rule of law I and rule of law II. This distinction has a long history in political thought and constitutional developments. Data from the encompassing World Bank Governance project is used to validate these concepts referentially.

Keywords

Good Governance, Constitutional Law, Principal-Agent Model, Dimensions of Rule of Law: Rule of Law I, Rule of Law II, Democracy, World Bank Governance Project, Dimensions of Good Governance, Principal-Agent Theory of Politics and the State, Measuring Rule of Law von Mohl

1. Introduction

The rationale of constitutional rules or institutions is to be found in the restraining of political leaders in so-called principal-agent games that unfold constantly in politics and public administration. Constitutions are best viewed as institutional mechanisms, devised to constrain the behaviour of political elites. These mechanisms are man or woman made devices of rules that are put in place, and hopefully enforced to constrain activities, i.e. institutions. A mechanism consists of a combination of institutions that are constructed or evolve over time for the purpose of directing human actors towards outcomes. The mechanisms channel the behaviour of men and wom-

en, affecting their preferences, objectives and interests.

The essence of rule of law institutions is to constrain the political agents—politicians at various levels of governments, political parties, rulers, bureaucrats, agencies, etc.—to the advantage of the *demos*, i.e. the population in a country. Only rule of law institutions can restrain political agents from engaging in *opportunistic* behaviour, like e.g. corruption, favouritism, embezzlement or patronage or the employment of excessive force like torture and sudden disappearances or seizures.

2. Constitutional Principles

The doctrine of constitutionalism entails the idea of limited government. Moreover, limited government in relation to civil society implies a state that operates under certain key rules (Brazier, 1990; Bradley & Ewing, 2010):

- 1) Legality: government is exercised by means of laws, enforced ultimately by an independent judiciary;
- 2) *Lex superior*: there is a higher law—the constitution—that guarantees certain rights for the citizens, like e.g. equality under the law, due process of law and *habeas corpus*;
- 3) *Trias politica*: executive, legislative and judicial powers are to be separated;
- 4) Accountability: governments can be held responsible for their actions and non-actions through various established procedures of criticism and complaint, enquiry and removal from office as well as redress;
- 5) Representation: the people have a SAY somehow in government through representative institutions.

These principles above emerged hundreds of years ago, long before democracy was introduced in many countries at the end of the First World War in Europe and America (Lloyd, 1991a; Lloyd, 1991b; McIlwain, 1958; Neumann, 1986). Today all existing democracies endorse these constitutional principles: constitutional democracies. But several non-democratic countries honour principles of the rule of law without accepting Western style democracy. Thus, rule of law is relevant to both democratic and non-democratic regimes.

One encounters the principles of rule of law above in various forms through history, either a few of them or all five (Burns & Goldie, 1991; Wormuth, 1949; Pennock & Chapman, 1979; Jowell, 1994; Jowell & Oliver, 1994). They are to be found long before the democratic regime was theorized thoroughly by Spinoza and Rousseau and it was practised in some countries with Common Law without democracy and in other countries in the form of the German *Rechtsstaat* (Reiss, 1970; Riley, 1983). Kant (1974) advocated rule of law, but he was not a democrat, endorsing constitutional monarchy, underling legality and due process of law more than representation and popular accountability. The political scientist von Mohl (1832) was an exception in Germany, combining all five principles above. Today, the rule of law principles 1 - 5 are relevant to all kinds of political regimes in the world.

Constitutional government embodies institutions or rules that constrain those active in domestic or international politics today. Thus, the meaning of “constitution” is a set of principles or rules that constrain rulers, politicians, governments or states. But there can be constitutional government without Western democracy, based upon competitive elections among political parties. Let me explain the distinction between two key concepts in good governance: rule of law I (legal integrity, judicial autonomy) and rule of law II (competitive party government), as they refer to good governance, according to the World Bank approach in its Governance project.

3. Rule of Law I and II

The concept of good governance has no standard definition in the dictionaries. Instead, I will rely upon the approach of the World Bank project to governance. The World Bank (WB) states:

“Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them”.

<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>

The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance project, mapping good or bad governance around the globe during the last decade, identifies six dimensions in of the concept introduced in the quotation above.

In the World Bank Governance project, one encounters the following definition of “rule of law”:

Rule of law (RL) = capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the

courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010: p. 4).

Rule of law (RL) is explicitly separated from voice and accountability (VA), which is defined as follows in the World Bank project thusly:


Voice and Accountability (VA) = capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010: p. 4).

The World Bank Governance project suggests four additional dimensions of good governance (political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and the control of corruption). The World Bank Governance project employs a host of indicators in order to measure the occurrence of rule of law RL around the globe, which results in a scale from -3 to +3.

In a constitutional democracy, there is a combination of both rule of law (RL) and voice and accountability (VA). But rule of law was conceived already in the Ancient and medieval periods, whereas Western type democracy belongs to the 20th century. Thus, I will separate between a narrow concept of rule of law I, corresponding to the World Bank's terminology, and rule of law in a broad concept, as including voice and accountability (VA). Several countries have or may introduce rule of law I without accepting rule of law II, i.e. party competitive democracy.

Rule of law principles offer mechanisms that restrain behaviour. We distinguish between rule of law in a narrow sense (legality, due process)—rule of law I—and in a broad sense—rule of law II (constitutional democracy). Some countries practice only rule of law I, whereas other countries harbour both mechanisms. A few countries have neither rule of law I or rule of law II, especially failed or rogue states or states in anarchy or anomie. Let us consider how China is ranked in the World Bank Governance project.

Figure 1 shows the overall country picture with rule of Law II on the x-axis (voice and accountability) and rule of Law I on the y-axis (legality and judicial autonomy).



Source: Governance Matters 2009. Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2008: vaest08, rlest08.

Figure 1. Rule of law I (rlest08) and rule of law II (vaest08).

In general, the occurrence of rule of law II is a sufficient condition for the existence of rule of law I. But rule of law I—legality and judicial independence—is only a necessary condition for rule of law II—constitutionalism as voice and accountability, according to **Figure 1**. The largest state on the Earth—China (CHN)—scores low on rule of law II and 0 on rule of law I, whereas the tiny city-state of Singapore (SNG) ranks high on rule of law I and medium on rule of law II. Why, then, would reforms in China towards better rule of law I be important for both the people of the country and international relation?

Figure 1 calls attention to the relevance of the distinction between rule of law I and rule of law II. Several countries in the world satisfy rule of law I requirements without scoring high on the rule of law II requirements. Improving rule of law I with for instance the *Ombudsman Office* would matter much in many countries, even though they are not democracies, according to rule of law II criteria.

4. Why Rule of Law I or II: What Is the Basic Rationale?

There is a form of interaction that tends to be long-term between individuals, which involves a *hiatus* between the agreement about what is to be done against remuneration (*ex ante*) and the later in time fulfillment of this contract (*ex post*). This time interval, lasting often more than several months or years, sets up the monitoring problem: Has the agreement been fulfilled in accordance with the considerations when the contract was made? This type of interaction does not take place in the various market forms, but constitutes a problem of analysis in itself (Arrow, 1985). The more this special type of contracting was analysed, between a principal asking for a service or job on the one hand and a set of knowable agents delivering this service or job on a long-term contract, the more often it was found in various important sectors (Ross, 1973; Grossman & Hart, 1983; Sappington, 1991; White, 1992; Ackere, 1993; Althaus, 1997). What came to be known as “*the principal’s problem*” was found in lengthy interactions within legal affairs, psychiatry, stock-market trading and agricultural production (*sharecropping*).

Two basic aspects of long-term contracting are transaction costs and asymmetric information, which never entered in the standard assumptions of the neo-classical decision model in mainstream economics. Since the agent(s) is supposed have much more knowledge about the service or job to be done, the principal needs to diminish this advantage, but without running up too heavy transaction costs, through costly monitoring or litigation. The agent(s) wants remuneration, which has to come from the value of the service or job delivered. Thus, there is both cooperation and conflict. In politics, one may model two principal-agent games, one game for moral hazard focusing upon good or bad performance after the election and another game for adverse selection or the choice of good or bad politicians before the election.

The theory of transaction costs stimulated this way of looking at long-term contracting (Rao, 2002). It was also furthered by insights into the nature of institutions, where rules could be employed to prop up the position of the principal (Furubotn & Richter, 2005; Weingast, 1989; Persson & Tabellini, 2003). However, the public choice school contributed little to the theory of principal and agents (Breton, 2007; Mueller, 2003), focusing almost exclusively on rent-seeking. Now, rule of law is nothing less than the regime that hands down institutions that counter-act agent opportunism, bolstering the principal.

5. Principal-Agent Interaction in Politics

In well-ordered societies, the political agents in government operate the set of governance mechanisms that we call “state” (Kelsen, 1961; 1967). It claims sovereignty over its country, but it enters into a web of relationships with other states, governed by the rule of law principles of the international society, namely the so-called *public international law* (Schwöbel, 2011).

A state or government may be seen as flowing from an agreement among the members about helping each other in securing peace and stability. A body of rules would codify this mutual agreement. A political club quickly develops a division of labour between leaders and followers, the subgroup who implements the rules and the subgroup who follow the rules in their behaviour. I will call the followers the “principal” of the political club and the leaders the “agents”. Thus, the political club will be modelled as confronted by the principal-agent problematic, comprising *inter alia*:

- Who are the political agents?
- How are these agents selected?
- Can agent power be laid down formally?

- Are there restraints on the power of the agents?

The principal-agent framework has enjoyed far-reaching success in modelling interaction between persons where one works for the other. This interaction is to be found in many settings, such as agriculture, health care, insurance and client-lawyer (Rees, 1985; Laffont & Martimort, 2002). As a matter of fact, the principal-agent problematic is inherent in any employment relationship where one person works for another, who pays this person by means of the value of the output.

Whenever people contract with others about getting something done, there arise the typical principal-agent questions:

- 1) What is the *quid pro quo* between the principal and the agent?
- 2) How can the principal check the agent with regard to their agreement?
- 3) Who benefits the most from the interaction between principal and agent?

These questions concerning principal-agent interacting arise whenever there is a long-term contract between two groups of people, involving the delivery of an output against remuneration as well as a time span between the making of the contract and the ending of the relationship with the delivery of the output. One finds this type of interaction in the client-lawyer relationship in the legal context, in the owner-tenant interaction in sharecropping as well as in the asset holder-broker relation in financial markets.

In politics, transaction costs are minimised by handing over the responsibility for the tasks of the political club to a set of people, called the leaders. I will employ the word: “agents”. The agents provide the members of the political system—the principal—with the chief goods and services of this type of community, when they are successful that is.

The agents and the principal are the two key components of political interaction that run through all political systems, whatever their nature may be. The problem of institutionalising the polity originates in this opposition between agents and the principal.

When governance is modelled as a principal-agent game, then it is not merely a matter of the interaction between two or more persons. The agent(s) is hired to accomplish an output or outcome, to be paid for his/her effort to do so. Here we have the two key foci in a principal-agent evaluation of governance: 1) the achievements—good or bad performance; 2) the remuneration—high or low.

In the literature, these two aspects—performance and remuneration—are not always kept separate. Thus, one speaks of bad performances when there is only high remuneration like in “corruption” or “rent-seeking”. Moreover, bad performance is sometimes equated merely with a failure to live up to promises made. The principal-agent framework is applicable to governance even when there is no form of embezzlement by the agent or merely reneging on lofty promises.

6. Agents’ Opportunism

Political agents are no different from any other human beings. They are driven by the same mixture of egoism and altruism as the average person. Sometimes political agents may be completely obsessed by protecting their own self-interests, as with cruel personalities like Genghis-Khan, Tamerlane, Hitler and Stalin. Sometimes political agents display great generosity and forgiveness towards their opponents, like Gandhi and Mandela. But on average political agents would be self-seeking, often with guile—the opportunism assumption.

The implications of assuming opportunism on the part of agents are strengthened in terms of importance when one adds the basic fact about long-term interaction of the principal-agent type, namely asymmetric information. It is the agent who delivers the output who knows the most about all things relevant to the interaction. And the agent will use this information advantage to capture a rent, or a set of benefits.

Strategy is a pervasive trait of human interaction, both in the micro setting and in the macro setting. Taking strategic considerations into account goes well in hand with opportunism and asymmetric information. The same applies to tactics. What, then, is the basic issue of contention in the principal-agent interaction? Answer: the division of advantages, given a certain size of the mutual gains to be had.

6.1. The Production of Value and Its Distribution

Political clubs help the population produce an output, a set of goods and services, to be denoted here with “V”, meaning value. By providing peace and stability, the population may engage in productive labour, resulting in an output of increasing value year after year. The political agents will claim a part of this value V for their contribu-

tions. It is the principal who ultimately has to pay the agents out of the total value V in society.

The agreement about what the agents are to contribute with as well as what they are to be paid may be only a tacit one. It may not even be a voluntary one, as the political agents may force the principal to accept an agreement by the employment of force.

Two things are of major concern to the principal:

1) The maximisation of V : If the political agents act in such a manner as to reduce V , then this is not in the interest of the principal;

2) Reasonable agent remuneration R : If the agents manage to capture a considerable portion of V for themselves, then that would be counterproductive to the principal.

It follows from these two principles that principals would be very unhappy with a situation where their political agents contribute to a low output V , while at the same time providing them with a considerable share of V by maximising R .

What is included in the output V ? One may offer a most comprehensive definition of V , denoting both tangible assets and intangible ones? V includes all things that are valuable government and its members: goods, premises, services, assets, perks, prestige, esteem, etc. Or one may confine V to the set of public or semi-public goods. The political club contracts with a set of agents in order to protect V , but the principal must remunerate the agents (R) from V . How can the principal select and monitor its agents so that V is maximised, given the constraint that the set of agents must be compensated for their effort from V ?

The interaction between political leaders and the population is omnipresent. Whatever the leaders are called and whichever rules apply for their behaviour, human societies have not been leaderless. Even among groups with a highly egalitarian culture, political leaders somehow emerge. This sets up the principal-agent problematic inherent in government. It is to be found in all levels of government whatever the form of institutionalisation.

When two people or sets of people interact, they may arrive at a mutual understanding of the terms of interaction. These expectations may be enshrined in a contract, written or verbal. Yet, even when the expectations governing the interaction between the political agents and the principal are not codified somehow, there is still consideration.

Consideration is at the core of human exchange and contracting: Something of value is given for getting something from another person. Consideration is the inducement, price or motive that causes a party to enter into an agreement or contract. In politics, the leaders receive ample consideration for governing the country. They take a part of total value V for their needs. And they are expected to deliver services to the political club, first and foremost maintain the peace.

The concept of consideration is a broad one, covering any compensation paid, or all inconvenience suffered by the party from whom it proceeds. A consideration of some sort or other is essential to the forming a reasonable contract. A *nudumpactum* would be an agreement to do or to pay anything on one side without any compensation to the other. In ordinary law no one can be compelled to fulfil a *nudumpactum*, but in politics absolutist rulerships and dictatorships are essentially just that.

Since the consideration must be some benefit to the party by whom the promise is made, or to a third person at his instance, or some detriment sustained at the instance of the party promising by the party in whose favour the promise is made, politics is replete with consideration. The agents of the political clubs employ a variety of techniques to raise value to themselves as consideration for their governance activities.

In respect of time, a consideration may be executed, or something done before the making of the obligor's promise. In modern law, an executed consideration is insufficient to support a contract but an executed consideration on request or by some previous duty is sufficient to maintain an action. In politics, consideration is omnipresent, although institutionalised to various degrees. The principal holds the agents responsible for the major developments, and it furnishes the agents with the resources necessary to direct government, whether voluntarily or involuntarily.

6.2. Key Forms of Consideration in Political Contracts

In government, the interaction between the agents and the principal varies depending upon the consideration implicit in the contract between them. It is an open question who prevails of the two parties. Thus, logically one may separate between two alternative considerations, or ideal-type structures at the extreme poles:

Subjugation of the principal: In this extreme principal-agent relationship, the principal is reduced to slavery or

serfdom, the agents exercising total domination—oriental despotism, totalitarian state. Yet, there is still consideration, as the enslaved population handles in a huge part of the yearly production to the agents, to be employed for governance. Typically, when the grip of the agents over the population slips, then there may occur rebellions, the principal searching for new agents.

Rule of law constraint over the agents: In the opposite extreme type, the political agents are checked by a variety of mechanisms so that they cannot accede to a position of dominance over the principal, like in intense direct democracy plus the popular initiative (Swiss democracy) as well as the recall of agents and imperative mandate (trade union democracy).

6.3. On the Risk of Political Monopoly and Looting

The external costs to principal may be very high, if there is political monopoly. What the principal would not want to have, all other things equal, is a situation where the political agents not only take a huge remuneration R for their work but also accomplish mediocre or straightforward disastrous outcomes, reducing the value of society V . In the principal-agent literature, excessive remuneration on the part of the agent is referred to as “rent-seeking”, whereas the failure of the agents to deliver on what they have promised is called “dissonant” actions. The important point here is that political agents may disappoint their principal on two grounds: 1) Dissipation of value V , meaning underperformance as measured by outcomes; 2) Looting, i.e. engaging in excessive remuneration R .

A virtue of the principal-agent perspective is that it alerts people to the possibility of large-scale looting in politics. The worst case scenario for the principal is the combination of bad outcomes in politics and excessive remuneration for agents responsible for the results. This happens often when there is looting.

“Looting” refers to any form of taking of value that amounts to an un-proportional compensation in relation to the effort exerted. It may be illegal, as when soldiers go on a rampage. But political looting is often more refined than populist looting when law and order breaks down. The appropriation of the resources of the administrative apparatus (“slack”) is a typical form of political looting, much emphasized by Weber for his comparative institutional analyses (Weber, 1978). The concept of political looting is broader than the notion of corruption or embezzlement, which are strictly illegal phenomena.

Looting may occur with or without value dissipation. Political agents may successfully claim a huge portion of the value in society without at the same time reducing the total size of value. In many Third World countries, political looting goes hand in hand with value dissipation though. An extreme case is that of present day Zimbabwe, which country according to its president “is mine”.

During known human history, there have occurred a wide variety of forms of looting. One may mention the Pharaohs, who treated the entire country as their “*oikos*” or household. Mohammed sanctioned looting with a religious argument in order to favour a rapid expansion of the Arab Empire. Looting constituted a key issue in Western feudalism, as the lord and the vassal focused upon how the fruits from the various benefices and fiefs were to be divided, both in the short-run and the long-run perspective. Finally, massive looting occurred in the authoritarian regimes of the 20th century, where both fascist and communist leaders looked upon politics as booty, covering embezzlement, patronage and favouritism.

Sophisticated forms of looting may occur in constitutional democracy, as when the executive allows itself to be surrounded by vast staff of advisors, experts and the like. Or political agents in the legislature manage to provide themselves with excessive budgets and perks. The fact that corruption allegation is an almost constant theme in public debate indicates how sensitive the principal is to the risk of looting. One form of political looting is of course nepotism or favouritism with regard to family members or cliques of friends when conducted by a president or premier for instance. Petty forms of looting involve negligence about the line of separation between private and public expenditures.

The rule of law regime is highly aware of the risk of looting, offering restraining rules about taxation, budgeting and financial accountability. It also aims at counteracting the dissipation of social value through representation, election and re-election. The dissipation of value is a problem of aggregation in society (*size of the cake*), whereas the risk of political looting presents a distributional problem (*who gets what*).

6.4. On the Risk of Value Dissipation

The constant focus of policy-makers upon economic growth shows how aware the principal is today about the

risk of value dissipation. The population worries not only about various forms of looting but also about the risk of unfortunate or disastrous policy-making that reduce aggregate income or wealth. A set of political agents may be extremely costly to the country because they are incompetent although honest. Political consideration as defining the *quid pro quo* relation underneath political leadership would comprise some mechanism for replacing one set of agents with another, especially in a rule of law regime.

There is the possibility of a dramatic effect from the combination of looting and dissipation of value, like for instance as matters now stand in countries like Myanmar, Zimbabwe and North Korea. One should not, however, assume that the risk of value dissipation is unique to Third World countries. On the contrary, value dissipation occurs also in First World countries, where the 2003 American led invasion of Iraq offers a telling example, resulting in so huge costs—human and economic—and so little value. And even a country like the UK with its rule of law tradition does not appear to be immune from various looting strategies on the part of parliamentarians, definitely immoral but not always illegal.

6.5. Variety of Principal-Agent Models in Politics

Whether in models of private companies or of the bureaucracy, principal-agent interaction harbours games between two or more players that involve both cooperation and conflict. Generally speaking, the principal may pay high or low remuneration for the effort of the agent(s). And the agent(s) may deliver high or low effort. Thus arise the problematic of offering and monitoring a contract with the agent(s) that elicits the best outcome for the principal, meaning high effort and reasonable remuneration to the agent(s) (Rasmusen, 2006).

The basic principal-agent model above has been developed in various elaborate ways in order to account for elections and re-elections in democracies (Barro, 1973; Besley, 2006; Helland & Sørensen, 2009). In a general analysis of politics in well-ordered societies or in countries with kleptocracy, the principal-agent approach highlights two problematic in governance: 1) value dissipation (poor performance); 2) looting (excessive remuneration).

Political agency of whatever kind it may be is fundamentally a job that has to get done against remuneration. This approach to political agency underlines its costs in the *quid pro quo*: What is the agent to do against what pay? Political agency is heavily institutionalized, as the population as principal wishes to restrict the behaviour of the agents—politicians, bureaucrats, legislators and judges. However, the institutions define the degrees of freedom, but they do not solve the incentive problem: How to motivate the agents to try hard to promote the interests of the principal?

Political costs arise with any form of political agency, as the politicians or political parties will not simply implement the policies the electorate wants without remuneration. The question of the size and nature of this remuneration has become a key issue in the post-modern society where political ideologies motivate less. There are a few key models of this effort—remuneration problematic in politics, stated in terms of the principal-agent approach. Let me briefly mention them in order to pinpoint these model differences concerning how agency costs are conceived:

- 1) Costs as embezzlement (Helland & Sørensen, 2009);
- 2) Costs as campaign funds (PAC:s) (Barro, 1973);
- 3) Costs as pursuing agent's own preferences (Besley, 2006);
- 4) Costs as bad performance like real policy failure (Ferejohn, 1986; Ferejohn & Shipa, 1990).

Groups in the electorate vote for a political party—a set of politicians with a common strategy—in order to have them promote a set of policies by means of outcomes—good performance. Due to the gap between election dates—normally four years, the relationship between the principal and the politicians he/she elects becomes one of asymmetric information, where effort is non-observable and non-verifiable. The politicians have normal incentives, meaning they wish to get paid somehow—maximum perquisites or at least much of them.

Political agency is a game with two rounds of play: election and re-election. Only re-election offers a strong restraint upon the agents not to “shirk”, meaning renege upon the effort to promote the interests of the principal. Only re-election gives the principal the opportunity to get rid of an agent who really was not a good one from the beginning (a “lemon”).

The theory of political agency as embezzlement is not really a success. Although corruption may be rampant in several Third World countries and flare up in spectacular cases in a few well-ordered societies like e.g. the UK, political agents do not employ such blunt tactics as stealing public money. Helland and Sørensen claim that

the threat of embezzlement is a most powerful one, forcing the principal to pay a rent to the agents. This is wrong. Bad agents who embezzle cannot survive the re-election stage, when asymmetric information is corrected.

The theory about agency costs as the extra campaign funds besides normal politician salary fits US democracy well. It models a structural weakness in the US political system, because these extra payments from pressure groups will only be forthcoming when politicians deliver policies, regulations or contracts as reciprocity. This always comes with an extra cost to the economy, involving the risk for social inefficiencies and massive rent seeking costs depleting the rents acquired. However, in other democracies the system of PAC:s is not allowed. In addition, the Barro model presents the difficulty of one agent serving two principals with opposite interests to some extent.

The Besley model is more applicable onto European democracies. It posits a radical separation between good and bad politicians, the latter being leaders or parties that promote their own policy agenda at the detriment of their policy promises to their principals. Given replay, the principal can eliminate bad politicians in the re-election. But under what conditions will a bad politician push his/her agenda already in the first round of play? Bad politicians could mimic good politicians in at least two rounds of play, surviving the re-election test. Under the Besley model, a lame duck politician would always push his/her policy agenda because there are no more rounds of play. Pushing one's own agenda is like scoring a rent. Thus, also good politicians will be tempted.

The distinction between good and bad politicians has a moralistic ring to it, which makes it less useful in scientific research. Is a bad politician an embezzler, a lackey of pressure groups or merely an idealistic loner who pushes his/her own convictions? Political agents tend to have their own agendas and the institution of representative democracy places few restrictions upon the mandate. Why would the principal not re-elect an agent who accomplishes positive outcomes by following his/her own agenda?

One may conceptualise the difficulties in governing as two games of principal-agent interaction, comprising two different forms of asymmetric information. In politics, the principal is confronted with the problem of voting for politicians or political parties agents at one election $e1$. But the voter as principal does not know whether the agents will really deliver—*ex post* the election—high performance although promising to do so (*moral hazard*). The voter does not even have—*ex ante* the election—full information whether the agents are capable of high performance (*adverse selection*). When the voter is not pleased with his/her agent, then he or she can decide to vote for another agent in the next coming election $e2$. Thus, the principal-agent games in politics have two rounds of play.


The principal would be willing to re-elect an agent who delivers high performance but reject the agent who delivers low performance (*incentive compatibility*). The risk in politics is that the agents promise one thing but delivers the opposite. Only eternal vigilance on the part of the principal in checking the political agents can improve upon the probability of the best outcome for the principal, given that few agents are benevolent saints. The worst outcome conceivable is that the agents deliver poor results but demands excessive remuneration. In the worst-case scenario, the agent appropriates much value produced in a country, or at least a considerable part of it (*looting*). In any case, the principal must pay the agent a level of remuneration that he/she could receive elsewhere (*participation constraint*).

To sum up: It appears from **Figure 2** that a majority of the population on the Earth do not enjoy the combined benefits of rule of law I and rule of law II. Actually, large portions of the peoples of the world do not even live under rule of law I in their daily lives, like mainland China.

Figure 2 shows clearly that there is ample room for improvements in rule of law I in several populous states, even if they for various reasons do not endorse rule of law II, or Western democracy.

7. Good Governance: Transparency and Effectiveness

It has been pointed out that the expression “good governance” has received numerous of definitions, some focusing upon the processes of decision-making whereas others have targeted outcomes or results, such as happiness or well-being. When one is confronted by semantic ambiguity or multiplicity of meanings, one research strategy is to enquire into how various concepts linked with the term or expression relate to each other referentially. This is often a more informative strategy than attempting to find the common core in all the various definition, or declare a new stipulative definition like good governance as impartiality (what is an impartial policy mix by government).



Source: Governance Matters 2009. Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2008: vaest08, rlest08.

Figure 2. Rule of law I and II in big states (>10 million inhabitants).

Thus, **Figure 3** looks at the relationship between rule of law I and the absence of corruption as transparency in the World Bank Governance project.

Figure 3 provides strong evidence that the institutionalisation or legal integrity and judicial autonomy is conducive to the control of corrupt behaviour or practices. China actually scores better on both indices than Russia or Nigeria, but far from the scores of UAE, Japan and Singapore. Rule of law I is clearly relevant for good governance in countries that have other political systems than Western democracy.

Governmental effectiveness is considered by the World Bank Governance Project as a vital aspect of good governance. **Figure 4** shows again that countries may score high on this aspect of good governance without scoring high on rule of law II.

The general trend is though those countries with rule of law II tend to score high on the index of governmental effectiveness.

8. Conclusion

A political regime that runs according to rule of law would satisfy a few conditions that constrain the exercise of political power (Vile, 1967; Tierney, 1982). Rule of law entails that power is exercised according to the following precepts concerning due legal process and judicial accountability:

- 1) Legality (*nullum crimen sine lege*);
- 2) Constitutionality (*lex superior*);
- 3) Rights and duties: negative human rights (*habeas corpus*);
- 4) Judicial independence: complaint, appeal and compensation.

The theory of good governance entails that a government adhering to these precepts will be more successful in enhancing socio-economic development than a government that fails to respect these principles. Thus, economic activity will be stimulated by legal predictability, the protection of property and the autonomy of judges when testing cases for assumed violations of legality or constitutionality (Cooter & Ulen, 2011).



Figure 3. Rule of law I and transparency (control of corruption).



Figure 4. Rule of law II and government effectiveness.

From the rule of law perspective, two unresolved questions are central in political agency, whatever the political regime may be:

- 1) What is the proper remuneration of the agents, both salary and perks?
- 2) Do agents really deliver, i.e. how can agent performance be evaluated systematically in terms of outcome data?

The remuneration of political agents, whether in legal or illegal forms, has not been much researched, not even in democracies where information is in principle available. For countries where the state controls such information not much is known, for instance about China. However, it is a well-known fact that political agents in some countries engage in comprehensive looting, for instance in Myanmar. The theme of corruption is a most important aspect in a principal-agent model of the interaction between people and political agents. Yet, there are several forms of corruption that need to be studied separately. Somehow the perspective of corruption does not offer a broad enough view of the entire remuneration question. See Meredith (1997) for an inventory of all forms of opportunism by politicians and officials in Africa to capture a rent or dissipate value.

References

- Ackere, A. (1993) The Principal/Agent Paradigm: Its Relevance to Various Functional Fields. *European Journal of Operational Research*, 70, 83-103.
- Althaus, C. (1997) The Application of Agency Theory to Public Sector Management. In G. Davis, B. Sullivan, & A. Yeatman (Eds.), *The New Contractualism* (pp. 137-153). Melbourne: Macmillan.
- Arrow, K. (1985) The Economics of Agency. In J. Pratt, & R. Zeckhauser (Eds.), *Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business* (pp. 37-51). Cambridge, MASS: Harvard University Press.
- Barro, R. J. (1973) The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model. *Public Choice*, 14, 19-42.
- Besley, T. (2006) *Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government*. Oxford: Oxford U.P.
- Brazier, R. (1990) *Constitutional and Administrative Law*. London: Penguin Books.
- Burns, J. H., & Goldie, M. (Eds.) (1991) *The Cambridge History of Political Thought* (pp.1450-1700). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cooter, R. D., & Ulen, T. (2011) *Law and Economics*. New York: Pearson.
- Ferejohn, J. (1986) Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control. *Public Choice*, 30, 5-25.
- Ferejohn, J., & Shipa, C. (1990) Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 6, 1-20.
- Furubotn, E. G., & Richter, R. (2005). *Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics*. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.
- Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1983). An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem. *Econometrica*, 51, 7-46.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1912246>
- Helland, L., & Sørensen, R. J. (2009). Hvorfor overlever politiskorrupsjon i representative demokratier. *Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift*, 25, 219-236.
- Jowell, J. (1994). The Rule of Law Today. In Jowell and Oliver, op.cit., 57-78.
- Jowell, J., & Oliver, D. (Eds.) (1994). *The Changing Constitution*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Kant, I. (1974). *The Philosophy of Law*. Clifton, NJ: Augustus M. Kelley.
- Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2010). The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues. World Bank Policy Working Paper No. 5430.
- Kelsen, H. (1961). *General Theory of Law and State*. New York: Russell & Russell.
- Kelsen, H. (1967). *Pure Theory of Law*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Laffont, J. J., & Martimort, D. (2002). *The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Lloyd, D. (1991a). *The Idea of Law*. London: Penguin Books.
- Lloyd, H. A. (1991b). "Constitutionalism". In Burns and Goldie. op.cit., 254-297.
- McIlwain, C. H. (1958). *Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Meredith, M. (1997). *The State of Africa*. London: Free Press.
- Neumann, F. L. (1986). *The Rule of Law: Political Theory and the Legal System in Modern Society*. Berg: Leamington Spa.

- Pennock, J. R., & Chapman, J. W. (Eds.) (1979). *Constitutionalism*. New York: New York University Press.
- Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2003). *The Economic Effects of Constitutions*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Rao, P. K. (2002). *The Economics of Transaction Costs*. Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230597686>
- Rasmusen, E. (2006). *Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Rees, R. (1985). The Theory of Principal and Agent. *Bulletin of Economic Research*, 37, 3-26.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.1985.tb00179.x>
- Reiss, H. (Ed.) (1970). *Kant's Political Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Riley, P. (1983). *Kant's Political Philosophy*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld Publishers.
- Ross, S. A. (1973). The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. *American Economic Review*, 63, 134-139.
- Sappington, D. (1991). Incentives in Principal Agent Relationships. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 3, 45-66.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.5.2.45>
- Schwöbel, C. E. J. (2011). *Global Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective*. Leiden: MartinusNijhoff.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004191150.i-205>
- Tierney, B. (1982). *Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought 1150-1650*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511558627>
- Vile, M. J. C. (1967). *Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- von Mohl, R. (1832). *Die Polizei-Wissenschaft nach den Grundsätzen des Rechtsstaates*. Zweite umgearbeitete Auflage. German Edition by British Library, Historical Print Editions (2011).
- Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and Society*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Weingast, B. (1989). The Political Institutions of Representative Government: Legislatures. *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 145, 693-703. Reprinted In E. Furubotn, & R. Richter (Eds.), *The New Institutional Economics*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) and College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1991.
- White, W. D. (1992). Information and the Control of Agents. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 18, 111-117.
[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681\(92\)90056-H](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(92)90056-H)
- World Bank (2012). Governance Project. <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>
- Wormuth, F. D. (1949). *The Origins of Modern Constitutionalism*. New York: Harper.

A New Explanation of K. J. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: On Conditions of Social Welfare Functions

Zheng Yuan

Center for Chinese Public Administration Research, Sun Yat-sen University (CCPAR), Guangzhou, China
Email: Lpsyzh@mail.sysu.edu.cn

Received 15 October 2014; revised 10 November 2014; accepted 6 December 2014

Copyright © 2015 by author and Scientific Research Publishing Inc.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY).
<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>



Open Access

Abstract

Social welfare function theory belongs to the cross disciplines of economics, sociology, management science and political science. The social welfare function conditions were first proposed by Kenneth Joseph Arrow, and served as the golden criteria in this field. For a long time, “the expressions of these conditions are not satisfactory”, as Arrow said himself, and he has continued to revise them. The author of this article has attempted to structure a mathematical expression that would meet Arrow's conditions. We found that the conditions of “unrestricted domain” and “independent alternatives independence” could not always be expressed simultaneously. This led us to conduct further research on the relationships among Arrow's conditions. We find that there are logical conflicts among some of these conditions, and we discuss these issues in this article.

Keywords

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, Social Welfare Functions, Unrestricted Domain Condition, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives

1. Introduction

Social welfare function is an important part of welfare economics or social choices; it concerns the objectives of social goals and the basic factors to be investigated in this field. It is not a function in the general mathematical sense; rather it is a conceptual function or a collection of decision-making rules. In social choice theory, Arrow (1951)'s impossibility theorem, or Arrow's paradox, states that when voters have three or more distinct alternatives (options), no rank order voting system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals into a community-wide (complete and transitive) ranking under a pre-specified set of criteria. These pre-specified criteria are *unre-*

stricted domain, non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The above four criteria, or conditions, are merged by researchers from Arrow's five original conditions. The specific form of social welfare function has no provision; this character can be both a weakness and an advantage. Note that social welfare function and social welfare are totally different concepts. The former deals with the choices of public policies, while the latter concerns the well-being of the society.

Arrow (1951) laid the foundation for the systematic study of the social welfare function, in which the key was to determine the criteria for such function. He found that the five basic conditions must be met for any reasonable social welfare function. On this basis, Arrow proposed his famous impossibility theorem that under these five conditions social welfare function did not exist. As it is commonly acknowledged that outside Arrow's five conditions there is no reasonable social welfare function, the theorem of impossibility eliminated the existence of such function, which generated a profound impact on welfare economics. In the early 18th century, it was noted that collective decision-making could lead to conflicting results. Arrow solved this issue with a general conclusion and liberated many researchers from their unnecessary works in this filed. More importantly, Arrow's impossibility theorem re-evoked numerous in-depth researches in welfare economics. For his outstanding contributions to the study of welfare economics, Arrow received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1972.

Social welfare function refers to a collection of rules that turn every independent, dispersed voting of individual (political, economic or social) polymerization into corresponding social (public, collective) voting. Existing voting methods are unable to meet the basic rules of social welfare function for they all have some major drawbacks. Arrow (1951) proved the famous "impossibility theorem": social welfare function that meets Arrow's conditions, which are the only reasonable conditions for such function, does not exist. Based on critical personal cardinal utility, which is the basis of personal ordinal utility, Arrow (1983: p.14) gave the classical definition of social welfare function: "social welfare function' will be meant a process or rule which, for each set of individual orderings R_1, \dots, R_n for alternative social states (one ordering for each individual), states a corresponding social ordering of alternative social states, R ". Social welfare function based on personal utility, in mathematics called functional¹, is not the common sense of function. The social welfare function can be expressed as $F(R_1, \dots, R_n)$. Its input variables are the order relationships of individuals to different optional objects (or bills) and the output is the social sorting (social order relationship results when the polymerization occurs through the individual voting).

Which social welfare function is truly representative of the social (mass, the collective) choice? In other words, what is the standard criterion for social welfare function? K. J. Arrow's conditions are the most authoritative such criteria. These conditions are not just pure abstract theory, but they are formulated based on voting (vote) practice analyses that take into account the basic, practical problems of a large number of voting. Arrow and many contemporary leading authors in this area developed these concepts.

There are enormous literatures on social welfare function. For example, Arrow (1951), Mueller (1979; 2003) and Sen (1970) are the representative works. Arrow (1983) made further modifications to the five basic conditions.

Since the birth of the theorem of impossibility more than sixty years ago, Arrow and his followers had made "concrete" justifications for this theory and its opponents hadn't been able to counter such justifications.

Here we try to give some counter examples for this theory and illustrate that this theory may not be true under certain conditions. In particular, we find that his condition 3 may be contradictory to the other conditions, and we propose a forum for discussion, which is the theme of this paper. As Arrow's conditions on social welfare function are difficult to understand and numerous authors tried to explain his works, we will also spend two sections in explaining/discussing these conditions before giving our counter example.

The rest of this article is organized as below. In Section 2, we analyze Arrow's five original conditions; in Section 3 we give particular discussion of the candidate independence condition; in Section 4 we give a counter example to the existence of the social welfare functions in Arrow's Theorem of Impossibility; in Section 5 we propose an optional solution to this problem.

2. Analysis of K. J. Arrow's Conditions

2.1. Introduction of K. J. Arrow's Conditions

We first explain some commonly used notations/symbols in this filed. For candidates x and y , the notation xR_iy Means that x is not worse than y in the opinion of individual i ; xRy means that x is not worse than y in the opi-

¹Functional domain is a set of functions, and range is the set of real numbers or a subset of the set of real numbers, which is from function space to number field mapping.

nions of the public; accordingly, xP_iy and xPy mean that x is better than y in the opinion of individual i and in the opinions of the public respectively; xI_iy and xIy mean that x and y have no difference in the opinion of individual i and in the opinions of the public. An environment S is the collection of all the alternative candidates, $C(S)$ is the sub set of S : $C(S) = \{x \text{ in } S: xRy \text{ for all } y \text{ in } S\}$. i.e., for any candidate in $C(S)$, in the opinion of the public he/she is not worse than any other candidate in S . The notation $A \rightarrow B$ means A implies B , and the notation $A \leftrightarrow B$ means A and B imply each other, i.e. A is the sufficient and necessary condition for B .

To better understand Arrow's five conditions, we list the two expositions for each of these conditions, based on Arrow (1970; 1983) (see Table 1).

According to Arrow's definition, social welfare function must simultaneously meet all the conditions set out in the above table.

Of Arrow's five conditions, conditions 1 - 3 are relatively difficult to understand. Sen (2004) and other scholars have re-grouped and merged K. J. Arrow's five conditions into four. Generally speaking, Arrow's condition 3 is deeper than conditions 1 and 2.

Remark: the symbols R , P , I or R' , P'' and I'' used in this article and their meanings are adopted from Arrow's book "Social Choice: Personality and Multi-Criteria", where R (or R') denotes the weaker order "no worse than"; P (or P') stands for the stronger order "better" than; and I (or I') stands for "no difference".

2.2. K. J. Arrow's Ideas for the Conditions of Social Welfare Function

In Arrow's book "Social Choice: Personality and Multi-Criteria", the five conditions for social welfare function are proposed to explain his idea. Below we discuss Arrow's ideas on conditions 1 and 3.

Arrow's idea on condition 1: for simplicity of exposition, it will be assumed that the society under study contains only two individuals and that the total number of conceivable alternatives is three. Since the results obtained are negative, the latter restriction is not real; if it turns out to be impossible to construct a social welfare function which will define a social ordering of three alternatives, then it will a fortiori be impossible to define one which will order more alternatives. The restriction to two individuals may be more serious; it is conceivable that there may be suitable social welfare functions which can be defined for three individuals but not for two. In fact, this is not so, and the results stated in this chapter hold for any number of individuals. However, the proof will be considerably simplified by considering only two (Arrow, 1983: p. 14-15).

In order to deepen the reader's understanding of condition 3, Arrow cites a classical example in the book "Social Choice: Personality and Multi-Criteria": "suppose there are three voters and four candidates, x , y , z , and w . Let the weights for first, second, third, and fourth choices be 4, 3, 2 and 1, respectively. Suppose that individual 1 and 2 rank the candidates in the order x , y , z , and w , while individual 3 ranks them in the order z , w , x and y . Under the given electoral system, x is chosen. Then, certainly, if y is deleted from the ranks of the candidates, the system applied to the remaining candidates should yield the same result, especially since in this case, y is deleted according to the tastes of every individual; but, if y is in fact deleted, the indicated electoral system would yield a tie between x and z " (Arrow, 1983: p. 17).

Arrow specially highlighted: "alternatively stated, if we consider two sets of individual orderings such that, for each individual, his ordering of those particular alternatives under consideration is the same each time, then we require that the choice made by society be the same if individual values are given by the first set of orderings as if they are given by the second" (Arrow, 1983: p. 16).

Arrow has been making modifications to condition 3 for quite some time.

Arrow (1983: p. 23-24) said: "interpretation of the impossibility theorem is given by examination of the meaning of conditions 1 - 5. In particular, it is required that the social ordering be formed individual orderings and that the social decision between two alternatives be independent of the desires of individuals involving any alternatives other than the given two (conditions 1 and 3)". Arrow's interpretation is the same as the understanding of condition 3 by Sen (1970) and Mueller (1979).

In Arrow's (1983) re-exposition of condition 3, the inexplicable $C(S)$ and $C'(S)$ are deleted (see chart 1), which reflects Arrow's spirit of "I am never satisfied with the current exposition", learning without stopping, and pursuit of truth and perfection.

Generally speaking, Arrow constantly absorbs others' suggestions and makes refinements of these conditions. The exposition of Arrow's condition 3 is more and more accurate and concise, but some of the expositions are too concise for the general reader to completely understand.

Table 1. Comparison of conditions for social welfare function.

Exposition of condition 1	
Arrow (1983: p. 15)	The social welfare function is defined for every admissible pair of individual orderings, R_1, R_2 .
Arrow (1970: p. 39)	In all possible choices, there must be a set S composed of three choices, which satisfies the conditions below: for any individual ordering T_1, \dots, T_n of objects in S , there is an admissible individual ordering set R_1, \dots, R_n for all objects, such that for every individual i , and all x, y in S , we have xR_iy if and only if xT_iy .
Exposition of condition 2	
Arrow (1983: p. 15)	If an alternative social state x arises or does not fall in the ordering of each individual without any other change in those orderings and if x was preferred to another alternative y before the change in individual orderings, then x is still preferred to y .
Arrow (1970: p. 41)	Let R_1, \dots, R_n and R'_1, \dots, R'_n be two sets of individual orderings, R and R' be the corresponding social ordering relationship, P and P' be the corresponding social preferences relationship. Suppose for individual i the two ordering relationships have the following connection: (1) for any two options x' and y' different from option x , $x'R_iy'$ if and only if xR_iy' ; (2) for any y' , if xR_iy' , then xR_iy' ; For any y' , if xP_iy' , then xP_iy' . Then, if xPy , then $xP'y$.
Exposition of condition 3	
Arrow (1983: p. 16)	(Independence of irrelevant alternatives). Let R_1, R_2 , and be two sets of individual orderings. If for both individuals i and for all x and y in a given set of alternatives S , xR_iy if and only if xR'_iy , then the social choice made from S is the same whether the individual orderings are R_1, R_2 , or R'_1, R'_2 (the author notes: this condition is known as the “independent candidate independence” conditions)
Arrow (1970: p. 42)	Let R_1, R_2 , and R'_1, R'_2 be two sets of individual orderings, $C(S)$ and $C'(S)$ be the corresponding social choice functions. If for some given environment S , for all individual i and all elements x and y , if the sufficient and necessary condition for xR_iy is xR'_iy , then the same is true for $C(S)$ and $C'(S)$ (i.e. independence or uncorrelatedness).
Exposition of condition 4	
Arrow (1983: p. 17)	The social welfare function is not to be imposed.
Arrow (1970: p. 45)	Definition 5: if for two different objects x and y , and for any individual ranking set R_1, \dots, R_n , we have xRy , then we call the social welfare function to be <i>imposed</i> . Condition 4: social welfare function is not imposed.
Exposition of condition 5	
Arrow (1983: p. 19)	(Non-dictatorship). The social welfare function is not to be dictatorial (non-dictatorial).
Arrow (1970: p. 46)	Definition 6: if there is some individual i , such that for any x and y , and for any ordering R_1, R_n of other individuals except i , xP_iy implies xPy , then the social welfare function is called dictatorial. Condition 5: Social welfare function is not arbitrary (i.e. social welfare function is authoritarian).

2.3. Some Researchers' Refinement of Arrow's Conditions

Due to the difficulty in understanding Arrow's conditions, many scholars made further refinements and modifications to these conditions. Among them, the works of Amartya Sen, William Vickrey and Dennis C. Mueller are representative. Below we discuss them.

Amartya Sen's refinements

Sen (1970: p. 41-42), in Sections 3.1 and 3.3 (p. 43-44), summarized Arrow's five conditions into four:

Condition U (unrestricted domain conditions): The domain of rule f must include all logically possible combinations of individual sequences. The domain of the rule f must include all logically possible combinations of individual orderings (Sen, 1970: p. 70).

Condition P (Pareto principle): For any pair, x, y in x , $[\forall i: xP_iy] \rightarrow xPy$.

Condition I (independence of irrelevant alternatives): Let R and R' be the social binary relations determined by f corresponding respectively to two sets of individual preferences, R_1, \dots, R_n and (R'_1, \dots, R'_n) . If for all

pairs of alternatives x, y in a subset S of X , $xR_i y \leftrightarrow xR'_i y$, for all i , then $C(S, R)$ and $C(S, R')$ are the same.

Condition D (non-dictatorship): there is no individual i such that for every element in the domain of rule f , $x, y \in X : x p_i y \rightarrow x P y$.

William Vickrey's and Dennis C. Mueller's refinements

Mueller (1979: p. 186) summarized Arrow's five conditions by referencing the short and simple restatement of them from Vickrey (1960):

1) Unanimity (The Pareto Postulate); 2) Non Dictatorship; 3) Transitivity; 4) Range (Unrestricted Domain); 5) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. The social choice between any two alternatives must depend on the orderings of individuals over only these two alternatives and not on their orderings over other alternatives.

Here, "domain" and "codomain" are characterizations of the same object from different points of view but their essential meanings remain the same. Domain is from the point of view of individual orderings while codomain is from the point of view of social welfare functional perspective. Mueller (1979: p. 186) suggested an additional explanation for codomain—"condition 4 perhaps requires an additional word of explanation. The notion of a universal alternative is not crucial here. What is implied by the Range Axiom is that the social choice process presumes that any ordering of the 3 alternatives X, Y and U is possible. The process is not established in such a way as to rule out possible orderings".

Obviously, if limited codomain (or domain) deliberately intervenes in voting results, then it will not be possible to guarantee that all the alternative voting information (or the corresponding votes) will be treated equally, and as a consequence voting will not be fair and just.

Generally speaking, scholars have made new and relatively concise exposition of the original difficult conditions 1 and 2. While Arrow's conditions 4 and 5 are easily understood, only condition 3 has remained unchanged, which is both a "gift" for newcomers and a last fortress for detailed explanation. Below we further explore Arrow's condition 3.

3. Independent Candidate Independence Conditions (Arrow's Condition 3)

"Of all the axioms, the independence of irrelevant alternatives has been the subject of the most discussion and criticism" Mueller (2003: p. 590). The difficulty in understanding condition 3 (independence of irrelevant alternatives) has caused Arrow, Sen, and Mueller (2003: p. 590-596) to make special explanations of it. We discuss them below.

3.1. Arrow's Further Explanation on Condition 3

For a better understanding of condition 3, Arrow (1983: p. 17) gave a classical example:

Suppose there are three voters and four candidates, x, y, z , and w . Let the weights for first, second, third, and fourth choices be 4, 3, 2 and 1, respectively. Suppose that individual 1 and 2 rank the candidates in the order x, y, z , and w , while individual 3 ranks them in the order z, w, x and y . Suppose that under the given electoral system, x is chosen. Then, certainly, if y is deleted from the ranks of the candidates, the system applied to the remaining candidates should yield the same result, especially since in this case, y is deleted according to the tastes of every individual; but, if y is indeed deleted, the indicated electoral system would yield a tie between x and z .

Arrow pointed out that: " y is after x in everyone's ordering", suggesting that he would strictly abide by the assumptions of condition 3 (for any individual $i \cdots$) to analyze this example. According to Arrow's note (p. 42 footnote), the above example and the suggestion from G. E. Forsythe (National Bureau of Standards) reinforced the importance of this example for the proof of independence of irrelevant candidates. This example was quoted verbatim in Mueller's book *Public Choice* (1979, p. 197).

As for the results of social choice of "before" and "after" y is excluded, according to Arrow's 1963 exposition and his 1983 re-exposition (see Collected Papers of Arrow (1983: p. 16)): "then the social choice made from S is the same", means that the orderings between all alternatives to S for "before" and "after" should be the same. Arrow (1983: p. 16) made an initial statement for condition 3: "alternatively stated, if we consider two sets of individual orderings such that, for each individual, his ordering of those particular alternatives under consideration is the same each time, then we require that the choice made by the society be the same if individual values are given by the first set of orderings as if they are given by the second". He then gave another example (Arrow, 1983: p. 16):

Suppose that an election is held with a certain number of candidates in the field, each individual filing his/her

list of preferences, and one of the candidates dies. Surely, the social choice should be made by taking each of the individual's preference lists, blotting out completely the dead candidate's name, and considering only the orderings of the remaining names in going through the procedure of determining the winner. That is, the choice should be determined according to the preferences of all the individuals without the non-surviving candidate.

3.2. Amartya Sen's Explanation of Condition 3

Sen (1970: p. 37) explained condition 3 (independence of irrelevant alternatives) in this way: "K. J. Arrow requires that social choice over a set of alternatives must depend on the orderings of the individuals only over those alternatives, and not on anything else, e.g., on rankings of 'irrelevant' alternatives that are not involved in this choice".

Sen (1970: p. 37) first gave a popular explanation: "to give an analogy, in an election involving Mr. A and Mr. B, the choice should depend on the voters' orderings of A vis-a-vis B, and not on how the voters rank Mr. A vis-a-vis Lincoln, or Lincoln vis-a-vis Lenin".

Then Sen (1970: p. 910) gave another formal example: let us imagine that there are only three alternatives relevant for our consideration, x , y and z . Let individual 1 rank them in the order stated. Some experiment also reveals the following utility numbers for the three: 200, 110, and 100, respectively, but the numbers are unique up to a linear transformation. There is, thus, no natural correspondence between the utility numbers of the different individuals. A common convention is to attach the value 0 to the worst alternative, and the value 1 to the best. A linear transformation of the original set of numbers, therefore, yields 1 for x , 0.1 for y , and 0 for z . By a similar method of normalization let the utility numbers of two other individuals to be exactly the same, in particular, 1 for y , 0.6 for x , and 0 for z . If the community consists of these three candidates, then x wins over y , as the aggregate utility for x is 2.2, and that for y is 2.1. Next imagine that individuals 2 and 3 revise their opinion of z , an irrelevant alternative in the choice between x and y . They now regard z to be just as good as x . While everyone's attitude to x and y has remained the same, nevertheless the utility numbers of x and y will change for persons 2 and 3. For them, x will now have value 0, while y will continue to get 1. Now y will win over x , as y having an aggregate utility of 2.1 as opposed to x 's 1. The social ordering between x and y is reversed by a change in the position of an irrelevant alternative, z .

For this, Sen (1970: p. 89) made an additional explanation: "any change in utility measures without a change of the individual orderings R_i 's must leave the social ordering R generated by any Social Decided Function (SDF) completely unchanged. This applies, naturally, also to such special cases of a CCR as a SWF and a SDF". Now we are clear: for all i , as long as there is no change in individual ordering R_i (the corresponding ordering relationship "before" and "after" remain the same: $R_i \leftrightarrow R'_i$ or $P_i \leftrightarrow P'_i$ or $I_i \leftrightarrow I'_i$), any changes in utility measurement should not cause any change in the social ordering R .

3.3. Dennis C. Mueller's Explanation of Condition 3

Mueller (2003: p. 592) gave a detailed description of the motivation of Arrow's condition 3: The preceding discussion indicates that an important objective of Arrow in imposing the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom was to eliminate the possibility of individuals being made better off under a collective decision procedure if they did not state their true preference as inputs into the collective decision process. Vickrey (1960: p. 517-519) speculated that immunity to strategic manipulation and satisfying the independence axiom were logically equivalent, and subsequently this insight was rigorously established by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975).

Mueller's introduction to the motivation of Arrow's condition 3 provides us an important tool for understanding the background and aim of Arrow's condition 3, and for accurately mastering this condition and its extension.

"The strategy control" has two different forms: one is that Arrow guards against this situation: "everyone from any given environment S to make the choice should be not a matter of any candidates is in or not in S ". This form allows someone to choose a different voting control environment thereby allowing him/her to influence (or even change) the result of the social choice. We call his kind of situation "the strategy control."

The second form is Dennis C. Muller's expression: Some people give order relation of the "relevant" alternatives unchanged, but to different environment "Independent candidate" given different (preference) order relation—"strategic misstatement".

Mueller (1979: p. 186) also gave a concise explanation of the initial motivation of Arrow's condition 3: "the

social choice between any two alternatives must depend on the orderings of individuals over only these two alternatives, and not their orderings over individual”. On this point, Mueller and Sen’s expositions are the same.

Mueller (1979: p. 197) observed: “one of K. J. Arrow’s objectives for invoking the axiom would seem to be to eliminate the permutation order such as program so that, ‘knowing the social choices made in pair-wise comparisons in turn determines the entire social ordering and therefore the social choice function $C(S)$ for all possible environments’”. Mueller (2003: p. 590) refined this observation by stating: “here K. J. Arrow defends the axiom in terms of limiting attention to feasible alternatives only”.

“Strategic misstatement” in expression form is different from “the strategy control”, but they are essentially the same (see proof in appendix of this article). In this article we only analyze the form of “the strategy control”.

4. Contradiction between Arrow’s Condition 3 and Other Conditions

K. J. Arrow’s conditions are statements of rather esoteric mathematical logic and consequently any demonstration of a contradiction between Arrow’s conditions is very difficult. This study is an attempt to identify and describe a contradiction between Arrow’s conditions. Below is our analysis.

Assume that the candidate set for environment A is S_A , candidate set for environmental B is S_B .

4.1. The Original Intention of Arrow to Establishment Condition 3

4.1.1. A Hypothesis Provisions: $S_A = S_B$

For the necessary and sufficient condition of condition 3, logically it should be that the two optional object collections in different “environments” are equal, namely $S_A = S_B$, that is, in different environments the optional object sets should be the same. On the other hand, if there is an alternative Y_1 of S_B which is not in S_A , let’s examine the necessary and sufficient condition in condition 3. Assume that individual k considers the ordering relationship between Y_1 and Y_2 in S_B to be $Y_1 R_k Y_2$. According to the necessary and sufficient condition, in environment A we still have $Y_1 R'_k Y_2$. But there is no Y_1 in the set S_A of alternatives in environment A, namely the relationship $Y_1 R'_k Y_2$ does not exist. To solve this contradiction, it seems that we should require $S_A = S_B$.

Next, we will illustrate, if we made the regulations $S_A = S_B$, then this will only be a seemingly reasonable voting rule, which does not accord with the practice of voting.

4.1.2. The Existence Value in Arrow’s Condition 3

As mentioned above, Arrow’s condition is based on voting practice. Arrow set up these conditions according to basic, practical problems found in large scale voting. It is not a pure theory or hypothetical research.

Assumption in the vote process makes a rational regulation: $S_A = S_B$. We will then face vote problems in practice: according to Dennis C. Mueller and other scholars’ explanations, further summary of condition 3 is as follows (see Sections 3.1 and 3.2). First, the original intention in establishing conditions 3 was to prevent voting control from becoming “strategic control”, thus the necessary condition of “strategic control” (or strategic misstatement) is $S_A \neq S_B$. The concept of “strategy control” can be further divided into two situations: “strategy control” (to influence choice by manipulating the vote “environment”) and “strategic misstatement” (a behavior by the voter in order to obtain some optional object, or candidate deliberately does not express the real order relationship).

If at any time the “candidate sets” does not change, that is, $S_A = S_B$ always holds, then there is no “strategy control” nor “strategy misstatement”.

But in practical voting we cannot assume that there is no “strategy control” nor “strategy misstatement” behavior.

Secondly, in voting practice often $S_B < S_A$ or $S_B > S_A$. If we only vote in the common optional object set S_g , then it will cause some votes for the legitimate candidate to be rejected and, consequently “social welfare function” will be “illegal”.

The above analysis shows that if the rule $S_A = S_B$ is imposed, then we will lose the existence value of Arrow’s condition 3.

4.1.3. Arrow’s Condition 3 Is Set Up for $S_A \neq S_B$ and for Preventing “Strategic Misstatement”

In the example given by Arrow (1983: p. 5), under the given electoral system, x is chosen, then, certainly, if y is deleted from the ranks of the candidates, the system applied to the remaining candidates should yield the same

result, especially since in this case, y is deleted according to the tastes of every individual; but, if y is in fact deleted, the indicated electoral system would yield a tie between, x and z .

Arrow's concern is that if the situation were different from the above case then the election result would be "dependent on the obviously accidental circumstance of whether a candidate died before or after the date of polling" (Arrow, 1983: p. 16). So Arrow (1983: p. 16) emphasized "the choice to be made among the set of surviving candidates should be independent of the preference of individuals for the non-surviving candidates". In other words, the social choice made in the environments S_A and $S_B = S_A - 1$ ($S_A - 1$ means that one person is not in the candidate set S_A) should be the same.

Dennis C. Mueller explained the purpose of Arrow's condition 3: to avoid election manipulation people use "opportunity choice" to influence election results. The original intention of Arrow's condition 3 is clear. Arrow's condition 3 is a setting up for "candidate set" change in a different "environments" ($S_A \neq S_B$) or preventing "strategic misstatement" (see Diagram 1).

4.1.4. On Background of Arrow's Condition 3

Here, we are focused on the situation $S_A \neq S_B$ and will analyze the more common situations. We will assume that the voting organizers have the ability to predict the outcome in the original S_A ($Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i, \dots, Y_K$), and that some candidates (the number is S_K) will leave S_A in another voting time (corresponding to the environment B).

In the above case, possibly N_1 of the candidates will retire or pass away, N_2 of them will relocate outside of the election district or withdraw from the company organization, etc, and N_3 of them will leave for some other reasons. Let $N_1 + N_2 + N_3 = S_K$. Obviously, under these circumstances, the number of candidates in S_A is greater than that of S_B .

Or take the reverse of the above: for the alternative set S_A in environment A, one can predict that at another election time (for environment B) there will be N_4 new candidates (newly qualified candidates), N_5 active members will relocate into this election district from other districts or company organization, etc. and N_6 candidates will withdraw from election for some other reasons. Let $N_4 + N_5 + N_6 = S_L$, then obviously the number of candidates in S_B is greater than that of S_A .

Thus, from environment A to environment B, the set of candidates S_A becomes $S_B = S_A - S_K$; or from environment B to environment A, the set of candidates S_B becomes $S_A = S_B + S_L$.

In these cases, the voting controller can control the voting to some extent in the seemingly strict voting method. This is what Arrow worried about. Condition 3 allows $S_A \neq S_B$ to prevent the voting controller to affect election results "legally", by using "opportunity choice" (voting arranged in different environments for some purpose).

Here we generalize Arrow's classical example (see Section 3.2). We need the following hypothesis

P: for a vote on activities, possible candidate set in environment A is S_A ($Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i, \dots, Y_K$), and possible candidate set in environment B becomes S_B ($Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i, Y_r, \dots, Y_s$) for several reasons. Obviously, the candidate sets of environment A and that for environment B are different.

It is also possible to have a number of different environment conditions (N) (see Table 2). But, in theory, we only need to analyze two different environments, as we will do latter.

In case $S_A \neq S_B$, the controllers may control voting to some degree (according to a particular purpose by choosing different voting environments) and they are *seemingly legal*, this is one of K. J. Arrow's worries for the case of $S_A \neq S_B$. So K. J. Arrow imposed his condition 3, in order to prevent the vote manipulation using the way of "strategy control" to "legally" influence the voting results.

The purpose of Arrow's condition 3 → to avoid "opportunity choice" → the necessary conditions of "opportunity choice" is $S_A \neq S_B$

or

The purpose of Arrow's condition 3 → to prevent "Strategic misstatement" → the necessary conditions of "strategic misstatement" is $S_A \neq S_B$

Diagram 1. The relationship between Arrow's condition 3 and candidate sets in different environments.

Table 2. (In hypothesis P) Candidate set changes in different environments (for two different “environment” situations).

K. J. Arrow “Social Choice: Personality and Multi Criteria”, example p. 42

The candidate set of environment A (S_A): x, y, z, wThe candidate set of environment B (S_B): x, z, w

Note: Environment B removed candidate y

Generalization K. J. Arrow’s example

The candidate set of environment A (S_A): $Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i, \dots, Y_k$ The candidate set of environment B (S_B): $Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i, Y_r, \dots, Y_s$ Note: Environment B, removed candidates $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_k$; added candidates Y_r, \dots, Y_s

4.1.5. Review of Elements of Arrow’s Condition 3

In order to make the subsequent analysis somewhat easier, below we give a brief review of Arrow’s condition 3.

- 1) The environment of voting is a function related to voting background (how, where, etc.);
- 2) The candidate set refers to a vote on the problem of the “all the candidate” or “every possible solutions summary” in different conditions; the candidate sets may not be all the same;
- 3) Necessary and sufficient condition: for all people voting in different environments (say A and B), the order relationship should remain unchanged, namely the sufficient and necessary conditions should be met: $xR_iy \leftrightarrow xR'_iy$ (R_i represent the order relation in environment A, of arbitrary two optional object, x, y; R'_i represent the order relation in the environment B be given to the same two candidates x, y). Because $S_A \neq S_B$, so the subscript i value ranges of both ends (in the necessary and sufficient condition) are not completely the same. Essentially, the necessary and sufficient condition can only constrain the public optional object set S_g which belongs to a different environment optional object set from S_A and S_B . This is the key, and helps to explain expression’s (I) and (II) of Section 4.2.2;
- 4) Social Order: it deals with the voting results of all voters for each candidate;
- 5) Arrow’s condition 3 requires that in different environments (with A and B, say) of voting, if the necessary and sufficient conditions are satisfied, then all optional objects have the same social order. In other words, for all optional objects of S_A and S_B , the social order in the two situations (environments) must be the same. Let S_N be the “not optional object” set, it’s not an empty set, and S_g the “the optional object” set. Let $S_M = S_g + S_N$, which aligns with Arrow’s condition 3 regulation. When S_g meets the sufficient and necessary conditions, no matter what sequence relationship between the optional objects in S_N and those in S_M , social choice results are not affected by the optional object order relation and are not subject to any influence from changes. This reflects the social choice results for independence for the “independent candidate”. As stated in Sen (1970)’s explanation: “to give an analogy, in an election involving for Mr. A and Mr. B, the choice should depend on the voters’ orderings of A vis-a-vis B, and not on how the voters rank Mr. A vis-a-vis Lincoln, or Lincoln vis-a-vis Lenin”.

4.2. Rule Conflicts for Condition 3

We continue to look at condition 3 and we find it has some rule conflicts: to eliminate “strategy control”. Arrow’s condition 3 reminds us to consider social election in different environments, in which: $S_A \neq S_B$. Condition 3 requires that under the situation $S_A \neq S_B$ (sets of alternatives are S_A and $S_B = S_A - S_k$, or sets of alternatives are S_B and $S_A = S_B + S_k$.) the social election results should be the same. Now we face a rule difficulty² as explained below.

4.2.1. Qualitative Analysis for Conflict of Arrow’s Condition 3 with Unrestricted Domain Condition

“Unrestricted domain” conditions stipulates that a social choice process should accept all the information of voters on every voting. It is said that for alternatives Y_1, Y_2 , we should make full use of all information of all

²In our repeated attempts to construct social welfare functions satisfying K. J. Arrow’s conditions, whenever coming to the intersection of the unrestricted domain condition and the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition when the sets of alternatives in the two “environments” are not all the same, we found that the two conditions cannot be satisfied simultaneously. This motivated us to explore the relationships among K. J. Arrow’s conditions.

voters voting on options Y_1, Y_2 , and that of Y_1, Y_2 each compared with all the other alternatives Y_j, Y_i, \dots Don't allow, abandon or limit parts of voting information (see the following playback window).

Now we investigate the conflict in Arrow's condition 3 with the unrestricted domain condition.

"Irrelevant alternatives" $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ appear only in one environment (such as A) and not in another (such as B). The order relations of "irrelevant alternatives" $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ can drift outside of the sufficient and necessary conditions of condition 3, that is to say, the order relations of $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ within each other, that between the set $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ and the set Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i , and that of Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i within each other can be any given ones, according to the requirements of Arrow's conditions 3, as long as they appear in different environments. When the order relation between "relevant optional objects" remains unchanged, then the Social order relation of "relevant optional objects" in the different environments should be the same.

For our analysis, unless a special section mapping function is specified, the common alternatives are set strictly on the function value S_G . And for setting variables other than in set $S_G(Y_1, \dots, Y_s)$, the function value is fixed. From the point of pure mathematics, such a function exists. But from the public choice's "social welfare function" perspective, it is directly set and the social choice result has nothing to do with the order relation of variables (Y_1, \dots, Y_s) ! Such "social welfare function" essentially repels the order relation information of variables (Y_1, \dots, Y_s) , so this obviously conflicts with "unrestricted domain" condition. In addition, the same social welfare function is used for candidates in and outside the set S_G while taking different "recount rules" respectively, clearly this violates the basic principles of collective (public) voting.

Playback window:

"Condition U (condition of unrestricted domain): the domain of rule f must contain all logically possible combinations of individual orderings." Amartya Sen made further explanation of this condition: "condition U and other conditions have different logical status. Given a preference structure, the other conditions specify or restrict what should be done. However, condition U claims that CCR must be feasible to all possible individual preference structure".

Mueller's domain (unrestricted area) axiom said: "everyone should choose any preference sequence freely, and collective choice process should reflect these preferences via other axioms", but it may need further explanation. Here, the concept of "common alternatives" is not critical. The axiom of domain means that social choice process should allow any possible orderings of the three alternatives X, Y and U . This process is not established via expelling some possible orderings.

4.2.2. Conflict of Condition 3 with Unrestricted Domain Condition (Quantitative Analysis)

The definition of the "Independence of irrelevant alternatives" (K. J. Arrow's condition 3) made from Amartya Sen is more specific: "if for all pairs of alternatives x, y in a subset S of X , $xR_iy \leftrightarrow xR'_iy$, for all i , then $C(S, R)$ and $C(S, R')$ are the same" (see Section 2.3). Arrow's condition 3 requires that: voting in different environments, the social choices $C(S, R)$ and $C(S, R')$ made on "relevant alternatives" set S_g should be the same.

Then we observe voting from the social process point of view (voting technology link), and focus on the three concepts involved in Arrow's condition 3 which are closely linked together: 1) "irrelevant candidate independence conditions"; 2) "unrestricted domain conditions (domain justice)"; 3) Arrow's expression of the result of "irrelevant candidate independence conditions": "then the social choice made from S is the same whether the individual orderings are R_1, R_2 or R_1, R_2 " (see Table 1: condition of the expression of 3).

We express Arrow's explanation of his classical example of (see this article page 5) "irrelevant candidate independence conditions" using mathematical language as follows:

According to Arrow's classical example, the voting function (Social welfare function, or functional) in environment A is $F(Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i, Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K)$.

Later on in environment B, some candidate(s) passed away, they (denoted by $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$) will be excluded from the set of alternatives. Then the voting function (Social welfare function, or functional) in environment B can be written as $F'(Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i)$.

We input the order relationship between candidates into the voting function F and F' and then output the results of the voting (social order). Arrow's condition 3 requires that when the sufficient and necessary condition $xR_iy \leftrightarrow xR'_iy$ is met, then the following identity is established according to Arrow's requirements: voting results in environments A and B are always the same: "then the social choice made from S is the same". According to the definition of social welfare function (or functional³), we get the following equation:

$$F(Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i, Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K) \equiv F'(Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i) \quad (1)$$

³Functional domain for a set of functions (such as order relation set), and the range is the set of real Numbers or a subset of the set of real Numbers, the promotion, that is to say, is from function space to number field mapping.

In expression (1), F is the voting result (ordering relation set) about the alternatives of all the voters in environment A , while F' is the voting result (ordering relation set) of the alternatives in environment B . The right side of expression (1) only contains variables Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i , so actually expression (1) is an eternal equation of the social order on the “relevant” candidate set S_g (where the candidates are Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i).

As mentioned in Section 4.1.5: the candidates $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ are outside the “relevant candidate” set S_g , they are free variables, and do not suffer from the constraint of the sufficient and necessary conditions of Arrow’s condition 3, every voter could arbitrarily give the ordering relationships about $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ with each other, and $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ with Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i .

Let Y be the order relationships among Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i ; while X is the order relationship between every pair within the set $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ and between the sets $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ and Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i .

Then (1) is simplified as (2):

$$F(Y, X) \equiv F(Y) \quad (2)$$

From the social (collective) voting perspective, at both sides of Equation (1) (or expression (2)), F and F' follow the same rule; Analysis of the expression (1) (or expression (2)) based on mathematical principles reveals that F and F' are the same function.

The condition of independence of irrelevant candidates requires that expression (1) (or (2)) be an eternal equation. In expression (2), X has no definition.

But, Arrow’s conditions for expressions (1) and (2) meet the “unrestricted domain” condition, too. To see this, for expression (1) (or (2)) to be an eternal equation, we have to apply a special limit to the order relationship of optional object $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ between each other and the order relationship between the sets $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ and Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i . For example, let the values of the functions of (1) (or (2)) have nothing to do with the order relationship of $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ or with each other and those with $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ or with each other; or allow expression (1) (or (2)) to only adopt the ordering information of relevant candidates set $S_g(Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i)$, and reject the ordering information of the relationship of irrelevant candidates which is outside of S_g . Then we have the following results:

First, expression (1) (or (2)) shows that the ordering relationships among the “irrelevant candidates” $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ which is outside of the relevant set S_g , and the ordering relationships among $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ with other candidates are all ineffective—now we restrict the ordering relationships of some candidates, thus the results conflicts with the condition of unrestricted domain.

Secondly, we may assume that the order relationship of “irrelevant alternatives” $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ between each other and the order relationship of $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ with Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i , as well as between each other are all effective. But this order relationship is not bound by the sufficient and necessary condition of condition 3. In different environments, they can, within order relationships R , P , and I , form any different combinations, because the order relationships are effective. The order relation for voting results (social order) must produce substantial effects. Thus, the social choice $F'(Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i)$ in environment B (which includes candidates Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i) must not be equal to the social choice $F(Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i, \dots, Y_K)$ in environment A (includes candidates $Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i, Y_{i+1}, \dots, Y_K$), and consequently $F'(Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i) \neq F(Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i, \dots, Y_K)$.

And Arrow’s condition 3 still requires that even in different environments the social order must remain the same. This is clearly a paradox.

“The strategy control” and “strategic misstatement” are seemingly different, but they are essentially the same (see **Appendix**).

5. The Proposed Optional Solutions

According to the above analysis, there is contradiction in Arrow’s condition 3, but the essence of the meaning of this condition is difficult to understand. According to the essential requirement 3 (with Dennis C. Mueller’s explanation for example) of Arrow’s conditions, we can design some easier-to-understand informal (rather than formal) conditions to meets Arrow’s conditions (including 3 conditions) of social welfare function. These informal conditions agree with those of Arrow’s in nature.

5.1. Alternative Object Collection “Maximize” (to Prevent the “Strategy of Manipulation”)

For every important (significant) collective vote activities, through demonstration, institutionally constructed to determine the activity of a vote within the time span for possible “maximize” alternative set of objects in differ-

ent “voting environment”, alternative sets of objects are the same (unchanged), so Arrow’s classical example of “strategy of manipulation” will not happen (if within this time span, there is “nothing to do” alternative object “died”, then at least for the alternative object organizers, this is “irrelevant” to those “relevant” alternative object result of the vote, i.e., the vote of people is dependent on all voting), we will request the “death” of the candidate objects be included in the original collection of objects (to vote for different “alternative unrelated object” is not the same) and to maximize the voter groups information with “hidden” death of the candidate object; On the other hand, we inform all voters to vote in accordance with their own original ideas, so there is no “strategic misrepresentation”.

For the voters, as they do not know what specific social welfare function will be used, they do not know if they should increase or decrease the “irrelevant alternative object” on voting (election), therefore, manipulation will have no effect

If we still suspect that voters might do “strategic misrepresentation” in the voting process, then we vote in accordance with the following program design process.

5.2. Set up a “Social Welfare (Quasi-) Library” Program (to Prevent the “Strategic Misrepresentation”)

In theory, prevent the “strategic misrepresentation” is the most difficult task, because it is entirely a psychological behavior to voters. We have psychological and behavioral control in the voting system, which will prevent “strategy misrepresentation” to happen. Clearly, the ordinary institutional constraints will fail!

Social Welfare (quasi-) function: that does not satisfy Arrow’s condition in the form of the three requirements, but meet Arrow’s other conditions (in the form of other requirements) of the welfare function. In this article we call such function social welfare benefits (quasi-) function.

5.2.1. The Basic Idea of Social Welfare (Quasi-) Library

In public examination, if there is only one set of questions, some candidates may “guess” the answers in advance; if there are many sets of questions consisting of a test database, the test organizers randomly selected a set of questions, then the “guess” behavior is basically useless. Following this line of thought, we construct a number of social welfare benefits (quasi-) function consisting of (quasi-) library. The inspiration is that: for an intended “strategic misrepresentation” in the vote, if there are multiple social welfare (quasi-) function options, let the actual social welfare (quasi-) function be kept strictly confidential until all the voters finished their vote. In this way, the effect of “strategic misrepresentation” can be reduced to the minimal level.

5.2.2. “Constitutional” Principle of Social Voting

The pioneers Buchanan & Tullock (1965: p. 56-58) in their long-term studies of social welfare real-valued function and tireless efforts to promote social selection process “unanimous consent” proposed some guidelines: “choose their own decision rule in a group selection... one way to avoid the methodology seems hopeless predicament, is to introduce some sort of unanimity or completely consensual constitutional rules on the ultimate level of decision-making.”

“Constitutional” principle of social voting (see the related discussions of Buchanan): refers to the highest standards of social voting. From the social vote “constitutional” principle point of view, Kenneth J. Arrow’s conditions of “agreed postulate, non-authoritarian postulate, transitive postulate, range (unrestricted area) axiom is the basic principle of social selection process apparently” are “constitutional” principle of social voting.

In addition, assume that all of Arrow’s conditions of the social welfare function (so it must be non-unique) are met, we will then face the following basic questions:

Arrow’s social welfare function has a number of conditions, while voting for the same sequence of individual variables (sequence), different social welfare function will give different results of the same social order. So, in a voting process, which social welfare function is the only fair and just to use? Obviously, an organizer’s subjective choice of social welfare function will be unable to avoid the suspicion of “strategic manipulation”.

It seems from the point of fair and just principles of practice that, for any community (collective) vote, the social welfare function should be randomly selected from a collection of social welfare functions.

Therefore, the “constitutional” principle of social voting should include voting methods (social welfare function) of the random principle.

5.3. Preventing the “Strategic Misrepresentation”

“Strategic misrepresentation” often “misrepresented” the voter who knows in advance the specific form of the social welfare function, then “exercise” in advance to determine what “strategic misrepresentation” to get the desired effect.

If the specific social welfare (quasi-) function is not announced before the vote, then the “strategic misrepresentation” should not happen. A mechanism should be set up under community supervision by a public authority to randomly select a social welfare (quasi-) function from the “social welfare (quasi-) function library”, and each individual votes with the selected social welfare (quasi-) function to obtain a social voting results. This can minimize the “strategic misrepresentation” (while preventing the “strategy of manipulation”), or with (using probability and statistics, hypothesis testing and other auxiliary method) “strategic misrepresentation” controlled within acceptable level.

6. Epilogue

As Roger d. Congleton, the successor of James M. Buchanan, mentioned (Congleton, 2002): “like other science, there are many open questions in the field of public choice, like floating-debris in ‘swamp’. Their current foundation is somewhat sufficient; however, when making further exploration, we can find that the publicly known research and its foundation are not so sufficient”. That is to say that some of the theories in social choice are still immature. The original works of Duncan Black, James McGill Buchanan, Kenneth J. Arrow, G. Tullock, Mancur Olson, Amartya K. Sen, Dennis C. Mueller, etc. created great beginning in the theory of social choice, such theory looks like finished construction of a large estate project, but there are still lots of works need to be done for its perfection: regional planning and commerce, educational facilities, residential property management, building area road beautification, building internal decoration, water, electricity, gas facilities installation... etc.

Arrow’s condition is the basic tool for the judgment of social welfare function. Understanding and analysis of these conditions will enable us to have clear concept in this filed. Analysis and exploration of the underlying sub conditions and is a way to better the development of this judgment tool. For it to be more conveniently applied, this has obvious important theoretic and practical values. We hope that this article can raise the attentions of more scholars to join the explanation of Arrow’s conditions, and to show their better and accurate understandings of these conditions.

7. Final Conclusion

It is not that there is no social welfare function which does not satisfy Arrow’s conditions, rather that there are contradictions and conflicts in Arrow’s conditions (“unrestricted domain condition”, “independence of irrelevant alternatives condition” and “Pareto condition”)! Thus, we should re-check, discuss and revise Arrow’s conditions!

Funding

This article is supported by the National Social Science Fund, P. R. China. Grant No. 06BZZ027.

The results won the Sun Yat-sen University third phase funding of the “985 project” (the study of contemporary Chinese government and political significant transformation project).

This research was funded by the prestigious funding project “Theoretical Research in Guangdong” (Approval number: 1306).

References

- Arrow, K. J. (1951). *Social Choice and Individual Values*. New Heaven, CT: Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
- Arrow, K. J. (1970). *Social Choice and Individual Values* (2nd ed.). New Heaven, CT: Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
- Arrow, K. J. (1983). *Social Choice and Justice*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Buchanan J. M., & Tullock, G. (1965) *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Congleton, R. (2002). The Future of Public Choice. *The Sixth International Conference in Public Choice*, Japan, 21 July 2002.

- Mueller, D. C. (1979) *Public Choice*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Mueller, D. C. (2003) *Public Choice* (3th ed.). London: Cambridge University Press.
- Sen, A. K. (1970) *Collective Choice and Social Welfare*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Vickrey, W. (1960). Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 74, 507-535.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1884349>

Appendix

1) “Strategic mistake expression” concept

We can use mathematical language to turn “strategic mistake expression” into a general statement: suppose that S_g is a “related” candidate set while S'_g is an “Irrelevant” candidate set; K is the real order relations by voters for all optional objects in the environment A ; K' is the “conscious” “strategic mistake states” that order relations by a voter to some optional object in environment B (Strategic mistake expression); and, $C(S_g, K)$ and $C(S_g, K')$ are the orderly relationship sets that the (some) voter gives to the candidates in S_g respectively. The set (S'_g, K) and $C(S'_g, K)$ are, the orderly relationship set that a voter may give to the candidates in S'_g and the candidates between S_g and S'_g , respectively. “Strategic mistake expression” can now be stated as follows: $C(S_g, K) \equiv C(S_g, K')$ and $C(S'_g, K) \neq C(S'_g, K')$.

2) Analysis to “strategic mistake expression” facing contradiction

We assume that:

a) In environments A and B , all the voting order relationships among the optional objects Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i are the same (the provisions of the necessary and sufficient conditions). We use $C1$ to denote this condition; In environment A , the order relationships among $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ and that between the sets $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ and Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i , are fixed. We use $C2$ to denote this condition;

b) In the environment B , part of the voters are endowed by $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ about their mutual order relationships among each other and that between the sets $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ and Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i , “painstakingly against their wills,” which is the “strategic misstatement”.

Given the above our analysis is as follows:

K. J. Arrow’s condition 3 requires that no matter what “strategic misstatement”, the mutual order relationships among $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ and between the sets $Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$ and Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i should keep unchanged, and so the following equation must be true:

$$F(C_1, C_2) \equiv F(C_1, Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K) \quad (3)$$

The left hand side of (3) represents social voting results of relevant optional objects Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i . in the environment A . The right hand side of (3) represents social voting results of the optional objects $Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i, Y_{i+1} \dots Y_K$. in environmental B .

Therefore, in essence, “the strategy control” and “strategic misstatement” will face the same contradiction (see Section 4.2.2 (Quantitative analysis)).

Political Change in Jalisco, Mexico

Alberto Arellano Ríos

El Colegio de Jalisco, Zapopan, México

Email: aarellano@coljal.edu.mx, betoarellano14@hotmail.com

Received 15 November 2014; accepted 27 November 2014; published 13 January 2015

Copyright © 2015 by author and Scientific Research Publishing Inc.

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY).

<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>



Open Access

Abstract

This paper analyzes the political change in Jalisco, Mexico. It is a panoramic work that evaluates a democratic transition at the subnational level. The work focuses on the structures of authority of the local political regime. The analytical framework used is the one proposed by Leonardo Morlino. It analyzes the document and describes the political and institutional framework of the governments divided and unified, the relationship between the powers, among other aspects.

Keywords

Political Change, Transition, Democratization, Jalisco

1. Introduction

This article outlines and discusses the political change in Jalisco. It basically focuses on the structures of authority and makes an assessment of the democratic journey in the western Mexican State. The study period covers the years from 1995 to 2015. The question that articulates this text focuses on answering the following questions: in which situation is political change towards democratization; what has changed or what remains in the political regime of Jalisco; what balances that may be democratizing cruise.

The argument that articulates this document indicates that while it is true that the political change towards democratization has stagnated since structural problems persisted and institutional design, a triumph, although slight and insignificant to many, is the ability to remove and move ruler class in the structures of authority by means of the vote. This essay focuses on the structures of authority. The “political” lies and limits on this part simply by a heuristic strategy. That is why this article rests on three pillars. The first is an analytical and conceptual reflection of political change in the structures of authority of the regime. Then seeks provide clarity or make explicit the logical sense of local political change based on the conclusions made by other researchers for. Finally, from the evidence shown and what sustains this chapter, analyze the structures of authority.

2. Political Change in the Structures of Authority

To analyze and understand the processes of political change, political science made some concepts such as tran-

sition to democracy or political change. And the Mexican case tried to embed in these debates and analysis schemes; but it was Merino (2003) who pointed out that our transition, unlike the international experience, was not agreed but voted. There was not a total rupture with the former regime in the Mexican transition as it consisted of transformation process in the game rules and the gradual recovery of the institutions. Therefore, the Mexican transition was slow and progressive, based on political openness, but with great risk to stagnate and possibilities of authoritarian regression (see Woldenberg, 2012; Merino, 2003)¹.

But how to analytically understand the change in the political regime and why focus only on the structures of authority. To start has to be said that the decision is heuristic, and the framework of understanding is that Leonardo Morlino us formula (Morlino, 1985). Your proposal is a reaction to the way how the processes of political change were understood previously. Critical Morlino instituted models in that its proximity to the theory of political development which in turn was then as a framework a systemic functionalism, theories of modernization and the political culture. Morlino criticisms to those prospects filed in its signaling that even if they wanted to become embedded as theories of intermediate-range, according to the terms of Robert Merton (1984), were still general proposals and macro.

In this sense, Morlino elaborates a proposal, yes generalization, but according to the more suitable to explain the change to the interior of the system. His proposal sought to: a) escape determinism social, economic, and cultural; b) placed in the middle of the macro and micro theory; c) obtain a concept that was efficient and clear in the flat empirical; d) use the data, even the historical purposes explanatory (Morlino, 1985: p. 50-80).

What Leonardo Morlino questioned the way to understand the political process so far, was the historic anchor of the concepts and that the category of political development was not the same or equal to political modernization. Based on this premise, political change, political development and political modernization are not comparable (Morlino, 1985: p. 28-29). Precision were not only conceptual but a pointing, more clear in a later work, that political change also occurs and is not in the direction of democracy to an authoritarian and totalitarian regime (see Morlino, 2005). Then then, made the previous accuracy, political change is equivalent in exchange for or in the political system (Morlino, 2005: p. 30), and indicates what a process or a movement without lineal valuation issues as it was the transition to democracy.

Done, the consequent problem consisted in setting the characteristics of the political system. So Morlino differed three areas or pillars which is supported politically, and therefore space system to observe changes and the continuities in their different shades and grades. The first pillar and of the political system is the political community, the second political regime and the third authority. In the political community manifested the ideologies, values and beliefs, dominant or competitive situation, as well as persons or active groups and some structures intermediate (not always present in the political community). For what have the political regime if it is true that in this area are expressed ideology, values, key beliefs or in competitive situation, in this space and clearer express norms or rules, decision-making structures and the structures of authority. Finally, this distinction of the parts of the political system led to Morlino, to appreciate that the third pillar is the level of authority and they distinguish the titular roles and interaction of the actors from the positions which are occupied in the structures of authority and decision-making (Morlino, 1985: p. 45-46).

In this sense, or a regime change is a frequent phenomenon of great importance that can affect all political systems. It is a change that is often seen in the historical processes and of great importance as it has repercussions in the lives of millions of people (Morlino, 1985: p. 81). In addition, emphatic Morlino says that the political regime is not equal to the political system. Also the values, doctrines and ideologies only can be considered important when they can count on available data. In short, political analysis, the object study of change is the rule and not the system because the system comes from the scheme but undoubtedly affects it, hence, the more frequent and palpable change occurs in the intermediate structures (parties and political groups) and the authority: occupying subjects, roles and periods, and of course all this affecting political orientation so there is sense and direction in the political system (Morlino, 1985: p. 81).

In short, in the previous framework this chapter display political change in Jalisco and tries to analyze the transition from one political regime to another and see what changes or remains either what or which political

¹The empirical basis on which it was built was and the political change had the historical experiences of countries in the Mediterranean Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe where a totalitarian or authoritarian by one more or less democratic regime was replaced as sustenance. Thus, the political changes in the world were conceived and interrelated either on the shaft of a great national transformation as raised Manuel Alcántara, a political transition as Samuel Huntington, Juan Linz, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, or in the variant of a great political change national as Leonardo Morlino or Adam Przeworski (Acosta, 2000: p. 20).

system has become. It is true that the objective of the proposal for Morlino is to develop taxonomies, classifications, see the variables, indicators of the degree of democracy and authoritarianism in perspective compared to analyzing national political systems. But applied to the case of Jalisco its analytical framework has two intentions: 1) allow conceptual precision, and 2) heuristically delimit parts of the political system will be analyzed. However, before doing so is necessary to realize the sense that political change in Jalisco has had according to several investigations, and in the third party conduct an assessment of the political change and take the pulse in your path towards democratization.

3. The Sense of Political Change in Jalisco

In the study of the change and the Mexican political transition there was two large positions to understand and explain it: the first was linked to electoral issues while the other is linked to how political processes and transformations of the regime are linked to wider social and economic processes. In this way, we can say that if the first perspective relates to the legitimacy of origin, the second cares about the legitimacy in the exercise of power. We also can say that if the electoral question corresponded to a package of problems first generation, the second involved being attentive to the problems of second generation in Mexican democracy (Aziz, 2003: p. 99-121).

As for the Jalisco case we can say that it has tried to insert in the former social and historical context, which resulted that the academic community of Jalisco not only take the pulse of political change at different times, but be aware of the nature and location of the political transition in general. So when the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) won the governorship of Jalisco in 1995, all the city halls of the Area Metropolitan of Guadalajara and other major State, as well as the majority in the local Congress, Jorge Alonso settled at that time which had taken a pragmatic and non-programmatic alternation in Jalisco (Alonso, 1995: p. 205-208). This since the PAN victory was unexpected and such situation did not have a clear government program that actually meets in a profound change of the political system.

The distance the consensus says that the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) lost because the regime in Jalisco has worn off at four levels: at first when the traditional channels of participation (corporatism) made crisis; the second crisis occurred in the non-competitive party system; the third crisis arose when there was a mismatch between the demands and the inability of the institutions for resolving them; the last one in the break given the political pact that claimed the elite that had monopolized power (Gómez, 1997: p. 182).

Already installed in the Government, the PAN, and soon to observe their performance, led to disappointment citizen, which quickly buried the idea of that the alternation as the essential of the transition policy towards democratization and as central vector of explanation, had run its course. It was so, and starting from the Jalisco case, which came to hold that in Mexico has raised a political change which not resulted in a change in the making of public policy, that is, that arise a political change without change in the form of formulating public policies (Acosta, 2004: p. 54-55).

The second Government of Francisco Ramírez, PAN marked clearly the disappointment with the electoral process so far lived. It was noted that it could have governments elected democratically, but this did not mean that Governments were. And it was the third Government PAN, that of Emilio González, who sealed as definitive proof that the formal and electoral element which democracies use to legitimize himself was insufficient. In this way, and seen as a political medium-term, and prior to the 2012 elections process, the intermediate elections of July 2009 were a cut of box alternation in 1995. In the 2009 election Jalisco evaluated a way to govern and not a Government in yes (Arellano, 2011b).

It is true that the election results and joints realize changes in the political positions of the political regime, but a more comprehensive assessment has been that the political change in Jalisco has been cut short or intermittent since there is a "partidocracia" that violates democracy (Aziz & Alonso, 2009). There is a monopoly shared between political parties (Guillén, 2005), or that it is also cut short, intermittent or limited due to the existence of a field of power that opposes its democratization (Arellano, 2011). However, a panoramic analysis of the changes in the structure of authority, as well as of the institutional relationships established in the political regime in the period of 1995 to 2012, indicates that democratic and at the same time changes there are authoritarian inertia in political system.

But the most significant balance of political change and the cycle that closed in 2012 and that is not limited to one political party in particular is that the alternation was emptied of democratizing element (Alonso, 2010: p.

245-254). Thus, it is valid to Gaetano Mosca quote where it says that in the process of political transition does not change the fact that there is a political class but its quality, its composition, formation and organization (Mosca, 1984: p. 11). Therefore, closes a cycle in the part more visible and important for the political regime: the Executive. The PAN leaves this position to open up another stage of PRI Government. But rather than get into the Constitution of a political class be observed generally the positions in the structures of authority.

4. The Structures of Authority

In Jalisco, as in much of the country, a long political transition was linked to the phenomenon of party alternation where the PRI lost positions, already out in local councils, congresses, and Executive. These, besides being the most clear and evident in the structures of political regime, are the places where the opening is and political pluralism. In this sense, voted “transition” (Merino, 2005) placed the electoral vector as the nodal element with which analyzed political change towards democratization. But once located the alternation in their fair dimension is observed, on the one hand, that it was in the simple release and circulation of the political class in a formally democratic regime and, on the other hand, as an element that might explain the sanction to the performance of Governments and political actors.

Therefore must be considered how the election results mean positions and establishing an institutional framework. This framework certainly conditions the institutional performance of Governments, but to be the political system of Jalisco a presidential regime, it is important to take into account this position and its relationship with the local Congress.

4.1. The Electoral Vein

Roughly in the process of political change in Jalisco, and valued on the electoral side, you can see clearly that during the period from 1979 to 2012 was the transit of a hegemonic party to a moderate multi-party system; before had gone through a system that tended to bipartisanship in practice (see Cortés & Ortiz, 2007). In the graph it can be noted that hegemonic party system says final goodbye and the bread is important spaces of the structures of authority.


In 1995 clearly wins the State Executive, the mayoralties of the Guadalajara metropolitan area and other major of the State as well as the majority in the local Congress. The pragmatic and non-programmatic alternation (Alonso, 1995: p. 204) which was driven by the events of the explosions of April 22, public insecurity, the murder of Cardinal Juan Jesús Posadas Ocampo, the mistake of December 1994 with the economic crisis that unleashed, among other circumstances arose.

In 1995 clearly wins the State Executive, the mayors of the area should be noted that the results which look at the transition and evolution of the party system are those of the election of deputies by relative majority. This is because such results, in addition to following the premise that the electoral system tries to convert votes into seats, their percentages determined the integration of the local Congress by two principles: that of relative majority and proportional representation. On this basis, it is necessary to point out that, in 1995, national action won the 53.9% of the vote in the election of Deputies. Since then it has not passed the threshold of 40% of the votes cast. This appreciation same extends to the PRI (see Figure 1).

That is why the 1995 election should be considered as the precipitous fall of the PRI in electoral terms and that the change in the political regime has had a connotation towards democratization in the political community. In contrast, the choice of 2009 and 2012 are manifestations of a process of political change, but now because it closes a cycle of PAN in the Executive Governments: political change was then limited to an important position in the structures of authority (Figure 1).

This same may indicate a value meaning that political change as a process towards democratization stagnated or has been limited to institutional and formal part of the political regime, and in the worst cases they must deal with who the positions of authority. The change is then confined to a matter of circulation and renewal of the political class: an important element in formal but insufficient democracy. The challenge is that democratization is moved to entire political system in two ways: in the same political regime toward greater democratization incorporating citizen participation in terms of true and greater places of decision, and in the political community with really build ideas, values, and more democratic practices.

The political struggle for positions in the structures of authority was limited real and effective politics between two forces. This happens with clarity in the period encompassing the elections from 1997 to 2009. In it,



Source: own elaboration. On the average of the PRI are referred to the Alliance in 2009 and 2012. *: the PRD considers the results of left-wing parties that preceded it.

Figure 1. Election of deputies by the principle of relative majority (1979-2012).

there are variations and subtle changes in the electoral preference between the PRI and the PAN, but is PAN who won most of the time, that yes with a minimum advantage. In the election for deputies in 2003 alone there were a “technical draw” having both forces policy 39% of electoral support. However, we can say that the choice of 2009 in 2012, and in real terms, what can be seen is that these two political forces have lost electoral support significantly (**Figure 1**).

With regard to the municipal level, it should be noted that up until the 2012 election, the only municipality not of the 125 existing in Jalisco, and that he did not know the alternation, it was la San Cristóbal de la Barranca. But already seated in the local political system, the alternation is confined to element relay and “turnismo” in the political system. The case of the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara is an example of this. In this way, it is necessary to make the election question aside to be more attentive to the results or consequences that the electoral system in the structures of authority of the political regime. This is why you first sketch the institutional framework that is conditioned on the political regime.

4.2. The Conditioned Institutional Framework

Be aware of the positions of political actors and the political parties, shall take into account not only the established framework but the way how must condition relations between actors and political institutions. Therefore you will be facing the line of the development of the regime and of much of the political system. Then the analysis is located on the other side of the issue: the positions actually obtained and occupied in the structures of authority of the political regime. It will be realizing some initial estimations of its institutional performance, and on this flank of the political regime is there anything settle, an element or structural presidential government system problem: the existence of divided government.

Alberto Aziz had already noted that in the Mexican political transition took place first alternation and then the phenomenon of divided government (**Aziz, 1996**). And in the case of Jalisco, and as a result of the process voted transition made democracy (**Merino, 2005**), it is clear that from 1995 to 2015, in the seven legislative periods in the congress of Jalisco and its relationship with the Executive Branch (see **Table 1**), in four divided government institutional environment and two of no unified Government. Divided government is usually, and framed in the presidential regime where there is separation of powers, the situation in which the party of the executive does not have absolute majority in the congress (50% + 1 of the seats). But more accurately, Javier Hurtado says that divided government is:

Table 1. Relationship executive-legislative in Jalisco (1995-2015).

	Alberto Cárdenas (PAN)		Francisco Ramírez (PAN)		Emilio González (PAN)		Aristóteles Sandoval (PRI)
Legislature	LIV	LV	LVI	LVII	LVIII	LIX	LX
Type of government	Unified	Divided	Unified	Divided	Not unified	Divided	Divided
The party of the governor seats	24	19	21	19	20	17	17
Seats of the opposition	13	21	19	21	20	22	22

Source: Own elaboration.

... aquél en que la mayoría de la cámara pertenece a un partido y el presidente (o gobernador) a otro. Y al contrario, cuando un partido pose el control, tanto del ejecutivo como del legislativo, unicameral o bicameral, se habla de gobierno unificado, mientras que cuando nadie cuenta con mayoría (absoluta) congressional se habla de gobiernos no unificados (Hurtado, 1998: p. 46).

Then a unified government is the situation in which the party of the governor has half plus one of the seats. But in the case of Jalisco to speak of a government not unified, and not having a bicameral system, refers to the situation in which the party of the governor has half of the seats and the opposition as a whole the other half. There is then a tie situation.

Thus, PAN (1995-2012) had been in the period of governments, and according to Acosta (2011: p. 195), “a law of alternation bronze”. This is when I was in game the election of governor of the Executive party had majority in the local congress, which was seen as a great triumph. However, in the mid-term election there was inevitably a defeat which was seen as a punishment. This act ceases to operate in the 2012 election, when now the PRI as a winning party in the position of the executive did not obtain the majority that in the case of the PAN Governments rose during the first half of the executive management (see Table 1).

No doubt this situation would that in the context of divided governments arose between the executive and the legislature the intensification of the use of the veto in our political system. This idea expressed with clarity, would indicate that this mechanism will increase in the second half in the period of the Executive. However, in this there were faults (see Arellano, 2011a).

In the Jalisco experience it came to pass, and view this relationship within the framework of the confrontation or paralysis that conditions the government divided and as a consequence of the election results, which certainly veto appeared with greater glow in the second half of the reign of Alberto Cárdenas, when it vetoed six decrees or laws. But the relationship between divided government and veto is not so convincing, since then the Francisco Ramírez vetoed the same number of laws or decrees in a context of unified government. It is true that Ramírez Acuña vetoed provisions on nine occasions laws and decrees in a context of divided government and therefore greater in quantity, but it is striking that the veto is not correlated with the divided government. The case of the government of Emilio González could seal this appreciation when in a context of unified government that was raised in the first half of his government, vetoed on eight occasions various laws or decrees of the congress of Jalisco (see Table 2).

In Jalisco the premise that the establishment of a divided government could intensify the use of the veto by the Executive was not clear and convincing. The brief historical and social experience was not for institutional explanations of causal type, either which was not in a linear vision of the integration of the congress, discipline or party indiscipline as permanent and solid factors explaining it, but that they were other factors and characteristics of the political field of Jalisco. The challenge was to locate the structural and cyclical elements of what really was at stake (see Arellano, 2011a: p. 57; Arellano, 2011c: p. 47-90).

It is important to bear in mind this institutional framework and add another. In the previous logic should be placed equally positions and the control of the municipalities of the metropolitan area as the territory where establishing the political arena. These positions are important because control of the capital and in the municipality of Zapopan, or another and at times was that of Tlajomulco de Zuñiga, conditioned, along with the control of the Executive and obtained positions at the congress of Jalisco, a context that could explain different joints.

It is significant to note that during 15 years of rule PAN in the Jalisco capital (1995-2009), and then in the case of the triumph of the PRI in 2009-2012, recent history indicates that the last three governors have been

Table 2. Decrees vetoed by the executive (1998-2012).

Governor	Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez	Francisco Ramírez Acuña	Emilio González Márquez	Total	
Legislature	LV	LVI	LVII	LVIII [*]	
Number of vetoes	6	6	9	8	29

Source: Own elaboration. *Data considered until December 2012.

Table 3. The control of the municipalities in the metropolitan area of Guadalajara (1995-2015).

Political party	Alberto Cárdenas (PAN)		Francisco Ramírez (PAN)		Emilio González (PAN)		Aristóteles Sandoval (PRI)
	1995-1997	1998-2000	2001-2003	2004-2006	2007-2009	2010-2012	2012-2015
PAN	Guadalajara, Zapopan, Tlaquepaque, Tonalá, Tlajomulco de Zúñiga, El Salto	Guadalajara, Zapopan, Tlaquepaque	Guadalajara, Zapopan, Tlaquepaque, El Salto	Guadalajara, Tlajomulco de Zúñiga, El Salto	Guadalajara, Zapopan, Tlaquepaque, Tonalá, Tlajomulco de Zúñiga		
PRI		Tonalá, Tlajomulco de Zúñiga, El Salto	Tonalá, Tlajomulco de Zúñiga	Zapopan, Tlaquepaque, Tonalá	El Salto	Guadalajara, Zapopan, Tlaquepaque, Tonalá, El Salto	Guadalajara, Zapopan, Tlaquepaque, Tonalá, El Salto
PRD-PT						Tlajomulco de Zúñiga	
Movimiento Ciudadano							Tlajomulco de Zúñiga

Source: Consulted in December 2012.

mayors of Guadalajara (Francisco Ramírez, Emilio González and Aristóteles Sandoval), so this role is a very important incentive for the politician who wants to be Governor previously attempt to be the Mayor of Guadalajara in the three years prior to when the State Executive is elected.

In addition to that in the period of 2010-2015, bread did not obtain any Mayor of the municipalities that make up the metropolitan area. For a long time political competition was between the PAN and the PRI. While in 1995 the PAN swept in the 1995 election, in the period ranging from 1998 to 2009 electoral processes of high competition between both political institutes for control of metropolitan councils were raised, and it is clear unless the PAN lost the municipality of Guadalajara. The situation changed when in the 2009 election bread was almost relegated from the metropolitan scene. The PRI took during two periods (2010-2015) control of five councils among them on the capital of the state, as well as a political group with the seal of different minority parties in the two periods concerned, the control of the municipality of Tlajomulco de Zúñiga (see [Table 3](#)).

5. Conclusion

Al delineates that the institutional framework can be glimpsed which starts a cycle of political openness of political regime since the 1980s. The choice of 1995 is a landmark date in local political alternation and he wanted to equate with the 2012 but it is not. It was confirmed that the electoral element of change is nodal but at the same time it is part of a broader process in which even installing a formally democratic regime in the line of the government performance is more important.

However, the 2012 elections in which the PRI won the Executive closed cycle PAN governments, hence, its meaning. While it is true that the PAN governed the state for 18 years, it was not a period of political party. Governmental actors and political parties have coincidences in his move which places change in aspects such as ideas, values, and practices that are not democratic, ergo it is concluded that the political shift to democracy has stalled. In this part of the political regime, real change is still far away. We are in a situation in which democratizing tendencies and authoritarian inertia are given; this is the paradox (see [Aziz, 2013: p. 41-62](#)).

There were also visible elements of change in the political regime in Jalisco. Changes in the formal rules of play were raised and positioned the mobility and greater competition in the positions in the authority of the local government structure. The most important and visible changes were a) travelling a hegemonic party to a multi-party system; b) that the political regime set up divided governments; c) that the alternation was now a simple relieved. Though dimly, in the end you can see that the voters reward and punish political forces. Therefore, you value the government performance. In the end, it is concluded that voters do not have any owner. In this way, voters don't have any owner to penalize and reward the incumbent Government. But the fact that voters are not owned by anyone is best understood when making a crossover vote. This determines that there is fragmentation of power in the political arena. The challenge now is to be more aware of government performance, which is the other side of the coin in the processes of political change. And although the electoral element of the Mexican transition is criticized for the disappointments, be emphatic in pointing out that there is no political democracy without free elections. Periodic and reflecting competition is not possible to speak of a formally democratic regime. This is the change which should be valued and defend.

References

- Acosta, A. (2000). Cambio Institucional. In L. Baca et al. (Eds.), *Léxico de la política* (pp. 19-22). México City: FCE-FLACSO-CONACYT.
- Acosta, A. (2004). Poder político, alternancia y desempeño político. La educación superior en Jalisco, 1995-2001. *Estudios Sociológicos*, 64, 53-78.
- Acosta, A. (2011). Jalisco 2009: Los votos y las causas. In M. C. Cortés, & D. Gómez (Eds.), *El voto en Jalisco: Crisis, elecciones y alternancia 2009* (pp. 193-204). Guadalajara: IEPC-Universidad de Guadalajara-ITESO.
- Alonso, J. (1995). *El cambio en Jalisco. Las elecciones en 1994 y 1995*. Guadalajara: Consejo Electoral del Estado de Jalisco-Universidad de Guadalajara-CIESAS.
- Alonso, J. (2010). Alternancias municipales en Jalisco. In M. A. Cortés, & D. Gómez (Coords.), *El voto en Jalisco: crisis, elecciones y alternancia 2009* (pp. 245-254). Guadalajara: IEPC-Universidad de Guadalajara-ITESO.
- Arellano, A. (2011a). El veto en Jalisco (1998-2009). *Estudios Jaliscienses*, 86, 45-57.
- Arellano, A. (2011b). Los gobiernos panistas de Jalisco: cambio político y desempeño gubernamental. *Espacios públicos*, 30, 138-154.
- Arellano, A. (2011c). *Campo político*. Zapopan: El Colegio de Jalisco.
- Aziz, A. (1996). Alternancia primero, gobierno dividido después: El caso de Chihuahua, 1992-1996. In A. Lujambio (Ed.), *Gobiernos divididos en la Federación mexicana* (pp. 99-127). México City: UAM/IFE/Colegio Nacional de Ciencias Políticas y Administración Pública.
- Aziz, A. (2003). Problemas de primera y segunda generación en la democracia regional mexicana. *Espiral. Estudios de Estado y sociedad*, 27, 99-121.
- Aziz, A. (2013). Paradojas electorales de 2012. *Desacatos*, 42, 41-62.
- Aziz, A., & Alonso, J. O. (2009). *México, una democracia vulnerada*. México City: CIESAS-Miguel Ángel Porrúa.
- Cortés, M. A., & Ortiz, I. (2007). Jalisco: Democracia electoral con déficit de legitimidad política. *Espiral: Estudios de Estado y sociedad*, 13, 45-80.
- Gómez, A. (1997). *Crisis y transición en Jalisco*. Guadalajara: Universidad de Guadalajara.
- Guillén, T. (2005). Frontera norte: Agenda (pendiente) de modernización política. In A. Aziz, & J. Alonso (Eds.), *El Estado mexicano: Herencias y cambios. Globalización, poderes y seguridad nacional* (pp. 389-403). México City: Cámara de Diputados-CIESAS-Miguel Ángel Porrúa.
- Hurtado, J. (1998). Los gobiernos divididos y las elecciones de 1998 en México. *Este País*, Núm. 85. http://estepais.com/inicio/historicos/85/11_ensayo_divi_hurtado.pdf. Accessed May 2012
- Merino, M. (2003). *La transición votada. Crítica a la interpretación del cambio político en México*. México City: FCE.
- Merton, R. (1984). *Teoría y estructuras sociales*. México City: FCE.
- Morlino, L. (1985). *Cómo cambian los regímenes políticos?* Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales.
- Morlino, L. (2005). *Democracias y democratizaciones*. México City: Centro de Estudios de Política Comparada AC.
- Mosca, G. (1984). *La clase política*. México City: FCE.
- Woldenberg, J. (2012). *Historia mínima de la transición democrática en México*. México City: El Colegio de México.



Call for Papers

Open Journal of Political Science

ISSN 2164-0505 (Print) ISSN 2164-0513 (Online)

<http://www.scirp.org/journal/ojps>

Open Journal of Political Science (OJPS) is an international journal dedicated to the latest advancement of political science. The goal of this journal is to provide a platform for scientists and academicians all over the world to promote, share, and discuss various new issues and developments in different areas of political science.

Editor-in-Chief

Prof. Peter Richard Moody University of Notre Dame, USA

Subject Coverage

All manuscripts must be prepared in English, and are subject to a rigorous and fair peer-review process. Accepted papers will immediately appear online followed by printed hard copy. The journal publishes original papers including but not limited to the following fields:

- Comparative Politics
- International Relations
- Political Methodology
- Political Theory
- Public Administration
- Public Law
- Public Policy

We are also interested in short papers (letters) that clearly address a specific problem, and short survey or position papers that sketch the results or problems on a specific topic. Authors of selected short papers would be invited to write a regular paper on the same topic for future issues of the *OJPS*.

Notes for Intending Authors

Submitted papers should not have been previously published nor be currently under consideration for publication elsewhere. Paper submission will be handled electronically through the website. All papers are refereed through a peer review process. For more details about the submissions, please access the website.

Website and E-Mail

<http://www.scirp.org/journal/ojps> E-mail: ojps@scirp.org

What is SCIRP?

Scientific Research Publishing (SCIRP) is one of the largest Open Access journal publishers. It is currently publishing more than 200 open access, online, peer-reviewed journals covering a wide range of academic disciplines. SCIRP serves the worldwide academic communities and contributes to the progress and application of science with its publication.

What is Open Access?

All original research papers published by SCIRP are made freely and permanently accessible online immediately upon publication. To be able to provide open access journals, SCIRP defrays operation costs from authors and subscription charges only for its printed version. Open access publishing allows an immediate, worldwide, barrier-free, open access to the full text of research papers, which is in the best interests of the scientific community.

- High visibility for maximum global exposure with open access publishing model
- Rigorous peer review of research papers
- Prompt faster publication with less cost
- Guaranteed targeted, multidisciplinary audience



Website: <http://www.scirp.org>

Subscription: sub@scirp.org

Advertisement: service@scirp.org