Author(s)

Qiuyue Wei, Hanmin Liu

Management School, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China.

In recent years, the cases which the executives of state-owned enterprise and government officials, internal staff, the third party audit institutions to realize the conspiracy for acquiring enterprise assets or increase their welfare are increasing in China. For maximizing their economic interests, executives of state-owned enterprise and government officials often conspire to obtain extra gains under asymmetric information. This article first analyses the stakeholders of state-owned enterprise in China, and sets up a game model about collusion between the executives of state-owned enterprise and government officials in order to obtain the condition of the collusion. And then, the paper focuses on the trilateral game model of executives of state-owned enterprise, government officials and commission for discipline inspection and puts forward discipline inspection strategy to overcome the collusion problem. The study results show that commission for discipline inspection can effectively reduce collusion motivation by enhancing the supervision success rate, reducing the examination costs, and increasing the punishment force.

Executives of State-Owned Enterprise, Government Officials, Game Model of Collusion, Discipline Inspection, Supervision and Restraint System

Wei, Q. and Liu, H. (2015) Research of the Game and Countermeasure about Collusion between Executives of State-Owned Enterprises and Government Officials. Journal of Service Science and Management, 8, 536-544. doi: 10.4236/jssm.2015.84054.