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Does Labor-Saving R&D Hurt Labors?

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DOI: 10.4236/tel.2019.96111    147 Downloads   313 Views


In this paper, we consider a right-to-manage model with a monopolist in the final goods market. We investigate how the wage determination of labor union affects the firm’s Labor-Saving R&D strategy. We find that if the labor union determines a higher wage, the monopolist may not produce less output or undertake more R&D investments. Besides, we also find that if the firm undertakes Labor-Saving R&D, then the total gains of labor may not decrease.

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Wang, Y. (2019) Does Labor-Saving R&D Hurt Labors?. Theoretical Economics Letters, 9, 1737-1743. doi: 10.4236/tel.2019.96111.

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