Kant on Self-Awareness

Thomas W. Smythe

North Carolina Central University, Durham, USA.

DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2013.34077                

Abstract

This paper has three main parts. First, I discuss Kant on self-awareness in terms of inner sense, why he failed to make this account coherent, and why he failed to give such an account. Second, I give two reasons why such an account is bound to be inadequate. In the last section, I discuss another attempt Kant was tempted to give in terms of transcendental self-awareness involving a nonsensory intuitive perception that helps solve some of his problems.

Keywords

elf-Awareness; Consciousness; Transcendental

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

References

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