One Sound and Complete R-Calculus with Pseudo-Subtheory Minimal Change Property

Wei Li, Yuefei Sui

Key Laboratory of Intelligent Information Processing, Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China..
State Key Laboratory of Software Development Environment, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Beijing, China.

DOI: 10.4236/jcc.2013.15004                

Abstract

The AGM axiom system is for the belief revision (revision by a single belief), and the DP axiom system is for the iterated revision (revision by a finite sequence of beliefs). Li [1] gave an R-calculus for R-configurations Δ|Γ, where Δ is a set of atomic formulas or the negations of atomic formulas, and Γ is a finite set of formulas. In propositional logic programs, one R-calculus N will be given in this paper, such that N is sound and complete with respect to operator s(Δ,t), where s(Δ,t)is a pseudo-theory minimal change of t by Δ.

Keywords

Belief Revision; R-Calculus; Soundness and Completeness of a Calculus; Pseudo-Subtheory

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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