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Cycles and Rationalization

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DOI: 10.4236/tel.2013.36056    3,247 Downloads   5,031 Views  

ABSTRACT

This paper studies the composition of the Paretian allocation set in the context of a finite number of agents and a finite number of indivisible goods. Each agent receives at most one good and no monetary compensation is possible (typically called the house allocation problem). I introduce the concept of a cycle which is a sequence of allocations where each allocation is linked to the following allocation in the sequence by the same switch of goods between a subset of agents. I characterize the profiles of agent preferences when the Paretian set has cycles.

 

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Cite this paper

P. Lamirande, "Cycles and Rationalization," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 3 No. 6, 2013, pp. 340-349. doi: 10.4236/tel.2013.36056.

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